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1945

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LIST OF FELLOWS, 1945

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>†³⁸ Professor F. E. ADCOCK, O.B.E.
 ⁴¹ Mr. J. ALLAN.
 ⁴⁴ Dr. C. K. ALLEN.
 ³³ Mr. T. W. ALLEN.
 ³⁸ Professor B. ASHMOLE.
 ³³ Dr. C. BAILEY, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor H. W. BAILEY.
 ³⁶ Mr. E. A. BARBER.
 ³⁶ Dr. L. D. BARNETT, C.B.
 ²¹ Professor C. F. BASTABLE (d. 3 Jan.).
 ³⁰ Professor NORMAN H. BAYNES.
 ³⁷ Professor J. D. BEAZLEY.
 ³⁷ Dr. H. I. BELL, C.B., O.B.E.
 ³⁴ The Rev. Professor J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER.
 ²⁷ Sir W. H. BEVERIDGE, K.C.B., M.P.
 ³⁸ Dr. C. M. BOWRA.
 ³⁶ Professor C. D. BROAD.
 ⁴⁰ Professor Z. N. BROOKE.
 ³⁰ Professor W. W. BUCKLAND.
 ³⁷ Dr. W. H. BUCKLER.
 ³¹ Professor W. M. CALDER.
 ⁴⁵ Miss Helen CAM.
 ⁴⁵ Mr. E. F. CARRITT.
 ⁴⁴ Miss G. CATON THOMPSON.
 ²⁵ Professor H. M. CHADWICK.
 ³⁴ Sir E. K. CHAMBERS, K.B.E., C.B.
 ⁴⁰ The Rev. M. P. CHARLESWORTH.
 ⁴⁵ Professor G. C. CHESHIRE.
 ⁴⁰ Professor V. GORDON CHILDE.
 ³⁵ Sir A. W. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.
 ³⁸ Sir J. H. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.
 ³⁶ Professor G. N. CLARK.
 ⁴¹ Dr. A. B. COOK.
 ³³ Professor S. A. COOK.
 ³⁸ Dr. G. G. COULTON.
 ³¹ Sir WILLIAM A. CRAIGIE.
 ²² Mr. O. M. DALTON (d. 2 Feb.).
 ³⁸ Professor R. M. DAWKINS.
 ⁴³ Mr. CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.
 ³⁷ Mr. J. D. DENNISTON, O.B.E.
 ⁴² Professor E. R. DODDS.
 ³⁸ Dr. CAMPBELL DODGSON, C.B.E.
 ³⁸ Professor G. R. DRIVER.
 ⁴³ Mr. J. GORONWY EDWARDS.
 ²⁴ Professor O. ELTON (d. 4 June).
 ⁴¹ Dr. A. C. EWING.
 ³⁴ Dr. R. E. W. FLOWER, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁰ Sir CYRIL FOX.
 ⁴¹ Professor E. FRAENKEL.
 ⁴⁰ Mr. C. J. GADD.
 ³⁹ Professor V. H. GALBRAITH.
 ³⁹ Dr. ALAN H. GARDINER.
 ³¹ Dr. H. W. GARROD, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor H. A. R. GIBB.</p> | <p>³⁶ Dr. G. P. GOOCH, C.H.
 ⁴³ Mr. A. S. F. GOW.
 ³⁸ Dr. W. W. GREG.
 ²³ Sir H. J. C. GRIERSON.
 ⁴³ Professor BATTISCOMBE GUNN.
 ⁴³ Dr. J. L. HAMMOND.
 ²⁵ Mr. R. G. HAWTREY, C.B.
 ⁴⁴ Professor F. A. VON HAYEK.
 ²⁴ Professor H. D. HAZELTINE.
 ⁴³ Professor J. R. HICKS.
 ¹⁷ Sir G. F. HILL, K.C.B.
 ⁴⁴ The Rev. Dr. F. E. HUTCHINSON.
 ²¹ The Very Rev. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O.
 ³¹ Mr. CHARLES JOHNSON.
 ⁴⁴ Dr. W. H. S. JONES.
 ⁴¹ Mr. T. D. KENDRICK.
 ³ Sir F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
 ²⁹ The Rt. Hon. Lord KEYNES, C.B.
 ³³ Professor J. LAIRD.
 ³³ Professor R. W. LEE.
 ²² Dr. A. G. LITTLE (d. 22 Oct.).
 ³⁰ Sir J. E. LLOYD.
 ¹⁴ Dr. J. W. MACKAIL, O.M. (d. 13 Dec.).
 ³⁴ Dr. NORMAN McLEAN.
 ²⁹ Sir A. D. McNAIR, C.B.E., K.C.
 ⁴⁵ The Rev. Professor T. W. MANSON.
 ³⁶ Sir JOHN MARSHALL, C.I.E.
 ³² Dr. W. MILLER (d. 23 Oct.).
 ²⁵ Sir ELLIS H. MINNS.
 ¹⁹ Professor G. E. MOORE.
 ¹⁰ Professor GILBERT MURRAY, O.M.
 ⁴⁴ Professor R. A. B. MYNORS.
 ²³ Sir J. L. MYRES, O.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor L. B. NAMIER.
 ²² Professor R. A. NICHOLSON (d. 27 Aug.).
 ⁵ Sir CHARLES W. C. OMAN, K.B.E.
 ³⁸ Dr. C. T. ONIONS, C.B.E.
 ³⁸ Sir C. R. PEERS, C.B.E.
 ²⁴ Dr. A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.
 ²⁷ Professor A. C. PIGOU.
 ³⁰ Dr. A. F. POLLARD.
 ²⁷ Professor F. M. POWICKE.
 ⁴⁰ Professor EDGAR PRESTAGE.
 ²⁹ Professor C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON.
 ⁴³ Professor H. H. PRICE.
 ²³ Professor H. A. PRICHARD.
 ⁴¹ Dr. F. J. E. RABY, C.B.
 ³⁹ Sir SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN.
 ³⁵ Dr. D. RANDALL-MacIVER (d. 30 April).
 ²⁷ Admiral Sir HERBERT W. RICHMOND, K.C.B.
 ⁴³ Professor L. C. ROBBINS, C.B.</p> |
|--|--|

† The year of election is indicated by the number: *e.g.* 4 = 1904; 13 = 1913.

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1945 (continued)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>33 Professor D. H. ROBERTSON, C.M.G.
 34 Professor D. S. ROBERTSON.
 35 Mr. E. S. G. ROBINSON.
 36 Professor H. J. ROSE.
 37 Sir W. D. ROSS, K.B.E.
 38 The Rev. H. E. SALTER.
 39 Dr. F. SAXL.
 40 Professor R. W. SETON-WATSON.
 41 Mr. K. SISAM.
 42 Professor D. NICHOL SMITH.
 43 Professor N. KEMP SMITH.
 44 Professor SIDNEY SMITH.
 45 Professor ALEXANDER SOUTER.
 46 Professor F. M. STENTON.
 47 Mr. B. H. SUMNER.
 48 Mr. RONALD SYME.
 49 Dr. W. W. TARN.
 50 Professor R. H. TAWNEY.
 51 Professor A. E. TAYLOR (d. 31 Oct.).
 52 The Rev. Dr. F. R. TENNANT.
 53 Professor F. W. THOMAS, C.I.E.
 54 Dr. H. THOMAS.
 55 Professor A. HAMILTON THOMPSON, C.B.E.</p> | <p>56 Dr. MARCUS N. TOD, O.B.E.
 57 Professor ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.
 58 Dr. GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, O.M., C.B.E.
 59 Mr. G. J. TURNER.
 60 Professor R. L. TURNER.
 61 Professor A. J. B. WACE.
 62 Professor H. T. WADE-GERY.
 63 Mr. A. D. WALEY.
 64 Dr. C. C. J. WEBB.
 65 Professor C. K. WEBSTER.
 66 Dr. R. E. MORTIMER WHEELER.
 67 Professor A. N. WHITEHEAD, O.M.
 68 Professor BASIL WILLIAMS, O.B.E.
 69 Mr. HAROLD WILLIAMS.
 70 Professor IFOR WILLIAMS.
 71 Professor F. P. WILSON.
 72 Professor J. DOVER WILSON, C.H.
 73 Professor P. H. WINFIELD.
 74 Sir R. O. WINSTEDT, K.B.E., C.M.G.
 75 The Rt. Hon. Lord WRIGHT.
 76 The Most Hon. the Marquess of ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
 77 Professor F. de ZULUETA.</p> |
|--|--|

RETIRED FELLOWS, 1945

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| <p>78 Professor A. L. BOWLEY, C.B.E.</p> | <p>79 Mr. E. W. BROOKS.</p> |
|--|-----------------------------|

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1945

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>80 The Duke of BERWICK AND ALBA (Spain).
 81 Professor JOSEPH BIDEZ (Belgium) (d. 20 Sept.).
 82 Professor ETTORE BIGNONE (Italy).
 83 Professor CAMPBELL BONNER (U.S.A.).
 84 M. JEAN CAPART (Belgium).
 85 Senatore BENEDETTO CROCE (Italy).
 86 M. F. CUMONT (Belgium).
 87 M. RENÉ DUSSAUD (France).
 88 Professor EILERT EKWALL (Sweden).
 89 Professor W. S. FERGUSON (U.S.A.).
 90 Professor MAX FÖRSTER (Germany).
 91 M. ALFRED FOUCHER (France).
 92 Professor WILHELM GEIGER (Germany).
 93 Professor ÉTIENNE GILSON (France).
 94 Dr. PAUL JACOBSTHAL (Germany).
 95 Dr. FELIX JACOBY (Germany).
 96 Professor WERNER JAEGER (Germany).
 97 M. PIERRE JOUGUET (France).
 98 Professor PAUL KEHR (Germany).</p> | <p>99 Professor HALVDAN KOHT (Norway).
 100 Dom HENRI LECLERCQ, O.S.B. (France) (d. 23 March).
 101 Professor PAUL LEHMANN (Germany).
 102 Professor H. L. LÉVY-ULLMANN (France).
 103 Professor EINAR LÖFSTEDT (Sweden).
 104 Professor FERDINAND LOT (France).
 105 Professor E. A. LOWE (U.S.A.).
 106 Professor J. LIVINGSTON LOWES (U.S.A.).
 107 Dr. PAUL MAAS (Germany).
 108 Professor C. H. McILWAIN (U.S.A.).
 109 M. ÉMILE MAËLE (France).
 110 Professor RAMÓN MENÉNDEZ PIDAL (Spain).
 111 Professor B. D. MERITT (U.S.A.).
 112 Professor VLADIMIR MINORSKY (Russia).
 113 Professor MARTIN P. NILSSON (Sweden).
 114 Professor A. D. NOCK (U.S.A.).
 115 Professor WALTER OTTO (Germany).</p> |
|---|--|

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1945 (*continued*)

- ³¹ Professor PAUL PÉLLIOT (France) (d. 8 Nov.).
- ⁴⁰ M. CHARLES PETIT-DUTAILLIS (France).
- ⁴⁰ Professor ROSCOE POUND (U.S.A.).
- ³⁸ Professor LUDWIG RADERMACHER (Germany).
- ³⁷ Professor EDWARD KENNARD RAND (U.S.A.).
- ¹⁷ Professor MIKHAIL ROSTOVITZ (U.S.A.).

- ³⁸ Dr. HAAKON SHETELIG (Norway).
- ³⁶ Professor JYUN TAKAKUSU (Japan).
- ⁴⁰ Professor A. M. TALLGREN (Finland) (d. 13 April).
- ⁴⁴ Professor E. V. TARLÉ (Russia).
- ⁴⁴ Professor TSCHEN YINKOH (China).
- ³⁹ Père L. HUGUES VINCENT (France).
- ³¹ Professor ADOLF WILHELM (Germany).

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1945

ORDINARY

- ¹⁸ The Rev. Dr. E. A. ABBOTT.
- ³⁷ Dr. LASCELLES ABERCROMBIE.
- ¹⁸ Professor SAMUEL ALEXANDER, O.M.
- ²³ Dr. P. S. ALLEN.
- * The Rt. Hon. Sir W. R. ANSON, Bart.
- * Mr. EDWARD ARMSTRONG.
- ³⁶ Sir T. W. ARNOLD, C.I.E.
- ³⁷ Dr. THOMAS ASHBY.
- ³⁸ The Rt. Hon. Lord ATKIN.
- * The Rt. Hon. the Earl of BALFOUR, K.G., O.M.
- ³¹ Professor C. F. BASTABLE.
- ⁴⁸ Dr. E. R. BEVAN, O.B.E.
- ³⁰ Dr. J. BONAR.
- * Professor B. BOSANQUET.
- ¹⁰ Dr. A. C. BRADLEY.
- * Dr. HENRY BRADLEY.
- ³⁶ The Rev. F. E. BRIGHTMAN.
- ³⁴ The Rev. Dr. A. E. BROOKE.
- ³⁴ Professor G. BALDWIN BROWN.
- * Professor HUME BROWN.
- * Professor E. G. BROWNE.
- * The Rt. Hon. Viscount BRYCE, O.M.
- * Professor F. C. BURKITT.
- ¹⁶ Professor JOHN BURNET.
- * Professor J. B. BURY.
- * Mr. S. H. BUTCHER.
- * Mr. INGRAM BYWATER.
- * Dr. EDWARD CAIRD.
- ³⁶ The Rev. Dr. A. J. CARLYLE.
- ³⁷ The Rt. Hon. Lord CHALMERS, G.C.B.
- ³⁷ Professor R. W. CHAMBERS.
- * The Ven. Archdeacon CHARLES.
- * The Rev. Professor T. K. CHEYNE.
- ¹⁶ Dr. A. C. CLARK.
- * The Rt. Hon. ARTHUR COHEN, K.C.
- ³⁴ Professor R. G. COLLINGWOOD.
- ¹⁸ Professor R. S. CONWAY.
- * Dr. F. C. CONYBEARE.
- ³⁷ Professor F. M. CORNFORD.
- * Dr. W. J. COURTHOPE, C.B.
- * Professor E. B. COWELL.

- ¹⁹ Sir ARTHUR E. COWLEY.
- ³⁹ The Rev. Professor J. M. CREED.
- ³⁸ Dr. WILLIAM CROOKE, C.I.E.
- ³¹ Dr. W. E. CRUM.
- * The Ven. Archdeacon CUNNINGHAM.
- * The Most Hon. the Marquess CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G.
- ²² Mr. O. M. DALTON.
- ³⁷ The Most Rev. C. F. D'ARCY.
- * The Rt. Hon. Lord DAVEY.
- * Professor T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
- ²⁶ Professor H. W. C. DAVIS, C.B.E.
- ³⁸ Professor W. G. DE BURGH.
- * Professor A. V. DICEY, K.C.
- * The Rt. Hon. Viscount DILLON, C.H.
- * The Rev. Professor S. R. DRIVER.
- ³⁰ Professor J. WIGHT DUFF.
- * Professor F. Y. EDGEWORTH.
- * Professor ROBINSON ELLIS.
- ²⁴ Professor O. ELTON.
- * Sir A. J. EVANS.
- * The Rev. A. M. FAIRBAIRN.
- ¹⁶ Dr. L. R. FARNELL.
- * Sir C. H. FIRTH.
- * The Rt. Hon. H. A. L. FISHER, O.M.
- ¹⁴ The Rt. Hon. Lord FITZMAURICE.
- * Professor J. FITZMAURICE-KELLY.
- * The Rev. Professor R. F. FLINT.
- ³³ Dr. J. K. FOTHERINGHAM.
- * Professor H. S. FOXWELL.
- * Professor A. CAMPBELL FRASER.
- * Sir J. G. FRAZER, O.M.
- * The Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD FRY, G.C.B.
- * Dr. F. J. FURNIVALL.
- ²⁵ Professor E. G. GARDNER.
- * Professor P. GARDNER.
- ³⁰ Sir STEPHEN GASELEE, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.
- ³⁷ Dr. PETER GILES.
- * Sir ISRAEL GOLLANCZ.
- * The Rt. Hon. Lord GOSCHEN.
- * Professor B. P. GRENFELL.
- ³⁴ Professor F. LLEWELLYN GRIFFITH.

* One of the First Fellows.

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1945 (*continued*)

- ¹⁴ The Rt. Hon. Viscount HALDANE, K.T., O.M.
¹⁵ Dr. H. R. H. HALL.
⁴ Professor F. J. HAVERFIELD.
²³ Sir T. L. HEATH, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
²⁶ Professor C. H. HERFORD.
²⁷ Professor G. DAWES HICKS.
²⁸ Professor A. PEARCE HIGGINS, C.B.E., K.C.
²⁵ Professor L. T. HOBHOUSE.
^{*} Dr. THOMAS HODGKIN.
^{*} Dr. S. H. HODGSON.
⁵ Dr. D. G. HOGARTH, C.M.G.
²² Sir W. S. HOLDSWORTH, O.M., K.C.
^{*} Sir T. ERSKINE HOLLAND, K.C.
²⁸ Dr. T. RICE HOLMES.
¹³ Professor A. S. HUNT.
^{*} Sir COURTENAY ILBERT, G.C.B.
^{*} Dr. HENRY JACKSON, O.M.
³ Dr. M. R. JAMES, O.M.
^{*} Sir R. C. JEBB, O.M.
³⁰ Dr. EDWARD JENKS.
²² Professor H. H. JOACHIM.
²³ Mr. W. E. JOHNSON.
⁴ Sir HENRY JONES, C.H.
¹⁶ Sir H. STUART JONES.
¹⁰ Mr. H. W. B. JOSEPH.
⁹ The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice KENNEDY.
⁹ Professor C. S. KENNY.
³ Professor W. P. KER.
²⁴ Mr. C. L. KINGSFORD.
⁶ Mr. ANDREW LANG.
³¹ Professor S. H. LANGDON.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. W. E. H. LECKY, O.M.
¹⁰ Sir SIDNEY LEE.
³ The Rt. Hon. Lord LINDLEY.
⁵ Professor W. M. LINDSAY.
²² Dr. A. G. LITTLE.
³ The Rt. Hon. Sir A. LYALL, G.C.I.E., K.C.B.
¹⁵ Sir CHARLES J. LYALL, K.C.S.I.
¹³ Sir GEORGE MACDONALD, K.C.B.
⁶ Professor A. A. MACDONELL.
¹³ Sir JOHN MACDONELL, K.C.B.
¹⁴ Dr. J. W. MACKAIL, O.M.
²⁴ Professor J. S. MACKENZIE.
²² Dr. R. B. MCKERROW.
⁶ Dr. J. ELLIS McTAGGART.
^{*} Professor F. W. MAITLAND.
³¹ Dr. R. R. MARETT.
¹⁵ Professor D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.
^{*} Professor ALFRED MARSHALL.
³⁰ Sir ALLEN MAWER.
^{*} Sir H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K.C.B.
^{*} The Rev. Professor J. E. B. MAYOR.
²³ Dr. W. MILLER.
^{*} Mr. D. B. MONRO.
⁶ The Rev. Canon MOORE.
³ Professor W. R. MORFILL.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Viscount MORLEY, O.M.
³¹ Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD.
³ Dr. A. S. MURRAY.
^{*} Sir JAMES A. H. MURRAY.
⁴ Professor A. S. NAPIER.
¹⁵ Mr. W. L. NEWMAN.
³ Professor J. S. NICHOLSON.
²² Professor R. A. NICHOLSON.
³⁰ The Rev. Dr. J. W. OMAN.
²⁴ Professor A. C. PEARSON.
⁴ Dr. JOHN PEILE.
^{*} Professor H. F. PELHAM.
⁴ Sir W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.
²⁴ The Rev. Dr. C. PLUMMER.
²³ Dr. A. W. POLLARD, C.B.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bart., K.C.
⁴ Dr. REGINALD L. POOLE.
⁷ Professor J. P. POSTGATE.
⁴ Professor A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON.
³ Sir GEORGE W. PROTHERO, K.B.E.
²³ Dr. L. C. PURSER.
¹⁵ Sir JAMES H. RAMSAY, Bart.
³⁸ Dr. D. RANDALL-MACIVER.
³¹ Professor E. J. RAPSON.
⁹ The Very Rev. HASTINGS RASH-DALL.
¹³ Sir C. HERCULES READ.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Lord REAY, K.T., G.C.S.I.
¹⁷ Professor JAMES SMITH REID.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Sir JOHN RHYS.
⁴ Sir WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.
³⁰ Professor J. G. ROBERTSON.
³ The Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, K.C.V.O.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. the Earl of ROSEBERY, K.G., K.T.
¹⁷ The Rt. Rev. BISHOP RYLE, K.C.V.O.
¹¹ Professor GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
^{*} The Rev. Provost GEORGE SALMON.
^{*} The Rev. Professor WILLIAMSANDAY.
⁹ Sir JOHN E. SANDYS.
¹⁵ Professor W. R. SCOTT.
²⁷ Professor E. de SELINCOURT.
²⁹ Mr. A. F. SHAND.
⁴⁰ Dr. W. A. SHAW.
^{*} The Rev. Professor W. W. SKEAT.
²⁹ Professor D. A. SLATER.
²⁴ Mr. A. HAMILTON SMITH, C.B.
¹⁵ The Very Rev. Sir GEORGE ADAM SMITH.
²³ Professor G. C. MOORE SMITH.
⁵ Professor W. R. SORLEY.
²⁶ The Rt. Hon. Lord STAMP, G.C.B., G.B.E.
²¹ Sir AUREL STEIN, K.C.I.E.
^{*} Sir LESLIE STEPHEN.
^{*} Dr. WHITLEY STOKES, C.S.I., C.I.E.
³ Professor G. F. STOUT.
²⁵ The Rev. Canon B. H. STREETER.

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1945 *(continued)*

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The Rev. Professor H. B. SWETE. ¹¹ Professor A. E. TAYLOR. ²⁷ Professor H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, O.B.E. ²⁶ Sir RICHARD TEMPLE, Bart., C.B., C.I.E. * Sir E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, G.C.B. ²⁴ Dr. R. CAMPBELL THOMPSON. ¹¹ Professor T. F. TOUT. ¹⁹ Dr. PAGET TOYNBEE. * The Rev. H. F. TOZER. * The Rt. Hon. Sir GEORGE O. TREVELYAN, Bart., O.M. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Professor R. Y. TYRRELL. * Sir PAUL VINOGRADOFF. * Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B. * Sir A. W. WARD. * Professor JAMES WARD. * Sir G. F. WARNER. ²¹ Mrs. BEATRICE WEBB. ²² The Very Rev. H. J. WHITE. * Professor J. COOK WILSON. * The Rt. Rev. JOHN WORDSWORTH. * Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT. |
|---|--|

RETIRED

- ¹⁶ Professor A. A. BEVAN.
- ¹⁷ Sir GEORGE A. GRIERSON, O.M., K.C.I.E.
- ²⁷ Dr. J. RENDEL HARRIS.
- ²⁶ Professor A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.
- * Sir W. M. RAMSAY.
- ²⁸ Dr. J. HOLLAND ROSE.
- ²⁶ Dr. F. C. S. SCHILLER.
- ²¹ Professor JAMES TAIT.
- ²⁸ Sir HERBERT THOMPSON, Bart.
- * Professor CUTHBERT H. TURNER.

HONORARY

- ²² Dr. FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY, O.M.
- ²¹ The Rt. Rev. Bishop G. FORREST BROWNE.
- ¹⁶ The Rt. Hon. the Earl of CROMER, G.C.B., O.M.
- ²² Dr. CHARLES MONTAGU DOUGHTY.
- ¹⁶ The Rt. Hon. Sir SAMUEL WALKER GRIFFITH, G.C.M.G.
- ²² The Rt. Hon. Lord PHILLIMORE.
- ²⁸ The Rev. Professor A. H. SAYCE.
- ²⁸ The Rt. Hon. Viscount WAKEFIELD, G.C.V.O., C.B.E.

CORRESPONDING

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Count UGO BALZANI (Italy). ¹⁴ M. CHARLES BÉMONT (France). ¹¹ M. HENRI BERGSON (France). ²⁷ Professor JOSEPH BIDEZ (Belgium). ¹⁷ M. CHARLES BORGEAUD (Switzerland). * M. ÉMILE BOUTROUX (France). ²⁴ Dr. JAMES H. BREASTED (U.S.A.). ¹³ Professor F. K. BRUGMANN (Germany). ¹⁷ Professor ÉMILE CARTAILLAC (France). ¹⁶ Senatore DOMENICO COMPARETTI (Italy). ²⁰ M. HENRI CORDIER (France). ¹⁶ Professor A. CROISSET (France). ²⁸ Professor ROBERT DAVIDSOHN (Germany). ²⁰ Père HIPPOLYTE DELEHAYE (Belgium). * M. LÉOPOLD DELISLE (France). ²⁷ Professor CHARLES DIEHL (France). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Professor H. DIELS (Germany). ¹⁰ Monseigneur DUCHESNE (France). ¹⁴ Mr. CHARLES W. ELIOT (U.S.A.). ²² Professor ADOLF ERMANN (Germany). ²⁴ Professor TENNEY FRANK (U.S.A.). * M. le Comte de FRANQUEVILLE (France). ¹² Professor OTTO von GIERKE (Germany). * Professor BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE (U.S.A.). * Professor M. J. de GOEJE (Holland). * Professor I. GOLDZIER (Hungary). * Professor T. GOMPERZ (Austria). ¹⁷ Senatore IGNAZIO GUIDI (Italy). ¹⁷ President ARTHUR T. HADLEY (U.S.A.). * Professor ADOLF HARNACK (Germany). ²⁶ Professor CHARLES HOMER HASKINS (U.S.A.). ¹⁷ Professor LOUIS HAVET (France). |
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DECEASED FELLOWS, 1945 (*continued*)

CORRESPONDING (*continued*)

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| <p>⁴ Professor J. L. HEIBERG (Denmark).
 ⁷ Professor HARALD HØFFDING (Denmark).
 ⁷ Mr. Justice HOLMES (U.S.A.).
 ¹² Professor CHRISTIAN SNOUCK HURGRONJE (Holland).
 ²² Professor EDMUND HUSSERL (Germany).
 ⁷ Professor WILLIAM JAMES (U.S.A.).
 ¹² Dr. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON (U.S.A.).
 ²² Professor OTTO JESPERSEN (Denmark).
 ⁴¹ Sir GANGANATH JHA, C.I.E. (India).
 ²² Professor FINNUR JÓNSSON (Iceland).
 ¹¹ His Excellency M. J. JUSSERAND (France).
 ¹² Professor G. L. KITTREDGE (U.S.A.).
 ²⁷ Professor WILHELM KROLL (Germany).
 ⁴ Professor K. KRUMBACHER (Germany).
 ²² Professor C. R. LANMAN (U.S.A.).
 ¹² M. ERNEST LAVISSE (France).
 ⁹ Mr. H. C. LEA (U.S.A.).
 ⁴⁴ Dom HENRI LECLERCQ, O.S.B. (France).
 ²¹ Professor ÉMILE LEGOUIS (France).
 ²¹ Professor O. LENEL (Germany).
 ⁴ Professor F. LEO (Holland).
 ⁹ Dr. F. LIEBERMANN (Germany).
 ¹² President A. LAWRENCE LOWELL (U.S.A.).
 ²² Dr. CHARLES LYON-CAEN (France).
 ⁷ Professor FREDERICK DE MARTEN (Russia).
 ²² Dr. T. G. MASARYK (Czecho-Slovakia).
 ⁹ Don MARCELINO MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO (Spain).
 ¹² Professor EDUARD MEYER (Germany).</p> | <p>⁴ M. PAUL MEYER (France).
 ¹² Professor ERNEST NYS (Belgium).
 ¹² Professor B. M. OLSEN (Iceland).
 ¹² M. H. OMONT (France).
 ²¹ Professor PAUL PELLIOT (France).
 ⁴ M. GEORGES PERROT (France).
 ⁴ M. GEORGES PICOT (France).
 ²¹ Professor HENRI PIRENNE (Belgium).
 ²² Professor PIO RAJNA (Italy).
 ¹¹ M. SALOMON REINACH (France).
 ⁹ His Excellency M. LOUIS RENAULT (France).
 ¹¹ Mr. J. F. RHODES (U.S.A.).
 ¹² His Excellency M. RIBOT (France).
 ¹² The Hon. ELIHU ROOT (U.S.A.).
 ¹² Professor JOSIAH ROYCE (U.S.A.).
 ²² Professor REMIGIO SABBADINI (Italy).
 ⁷ Professor KARL EDUARD SACHAU (Germany).
 ⁴ Professor C. H. SALEMANN (Russia).
 ²² Père VINCENT SCHEIL (France).
 ¹² M. SENART (France).
 ⁹ Professor E. SIEVERS (Germany).
 ⁴² Professor A. M. TALLGREN (Finland).
 ²² Professor FRANCIS WILLIAM TAUSIG (U.S.A.).
 ⁹ The Prince of TEANO (Italy).
 ²² M. F. THUREAU-DANGIN (France).
 ¹² Signor PASQUALE VILLARI (Italy).
 ⁷ Professor ULRICH von WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF (Germany).
 ²² Professor ULRICH WILCKEN (Germany).
 ¹² Professor D. ERNST WINDISCH (Germany).
 ²² Professor THADDEUS ZIELINSKI (Poland).</p> |
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THE BRITISH ACADEMY
OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

JULY 1945

PRESIDENT :

SIR J. H. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.

COUNCIL :

- ⁴⁵ PROFESSOR F. E. ADCOCK, O.B.E.
- ⁴⁵ DR. C. BAILEY, C.B.E.
- ⁴³ PROFESSOR C. D. BROAD.
- ⁴⁴ PROFESSOR G. N. CLARK.
- ⁴⁵ MR. J. GORONWY EDWARDS.
- ⁴⁵ PROFESSOR V. H. GALBRAITH.
- ⁴³ DR. W. W. GREG.
- ⁴⁴ SIR GEORGE HILL, K.C.B.
- ⁴³ SIR E. H. MINNS.
- ⁴³ SIR C. R. PEERS, C.B.E.
- ⁴⁵ DR. A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.
- ⁴⁴ PROFESSOR D. S. ROBERTSON.
- ⁴⁴ PROFESSOR D. NICHOL SMITH.
- ⁴⁴ PROFESSOR A. SOUTER.
- ⁴³ PROFESSOR P. H. WINFIELD.

TREASURER :

SIR F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
BURLINGTON GARDENS, LONDON, W. 1.

SECRETARY :

SIR F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
BURLINGTON GARDENS, LONDON, W. 1.

⁴³ Elected 1943.

⁴⁴ Elected 1944.

⁴⁵ Elected 1945.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY

1945

ANNUAL REPORT

1944-5

DURING the year 1944-5 the Academy lost seven Ordinary Fellows by death, viz. Lord Atkin, Professor C. F. Bastable, Mr. O. M. Dalton, Professor J. Wight Duff, Professor O. Elton, Dr. D. Randall-MacIver, and Professor G. F. Stout, and one, Professor A. L. Bowley, by resignation; also two Retired Fellows, Professor A. B. Keith and Professor J. Tait. News was also received of the deaths, at various dates since 1940, of six Corresponding Fellows, Professor E. Bignone, Professor C. Diehl, Dom H. Leclercq, M. Henri Omont, Père V. Scheil, and M. F. Thureau-Dangin. In July 1944 Dr. C. K. Allen, Professor H. W. Bailey, Miss G. Caton Thompson, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Professor F. A. von Hayek, Dr. F. E. Hutchinson, Dr. W. H. S. Jones, Professor R. A. B. Mynors, Professor L. B. Namier, Dr. F. Saxl, Mr. Ronald Syme, and Mr. Harold Williams were elected Ordinary Fellows, and Dom Henri Leclercq, Professor E. V. Tarlé, and Professor Tschen Yinkoh Corresponding Fellows. The total number of Fellows before the elections of 1945 was 138 Ordinary and 49 Corresponding.

The following lectures were delivered during the year on the various foundations administered by the Academy:

ITALIAN LECTURE, by Sir Kenneth Clark, on *Leon Battista Alberti on Painting* (1 November).

SIR JOHN RHÏS MEMORIAL LECTURE, by Mr. J. Goronwy Edwards, on *Edward I's Castle Building in Wales* (22 November).

SCHWEICH LECTURES, by Professor G. R. Driver, on *Writing, from Pictograph to Alphabet* (11, 13, and 15 December).

PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE, by Professor R. I. Aaron, on *Our Knowledge of Universals* (24 January).

SIR ISRAEL GOLLANCZ MEMORIAL LECTURE, by Mr. N. H. K. Coghill, on *From Prologue to Pardon in Piers Plowman* (28 February).

WARTON LECTURE, by Lord David Cecil, on *The Poetry of Thomas Gray* (21 March).

SHAKESPEARE LECTURE, by Professor P. Alexander, on *Shakespeare's Punctuation* (25 April).

MASTER-MIND LECTURE, by Sir Richard Livingstone, on *Ruskin* (23 May).

RALEIGH LECTURE, by Miss Helen Cam, on *The Legislators of Medieval England* (13 June).

ASPECTS OF ART LECTURE, by Dr. H. Buchthal, on *The Western Aspect of Gandhara Sculpture* (11 July).

The volume of Schweich Lectures for 1940, on *Isaiah, Chapters XL-LV*, by Professor Sidney Smith, and that for 1942, on *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity*, by Canon W. L. Knox, have been published; and the following volumes assisted by the Academy have appeared: Canterbury and York Society, Parts cxiii, cxiv; Pipe Roll Society, N.S., vol. 21. M. C. Petit-Dutaillis, Corresponding Fellow, presented his book, *Le Roi Jean et Shakespeare*.

The following awards of prizes and medals were made:

Serena Gold Medal for Italian studies: no award.

Burkitt Medal for Biblical Studies: the Rev. Prof. C. H. Dodd.

Rose Mary Crawshay Prize: Miss Rae Blanchard, for her book, *The Correspondence of Richard Steele*.

Cromer Greek Essay Prize: no award.

Sir Israel Gollancz Prize: no award.

The following appointments of representatives of the Academy on various bodies were made: Sir John Clapham on the British National Committee of the International Congress of Historical Studies; Sir George Hill on the Council of the British School of Archaeology in Iraq; Professor Ashmole on the Council of the British School at Rome; Professor F. W. Thomas on the Council of the London School of Oriental Studies; and Dr. W. W. Greg as a Trustee of the Rose Mary Crawshay Fund.

The Council, after consultation with the members of Section IX, decided to enlarge the scope of the Section, so as to include scholars concerned mainly with Social Studies, and to alter its designation to 'The Section of Economic and Social Science'.

On the liberation of France and Belgium, letters of greeting were sent to the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres in Paris and the Académie Royale de Belgique in Brussels, with inquiries as to the health of those scholars who were Corresponding Fellows of the Academy. Letters of warm gratitude were received from both Academies, with reports of the deaths of some members and the welfare of others.

A gift of sixteen volumes of the *Proceedings* of the Academy was made to Birkbeck College, to complete the replacement of the set destroyed by enemy action. It was also agreed to place the Academy of Lisbon on the list to receive the publications of the Academy.

FINANCE.—The Government grant was continued at the reduced rate of £1,000. The following grants were made in the course of the year.

(a) From General Fund:

British School of Archaeology at Jerusalem	£
Pipe Roll Society	50
Canterbury and York Society	100
Anglo-Norman Text Society, for 1944-5	50
" " " for 1945-6	50

	£
Royal Asiatic Society	200
English Place-Name Society	150
British Institute of Philosophy	75
Corpus Platonicum	200
Professor P. Jacobsthal, for Celtic studies	50
Dr. Pächt, for Inventory of Illuminated MSS., 1944-5	50
" " " " , 1945-6	50
British National Committee of International Congress of His- torical Studies	25
Council for British Archaeology, 1944-5 and 1945-6	10
(b) From Schweich Fund:	
Critical Edition of Greek New Testament	100
Lexicon of Patristic Greek	50

The late Sir Herbert Thompson, Retired Fellow, bequeathed to the Academy the sum of £100, without restriction to any specific purpose.

The Trustees of the Sir Halley Stewart Trust made a grant of £500 to the Academy, to provide for visits to England by distinguished men of learning from Holland and Belgium, with the intimation that visits by scholars from other countries need not be excluded from consideration. The Council appointed a small committee to organize such visits.

The following reports have been received with regard to the various publications supported by the Academy.

MEDIEVAL LATIN DICTIONARY COMMITTEE.—No meetings of the Committee have been held during the past year. It is hoped to resume them as soon as conditions permit.

There has been a welcome renewal of activity on the part of contributors, but there is still need for readers of texts on scientific and technical subjects.

Slips have been received for the following texts since the last Report was made:

- Close Rolls, 1261-1272 (3 vols.).
- Curia Regis Rolls, vol. viii.
- Oxford Formularies, 2 vols. (Oxford Historical Soc.).
- Muniments of the Deans and Chapters of Chichester, Canterbury, and Salisbury, and Records of the Corporations of Burford and Lostwithiel, in Hist. MSS. Comm. Reports, Var. Coll. I.
- Register of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, vol. I.
- Minister's Accounts of the Earldom of Cornwall, vol. I (Camden 3rd Ser., 66).
- Cambridgeshire Sessions of the Peace in the 14th century (Cambs. Antiq. Soc.).
- Chronicle of Dieulacres (Rylands Bulletin, 1930).
- Pope Adrian IV; Letters.
- MSS. Account Rolls of the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury.

CANTERBURY AND YORK SOCIETY.—The Council submits the following report and statement of accounts for the year ending 30 June 1944.

The publications for the year 1941–2 are Part CXIII, Volume III of the Register of Archbishop Chichele, and Part CXIV, Part X of the Register of Archbishop Winchelsey. Part CXIV was issued in 1944, and the thanks of the Society are due to Dr. Rose Graham for the conclusion of the text of the Register of Winchelsey. Part CXIII is far advanced.

The publication for the year 1942–3 was intended to be the conclusion of the Register of Bishop Hamo de Hethe, but it may be necessary to issue it in two Parts. The delay is mainly due to the war.

For the year 1943–4 it is proposed to issue the Acta of Archbishop Stephen Langton, edited by Miss Kathleen Major. For the year 1944–5 it is hoped that Volume IV of Archbishop Chichele's Register may be issued.

The generous grants of the British Academy in 1941, 1942, and 1943 have been allocated to the completion of the Registers of Archbishop Winchelsey and Bishop Hamo de Hethe.

THE PIPE ROLL SOCIETY.—During the past twelve months the Society has issued a volume containing the Memoranda Roll for the first year of King John (1199–1200), together with fragments of the Originalia Roll of the seventh year of King Richard I (1195–6), the Liberate Roll of the second year of King John (1200–1), and the Norman Roll of the fifth year of King John (1203). These documents form a broken series of fragmentary but official records relating to the period covered by previous volumes issued by the Society. The Introduction to this volume was written by Mr. H. G. Richardson. It is hoped in time to publish a second miscellaneous volume which will include all the fragmentary records in official custody still available for the illustration of the Pipe Rolls of this period. The next volume which the Society proposes to issue is the Pipe Roll for the eighth year of King John (1206), edited by Miss A. M. Kirkus, Librarian of the University of Reading. This volume is already in the press. The text of the Pipe Roll for the ninth year of King John (1207), to be edited by Mrs. Stenton, is also in the printer's hands.

The membership of the Society has increased slightly during the past year, and now stands at 192 members, composed of 44 individuals and 148 subscribing libraries. This number includes libraries in Switzerland, Sweden, and France, from which subscriptions can now be obtained, but omits libraries in Germany, Denmark, and Belgium. The fact that the financial position of the Society may still be described as satisfactory is entirely due to the continued support which the British Academy has given throughout the years of war. But printing costs are rising, and without the support of the Academy it will be impossible

to carry through the publication of the lengthy financial records of the later years of King John.

The Council of the Society therefore requests the British Academy to renew its grant of £100 for the present financial year.

ENGLISH PLACE-NAME SOCIETY.—During the year under review the greater part of our time has been given to work on Cumberland. The material previously collected has been checked, arranged, and increased from a number of miscellaneous sources. Miss A. M. Armstrong, Secretary of the Society, has again visited the county, and has searched for forms in a number of manuscript collections. For the facilities which she received on this occasion, the Society is particularly indebted to Mr. G. W. Graham-Bowman, the Registrar of the Bishop of Carlisle, and Colonel Guy Pocklington-Senhouse of Netherhall. In this, as in previous years, Mr. T. Gray, Librarian of Tullie House, has placed unreservedly at the service of the Society his knowledge of the county and of all the materials which illustrate its history. We have received valuable assistance on points of detail from correspondents resident in the county, and through the kindness of Mr. G. B. Brown, Director of Education for Cumberland, we have obtained local information from many schools.

The typescript of the volume, or volumes, on Cumberland has not yet gone to press. As was explained in the last Annual Report, this county is in some ways the most difficult yet undertaken by the Survey. The place-names of Cumberland raise problems of interpretation of a kind to which there is no parallel in the greater part of England. In dealing with these problems, the help of various scholars has been sought, and the results of their suggestions have still to be incorporated in the final draft. Owing to these difficulties and to the circumstances of the present time, we are compelled with regret once more to call upon the patience of our members.

It is hoped that the interval between the payment of a subscription and the receipt of the year's volume will be reduced in the near future. Concurrently with the preparation of the Cumberland volume, work has been proceeding on the place-names of Oxfordshire, and there is reason to think that the volume on that county will follow in the series without any long delay. The rate at which the preparation of this volume can go forward will largely depend on the date at which the great national collections of manuscript records are once more available for investigation. Work upon Oxfordshire began in the earliest years of the Society's existence, and what remains to be done is in the main the addition of detail to collections which are already extensive. Towards the cost of production of the Oxfordshire volume we have this year received a donation of £5 from Dr. T. Loveday, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bristol.

Towards the publication of a volume on Berkshire, we have received

a legacy of £500 from the late Mr. A. E. O. Slocock of Newbury. From the first, Mr. Slocock had been a generous supporter of our work, and by his death we lose one of our foundation members. He had always been particularly interested in Berkshire, and his legacy means that the preparation of a volume on that county is an obligation to be carried out as soon as possible. The foundations of this work have already been laid, and a volume either on Berkshire or on Derbyshire will follow the volume on Oxfordshire. We have not yet received in full the legacy of Mr. Palmer Pearson, the principal charge upon which is a volume on the place-names of Derbyshire, but £800 of it has been paid to us, and appears in the accounts for 1943-4.

Our losses by death have been heavy this year. In Professor James Tait we have lost a scholar who was a principal supporter of the Society from the time of its foundation, and served for nine years as its first President. He took an active part in the discussions which preceded its establishment, made suggestions of the highest value towards the determination of its plan of work, and contributed to our Introductory Volume an article on the feudal element in place-names, of which the importance becomes steadily more apparent with the passage of time. In those early days he brought to our help the support of an historian, eminent among English medievalists, who was one of the first modern scholars to appreciate the significance of place-name studies as an aid towards the solution of historical problems. It would be hard to over-estimate the value of the service which Professor Tait rendered to the Society through his unique combination of feudal and agrarian learning, and the balanced judgement with which he always approached the practical difficulties incidental to our work. His interest in the studies of which he was a master was maintained until the end of his life, and although he felt himself compelled, by advancing years and by the distance from London at which he resided, to resign the Presidency in 1932, his advice continued to be at our service. His death removes not merely a great historian who was influential in our past, but one who to the end shared in the work of the Society and concerned himself actively with its fortunes.

Among other members who have died during the year should be mentioned Miss E. Jeffries Davis, who allowed us to use her exhaustive knowledge of Middlesex topography; Sir Gurney Benham, who gave us valuable help in the preparation of the volume on Essex; and Sir Herbert Thompson, to whom we, like other Societies with kindred aims, are indebted for long-continued and generous support. In all, we have lost by death thirteen members. Six members have resigned, and three memberships have lapsed. These losses have in part been balanced by the accession of twelve members (ten private and two institutional). Our numbers are now 664 (384 private and 280 institutional members), as against 674 at the corresponding period last year.

Our accounts for the year 1943-4 are, on the whole, satisfactory. But

it should be emphasized that the large credit balance on current account at the end of our financial year includes £800—part of the legacy of Mr. Palmer Pearson—which has since been invested, and also that this balance is subject to the cost of publication of two volumes, both of which are likely to involve us in heavy expenses. The amount received for subscriptions for 1942-3 and 1943-4 includes £44. 16s. *od.* received in repayment of income tax on subscriptions paid under covenant. In the financial year 1944-5 this sum will be substantially increased by the repayment of tax on the full number of subscriptions thus paid. The increase to our income obtained in this way is a very considerable help to us, and we are most grateful to the members who have signed seven-year covenants. A few of those who had originally signed have since died, but we still have one hundred members helping us in this way. The Publication Account received from the Cambridge University Press showed an unusually heavy balance in our favour, mainly owing to the good reception of the Cambridgeshire volume by persons who are not members of the Society. The balance was also enlarged by a slight increase in the sale of back volumes. The interest taken in our volumes by the general public, as well as by members of the Society, is very encouraging. To the British Academy we are again indebted for a grant without which the work of the Society could not be continued.

Owing chiefly to the steady support of the work by our members, the financial position of the Society after five years of war is much stronger than we could have ventured to anticipate. With the continuance of that support we should be able to meet the heavy additional expenses caused by the greatly increased cost of production of the volumes and by various subsidiary increases in prices. But, like all long-established societies, we are subject to an inevitable loss of membership each year, and, if the continuity of our work is to be maintained, the recruitment of new members, both institutional and private, is essential.

LEXICON OF PATRISTIC GREEK.—By the death of Mr. P. V. M. Benecke on 25 September 1944 the Lexicon has lost one of its most untiring supporters and warmest friends. From his taking over of the treasurership many years ago, he collected and administered our funds with that combination of energy, precision, and grace which marked all his work. He also contributed generously to the progress of the Lexicon in other ways. His considerable experience with the new Liddell and Scott, which had rendered him familiar with many lexicographical problems, made his counsel always valuable and, though his characteristic self-distrust often led him to express quite unnecessary scruples as to his capacity to read authors, yet when he could be over-persuaded he read them to perfection. Like many of the other causes with which Benecke associated himself, the Lexicon often derived substantial material benefits from his generosity in items not revealed on the balance sheet. Since his death, the Chairman of the Committee has acted temporarily as Treasurer.

The difficulties in obtaining regular assistance have much increased in the past year. The shortage of labour in all directions is no doubt a sufficient explanation of the difficulty of obtaining new recruits. To our very great regret, the Rev. E. C. E. Owen felt compelled through increasing age to resign at Michaelmas after prolonged service to the Lexicon. His drafts, beautifully set out and often embodying much curious and out-of-the-way information, are among the most valuable materials in our collections. Small portions of his work will be known to many scholars through their having appeared from time to time in the pages of the *Journal of Theological Studies*. The Rev. B. J. Wigan continued work on the 'List of Authors' until the end of the summer, but owing to new duties in the Diocese of Oxford is unfortunately no longer able to provide regular help. In the course of the year some assistance with the checking of references has been given by Dom Norbert Cappuyns, O.S.B., of the Abbey of Mont César, by Miss E. M. Grinling, and by Miss E. Blackburn.

Treatises or other items for the Lexicon have been generously read by Mr. G. S. P. Freeman, Sr. Veronica Markham, C.H.F., Mr. D. Martynowsky, Dr. R. V. Sellers, and Mrs. E. Zuntz. Professor G. R. Driver has sent us several important communications arising out of his studies in Semitic and Septuagintal vocabulary. The Rev. G. D. Kilpatrick has also occasionally communicated material.

It is proposed to take steps to bring the work to a speedy conclusion by enlisting all possible help at the close of the European war. With this object in view and as a result of reduced expenditure in recent months, a considerable part of the income of the past year has been set aside for future use, and the Committee begs that generous financial support may continue to be forthcoming, since the demand upon the available funds, as soon as some fully qualified scholars can undertake regular work upon the Lexicon, will certainly be great.

GREEK TESTAMENT CRITICAL EDITION.—The work on the preparation of St. Luke's Gospel, though necessarily much hindered by war conditions, has by no means come to a standstill during the past year. The Editor has worked at the assembling of material already collated and at least twelve chapters are completed. Some revising and checking are still needed and a good deal of this can only be done when manuscripts and rare books have returned from their war-time hiding-places. This should not be long delayed. Dr. R. P. Blake has very kindly expedited his work on the Old Georgian Version, and has sent the Editor a well-typed advance proof of the Old Georgian Version of St. Luke which is a valuable addition. Professor H. A. Sanders of Michigan has been very helpful in checking the more important minuscule MSS., but his means for accurate checking is limited to editions not always trustworthy. Other assistance has been very spasmodic, in most cases pressure of work being the excuse for inability to help. It must be some little time before the copy is ready for the press,

but the work may be said to be making some real progress towards completion.

CORPUS PLATONICUM.—The following report has been received from Dr. Klibansky:

Work has been hampered by the fact that the time of most contributors was taken up by war duties, and that manuscripts in Continental libraries were inaccessible. It is hoped that both these obstacles may gradually be overcome in the near future. Meanwhile, in spite of adverse conditions, some progress can be registered.

A. PLATO LATINUS

(1) Plato, *Phaedo*. The translation has been preserved in two distinct versions, an original and a revised one. This creates the problem of the relation of the two versions to each other and to the Greek tradition, which has to be solved before the text can be finally constituted. It has now been established by Dr. Lotte Labowsky and Professor H. Armstrong that the author of the second version consulted a Greek manuscript; that this Greek manuscript was the same as the one on which the first version was based; and that—as Burnet had guessed—this is probably identical with the Vienna MS. vindob. 54 suppl. phil. graec. 7, commonly known as *W*. However, to prove this beyond doubt, photostats, if not consultation of the manuscript itself, are necessary.

Furthermore, the detailed examination of the manuscript evidence of the Latin text has resulted in establishing the interdependence of a series of manuscripts, thus simplifying the critical apparatus and determining the principles of its constitution. The final revision of the apparatus will not be possible without comparing the oldest extant witness of the Latin text, MS. Paris BN lat. 16581, which once belonged to Gérard d'Abbeville, master of the Paris Faculty of Arts and adversary of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The completion of this edition thus depends on the possibility of obtaining photostats from Paris and Vienna. Application for the former was made immediately after the liberation of France; they will be provided as soon as manuscripts are brought back to the Bibliothèque Nationale.

(2) Plato, *Parmenides*. Proclus, *Commentaria in Parmenidem*. Here, too, the completion of the edition depends on the possibility of obtaining access to certain Greek manuscripts in Paris which have been read differently by former editors. Only when the readings of these manuscripts are definitely established will it be possible to determine the relation of the Latin Proclus translation to the Greek original and to establish the place of Proclus' Plato text in the Plato tradition as a whole.

(3) *The Medieval Timaeus Commentaries*. More material has been gained as a result of detailed examination of manuscripts, especially

of MS. Leiden bibl. publ. lat. 64. This manuscript, in which various Platonica have been collected by a scholar of the fourteenth century, probably the philosopher and astronomer Henricus Bate of Malines, is a significant document of medieval Platonic studies, containing a wealth of glosses dating from the eleventh to the fourteenth century. It has been established that many of the earlier glosses on the *Timaeus* are connected with the commentaries on Martianus Capella's encyclopaedic work *De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*. In order to determine their date and authorship it thus becomes necessary to examine the early Martianus commentaries. Evidence of the ultimate connexion of these expositions with the activities of Carolingian scholars in the tradition of Ioannes Scotus Eriugena stands out with increasing clearness.

B. PLATO ARABUS

(1) Galenus, *Compendium Timaei aliorumque dialogorum quae extant fragmenta*. The publication of this volume has been persistently dogged by misfortune. We regret to announce the death in Cairo of Dr. Paul Kraus, one of the two joint editors, who during the war years maintained contact with the printers in Syria. All efforts to get hold of his papers deposited at the French Institute in Cairo have so far failed. At the same time, the publication is rendered difficult by the delays caused by the French printing house in Beirut and its failure to answer the publishers' and editors' repeated questions regarding the precise stage the printing has reached. Efforts are now being made to obtain the sheets already printed, i.e. the whole text, with introduction, translation, and notes; while the still outstanding Indices are being compiled anew with a view to having them printed in this country, should we fail to obtain them from the Middle East.

(2) Averroes, *Paraphrase of Plato's Republic*. The revision of the Hebrew text has been continued. The translation and the notes are making steady progress.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By SIR JOHN CLAPHAM

11 July 1945

TWELVE months ago, when the Academy extended my tenure of this Chair for a further year, I welcomed the chance of presiding once in a year of peace. We are now in what we might call a state of three-quarters peace; and as you have just honoured me with a second extension I may yet live to address you in a state of such total peace as six or more years of war may render possible. In any case, it is time to look forward, whereas until 1944 one's vision was limited to the circumstance of war; and even in 1944 any attempted distant vision seemed presumptuous.

But first some words on the events of the year. We have lost seven Ordinary Fellows and two retired Fellows; and, as the Report tells you, notices of the deaths of six Corresponding Fellows that have occurred since 1940 have been sent to us. Those whom we have lost from our inner circle, including the two retired Fellows, had an average life—I hope the Academy will still pardon my taste for simple arithmetic—of over 80 years. My old friend Professor Bastable, the Dublin economist, was 90. It is evident that scholarship is a healthy life and that we scholars are durable. The newly elected are not so young as they have recently been; here I omit the arithmetic. Yet I cannot help noting that, of the nine who have left us, I knew only two personally, besides Bastable that exact and eminent historian James Tait, of whose work you will find a preliminary account in the contribution of the Place-Name Society to the Annual Report. These two were workers in my own fields, whom of course I knew. My ignorance of the other seven shows that, owing to election late in life, our widely scattered homes, the scholar's love of his study, and latterly the difficulties of travel, we are not quite so much of a *societas*, not so much of a fraternity, as I could wish. It will be for future Councils and Presidents to revive our modest social gatherings and do whatever else they may think proper to bind us together, not forgetting that the third of one of the oldest surviving sets of rules for a fraternity or guild—it is from St. Omer—begins with the words *adveniente tempore potacionis*.

On one event of the year I ought to make a formal independent report. At the end of April, with the organizing and financial support of the British Council, three of us—the Warden of Wadham, Professor Galbraith, and I—spent a week in Paris renewing, or establishing, contact with men at the Sorbonne, the Archives, the *École des Chartes*, and the *Collège de France*. We learnt who had gone and how learning had been kept alive—surprisingly well I may note—and how nobly the student body had stood by the country. We heard a very little about collaboration, about those of whom one does not speak. While we were in Paris the Director of the *Bibliothèque Nationale* returned, not well but happily convalescent, from a concentration camp. But my greatest friend among the professors at the Sorbonne, Marc Bloch, could not return. He had been foully murdered—the old term is in his case strictly correct—by Germans; for he had gone underground at 57, had worked under a series of assumed names, and was caught.

One French scholar whom I asked for back news from the newspapers said he could not give it—he had not read a paper since June 1940: he did not mind reading a German paper, but he would not read a German paper written in French. ‘I have lived on that’, he said, jerking his hand over his shoulder towards a big radio set. Our much-criticized British Broadcasting Corporation has to meet only a single criticism in France—it began to talk of invasion a little too soon, and raised hopes that had to be deferred.

May I quote, at the risk of appearing unscholarly sentimental, an inscription in a book which came to me the day after its author, an old friend, had learnt that I was in Paris: ‘Ce livre vous attend depuis avril, 1941, dans la confiance jamais ébranlée depuis juin, 1940, d’une famille qui a prié chaque jour pour l’Angleterre.’

As a result of our visit, counter-visits are now being organized. French scholars are due at Classical gatherings in August: and in September the British Committee of the International Historical Congress, which the Academy supports, hopes to welcome in London twelve French historians headed by our Corresponding Fellow, the veteran Charles Petit-Dutaillis, whose name carries the minds even of undergraduates back to that of Stubbs. There are also plans for bringing over Dutch, Belgian, and perhaps Scandinavian scholars, for which we can draw upon the generous gift from the Halley Stewart Trust mentioned in the Annual Report.

Looking forward, I am disposed to touch on what is no doubt a controversial matter—the size of the Academy. As a general proposition I find it hard to believe that there are from three to four times as many persons distinguished in the natural and mathematical sciences as in all other branches of learning from Archaeology to Economics. Yet that is about the ratio between the Academy and the Royal Society. An increase of numbers would mean a change in our Bye-laws, but that could be arranged if we wished it. At present I incline to think that we do not. Certainly a few colleagues whom I have consulted do not. Some argue that increase would lower the standard of entry. It might; but I do not myself think that an increase from 150 to say 200 need do this. We all know scholars fit for admission who are kept out by the reluctance of Sections to press claims on a limited list of vacancies. I have a friend—one of ourselves—who argues that the satisfaction of those elected to the Academy is outweighed by the disappointment of those who might be, but are not. I have not heard this said of the Royal Society, and am inclined to think that both creative genius and solid achievement normally gain admission there. If an increase in our numbers did lead to some slight lowering of standards, it might also lead to greater activity in a society of lower average age, if with a faintly lower average of distinction.

Another point: more than once recently it has been suggested to me that the Academy might initiate, or participate in, such and such an activity, national or international. I have felt bound to say that our Secretary-Treasurer and his single Assistant are incomparable, but that I cannot ask them to undertake tasks involving heavy additional administrative work. A larger society, with a larger income, might carry a larger staff. The difficulty could of course be met by an increased government grant, for which a strong case can, I think, be made out; but with a larger society that might not be needed.

Some Fellows with whom I have discussed this question of numbers have argued warmly that the present is not the moment for action; and perhaps they are right. Sharing my interest in the election of relatively young Fellows, they point out that in general it is the younger men who have sacrificed most completely long years, in which they might have been establishing their claims on us, to the service of the State. And, they add, we must never elect without achievement. An admirable maxim; but there are degrees of achievement, and I am not yet convinced that the argument is decisive. I *am* convinced that if younger

men who have sacrificed six years to the State have then to reach the full standard of achievement to which we have been accustomed the average age of election will certainly not fall. Sometimes, in reckless and indiscreet imagination, I tell myself that groups might be found within the Royal Society not superior in intellectual quality or in achievement to groups outside the Academy. That imagining sounds impertinent. Yet it only suggests what I have already suggested once, that there may not be in the country from three to four times so many distinguished Naturalists as distinguished Humanists.

Were we a larger society, and most certainly if we carried a larger staff, the question of accommodation would arise. But, with all our gratitude to those who originally made these quarters habitable for us, I think that this ought to arise in any event before many years are over. I should suspect that the Academy of Peru—if Peru has an Academy—is more sumptuously housed; and I sometimes wonder whether a health inspector might not condemn the working conditions of our Assistant Secretary. But if this, as those friends of mine who may be right have maintained, is not the moment for an increase of numbers, it is hardly the moment to clamour for housing space. I leave these disputable matters for your consideration; and I sit down with a thanksgiving for having been honoured and spared to preside over the Academy at a time of three-quarters peace.

ANNUAL PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS

By R. I. AARON

Read 24 January 1945

IT is no doubt a good practice to begin by defining one's terms, and it would be pleasant to begin this lecture with a fool-proof definition of the term *universal*. But anyone who reflects on the problem of universals and on its history in the philosophical speculation of the past comes quickly to realize two things: first, that the term is used in more than one sense; secondly, that we are not in a position to say of any one of these senses that it is the true sense and that all the others are false. We may, if we choose, pick out one of the senses, and say that henceforth we propose always to use the term thus. But we should gain little by this procedure, since we should still have to consider universals in the other senses, or wilfully neglect a great part of our problem. This follows from the fact that these different senses of the term reveal different aspects of the matter before us. The problem of universals is exceedingly complex; it is indeed the whole problem of human thought and of the objects of human thinking. It is not strange, therefore, that philosophers looking at this complexity from different angles should view it in different ways and so use the same term *universal* in different senses. No doubt much of the confusion and error of past speculation about universals is due to the multiplicity of senses in which the term has been used. The multiplicity could hardly have been avoided; but the confusion might have been if each philosopher had made it clear in what sense he was using the term at any particular moment, and if every reader had understood that he was using it in that sense and in that sense alone.

For instance, the traditionalists, speaking of the genesis of universals, held that we begin with particulars and from them abstract universals. This doctrine has appeared objectionable to many, and no doubt it is objectionable if we are using the word *universal* in certain senses. In one sense of the word, however, this account of the way in which we come to know universals is adequate, and this is the sense which the traditionalists

had in mind. But there are other senses of the word in which it is not at all correct to say that we come to know universals by abstracting from particulars. I agree with those theorists who hold that it is as true to say we begin with universals as it is to say we begin with particulars. It depends entirely upon the sense in which we use the word *universal*. In one sense of the term the traditional theory is sound; it is false, however, applied generally to universals in any and every sense.

The method I propose to adopt in this lecture, accordingly, in inquiring into our knowledge of universals is the following: I shall try to take into account all of the various usages of the term—or, at least, all of the more prominent usages—and ask of each how we come to know the universal in that sense. Thus I shall be consciously using the term in different senses, but I shall try to make clear on each occasion in what sense I am using it.

To keep the lecture within reasonable bounds, however, I propose to make one limitation. I shall so far as possible avoid the metaphysical issues which arise in connexion with this problem. My approach will be psychological and phenomenological; that is to say, I shall not consider questions of ontology. So far as possible, also, I shall avoid logical issues, though these are not so easily avoided. Perhaps it will be felt that with such an approach I am not likely to proceed very far, but I think that some progress may be made and that something can be gained, even though the larger and graver questions about universals remain unasked.

It will be clear from the foregoing that I cannot at this stage accept the view that universals should be wholly distinguished from concepts. There is an influential body of opinion which asserts that a hard and fast distinction should be made between *universal* and *concept*, and that the one term should not be taken to be synonymous with the other. If this distinction were accepted, the universal would not then be what Aristotle says it is, 'that which can be predicated of more things than one'. The universal would be the actual quality or relation which recurs. The concept, on the other hand, would be the way in which this universal appears in thought. Thus the concept could be predicate, but not the universal. Now this theory, though it may be sound, is not one from which I can begin. In philosophical discourse the term *universal* is used frequently as a synonym for concept, and I cannot disregard this usage. When people use the word *universal* they certainly sometimes

mean what is thought or conceived, even in the sense of what owes its being to the thinking or conceiving, a construct of the mind, and this usage is clearly an important one. I shall thus have to take it into account.

This distinction to which I have just referred is not unconnected with another: that between universals in the sense of discovered or observed recurrences and universals in the sense of constructions of the mind. I attach considerable importance to this latter distinction and find in it the best guidance in seeking to traverse the labyrinth before us. Thus I propose to begin by inquiring into the character of these discovered or observed universals, and shall ask how it is we know them. I shall then turn to consider universals as constructions of the human mind.

2. In what sense, then, do we speak of discovered or observed universals? We may think of a quality, say a certain shade of red, which we may name r^1 to distinguish it from all other shades of red. Now there is a universal r^1 . How do we come to know this universal? Clearly in some such way as follows: Suppose that in what I am seeing directly at the present moment, in my direct visual field, I observe an object which we may call O^1 . I see that the colour of O^1 is r^1 . In another place in the same visual field I observe another object, O^2 , and I observe that its colour is exactly the same as is that of O^1 , that is to say, it also is r^1 . Here then I not only observe the simple quality r^1 but also observe that r^1 is the colour of O^1 and O^2 . I observe the recurrence of this identical colour.

This appears to be a satisfactory and a fair description of the experience. Some philosophers, however, would disagree. They would say that a colour is as particular as the object to which it belongs. Thus there would be two colours, and we should have to say something of this kind, that the two colours, though two, are none the less identical in type. This introduces the notion of type as, apparently, something over and above the colour, and it seems to me that it unnecessarily complicates the issue. It seems more in accordance with actual experience to say that O^1 and O^2 are both r^1 , that is to say, that one and the same colour can be in two places at the same time. The content of the universal r^1 is just the colour r^1 which I now see, but it is first known as a universal in so far as I see it to belong to two or more objects.

It is in this way that we first come to know the universal r^1 ,

and it is a discovery or an observation. Clearly the traditional theory will not do here. We have not known this universal by observing particulars and abstracting the universal from them. On the contrary, it seems nearer the mark to say that we observe the universal simultaneously with the observing of the particular. But we must inquire further into this knowledge. (1) Is it correct to say that we observe *one and the same* colour? Do we in this case know an identity? (2) What kind of observation is this observation of a universal? Is it correct to speak of it as an 'observation' at all? Have we here, as the word *observation* appears to suggest, a genuinely concrete experience?

(1) When I say we observe an identity, it is necessary for me to emphasize the point that I am speaking of an *experienced* identity and that I am putting forward no claim to a knowledge of a 'real' identity as pertaining to 'real' physical objects. Thus it would be no disproof of what I am now saying to say, with the upholders of the Resemblance Theory, that there are no identities *in re*, and that therefore we cannot be observing an identical quality. Even supposing that this theory were true it would be quite irrelevant to the point at issue. I have said nothing at all about a real world and I am not saying that the observed identities are real qualities of real things. I merely say that in this case I observe identically the same shade of colour r^1 to belong to O^1 and O^2 . Sometimes I observe colours which merely resemble one another; but in this present case I am observing not two resembling colours but one and the same colour. That is the fact; and no metaphysical theory about the absence of identities *in re* can compel me to deny that fact.

In the same way the objection that the indistinguishable as experienced may not be the identical in reality cannot be urged against my present position. I should not deny that our senses are gross and that they lead us to identify what we should distinguish were they more acute. But in saying that the r^1 of O^1 is identical with the r^1 of O^2 I merely mean that I cannot distinguish between them. I am using the word *identical*, that is to say, in a sense which would make it synonymous with *indistinguishable*. And what I wish to say is that to observe an identity in that sense provides me with my first knowledge of the universal r^1 .

(2) This, then, is the sense in which I speak of observing the *identical* colour. But now what of the word *observing* as used in this context? The suggestion of this word is that the experience is concrete, but the statement that I know a universal con-

cretely savours of paradox. Is not the process of coming to know universals intimately linked with the process of abstracting? Are not universal ideas necessarily abstract ideas? When we talk of knowing universals concretely are we not in fact contradicting ourselves?

In answer, it is first necessary to note that these terms *concrete* and *abstract* are used vaguely. It is possible to distinguish between three senses in which the word *abstraction* is used, and if we distinguish between these senses it will be easier to explain in what sense r^1 is a concrete universal. (a) By abstraction is sometimes meant the process of isolating an element in the experienced whole and attending to it. Beginning with the more or less undifferentiated we discriminate elements within this whole. They are still concrete in the sense of being experienced in a particular place and at a particular time; they are still part of that which is concretely experienced. But we attend to them rather than to the whole experience. (b) This first sense is to be distinguished from a second sense of the word. We sometimes mean by it the abstracting from the concrete situation, dropping the reference to a particular space and a particular time, and considering the object in itself as so abstracted. (c) Thirdly, we may mean observing common characteristics of complex objects and abstracting these common features so as to frame an abstract complex idea. There may be other senses of *abstraction*, but the understanding of these three will be enough to enable us to say in what sense observing the universal r^1 is a concrete and not an abstract experience.

Now on reflection it becomes clear that observing the universal r^1 is abstract in sense (a), but not abstract in senses (b) and (c). If we say that to attend to anything we have first to isolate it, select it for attention, and that such isolation is abstraction, then the observation of the universal r^1 certainly involves abstraction. But in *that* sense of the term it is equally true to say that observing the shade r^1 also involves abstraction. It would generally be agreed, however, that this sense of the term is a somewhat unusual one, and that it is, for instance, unnatural to say that seeing r^1 is an abstract experience. The point I then make is that observing the universal r^1 is as concrete as seeing r^1 . And so though in sense (a) we may call it an abstract experience, it would be more usually called a concrete experience, for it is concrete as contrasted with senses (b) or (c) of the term *abstract*.

Yet is it true to say that observing that O^1 and O^2 are both r^1 and so becoming aware of the universal r^1 is as concrete an

experience as observing the colour r^1 ? It seems to me that it is, though I should not deny that there is a difference between seeing r^1 and seeing that O^1 and O^2 are both r^1 . The difference, however, is not one between a concrete and an abstract experience. Strictly speaking, we are not using the word *observe* in quite the same sense when we say 'I observe r^1 ' as when we say 'I observe that O^1 and O^2 are r^1 ', or 'I observe that O^1 and O^2 have identically the same colour'. There is an introspectible difference between 'observing' in the first and 'observing' in the second sense, although the difference is a difficult one to put into words. Would it be misleading to say that seeing a colour is a sensory intuition, whilst apprehending the oneness of the colour in O^1 and O^2 is a more intellectual intuition? Whatever language is used it must be made plain that the degree of abstraction in the latter experience is no greater than that in the first. In sense (a) I abstract in attending to the colour r^1 in the whole visual field, and I abstract in the same sense in apprehending the oneness of r^1 in O^1 and O^2 . In senses (b) and (c) of the word, however, neither seeing r^1 nor apprehending the oneness or identity is an abstract experience. Thus apprehending this universal may be said to be a concrete experience and r^1 itself a concrete universal.

Now nature (that is to say, the nature observed and experienced by us) is full of such recurring qualities. And it is not simple qualities only which recur; complexes of qualities recur and so do relations. For instance, I observe that a is larger than b . I also observe that c is larger than d . This relation *larger than* recurs in my experience and I apprehend it as recurring, that is, as a universal. Thus the universals which I apprehend in nature are not confined to simple qualities but include also complex qualities and relations.

3. Qualities and relations recur, and our knowledge of such recurrences is a knowledge of universals, as primitive and as concrete as our knowledge of particulars. Now another question arises. Is it qualities and relations alone which recur within our experience? Do not *things* also recur? Are there, or are there not, 'universals of things'? And if there are, what are we to say about our knowledge of them?

These are awkward questions about which (not unwisely, perhaps) philosophers have said little in the past—that is to say, little directly, for *indirectly* much has been said. If, however, we are to do justice to the theme of this lecture we cannot now avoid

facing these questions directly. We speak of *man*, *table*, *bed*, *tree*, as universals. What do we mean? In the background of contemporary thought there seems frequently to be assumed one of two answers, neither of which do I find to be satisfactory. I shall try to show why, and then suggest another answer which may, I hope, prove more satisfactory.

According to the first the universal *man* is a complex of universals of quality and relation. In the strict sense there are no 'universals of things'; when we talk of *man*, *table*, *bed*, which seem to be universals of things, we in fact have in mind complexes of universals (of quality and relation) attributable to things. A *thing*, so the theory supposes, is individual, unique, filling a certain space, *not* in two places at the same time. A quality or relation recurs, that is, it *can* be in two or more places at the same time—always supposing that we do not say that qualities are as particular as the things to which they belong. So it is natural to think of a universal of quality or relation, but not, it is held, of a thing.

In considering this theory that the universal *man* is strictly speaking a complex of qualities and relations attributable to man, the first point that needs to be made is that *man* also is a term used in many senses. And there *is* a sense of the term in which it is true to say that it signifies a complex of qualities and relations. For we do sometimes attempt to search for those qualities and relations which are shared by all men in common in order to construct out of them the universal *man*. Moreover, philosophers say that the only *precise* universal possible for us in this case is that which is a combination of precisely known qualities and relations. Thus the term *man* may be said occasionally to signify this complex—though whether it is ever precise or not we must leave for later consideration. But if it is occasionally used in this way, the usage is surely rare. Even the philosopher tends to think of the complex as a group of qualities and relations holding together, integrated, a 'family'—all question-begging words and phrases. Vaguely the notion of thing or substance is present. And certainly in its ordinary usage in daily life the universal *man* always contains within it as one element this admittedly vague notion. Perhaps, if we want to think precisely, we must try to rid our thought of this element in thinking the universal *man*. But it is obvious that usually we do nothing of the kind. It does not seem correct, therefore, to say that the universal *man* is invariably a complex of qualities and relations and nothing more.

In this connexion considerable interest attaches to the Aristotelian view that the universal *man*, that which we think about, is secondary *substance*. Man as primary substance is the real, unique individual; as secondary substance he is the subject of our discourse and thought, the universal. What is unique in any individual eludes thought, but there is something (the Aristotelian calls it 'the specific nature') which *can* be thought and this is secondary substance. Thus the man we think about is never the individual in his uniqueness, but he *is* a substance. In other words, the Aristotelian cannot admit that the universal man is a mere complex of qualities and relations. There is also the thing, the substance, although it must be admitted that the account which the Aristotelian gives of man's substantiality is not without difficulty.

The strongest argument, however, for rejecting this first answer, namely, that there are no universals of things but only complexes of qualities and relations, is that we do experience universals of things. For just as qualities and relations recur in the primitive concrete experiences to which we have referred, so also do things. And it is this primitive experience of these recurrent things which lies behind our thinking of such universals as *man*, *table*, *bed*. At a later date in our development we may attempt to construct consciously a universal *man*, possibly out of qualities and relations merely, or with the addition of the notion of substance, but long before we do this we have been using the universal *man*, and using it as a *thing*-universal. And if we are to understand our knowledge of this universal, we must look not to conscious constructions but to our primitive experience of things. We must attempt, therefore, to give some account of this experience and of how it is that *things* are observed to recur.

4. Before we proceed with this task, however, let us consider a second answer to the question, What do we mean when we use *man*, *table*, *bed*, as universal terms? I refer to the nominalist answer. In the past nominalism has frequently meant conceptualism, but it is not such nominalism that I wish to consider in this section. There is current to-day an extreme nominalism which would provide some such answer as the following to our present question. Strictly speaking, it would say, we *mean* nothing by *man*, *table*, *bed*, used as universals. The question as to what these mean is an unreal one. The only question which can be answered is not this one but another,

namely: How are these words used in sentences? To this question the nominalist answer is that when we use such words as these in sentences we are in fact using them as class-words, and class-words are *mere* fictions, logical contrivances, so that we are mistaken in asking *what* they signify either (a) in idea, or (b) in reality. In *that* sense they signify nothing.

To what extent does this contemporary type of nominalism really meet the difficulty we are now facing as to whether *man*, *table*, *bed*, are universals, and if so in what sense? The nominalist doctrine is usually supposed to be derived from *Principia Mathematica*, and we do find there that the class-term is taken to be an incomplete symbol. We find also that *Principia* 'abolishes the class'. I doubt, however, whether we can find in that work any justification for the view now before us which denies that class-words have any ideal or real signification. On the contrary, *Principia Mathematica* asserts that the class-term can only be understood in terms of a universal other than a mere name, although it leaves in abeyance the further question whether this universal is merely ideal or whether it is also real—as we ourselves are doing in the present lecture. The universal which it does think to be necessary, however, is the quality or relation; in the case of the class-term *man*, for instance, it interprets *man* in terms of the universal *human*. The standpoint assumed in *Principia* is that universals are qualities or relations, never things. I am challenging that standpoint in this lecture. But *Principia* does assert the existence of universals and does not 'abolish' *them* by speaking of them as mere class-names, mere logical contrivances.

I may develop this point a little farther. The aim of *Principia* is to exhibit the logical structure of that kind of thinking which is best exhibited in mathematics. It is therefore inevitable that it should emphasize the extensional aspect of the class. It makes clear the technique for handling extensions and shows how the calculus of propositions and the calculus of classes are possible. None the less, in spite of its concern with the extensional, when it comes to substitute for the class a propositional function, and so 'abolish' the class, it rejects any extreme extensionalism. What it substitutes for the class *man* is a propositional function whose core is the universal *human*.¹

¹ A reference to the now familiar analysis of universal propositions in *Principia* will make this clear. Take the proposition *All men are liable to error*. In this case if we think of *being a man* or *being human* and *being liable to error*, then we may think of an x who is both human and liable to error. To

The standpoint of *Principia* in connexion with this matter is made quite plain in the following passage: 'It is an old dispute whether formal logic should concern itself mainly with intensions or with extensions. In general, logicians whose training was merely philosophical have decided for intensions, while those whose training was mainly mathematical have decided for extensions. The facts seem to be that, while mathematical logic requires extensions, philosophical logic refuses to supply anything except intensions. Our theory of classes recognizes and reconciles these two apparently opposite facts, by showing that *an extension* (which is the same as a class) *is an incomplete symbol, whose use always acquires its meaning through a reference to intension*' (p. 72, my italics).

I conclude that *Principia Mathematica* lends no support to the view that we can use *men* significantly in the proposition *All men are liable to error* without any reference whatsoever to the intension of the term *man*. On the contrary, its explicit teaching is that such a reference is necessary. How, then, has the contemporary denial of this necessity come about? It is the consequence, I believe, of the modern extensionalist criticism of think in such terms is to think of the sentence as involving two propositional functions, namely, *x is human* and *x is liable to error*, and the analysis proposed is: for all cases of *x*, *x is human* and *x is liable to error*, or, for all cases of *x*, if *x is human* then *x is liable to error*. This is written symbolically $(x)fx \cdot gx$ or $(x)fx \supset gx$.

Now the interesting items in the above analysis from our present point of view are *f* and *g*. Let us consider $(x)fx$. Taking the class to be all the objects satisfying a propositional function, then for *all men* (in such a sentence as *All men are liable to error*) *Principia* substitutes for any *x*, *x is human* or $(x)fx$. The symbol *x* is a variable. It has no meaning; nothing corresponds to it; but a name can be substituted for it. We cannot, however, rightly substitute for it *any* name, but only a name of which we can say: it is *f*. And this helps us to understand the other symbol, *f*. It symbolizes that which determines the range of values of *x*. We accordingly see that the principle involved in the function is the following: Whatever is substituted for *x* must be something of which *f* can be affirmed. If *a*, *b*, and *c* can each in turn be substituted for *x*, then *a is f*, *b is f*, and *c is f*. Now *Principia* calls *f* a universal and it assumes that we know what a universal is. Thus whilst it takes the class to be an incomplete symbol *used* in a sentence (thus enabling the logician to free himself from all concern with the problem as to the existence of a class as a real external entity), its account of this class is such that it presupposes an acquaintance with, and an understanding of, universals. That is to say, in the above example we must know what the universal *human* is before we can say *All men are liable to error*. Thus *Principia* in asserting that *man* is an incomplete symbol certainly does not relieve us of the task of understanding the universal *human*.

Principia. *Principia's* analysis is nowadays said to be too *attributive*, too *intensional*. Is it not possible, it is asked, to free logic from mysterious intensional elements and so to create a purely extensional logic by taking the fundamental conceptions of *Principia* and interpreting them in a non-attributive and non-intensional way? The important notion of a propositional function can be accepted *if re-interpreted*. The variable will no longer be conceived as something which has a range determined by an attribute such as *human*. It is rather conceived pronominally, as an *it*, an incomplete symbol for which a name can be substituted. What the pronoun stands for is no concern of the logician. Indeed, according to some writers, all that is needed is a sign which can make possible cross-reference within a sentence. A variable x is the same whenever and wherever it is used in a sentence and so precise pronominal repetition becomes possible. A variable in a propositional function, on this view, is to be conceived not as that of which an attribute can be predicated, but as a sign which makes possible cross-reference.

Now it is an interesting question whether a purely extensional logic is possible and whether it can be erected on this foundation of purely extensional variables. There are obvious grounds for doubting. Suppose we take the following sentence: *All men are animals and all men are rational*. In this case the term *men* does serve as the sign of cross-reference. If we confine our attention to this function of it can we then handle it without intensional reference? Even accepting the nominalist position in its most extreme form, still, if we speak of the first token-word *men* (we may call it *men*¹) and the second (*men*²) as mere signs of cross-reference, do we not mean this much at any rate that the printed shapes *men* are alike in both cases? And are we not then thinking in terms of an intension, or an attribute, i.e. the attribute *being of the same printed shape*? Even if we ceased to use printed words but merely drew a curved line from the blank space now occupied by *men*¹ to the blank space occupied by *men*² to mark the cross-reference we should still, it seems to me, be thinking intensionally. For the procedure would at least mean this minimum, that that which is at the first place is the *same* as that which is at the second place. But surely *being the same* is an attribute and an intension. There thus seems to be a *prima facie* case for doubting whether a pure extensional logic can be built upon this foundation.

However, this is not the point which concerns me at the present moment. My interest lies in an application of this

general standpoint to the problem of universals. That problem is supposed to be solved by showing its unreality in this way: the universal *man* can be 'abolished' by stressing its extensional side, regarding it as a class, and then 'abolishing' the class by thinking of it as a mere incomplete symbol for which a propositional function can be substituted, and finally interpreting this propositional function in a non-intensional way. We can thus explain the use of such general terms as *man* in a sentence without involving ourselves in any reference to *man* in intension, and there is therefore no problem of universals other than the linguistic one of the use of class-terms. Now this seems to me a completely unjustified application of contemporary logic. Even if it were the purpose of certain logicians to set up a pure extensional logic on the basis of purely extensional variables, and even if they succeeded in doing so, they would do so only by confining themselves to certain formal aspects of the usage of such terms as *man*, *table*, *bed*, for instance, as signs of possible cross-reference. They would, of course, be within their rights in so confining themselves. But those who apply their theories to the problem of universals would have no right to limit themselves in this way. They could only establish their thesis by proving that whenever we use the word *man* as a universal we invariably use it in this limited way. But this is obviously nonsense. And the moment we see that it is nonsense we also see that there is in fact no argument from this side. Even if a pure extensional logic were established, it would not follow that the problem of universals is a sham problem. Such a logic would have nothing whatever to say about a large part of that problem. At most it could only refer to limited aspects of the usage of such general words as *man*, *table*, *bed*. We can thus proceed with our task of trying to understand what universals are and how the mind comes to know them, without feeling that we are wasting our time on an unreal problem.

5. I may now attempt to give what appears to me to be a truer account of our knowledge of such universals as *man*, *table*, *bed*.

It would seem that our first discriminations within the as yet undifferentiated mass of primitive experience do not consist solely of qualities and relations. As early as the knowledge of quality and relation is the knowledge of a thing to which qualities belong. Or, to speak more strictly, the function of our first acts of discrimination seems to be to break up the original

mass into smaller masses, into 'wholes', which on further analysis, later in our experience, reveal themselves to be things having qualities and standing in various relations to each other. One might here borrow a useful term from the psychologists. Our first discriminations are *Gestalten*, not as meaning merely figures, patterns, or shapes seen, but in a wider sense as signifying 'wholes', wholes which are not merely seen but also felt to be solid, and which later are understood to be things having qualities.

Now an important point to notice is that these *Gestalten* or 'wholes' in our primitive experience are universals rather than particulars. In their case we *begin* with the universal. And the reason for this lies in the fact that at this primitive stage our powers of discrimination are weak, so that we miss the detailed differences we later observe. We thus miss the unique individual. What we experience, for instance, is the recurring, blurred, vague 'whole', the universal, which we may call *G*. It is only later that our discriminatory powers are heightened sufficiently to enable us to apprehend G^1 , G^2 , G^3 . . . each differing from the other in certain respects and resembling in other respects. At the primitive level these differences are missed and we begin with a vague universal.

Now at one stage of our experience we may possibly use the word *man* or the word *table* to signify just such a vague universal. We have seen that the word *man*, like the word *universal* itself, is used in different senses, and here it clearly stands for something very primitive. It may be felt that such an experience is prior to the use of language and prior to the use of the word *man*. By the time we are able to use language significantly our powers of discrimination, it may be held, are developing beyond this primitive stage. This may be so; it is a question of degree. But it does not seem false to suppose that the word is used in the early experience of childhood for something very much like the vague *Gestalt* we have just described. Thus we may consider the following illustration.¹ Very small children frequently call all the men they see 'Dad'. In the mass around them they discriminate between men and tables or chairs, even between men and women, but they are unable to discriminate between individual men. They begin with the universal and only later distinguish the particulars.

¹ I have borrowed the illustration from Professor Kemp Smith. Throughout this lecture I am much indebted to him, and to his four excellent papers on universals (*Mind*, 1927, and *Proc. Arist. Soc.* 1928). I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness.

If we agree that we do begin with vague universals of this kind, the next point which needs to be stressed is that these universals are already *thing*-universals. It is false to hold that we must first wait for knowledge of precise universals of qualities and relations if we would frame universals of things. These early universals, as early as our first intimations of distinct qualities, are, to say the least, as much universals of things as they are universals of qualities and of relations, and they provide in a rude, vague way a notion of thing or substance just as they provide the notions of quality and relation. This I take to be the solution of the problem as to how we first come to apprehend universals of things. At the same time, I in no way wish to suggest that all universals of things are mere primitive experiences of this sort. We shall see that when as adults we use such words as *man*, *table*, *bed*, we are not then using them in this primitive manner. Even at the primitive level, however, there *are* universals of things and I have tried to explain in what sense.

In view of what has just been said, we may now draw two important conclusions: (a) universals are as primitive as particulars; (b) the universals *man*, *table*, *bed* are as primitive as the universals *r*¹, *larger than*, and so on. These conclusions in turn enable us to free ourselves from two errors; (a) that universals are *always* abstractions from observed particulars; (b) that universals such as *man*, *table*, *bed*, and so on, are invariably mere complexes of universals of quality and relation.

6. In the previous section I have referred to *G* as a *vague* universal and I must here add a word about vagueness. This is a characteristic of many universals, not merely of the primitive ones of which we have been speaking. But perhaps it will be objected that a universal, as such, cannot be vague. Certainly, if we use the word *universal* in the realist sense and mean by it, for instance, a recurring quality really pertaining to physical things, then we cannot talk about *vague* universals in this sense. For the realist, the universal is what it is. It is only our apprehension of it that can be vague, our concept or notion of it, where *concept* is something entirely different from *universal*. I, however, am not in a position to adopt the realist view, since I wish to avoid the issue as to whether there are 'real' universals in this sense. I therefore content myself with the reflection that in some senses of the word *universal* there certainly are *vague* universals, and *G* is one such instance.

Not enough attention has been given to vagueness in thinking. What does it mean to say that a universal is vague? A universal is vague when we cannot define it, when we cannot say precisely what it means, or when we are so ignorant of the *range* of instances subsumed under it that we frequently do not know whether an entity or occurrence x is or is not an instance of that universal. In the case of the vague universal the boundaries of the range are not fixed; in other words, its meaning is always liable to change; whereas the precise universal never varies in meaning. Peirce once aptly remarked that the vague universal is that to which 'the principle of contradiction does not apply'. The primitive thing-universal, G , is vague in just this sense.

We should note, however, that it is not only universals of things which are vague. There are vague universals of quality and vague universals of relation. I may take an instance of each. Consider the universal *red*. Its boundaries are not fixed. Sometimes a particular shade will be said to be an instance of it, sometimes this will be denied. The universal *red*, as meaning all the shades of red, is a vague universal of quality. Consider again the universal *causality*. This is a vague universal of relation. There is something alike in fire 'causing' heat, in the movement of one billiard ball 'causing' a movement in another, in a demagogue 'causing' a crowd to rebel. We find it difficult to define causality precisely or to analyse it successfully, but empirical observation gives us the vague universal. In spite of its vagueness we make good use of this universal and it is only when we begin to reflect upon it and attempt to analyse it philosophically that we realize how vague it is. Here, then, are two instances of vague universals which do not happen to be universals of things. I shall have more to say about vague universals as we proceed, but we can see now that they need more attention than has been given them in the past if we are to deal adequately with the problem of universals.

7. I next proceed to ask how we know universals in the sense of less primitive and less concrete objects than the ones we have been considering up to the present. And here two processes concern us; first, abstraction and, secondly, mental construction. Referring again to the three senses in which the word *abstraction* is used, the abstraction I now have in mind is abstraction in the second sense, the commonest meaning of the word, abstracting from the concrete situation. The *construction* here referred to, on the other hand, may and frequently does

involve abstraction in the third sense, that is, abstracting features which appear to be common and constructing or framing a complex idea out of such features, although it does not always proceed in this way.

I need say little about abstraction in the commonest sense of the term. No one denies that the mind has the power of abstracting in this sense, that is to say, of considering a quality, a relation or a 'whole', in abstraction from the context in which it was experienced. Berkeley perhaps goes nearest to denying this, but he never manages to deny it outright. He does emphatically deny that we can carry this sort of abstraction to such an extent that we can at one and the same time imagine a triangle which is both equilateral and not equilateral—but that is admittedly a different proposition. We *are* able to abstract in the sense of considering a content apart from the concrete situation in which we observe it. This is what some philosophers seem to mean by 'reflection', and reflection in this sense is essential for thinking.¹

In addition to abstraction there is construction, but before I consider the mind's overt, explicit construction of universals, something must be said about a more implicit kind of construction, that conditioning through habit which produces what might be called the *dispositional universal*.

If a child happens to remark: *There are crowds of houses in our town*, what account should be given of the universal *house* as used in this context? More seems to be involved than the bare primitive observation of such a universal as *G*. At the same time it seems hardly correct to suppose that the child has synthesized certain precise abstract notions, for example, having windows, doors, cupboards, being a shelter from storms, a place where people may live, and so on. These notions, no doubt, are vaguely present, but we cannot suppose that the child has explicitly blended them into a whole. This would appear to be too artificial, too precise, and too adult an undertaking for this age. It seems more likely that the universal is dispositional. It

¹ We may observe five stages in the whole process. For example, we (a) see a white patch, (b) observe that this white patch is repeated, (c) think of the white patch in the particular context perceived, (d) think of the white patch without thinking of it in that particular context, (e) think of a white patch without thinking about any particular white patch which we have seen in the past. Stage (b) is not always necessary. On the basis of past experience we expect to see other white patches as well as the present one and, even if we have not and do not see them, we think of a white patch as the sort of thing that recurs, or as a universal.

rests ultimately upon the observation of a recurring *Gestalt*, in the sense explained earlier. The child gets used to this recurring 'whole', and to various recurring experiences of a house from the outside and from the inside. Furthermore, it learns that the name for the *Gestalt* is *house*, and henceforth it connects the name with the *Gestalt*. Thus the apprehension of the universal in this case is conditioned by habit.

The content of such a universal is vague; yet the dispositional tie is strong. The disposition has its emotional as well as its cognitive side. A child told a story of a house which has no doors may well find the story ridiculous and may even get angry. Its expectations are disappointed. On the other hand, such a story may awaken its interest as being unusual, breaking across the habitual, and so wonderful. Both cases bear witness to the strength of the dispositional tie. The usefulness of such dispositional concepts in life is obvious. They are, as it were, blue-prints with which to meet future situations. To have this concept *house* is to know amongst other things that if you are in a storm and if you come to what you recognize to be a house you may possibly be able to go in and find shelter. Pragmatists having this aspect of conception in mind speak of universals as 'ways of operation'. This aspect appears to be present to some degree in all constructed universals, as we shall see—although it does not seem to be present in universals such as *r*¹. Hume discussed universals as states of expectation, but in his case the dispositional theory is bound up with the Berkeleian theories (*a*) that we begin in sense experience with bare particulars, and (*b*) that when we think a universal we always have a particular image in mind. Neither of these latter theories seems true, but they are not necessary for the dispositional theory. *It* rests, I believe, not on seeing (or imagining) a particular, but on discovering resembling *Gestalten*.¹

That there are dispositional universals in our experience, not discovered on the one hand, nor consciously created on the other, but the creatures of habit generated by experience, seems to me very difficult to deny; they belong to the life of the adult as well as to that of the child.

Incidentally, it is in relation to such universals as these that the case for a 'physiological' explanation of generalization and of universals seems most promising. I do not know of any

¹ Not, be it noted, identical *Gestalten*. In the case of these universals observation of resemblance is enough and the Resemblance Theory of universals is adequate.

explanation on these lines which shows real promise of being satisfactory, but if habits could be explained physiologically, the existence of these dispositions might also be explained in the same way. (It would be necessary to bear in mind, however, that to explain the occurrence of such universals as these physiologically would not be to explain the occurrence of *all* universals in that way.)

8. We come now to that usage of the word *universal* in accordance with which universals are constructions of the mind, consciously framed. It may be asked on what grounds we hold them to be constructions. The answer is that they literally are constructed or fabricated by the mind out of materials it already possesses. We may see how this is so if we reflect for a moment upon the ideal of all such universals. The constructed universal at its best would be one fabricated out of elements each one of which is wholly precise. The mind puts together, synthesizes, what is known by it clearly and precisely. We shall have to ask later whether this ideal is ever realized, but its nature as we now see it is certainly a construction or a fabrication. Thus we need not be afraid to admit that this universal is *artificial* in one sense, as being made. It is also *subjective* in the sense that one individual mind has put it together. There are other senses of these words in which it is neither artificial nor subjective, but in so far as it is a genuine construction these adjectives are both applicable to it.

Now in respect to the general question how such constructed universals as these are known, the answer in principle is obvious enough; the mind knows them because it constructs them, because it itself makes them and knows what it is doing in making them. I must not be supposed to be advocating the view that *knowing* is constructing. That is quite a different thesis. All I mean is that the mind knows what it is doing in constructing these universals, and knows what it creates. In connexion with this point there is therefore no difficulty. But, of course, when we attempt a detailed account of these constructed universals there are difficulties in plenty. I purposely avoid the most difficult question of all, namely, how constructing such a universal helps us (if it does help us) to know the real world, though I hope that the present discussion may possibly prove of some assistance later when the effort is made to solve *that* problem. In what remains, however, I propose to confine myself to two questions only which are certainly difficult

enough and which obviously need our attention: (a) What do we mean when we say that these universals are 'constructed out of materials already possessed by the mind'? (b) Do we ever attain the ideal, do we ever construct a completely precise universal?

(a) First, then, what do we mean when we say that these universals are constructed out of material which the mind already possesses? What is this material? How is it gained? It seems to me that the empiricist answer to these questions is, on the whole, sound, though possibly it may not apply to all constructed universals. At the same time we must admit that certain forms of the empiricist answer are unsatisfactory. Thus it would not be correct to say that the materials are so many *particular* qualities experienced by us and then combined into a whole; for instance, putting red, sweet, circular together and so framing the universal *apple*. It is true that some of the cruder and more careless passages in Locke's *Essay* might suggest some such doctrine, but as it stands it is a caricature even of the traditional empiricism and is, anyhow, patently incorrect. Nor would it be correct to hold that the mind has in its possession universals *red, sweet, circular*, and that these are the materials used to construct the complex universal. All such theories err, as idealist philosophers have rightly insisted, in the implied suggestion that the materials with which we begin are so many isolated elements lying about singly in the mind, waiting to be bound together into wholes.

As the result of what we have discovered about universals in the course of the present inquiry we are in a much better position to face this first question. Our answer will still be empiricist although it will be free from the crudities just mentioned. We have seen that the universals of primitive and early experience are not merely qualities and relations. Quite as early is the discovery of vague wholes or *Gestalten*, and this is quickly followed by the thinking of dispositional universals. Now it is in this direction, I suggest, that we are to look for the materials out of which the mind fabricates many, if not all, of its constructed universals. The construction we are trying to describe is not a putting together of isolated entities. The building of a brick wall out of separate bricks is no true analogy in this case. The constructing is rather one aspect of a complex movement. We begin not with isolated entities, but with wholes. We proceed to differentiate between elements within these wholes. We discover or rediscover within them universals such as r^1 or

larger than. At the same time we are constantly reconstructing the whole in the light of our discoveries and so the whole becomes more precise. The analytic and the synthetic together form a double movement which *is* the thinking of constructed universals. All such construction, in other words, is reconstruction.

I may refer to an illustration I have already used. Somehow a child comes to use the universal *man* significantly. How does this come about? We have seen that the child begins with a very vague universal, named by it 'Dad', and that this is a universal *because* of the child's failure to differentiate. But as its powers develop it does manage to differentiate between its own father and other men, and at the same time it sees how its father has many characteristics in common with other men, for instance, having two arms and two legs, standing upright when walking, and so on. The upright-standing of man is a discovered universal of the same nature as r^1 or *larger than*, and in discovering it the child is analysing its original, vague universal. This procedure goes on also in respect to other elements in the whole and so the child corrects its first universal. The correction consists, on the one hand, of an analysis which rids the vague whole of its vagueness by making its parts precise and, on the other, of a synthesis which retains the whole as a whole. Such, it seems to me, is the manner in which constructed universals come into being and such are the 'materials' out of which they are fabricated.

These reflections permit us to take a new view of a matter very relevant to our present discussion, namely, the distinction, much emphasized in the traditional logic, between specific and generic universals. And I may here add a word or two about this distinction.

The traditional distinction between species and genus may be made clear in this way. Consider the universal *a* constituted of the elements x, y, z , and the universal *b* constituted of the elements x, y, n . By abstraction the mind may frame another universal *C* having x, y as its elements, that is, what is common to *a* and *b*. In that case *a* and *b* are specific universals and *C* is the generic universal under which *a* and *b* are subsumed.

If we now view this distinction in the light of our present inquiries we can see that the traditional account of it is superficial and inadequate. For we now realize that this movement of thought from species to genus has a corresponding movement in earlier less explicit thinking, although that proceeds in the reverse order. We begin in experience with a universal which

we later understand to be genus rather than species. The first vague universal, that is to say, is an implicit genus. I mean that, for instance, the genus-word *tree* is used by us significantly before we begin to distinguish between the oak, the sycamore, and the beech. Or, again, we speak of *grass* as if there were no species of grass, being blind to the differences between the various species. The botanist, however, is aware of the different species and so *grass* for him is an explicit generic universal. The difference between my universal *grass* and the botanist's is that mine is a vague universal, while his is explicit. But both are generic. The mind's natural movement in thinking, that is to say, is from the comparatively speaking undifferentiated (implicit generic) to the differentiated (specific), and what it does in passing from explicit species to explicit genus is merely to reverse the process with which it began. What we now see, therefore, and what is not explained in traditional logic, is that the distinction between species and genus is grounded on a more primitive process. And it is this primitive process which provides us with the material that enables us to fabricate the explicit constructed universal, both specific and generic. Traditional logic tells half the tale only.

(b) The second question we have to consider is, Does the constructed universal ever become what in thought we want it to become? Do we ever attain the ideal of complete precision?

We may well ask this question, for reaching absolute precision in the case of the constructed universal is no easy task. For instance, it is not difficult to see that some vagueness will always pertain to our constructed universals of things. The following considerations will make this clear: (1) To be completely precise all the elements which go to make the constructed universal would themselves have to be precise. (2) The constructed universal in the case of universals of things consists of a whole made up of elements each of which has been discovered to be common to every instance of that whole. But we can never be sure that, for instance, *a* is a common element, since the next instance we observe may lack *a*. Thus we can never know with certainty what the elements are out of which the universal is to be constructed. (3) In so far as a thing is individual and really unique, to that extent it *cannot* be universalized. The unique eludes universalization. Consequently some element or elements which should be present in the universal if our thought is to be precise and adequate will always be lacking in it.

These three considerations together amply justify the assertion that universals of things can never be absolutely precise. The prejudice amongst philosophers against universals of things may in part be due to the realization of this inevitable lack of precision. And certainly if we confine the usage of the word *universal* to the completely precise then 'universals of things' are not universals. My contention, however, is that we can and do think thing-universals and that it is foolish to deny that they are universals because they happen to be vague, and equally foolish to attempt to ignore them.

In the light of what has just been said we may reconsider the universal *man*. I speak of *the* universal *man*, but the truth, as we have seen, is that this term is used in many senses. And we now see that in no sense is the universal *man* a completely precise universal. It is clearly not so when the child first begins to use the word, nor again when it exists as a dispositional universal. Our only hope is that we can *construct* a precise universal by a conscious effort. But if we make the effort are we likely to succeed? I think not; at least there are very solid grounds for doubting. We may strive to think more and more precisely, but complete precision is not within our grasp. For consider what is involved. To construct a precise universal *man* involves knowing man's nature completely. If we miss anything, some element in the whole will be thought vaguely and our construction will not be absolutely precise. All those puzzling problems about man's powers, about the relations between his mind and his body, about his place in the universe and his destiny will have to be solved. To conceive a precise universal *man* we need first to understand the whole of man's universe. Secondly, even if we succeeded in this (for us impossible) task, could the universal be precise if all the time the unique in each man eluded it? Here the movement of thought by way of constructing universals, seeking the common elements through abstraction and synthesizing the whole, seems to break down utterly. If persisted in it leads to error. Professor Kemp Smith has recently insisted that not all abstraction is falsification, and this is true of abstracting in the sense of isolating something and attending to it, or again in the sense of considering something out of its context. We can abstract in these senses without falsifying, and the abstraction is an aid to clearer thinking and improved understanding. But the abstraction which is seeking the common elements and framing the whole *is* a falsification if the universal pretends to complete precision and yet misses the

unique. The universal *man* is false *a priori* if it pretends to be precise and yet inevitably misses that in each man which is unique. Aristotle is surely right here.

I need hardly add that these constructed universals of things can be very valuable even though we are compelled to conclude that they cannot possibly be completely precise. For, of course, they are an advance *towards* precision and the mind has the advantages which a more precise thinking gives. Thus in a practical sense, such constructed universals as those of the natural sciences are more than mere expectations in the sense in which dispositional universals are expectations; they have more properly been described as 'prescriptions'. And even though the prescription is not infallible because the universal is not wholly precise, it gives far more reliable guidance than anything the mind previously possessed. It is a surer instrument in operation. Hence such universals have a high value even if they fall away from the ideal of complete precision.

Universals of things can never attain the ideal of the constructed universal. What of other universals? Is this ideal of constructive thinking—the isolating of a part and the concentration upon it so that it becomes transparent to the intellect, and the re-synthesizing of these parts into a whole which is now apprehended with crystal clarity and complete precision—is this ideal wholly unattainable? It is not unnatural to look to mathematics in answering, for here, it is commonly agreed, we do find precision. We find it, says Locke, because mathematical universals are 'ideas which are their own archetypes'; we find it, says the mathematical logician, because we are dealing with *pure form*. These are suggestive phrases, but I want to avoid both in what follows since they would lead me too far afield. I shall, therefore, use the language of this lecture and term the complex mathematical universal a constructed universal; and I shall argue that here the *a priori* grounds for denying the possibility of precision are certainly not so obvious as in the case of constructed universals of *things*.

Consider a mathematical constructed universal; for instance, the mathematician's conception of circle. The plain man's conception of circle is admittedly not precise. It is the outcome of observing many approximately circular objects in experience and should be grouped with dispositional universals. But let us suppose that the mathematician thinks of a circle as a plane curve such that all its points are at a fixed distance from a fixed point. And let us also suppose that he has succeeded in

making completely precise to himself each of the constituent parts, *plane curve, point, all, distance, being at a fixed distance from a point, &c.*, and that he also fully understands the manner in which the parts fit into and together frame the whole. None of this seems to be *a priori* impossible. All the elements are included; the analysis is exhaustive. There are no vaguenesses. We see what a circle *is* and must be. Such universals carry necessity with them. In their case we need not search for empirical verification; we do not need the empirical test to confirm us in our knowledge. The precision of the universal is not affected by the mathematician's ignorance as to the number of instances of the universal. Vagueness in this extensional sense is irrelevant. Any vagueness on the intensional side, however, would immediately mar the precision of the universal. Finally, because this universal is necessary in the sense explained its prescriptive force is complete. Here is a wholly precise universal, the complete prescription for producing a circle.

Have we here attained the ideal? It seems to me that we have, that the constructed universal in this case is precise. Whether I am right in thinking so, and whether I am right in thinking of such a universal as a constructed universal in the sense in which I have been using that term, I must now leave to mathematicians and to mathematical logicians. I shall also leave to them the thorny problem as to the real nature of such mathematical universals as *point, line*. Are they the products of reflection upon experience, that is to say, of abstracting discovered universals from the context in which they are experienced and refining them? Or are they universals in some quite new sense as yet unmentioned in this lecture? Do we need some doctrine of pure intellect apprehending a purely intellectual and non-empirical universal? I am inclined to think we do not and that we can fit these universals into the framework set out in this lecture, but I may be mistaken.

I shall not discuss instances of completely precise constructed universals in spheres other than the mathematical, for I find it difficult to think of examples of completely precise constructed universals elsewhere. And even if we found such examples we could not very well discuss them here as they should be discussed, since the precise abstract universal, whether in the mathematical sphere or elsewhere, is the focal point of very many difficult questions which can only be discussed properly in conjunction with the general epistemological and meta-physical problems about universals which we are at present

avoiding. All I have tried to do is to explain what the ideal is in the case of constructed universals and to suggest what appears to be one instance of the attainment of the ideal. We can thus answer the question as to whether the ideal of constructed universals is ever realized by instancing one case where the ideal does seem to be attained.

9. I shall not pursue these speculations farther. My task has been the humble one of clearing up some of the approaches to the larger problems which remain to be considered. I have said nothing as to whether realist, nominalist, or conceptualist has the soundest case in the great debate about the ontological status of universals; I have not mentioned the Platonic theory; I have avoided the question how conceiving and what is conceived are related, whether, that is to say, the *being* of the concept is *to be conceived*; or, again, how conceiving (that is, thinking) helps in knowing the real world. Yet all these questions are bound up with the main problem of universals. I believe that their consideration will be more likely to prove successful if the conclusions to which we have come in this lecture are borne in mind. It ought to help us to know that the term *universal* is used in many senses, that sometimes we mean discovered and sometimes constructed universals, sometimes dispositional and sometimes explicitly conceived universals. We need to acknowledge also, before grappling with the larger problems, the existence of vague universals as well as precise, and universals of things as well as universals of quality and relation. Having understood these preliminary matters we should then be in a better position to face the other difficulties as they arise.

I should like, in concluding this lecture, to mention one reflection which I find intriguing. It arises out of what has been said about vague universals and particularly the dispositional universal with its strong emotional colouring. I wonder whether one may not gain a better understanding of the 'intuitions' of poetry and of religion in terms of dispositional universals. Such intuitions should be carefully distinguished from the *intuitus* which Descartes had in mind, for the latter is infallible, whereas these intuitions are admittedly fallible, and what I now suggest, of course, refers in no way to the Cartesian *intuitus*.

Consider the usual account of such 'intuitions' as we find it in what, for instance, poets say about themselves. Poets claim

that they gain insight in a strange, paradoxical way. The 'intuition' occurs spontaneously, it *comes*, and comes, in some sense, without effort; yet at the very same time it is felt to be the flowering of the poet's experience, hardly bought, welling up from his deepest being. It is given; and at the same time purchased at a great price. Again, the intuition is charged with emotion and when it is expressed it arouses emotion in others, for this is the flowering not merely of the poet's own experience, but of an experience common to many. The poet and his reader are profoundly moved, and *feel* a deep concern for this truth vouchsafed to them. Lastly, the 'intuition' is vague; it is a glimpse, only vaguely apprehended and vaguely expressed by the poet in symbols and myths. Such seems to be the description of their 'intuitions' which the poets themselves offer us.

Now the question I should like to leave with my audience is this one: Whether in the chilling light of philosophical analysis we have not here a typical instance of a dispositional universal? It is vague, the fruit of experience; it comes almost unconsciously; it is not merely cognitive, it is also feeling. Are we not describing a vague, dispositional universal? It is, of course, exceedingly valuable in spite of its vagueness; it is the best we can get—indeed, more in a sense than we can rightly expect; it is a dim intuition of a realm which beings placed as we are in what Locke called 'a twilight state' cannot hope to see clearly. But that does not alter the fact that essentially the gaining of the intuition is the same sort of experience as the emergence of dispositional universals from primitive experience.

If, now, there is any truth in the suggestion, it shows the importance of such dispositional universals. But whether it is true or not, these vague universals most certainly deserve more of our attention than it has been usual to give them, particularly when we recall that some of the fundamental categories which rule our thought, such as causation, are universals of this kind.

WARTON LECTURE ON ENGLISH POETRY
THE POETRY OF THOMAS GRAY
BY LORD DAVID CECIL

Read 21 March 1945

THIS is an extremely agreeable occasion for me. It is the more so, because I think it might have been an agreeable occasion for Thomas Warton, in whose honour this lecture was founded. Not, I hasten to say, that I imagine he would have wanted to listen to me. Warton lived in the civilized eighteenth century, and so would have been likely to despise the child of a barbarous age like our own. But, whether or not he would have approved of me, Warton would certainly have approved of my subject. In April 1770 he wrote to thank Gray for sending him some notes on the history of English poetry. The letter ended in a tribute to Gray's own work expressed in the rotund strain of compliment characteristic of his period.

I cannot take my leave [he says], without declaring that my strongest incitement to prosecute the history of English Poetry is the pleasant hope of being approved by you; whose true genius I so justly venerate, and whose genuine poetry has ever given me such sincere pleasure.

To appreciate Gray, then, is an appropriate task for a Warton lecturer. But it is not an easy task. Appreciation of an author, if it is to be profitable, involves more than just making a list of his excellences, taking the reader on a personally-conducted tour, as it were, of his subject's works, stopping to point out outstanding beauties. The critic should interpret as well as exhibit, perceive the relation between particular works in such a way as to discover the general character of the personality that produced them, and to analyse the special compound of talent and temperament which gives his writing its individuality. With Gray, this is hard. For one thing, his work is so diverse that it is not easy to see it as the expression of a single personality. It is odd that this should be so; for he wrote very little. There are not more than a dozen or so of his memorable poems. But among this dozen we find light verse and serious verse, reflective and dramatic, a sonnet on the death of a friend, and an ode composed to celebrate the installation of a chancellor of Cambridge University. Further, Gray's poems are composed in a highly conventionalized form which obscures the direct revelation of their

author's personality. His figure is separated from us by a veil of literary good manners which blurs its edges and subdues its colour.

All the same, personality and figure are there all right, if we train our eyes to look carefully. The good manners are Gray's special brand of good manners; whether he is being light or serious, personal or public, Gray shows himself as much an individual as Blake or Byron. What, then, is his individuality? As might be expected from the diversity of its expression, it is complex, combining unexpected elements. The first that strikes the critic is the academic. Gray is an outstanding example of the professional man of learning who happened by a chance gift of fortune to be also a poetic artist. No one has ever lived a more intensely academic life. His home background had nothing to offer him: he was a fastidious scholarly type, incongruously born into the Hogarthian world of commercial London. At 9 years old, however, he was sent to Eton: from Eton he proceeded to Cambridge: and at Cambridge—save for two years' tour of the Continent at the age of 24—he remained for the rest of his life. He never married, and never engaged in any work outside the University. For thirty years his life was divided between scholarship and scholarly pleasures; reading in his rooms at Cambridge, going up to London for a concert or, once a year, taking a stately little holiday in some picturesque part of England, where he fastidiously contemplated medieval ruins and sunset lakes. As much as Walter Pater, he represents that peculiar product of the ancient English universities, the scholar-aesthete.

The name Pater, however, suggests a difference. Gray, unlike Pater, lived in the eighteenth century; so he was an eighteenth-century scholar-aesthete. Now this was something very unlike the nineteenth-century type of which Pater is an example. Nineteenth-century aesthetes were spiritual hermits; they fled from the normal world in horror; its interests and its values alike repelled them as barbarous and philistine. Not so their eighteenth-century forebears. For England, in the eighteenth century, was an integrated society in which people agreed to respect each other's interests and united to accept similar standards of value. Often they differed in taste: some liked the town, others liked the country; some were interested in politics, some in hunting, some in learning. But the student did not despise the soldier; the master of foxhounds was proud to quote such Latin tags as he could remember, and the aesthete was not in the least disposed to scorn the avocations of normal active life, or to dismiss

its standards as valueless. Certainly Gray was not. Personally, he preferred a life of retirement; but he could admire those who did not; he had, in fact, a certain amount in common with them. Was he not a strong Whig, a full-blooded patriot—he could hardly keep his temper when he thought of the contemptible French—a solid, though broadminded, member of the Church of England, and a believer in the social graces? Donnish provinciality and awkwardness repelled him: and he showed no taste for artistic unconventionality. The people who attracted him were well-bred, well-mannered, and well-dressed. They were also entertaining. For Gray—and this was another difference between him and the Paterian aesthete—had a great deal of humour. His enthusiasm for beauty and romance was always kept rational by the smiling and satirical good sense of his age. Here we come to the second important element in his composition. In addition to being a representative scholar-artist, he was a representative man of the eighteenth-century world.

We have not done with him, though, when we have discovered his typical qualities. Remarkable people are always more than types; they would not be remarkable if they were not. Gray's personality owes its unmistakable flavour to the peculiar bias of his taste, to the peculiar colouring of his temperament. His taste was the expression of his mental life. This, we have seen, was aesthetic: Gray enjoyed things in so far as they appealed to his sense of beauty. 'Beauty' is such a misused, shop-soiled word by now that perhaps I may be allowed to stop for a minute and define in what sense I am using it. It is the ordinary, obvious sense we mean when we say: 'What a beautiful sunset!' 'What a beautiful church!' 'What a beautiful piece of music!' We intend to convey by these exclamations that the object in question appeals to our senses, and, through them, to our imagination. A well-cooked mutton-chop appeals to our senses but not, I fancy, to our imagination; so, however agreeable to the palate, it cannot legitimately be called beautiful. An heroic action appeals to our imagination but not to our senses. It can only be called beautiful metaphorically. When I say that Gray found his chief satisfaction in life in what appealed to his sense of beauty, I do not mean mutton-chops or heroic actions, I mean sunsets and churches and music. As a matter of fact, he did like all these things. His sensibility was extremely varied. And such other subjects as appealed to him were in some way associated in his mind with aesthetic pleasure. His interest in botany, for instance, came primarily from the fact that he thought plants

beautiful. All the same, there was another side to him, only second in importance to his aesthetic sense, namely, his intense feeling for history. The fact that he had spent his life amid the ancient groves and mouldering traceried architecture of Eton and Cambridge, and that his whole education was steeped in the spirit of historic Greece and Rome, made him acutely responsive to the imaginative appeal of past ages.

Such a responsiveness is often regarded as a phenomenon of the Romantic Movement. This has led some people to say that Gray, just because he liked reading Norse sagas and looking at fourteenth-century abbeys, was a romantic before his time. This is all nonsense. It is true that the sense of the past only achieved its full development in the time of the Romantics. Not till Scott wrote the *Waverley* novels did it show itself capable of stimulating by its own unaided power a new and major form of literature. But it was born earlier. It was the creature of the eighteenth century. Before then people do not seem to have felt it. Shakespeare draws medieval barons and Roman senators alike, as Elizabethan gentlemen; but Pope in his *Eloisa* already shows signs that he feels nunneries and ruins to be romantic. By Gray's time a whole group of persons had grown up who delighted in nothing so much as letting their imaginations luxuriate in dwelling on some past period, in noting the quaintness of its costumes and architecture, and in enjoying the picturesque charm of its archaic tongue. Plays, for the first time, were acted by their producers in what they imagined to be the correct dress of the period in which they were set: authors composed historical novels and mock medieval ballads: scholars edited ancient texts, Horace Walpole built Strawberry Hill.

Why the sense of the past came to birth in the eighteenth century is not certainly known. But I would suggest that the sober rationalism which permeated the general outlook of the age led its more poetic spirits to find contemporary life intolerably prosaic. Their imagination felt constricted by the spectacle of the world of their own time. They therefore sought relief by escaping mentally to the contemplation of other and less rational periods. Since there was no mystery and magic about the coffee-houses and classical architecture of 1750, they looked for them amid the ruins and rusting armour of the age of faith. Academic persons confined to the humdrum security of college life were peculiarly susceptible to this.

Thomas Warton himself felt it, but no one more intensely and more sensitively than Gray. Perpendicular architecture,

Elizabethan mansions, medieval illuminated manuscripts alike stirred him to dream and to delight. What wild, mysterious visions arose before his mental eye as he listened to the blind Welsh harpist, Barry, singing the traditional folk-songs of his country! How fascinating it was to walk round the panelled chambers of a Tudor manor-house, tracing the patterns on the blackened carving, noting the picturesque details of dress in the portraits that stared down so uncompromisingly from the walls! In his comic poem, *The Long Story*, he lets his mind play in whimsical fantasy on this taste of his.

In Britain's Isle, no matter where,
An ancient pile of building stands:
The Huntingdons and Hattons there
Employ'd the power of Fairy hands

To raise the cieling's fretted height,
Each pannel in achievements cloathing,
Rich windows that exclude the light,
And passages, that lead to nothing.

Full oft within the spacious walls,
When he had fifty winters o'er him,
My grave Lord-Keeper led the Brawls;
The Seal, and Maces, danc'd before him.

His bushy beard, and shoe-strings green,
His high-crown'd hat, and sattin-doublet,
Mov'd the stout heart of England's Queen,
Tho' Pope and Spaniard could not trouble it.

When Gray looked at a landscape, immediately, instinctively he peopled it in imagination with the figures of those who had lived there in times past. Here he is writing a letter describing his fancies during a visit to the ruins of Netley Abbey.

In the bosom of the woods (concealed from profane eyes) lie hid the ruins of Netley Abbey; there may be richer and greater houses of religion, but the Abbot is content with his situation. See there, at the top of that hanging meadow, under the shade of those old trees that bend into a half circle about it, he is walking slowly (good man!) and bidding his beads for the souls of his benefactors, interred in that venerable pile that lies beneath him. Beyond it (the meadow still descending) nods a thicket of oaks that mask the building, and have excluded a view too garish and luxuriant for a holy eye; only on either hand they leave an opening to the blue glittering sea. Did you not observe how, as that white sail shot by and was lost, he turned and crossed himself to drive the tempter from him that had thrown that distraction in his way? I should tell you that the ferryman who rowed me, a lusty young fellow,

told me that he would not for all the world pass a night at the Abbey, (there were such things near it,) though there was a power of money hid there.

Do you notice in this passage how Gray's aesthetic response to the beauty of the scene mingles inextricably with his response to its historic appeal? His aesthetic emotion was always most intense when it was reinforced by his historic interest, when what was beautiful was also evocative of some vanished age.

Indeed, he always tends to see the contemporary world in relation to its historic past. The Eton College of his Ode lies in the shadow of Windsor's ancestral battlements; the school itself is the place where learning 'still adores her Henry's holy Shade'. Even when he was meditating on the rustic graves in a country churchyard, historic references intrude themselves; village-Hampdens and Miltons, he fancies, may lie buried there: he contrasts the simple funerals of the poor with the pompous obsequies of great persons in some majestic Gothic cathedral

Where thro' the long-drawn aisle and fretted vault
The pealing anthem swells the note of praise.

His attitude to literature itself is largely an historian's attitude. Both in *The Bard* and in *The Progress of Poesy* he directs our mental eye to observe the great poets of the past as they file by one by one down the endless corridor of the ages; he sees the development of the art of letters as an historic process. Gray is the first great English writer for whom the imaginative sense of history is an important source of inspiration, the first who consciously cultivates the sense of period.

This inevitably gives an individual colour to his otherwise normal eighteenth-century vision. It is made still more individual by the particular mood in which he surveyed the drama of human existence. This, for all his humour, was predominantly a minor key mood. The circumstances of his early life, an uncongenial home background, and an unhappy family life still further darkened by the shadow of poverty, had made him early aware of the gloomier side of human existence; with the result that his confidence in living was, from the outset of his career, irrevocably damaged. This was why he took up academic life. Shrinking from contact with the rough world, he sought shelter in monastic and solitary seclusion. He found too little stimulus in it to invigorate his vitality. Year after year he idled away his time in aimless study and abortive literary projects—a prey to hypochondria and ennui. True, he had friends whom he loved

passionately. But friendship, though it brought him some ecstatic moments, also brought him sorrowful ones. The friendships of the solitary seldom are productive of happiness. If cool, they are not delightful enough to conquer melancholy; if ardent, they are inevitably frustrated of satisfying fulfilment. For they are not founded on a sufficiently stable basis. The friend is liable to drift away to marriage or active life. Conscious of this insecurity the solitary grows suspicious and difficult. Gray was a touchy, uneasy friend, and his intensest friendships generally came to grief. Such experiences did not tend to brighten his spirits. His considered view of life was melancholy: the world was a dangerous place where sorrow is certain and happiness transient. Once more, however, his temperamental outlook was qualified by the age in which he lived. The eighteenth-century point of view was incompatible with that open out-and-out pessimism to which a romantic like Housman could full-bloodedly surrender himself. For one thing, it believed in the golden mean, and disapproved of extremes of any kind. Even if human life was not perfect, it had its good sides: a rational person strove to keep this in mind. Moreover, whatever unpleasantness life on this planet might entail, it had to be lived: and the wise man made the best of it. To give oneself up to lamentation only made things worse.

Nor was it right. The eighteenth century was profoundly moral. The first duty of man, it held, was to pursue virtue; and there was no doubt that suffering, if taken in the right way, was an aid to virtue. Man could learn through it to bear his own sorrows with courage, and to look with sympathy on those of others. Gray's strong religious convictions made him peculiarly conscious of these obligations, with the result that his melancholy was softened, alike by his faith and his good sense. For the most part it was, as he says, a 'white melancholy' which,

though it seldom laughs or dances nor ever amounts to what one calls Joy or Pleasure, yet is a good easy sort of a state. . . . There is another sort, black indeed, which I have now and then felt that has somewhat in it like Tertullian's rule of faith, *credo quia impossibile est*; for it believes, nay is sure, of everything that is unlikely, so it be but frightful; and, on the other hand, excludes and shuts its eyes to the most possible hopes, and everything that is pleasurable; from this the Lord deliver us! for none but he and sunshiny weather can do it.

Such, then, was Gray—a typical eighteenth-century scholar-artist with a peculiarly intense response to the imaginative appeal of the past and whose pervading temper was a sober melancholy. His memorable poems—for some are mere craftsman's exercises—

are the characteristic expression of such a man. They divide themselves into two or three categories, in accordance with the different aspects of his complex nature. His three long odes are inspired by the historical and aesthetic strain in him. That on the Installation of the Duke of Grafton as Chancellor of Cambridge was, it is true, originally designed as an occasional piece. But in it Gray takes advantage of the occasion to show us in what particular way Cambridge did appeal to his own imagination. As might be expected, this is historical. For him the groves and courts of the University are haunted by the ghosts of its founders, Margaret of Anjou, Edward III, Henry VI, and Henry VIII; and of the great spirits, Milton and Newton, who had studied there. *The Bard* gives Gray's historical imagination greater scope. The last of the Druids prophesies to Edward I the misfortunes that are to overtake his line: in a sort of murky magnificence, names and events heavy with romantic and historic associations pass in pageant before us. *The Progress of Poesy* is less historical, more aesthetic. Though in the second part Gray traces the development of poetic art from Greece to Rome and from Rome to England, this historical motive is made subsidiary to an exposition of what the author considers to be the place of poetry in human life. Like Keats's *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, the *Progress of Poesy* is a meditation about the fundamental significance of art. Not at all the same sort of meditation though. The difference between the Augustan and Romantic attitude to life could not appear more vividly than in the difference between these two poems. There is nothing mystical about Gray's view, no transcendental vision of art as an expression of ultimate spiritual reality, where Truth is the same as Beauty and Beauty the same as Truth. No—poetry to Gray, as to any other sensible eighteenth-century gentleman, was just a pleasure: and the poet so far from being the priest of a mystery was a purveyor of pleasure—'above the great, but,' he is careful to point out, 'far below the good'. But poetry was useful and even educative: a necessary part of the good life, soothing the passions, civilizing the heart and manners, celebrating beauty and virtue, and, above all, providing an alleviation to the inevitable ills of the human lot.

The second category of Gray's poems deals with his personal relation to life: his impressions of experience and the conclusions he drew from them. In one poem, indeed—the sonnet on the death of his friend West—he draws no conclusion: the poem is a simple sigh of lamentation. But, in all the other expressions of this phase of his work, sentiment leads to reflection and reflec-

tion to a moral. The Eton College Ode shows Gray surveying the scenes of his youth and observing the unthinking happiness of childhood through the eyes of a disillusioned maturity. With a sad irony he draws his conclusion:

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.

The *Ode on the Spring* is inspired by the spectacle of a fine day in early spring, with the buds hastening to open and the insects busily humming. How like the activities of the world of men! says Gray, and hardly more ephemeral. But once more irony steps in—Who is he to condemn? It is true he has chosen to be spectator rather than actor: but he is no wiser than the actors and perhaps enjoys himself less. The unfinished *Ode on Vicissitude* points yet another moral. Though life is a chequer-work of good and ill, sad and happy, we ought not to repine: perhaps without the sadness we should enjoy the intervals of happiness less than we do. The Adversity Ode is sterner in tone. Adversity is a trial sent by God to school us to virtue, if we are strong enough to profit by it. Finally there is the *Elegy*. Here the sight of the graveyard stirs the poet to meditate on the life of man in relation to its inevitable end. Death, he perceives, dwarfs human differences. There is not much to choose between the great and the humble, once they are in the grave. It may be that there never was; it may be that in the obscure graveyard lie persons who but for untoward circumstances would have been as famous as Milton and Hampden. The thought, however, does not sadden him; if circumstances prevented them achieving great fame, circumstances also saved them from committing great crimes. Yet there is a special pathos in these obscure tombs; the crude inscriptions on the clumsy monuments are so poignant a reminder of the vain longing of all men, however humble, to be loved and to be remembered. This brings Gray round to himself. How does he expect to be remembered? Not as a happy man: he has been sad, obscure, misunderstood. Yet, he reminds himself with his customary balance, there have been alleviations. He has known friendship, loved learning, and attained, in part at least, to virtue. Soberly, but with faith, he resigns himself to the judgement of his God.

This group of poems is all concerned with the same thing, the relation of a sensitive contemplative spirit to the thronging, mysterious, tragic, transient world into which he finds himself thrown. For all their formality of phrase, they are consistently and intensely personal.

There remains the brief and brilliant category of Gray's satirical and humorous verse—*The Long Story*, *The Ode on a Cat*, *Hymn to Ignorance*, and the *Impromptu on Lord Holland's House*. Now and again in these poems, more particularly in *The Long Story*, Gray the historian shows his hand; while they all display his scholarly sense of finish. Mainly, however, they reveal Gray the man of the world—Gray the admirer of Pope and the friend of Walpole. In the best eighteenth-century manner he uses his taste and his learning to add wit and grace to the amenities of social life. But they are none the less characteristic for that. As much as pindaric or elegy they contribute essential features to our mental portrait of their author.

Gray's mode of expression is as typical of him as is his choice of themes. His style is pre-eminently an academic style, studied, traditional, highly finished. His standard of finish, indeed, was so high as sometimes to be frustrating. He could take years to complete a brief poem. During the process he sent round fragments to his friends for their advice. Like Mr. James Joyce, though not so publicly, Gray was given to issuing his work while 'in progress'. Sometimes it remained for ever in this unreposeful condition. He never managed to get the *Ode on Vicissitude* finished at all. His choice of forms, too, is a scholar's choice. Sedulously he goes to the best authors for models. He writes the Pindaric Ode—making a more careful attempt than his predecessors had, exactly to follow Pindar—the Horatian Ode, the classical sonnet, and the orthodox elegy, leading up to its final formal epitaph. His diction is a consciously poetic affair; an artificial diction, deliberately created to be an appropriate vehicle for lofty poetry. 'The language of the age', he stated as an axiom, 'is never the language of poetry.' Certainly his own language was not that of his age—or of any other, for that matter. It is an elaborate compound of the language of those authors whom he most admired: Horace and Virgil, Pope and Dryden, above all, Milton—the youthful Milton who wrote *L'Allegro* and *Lycidas*. For Milton, as the greatest English Master of the artificial style, appealed peculiarly to Gray. Sometimes the influence of one of these poets predominates, sometimes of another, according to which Gray thinks is the best in the kind of verse he is attempting. He follows Pope in satire, Dryden in declamation, Milton in elegiac and picturesque passages. It was from Milton, incidentally, he learnt the evocative power of proper names:

Cold is Cadwallo's tongue,
That hush'd the stormy main:

Brave Urien sleeps upon his craggy bed:
 Mountains, ye mourn in vain
 Modred, whose magic song
 Made huge Plinlimmon bow his cloud-top'd head.

Nor does he just imitate other authors. He openly quotes them. The Pindaric Odes especially are whispering galleries, murmurous with echoes of dead poets' voices—Shakespeare's, Spenser's, Cowley's. Sometimes he will lift a whole passage; the image of Jove's eagle in the second stanza of *The Progress of Poesy* is transplanted from Pindar's First Pythian. Sometimes he will adapt a phrase: 'ruddy drops that warm my heart' in *The Bard* is a modification of the 'ruddy drops that visit my sad heart' in *Julius Caesar*. Once again, Gray curiously reminds us of a modern author. This device of imbedding other people's phrases in his verse anticipates Mr. T. S. Eliot. Gray's purpose, however, is very different. The quoted phrase is not there to point an ironical contrast as with Mr. Eliot; rather it is inserted to stir the reader's imagination by the literary associations which it evokes. Conscious, as Gray is, of poetry developing in historic process, he wishes to enhance the effect of his own lines by setting astir in the mind memories of those great poets of whom he feels himself the heir.

The trouble about such devices is that they limit the scope of the poem's appeal. Gray's pindarics, like Mr. Eliot's *Waste Land*, can be fully appreciated only by highly educated readers. Indeed, Gray's education was not altogether an advantage to him as a writer. At times his poetry is so clogged with learning as to be obscure. *The Bard* and *The Progress of Poesy* are crowded with allusions that need notes to explain them. While we are painstakingly looking at the notes, our emotional response to the poem grows chilly. In his effort to concentrate his allusion into one polished, pregnant phrase, Gray tends to leave out the facts necessary to make it immediately intelligible:

The bristled Boar in infant-gore
 Wallows beneath the thorny shade.

To Gray fresh from the libraries of Cambridge this may have seemed lucid enough. But how can the common reader be expected to realize straight away that it refers to Richard III's death at the battle of Bosworth? Like some poets of our own time, Gray seems at moments to forget the difference between a poem and a conundrum.

It is another defect of Gray's academic method—and, it may be added, of his academic temperament—that it involved a

certain lack of imaginative heat. Scholars are seldom fiery spirits: Gray's poems are, compared with those of Burns let us say, a touch tepid. This tepidness shows itself in his personifications. Gray is very fond of personifications:

Warm Charity, the gen'ral Friend,
With Justice to herself severe,
And Pity, dropping soft the sadly-pleasing tear.

These personifications are clear and sensible enough. Charity—were she a person—might reasonably be expected to be a friendly one; and Pity to shed tears. But somehow the effect is lifeless. We feel that—having decided to personify these virtues—Gray deliberately, and with the help of his intellect, gets to work to make suitable puppets in which to incarnate them. On the other hand when Keats speaks of

Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips
Bidding adieu;

the impression we get is that Joy spontaneously embodied itself in a living figure, which flashed unbidden, and as in a vision, before the poet's mental eye.

Indeed Gray's head is stronger than his fancy or his passions. Always we are aware in his work of the conscious intellect, planning and pruning: seldom does his inspiration take wing to sweep him up into that empyrean where feeling and thought are one. The words clothe the idea beautifully and aptly and in a garment that could only have been devised by a person of the most refined taste and the highest culture. But they clothe it, they do not embody it. For that absolute union of thought and word which is the mark of the very highest poetry of all, we look to Gray in vain. He had not that intensity of inspiration; and, anyway, education had developed his critical spirit too strongly for him to be able completely to let himself go. His poetry, in fact, illustrates perfectly the characteristic limitations of the academic spirit.

But it also reveals, in the highest degree, its characteristic merits. Always it is disciplined by his intellect and refined by his taste. The matter is rational; Gray never talks nonsense; each poem is logically designed, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Every line and every phrase has its contribution to make to the general effect; so that the whole gives one that particular satisfaction that comes from seeing a problem completely resolved. Even the best lines—and this is a typical beauty of conscious art—are better in their context than when they are

lifted from it. Moreover, though Gray fails to achieve the highest triumphs of expression, he maintains a consistently high level of style—better than some greater men do. No doubt it is a style that takes getting used to: artificial styles always do. We must accustom ourselves to the tropes and the antitheses, the abstractions, classical allusions and grandiose periphrases which are his habitual mode of utterance. They are as much a part of it as the garlands and trophies which ornament a piece of baroque architecture; for Gray lived in the baroque period and shared its taste. A poem like *The Progress of Poesy* is like nothing so much as some big decorative painting of the period in which, posed gracefully on an amber-coloured cloud, allegorical figures representing the arts and the passions offer ceremonious homage to the goddesses of Poetry or Beauty:

Slow melting strains their Queen's approach declare:
 Where'er she turns the Graces homage pay.
 With arms sublime, that float upon the air,
 In gliding state she wins her easy way:
 O'er her warm cheek, and rising bosom, move
 The bloom of young Desire, and purple light of Love.

Does not that recall some radiant, florid ceiling painted by Tiepolo?

And it is executed with a similar virtuosity. Gray attempts the most complex and difficult metres. His work is thickly embroidered with image and epigram. But the images and epigrams are appropriate. Every cadence is both musical in itself and an apt echo of the sense:

Say, has he giv'n in vain the heav'nly Muse?
 Night, and all her sickly dews,
 Her Spectres wan, and Birds of boding cry,
 He gives to range the dreary sky:
 Till down the eastern cliffs afar
 Hyperion's march they spy, and glittering shafts of war.

Once again, I am quoting from *The Progress of Poesy*: for it is in these Pindaric Odes that Gray's virtuosity appears most conspicuously. They are not, however, his most successful works. For in them he is dealing with subject-matter which does reveal his limitations. This is especially true of *The Bard*. Here Gray tries to write dramatically; he addresses us in the person of a medieval druid about to commit suicide. Such a role does not suit him. Gray was excited by reading about druids; but he was not at all like a druid himself. Nor had he the kind of imagination convincingly to impersonate one. He tried very hard—

'I felt myself the Bard,' he said—but, alas, the result of all his efforts was only a stagey, if stylish, example of eighteenth-century rhetoric, elaborately decked up with the ornaments of a Strawberry Hill Mock-Gothic. In *The Progress of Poesy* Gray wisely refrains from any attempt at impersonation and the result is far more successful. Indeed, in its way, the poem is a triumph. But a triumph of style rather than substance. The pleasure we get from the work is that given by watching a master-craftsman magnificently displaying his skill in an exercise on a given conventional theme.

No—Gray writes best when he does not try a lofty flight of imagination but, with his feet planted firmly on the earth, comments lightly or gravely on the world he himself knew. Here, once more, he is typical of his period. Eighteenth-century writers are, most of them, not so much concerned with the inward and spiritual as with the social and moral aspects of existence—less with man the solitary soul in relation to the ideal and the visionary, than with man the social animal in relation to the people and the age in which he finds himself. For all he lived a life of retirement, Gray is no exception to his contemporaries. The region of romance and art in which he liked to take refuge was to him a place of pleasant distraction, not the home of a deeper spiritual life, as it was for Blake, for instance. Even when in the *Ode on the Spring* he contrasts his own inactive existence with that of his fellows, his eye is on them; his interest is to see how his life relates to theirs. And the thoughts stirred in him by his contemplations here, as also in his Eton ode, are of the straightforward kind which they could understand. So might any thoughtful person feel on a spring day, or when revisiting their old school. What Johnson said of *The Elegy in a Country Churchyard* is equally true of Gray's other elegiac pieces. 'They abound with sentiments to which every bosom returns an echo.' Indeed Gray's relative lack of originality made him peculiarly able to speak for the common run of mankind. But he spoke for them in words they could not have found for themselves. Poetry, says Pope, should be 'what oft was thought but ne'er so well expressed'. This is not true of all poetry. But it is true of Gray's. The fact that he was an exquisite artist made it possible for him to express the commonplace with an eloquence and a nobility that turn it into immortal poetry. Moreover, his vision is deepened and enriched by his historic sense. His meditations in the churchyard acquire a monumental quality, because they seem to refer to it at any time during its immemo-

rial history: his reflections on his Eton schooldays gain universality from the fact that he perceives his own sojourn there as only an episode in the School's life, and his personal emotions about it as the recurrent emotion of generations of Etonians.

These reflective poems, too, are more moving than the Pindaric Odes. No wonder: they were the product of the deepest emotional crisis of his life. The Pindarics were written in his tranquil middle age; these other poems, all except the *Elegy*, in the later months of 1742; and the *Elegy*, composed a few years later, is a final comment on the same phase of his experience. Two events produced this phase. Gray's prospects were very dark; poverty was forcing him back to take up life at Cambridge at a moment when he felt a strong reaction against it: and the pair of friends who were his chief source of happiness were during this time lost to him. He quarrelled with Walpole, and West died. Under the combined stress of these misfortunes his emotional agitation rose to a pitch which found vent in an unprecedented outburst of poetic activity. Even when inspired by such an impulse, the result is not exactly passionate: but it is heartfelt. The sentiment it expresses has its birth in the very foundations of the poet's nature; it is distilled from the experience of a lifetime. Let me quote the sonnet on the death of West:

In vain to me the smileing Mornings shine,
 And redning Phœbus lifts his golden Fire;
 The Birds in vain their amorous Descant joyn;
 Or chearful Fields resume their green Attire:
 These Ears, alas! for other Notes repine,
 A different Object do these Eyes require.
 My lonely Anguish melts no Heart, but mine;
 And in my Breast the imperfect Joys expire.
 Yet Morning smiles the busy Race to chear,
 And new-born Pleasure brings to happier Men:
 The Fields to all their wonted Tribute bear:
 To warm their little Loves the Birds complain:
 I fruitless mourn to him, that cannot hear,
 And weep the more because I weep in vain.

Is not this poignant? Once more, you will remark, its effect is intensified by what I can only call Gray's commonplaceness. It is interesting in this connexion to compare it with a more famous lamentation over the dead, with *Lycidas*. Poetically, of course, it is of a lower order. Gray had nothing like Milton's imaginative and verbal genius. All the same, and just because Gray was not so original a genius, his poem does something that Milton's

does not. It expresses exactly what the average person does feel when someone he loves dies.

Nor does its eighteenth-century formality weaken its emotional force. On the contrary, it makes it seem more authentic. Personal feelings of this kind always present peculiar difficulties to a poet; for it is so hard to express them without sentimentality, so hard for the poet not to seem as if he was calculatedly exploiting his private emotions in order to bring tears to the eyes of his readers. The more colloquial and informal the language he uses, the more likely this is to happen. Gray's formality acts as a filter of good-mannered reticence through which his private grief comes to us, purged of any taint of sentimentality or exhibitionism, and with a pathos that seems all the more genuine because it is unemphasized:

I fruitless mourn to him, that cannot hear,
And weep the more because I weep in vain.

In lines like these, as in the more famous *Elegy*, the two dominant strains in Gray serve each to strengthen the effect of the other. The fastidious artist and the eighteenth-century gentleman combine to produce something that is in its way both perfect and profound.

Equally perfect and from similar causes is Gray's lighter verse. Light verse rarely attains classical quality. Either it is so conversational and careless as to be vulgar; or, if the author tries to dignify it by a more stately style, he only succeeds in being pedantically facetious. The writer of light verse walks a narrow path between the abysses of donnish jocularly, on the one hand, and music-hall slanginess, on the other. Gray's curiously compounded nature enabled him to keep to this path unerringly. He is never pedantic, he jests with the elegant ease of a man of fashion. But the solid foundation of scholarly taste, which underlies everything he writes, gives his most frivolous improvisation distinction. Nor do those characteristics of his style which sometimes impede our appreciation of his other work trouble us here. In light verse it does not matter if we are aware of the intellectual process at work. It is right in comedy that the head should rule the heart and fancy. As for Gray's baroque conventionalities of phrase, these, when introduced, as it were, with a smile, enhance his wit by a delightful ironical stylishness:

The hapless Nymph with wonder saw:
A whisker first and then a claw,
With many an ardent wish,

She stretch'd in vain to reach the prize.
 What female heart can gold despise?
 What Cat's averse to fish?

'The Cat', says Dr. Johnson caustically, 'is called a nymph, with some violence both to language and sense.' Perhaps she is. Nevertheless—and one can dare to say so aloud now Dr. Johnson is no longer with us—the effect is charming.

Gray has two masterpieces in this lighter vein; these lines on the Cat, and those on the artificial ruins put up by Lord Holland at Kingsgate. The poem on the Cat is the more exquisite, in its own brief way as enchanting a mixture of wit and prettiness as *The Rape of the Lock* itself. But the bitter brilliance of the other shows that, had he chosen, Gray could equally have rivalled Pope as a satirist in the grand manner:

OLD and abandon'd by each venal friend
 Here H<olland> took the pious resolution
 To smuggle some few years and strive to mend
 A broken character and constitution.
 On this congenial spot he fix'd his choice,
 Earl Godwin trembled for his neighbouring sand,
 Here Seagulls scream and cormorants rejoice,
 And Mariners tho' shipwreckt dread to land,
 Here reign the blustering north and blighting east,
 No tree is heard to whisper, bird to sing,
 Yet nature cannot furnish out the feast,
 Art he invokes new horrors still to bring:
 Now mouldring fanes and battlements arise,
 Arches and turrets nodding to their fall,
 Unpeopled palaces delude his eyes,
 And mimick desolation covers all.
 Ah, said the sighing Peer, had Bute been true
 Nor Shelburn's, Rigby's, Calcraft's friendship vain,
 Far other scenes than these had bless'd our view
 And realis'd the ruins that we feign.
 Purg'd by the sword and beautified by fire,
 Then had we seen proud London's hated walls,
 Owls might have hooted in S^t Peters Quire,
 And foxes stunk and litter'd in S^t Pauls.

Horace Walpole said that 'humour was Gray's natural and original turn, that he never wrote anything easily but things of Humour'. In view of these poems, it is hard to disagree with him. Nowhere else does Gray's virtuosity seem so effortless; nowhere else does he write with the same spontaneity and gusto. For once Gray seems to be sailing with the wind behind him the

whole way. Of all his work, his light verse appears the most inspired.

How far this means that it is also the most precious is a different problem. A very big one too: it opens the whole question as to whether comic art can of its nature be equal in significance to grave art, whether the humorist's view of things is always, comparatively speaking, a superficial view. This takes us into deep waters; too deep to be fathomed in the brief close of a discourse like the present. But the issue is, I suggest, a more doubtful one than those earnest personages, the professional critics of literature, appear for the most part to think.

ANNUAL SHAKESPEARE LECTURE
SHAKESPEARE'S PUNCTUATION

By P. ALEXANDER

Read 25 April 1945

NO man forgets his original trade: the rights of nations, and of kings, sink into questions of grammar, if grammarians discuss them.' Without arrogating to oneself the honourable title of grammarian, one may plead some extenuating circumstances in choosing with all the world of Shakespeare before one such a bleak byway as his punctuation. When the British Academy laid upon me the honourable task of delivering the Shakespeare Lecture for 1945, I could not dare to prophesy that this would indeed be the year of victory. As I sat down to write there was sounding in my ears the dreadful note of preparation that preceded the great assault by the combined American and British forces on the embattled coast of Normandy. And in the days that followed the success of this daring venture, who could keep his thoughts from the desperate struggle to make the landing good except by concentrating on the most mechanical tasks to his hand? The men who speak the tongue that Shakespeare spake had to be free or die—the only adequate commentary for such a season was being made by those in the forefront of the battle. It is of course the same men who fight the battle in every generation. 'They were' said a contemporary of Shakespeare,

They were young gentlemen, yeomen, and yeomen's sons and artificers of the most brave sort, such as did disdain to pilfer and steal, but went as voluntary to serve of a gaiety and joyalty of mind, all which kind of people are the force and flower of a kingdom.

They are the same to-day and will be the same to-morrow while England's glory lasts. From those who could do no more than send their hearts with them, you will be the last to expect the eloquent words and the felicity of criticism that have hitherto given the annual Shakespeare Lecture its interest and repute. That is why though I now stand in what not the least critical of my countrymen described as 'the flour of cities all', delivered at last from the siege it has so stubbornly resisted, some words of an English poet may be necessary to restore you to the temper

in which you can bring yourselves to listen to this discourse; for

Just as a drudging student trims his lamp,
 Opens his Plutarch, puts him in the place
 Of Roman, Grecian; draws the patched gown close,
 Dreams, 'Thus should I fight, save or rule the world!'—
 Then smilingly, contentedly, awakes
 To the old solitary nothingness

so you must forgo the thoughts that the very name of Shakespeare inspires in these days—though you may not remain long contented or indeed awake.

'Criticism apart from interpretation does not exist' said the late Professor Housman. This is true of all criticism; but Professor Housman was speaking of textual criticism, and it is in this restricted sense that I would, for the moment, remind you of his precept. Recension is impossible if the critic cannot choose between variant readings; and how is he to choose if he does not understand his author's meaning? In Emendation it is, if possible, more obvious: you cannot even tell what needs emendation if you do not follow the drift of your author's argument. These are truths Housman thought worth repeating. Speaking of emendation he said:

The merits essential to a correction are those without which it cannot be true, and closeness to the MSS. is not one of them; the indispensable things are fitness to the context and propriety to the genius of the author. The question whether the error presupposed was great or small is indeed a question to be asked, but it is the last question. With vulgar judges it is the first, though usually the last as well. This detail is their favourite criterion, because it can be discerned, or they think it can, by a bodily sense, without disturbing the slumbers of the intellect.¹

His pages—those I am familiar with, those from which the unlearned, so he said, hoped to extract a low enjoyment—are full of such warnings and threats. Indeed, he treated the devotees of the 'palaeographical method', which he called 'the delight of tiros and the scorn of critics', with something of the violence his Shropshire Lad reserved for his Creator.

'Fitness to the context and propriety to the genius of the author'—with these few precepts charactered in the memory, or, since there is something almost minatory in them, written for the mind's eye upon the plaster of the wall by the fingers of a man's hand, that of the ghost of the great scholar himself shall we say, as a MENE MENE TEKEL UPHARSIN, let us come, or try

¹ Introduction to *Manilius*, bk. v, p. xxxv.

to come, to judgement on some of the mysteries in the commas and colons of Shakespeare's text.

Opening a modern and popular edition of *Macbeth* one may read at Act II, sc. ii:

Will all great Neptune's Ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No: this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one, red.

Some of you will at once object that the last line should read:

Making the green one red.

where 'one red' means 'total gules'. But the editor can plead that in the only authoritative text of *Macbeth*, that of the First Folio, there is a comma after 'one'. And if I may continue to speak for him, he might add, though no doubt more forcibly than I can, something like this. When the early eighteenth-century editors came to the study of Shakespeare they had the ideas of their age of what fitness to the context and propriety to the genius of their author implied. Into what bogs this will o' the wispish illumination sometimes tempted them is well illustrated in Pope's treatment of the passage now in question. For all his poetic genius and sharp wit Pope could not accept as genuine what every schoolboy now confidently quotes, in his need to satisfy examiners in English, as the quintessential Shakespeare. Spurious passages were degraded by Pope to the bottom of his page where the line

The multitudinous seas incarnadine¹

finds a humble position; and Pope restored in the text the words he thought Shakespeare must have used:

No, this my hand will rather
Make the green ocean red.

Of course Pope was far too intelligent a man not to see that such changes carried with them important implications about the history of the text he was editing, and he was as solicitous as any modern editor to account for the errors he proposed to remove. Bentley, when he rewrote *Paradise Lost*, tried to reassure his startled readers by reconstructing for them the circumstances in which the poem was transmitted to paper. He pictured for them the blind poet dictating to a scribe whose wandering fancy

¹ He put 'sea' for 'seas'.

had embroidered on the lucid yet often prosaic words that Bentley now restored to the text. The great critic took account of at least one fact that could not be questioned. Milton had to dictate his poem to a scribe. So Pope took account of one undoubted fact in the transmission of Shakespeare's plays—they passed through the hands of his actor colleagues. And he then constructed a story that squared with his judgement of his author. Shakespeare was himself, Pope thought, an untaught genius; but the actors who were his literary executors had no genius to protect their ignorance. The quick and sensitive Pope indeed felt that there might be detected in this assumption a general criticism of the educational standards of actors, and hastened to add that this unfavourable view was confined to the Elizabethan actors, about whom he knew nothing, and did not reflect on the gentlemen of the stage of his own day, who still had it in their power to make themselves better known to him. These actors took the place of Bentley's scribe as the whipping boy for the critic's castigations. In this way the eighteenth century tried to reconcile its respect for Shakespeare with its critical conscience.

When poets found it necessary to rewrite the text itself, it was natural that the punctuation should receive short shrift. 'In restoring the author's works to their integrity, I have considered the punctuation as wholly in my power;' said Dr. Johnson 'for what could be their care of colons and commas, who corrupted words and sentences.' And long after editors had given up rewriting the poetry of the plays the punctuation was still left beyond the pale of critical discussion. 'In many places,' declare the first Cambridge editors, Clark and Glover,

In many places, we may almost say that a complete want of points would mislead us less than the punctuation of the Folios. The consequence is, that our punctuation is very little dependent upon the Folios and Quartos, but generally follows the practice which has taken possession of the text of Shakespeare, under the arrangement of the best editors, from Pope to Dyce and Staunton.

Then came the Revolution—in this particular realm of scholarship, long prepared for and carried through, like the typical English revolution, by devoted students of the past. The eighteenth-century editors, like all good scholars, had gradually accumulated the evidence that was to correct their own assumptions—it is a far cry from Rowe to Malone; and the nineteenth century put it all in a more easily digested and

comprehensive form. Thus were laid the solid foundations for the new Shakespearean world of the twentieth century.

The main doctrine finding expression in this revolution is that the printed texts of Shakespeare's plays are much nearer the author's manuscript than the early editors could bring themselves to believe. In 1902 Sir Sidney Lee in his *Preface* to the Clarendon Facsimile of the First Folio summed up the pre-revolutionary scheme of things, and in 1909 Professor Pollard, in his *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos*, was able to ask on what evidence Sir Sidney Lee had based his conclusions. The question was a rhetorical one, for no answer was possible. The avalanche long impending had moved at last, and Sir Sidney Lee was left without a leg to stand on. His cries could still be heard ascending from footnotes and appendices—for he was a stout mountaineer—but for all critical purposes his views were dead and buried.

The change in the contours of the approach to the problem was here seen in its most catastrophic form, but was everywhere perceptible. No one could any longer believe that the actors had written

The multitudinous seas incarnadine

and most people were agreed that Shakespeare had not caught Heminge and Condell composing the Porter scene in *Macbeth*, and 'with the remaining ink of a pen otherwise employed just interpolated it with the sentence, "I'll devil-porter it no further" and what follows to "bonfire"'. Pope had degraded the whole scene to the bottom of the page. Coleridge was for putting a line or two back into the text. Who now doubts that the scene must stand there in its entirety? It was now possible to take a more rigorous view of the factors governing the transmission of the text, and to those who kept on repeating what they had heard about the multiplication of transcript after transcript Professor Pollard replied with his famous 'printed from the author's autograph manuscript'. To summarize here the work of the school of critics who had made this conclusion a scholarly proposition and who had helped to prepare for it and have developed and refined on it is unnecessary. Dr. Greg, the late Dr. McKerrow, Professor Dover Wilson—their names need no more than a grateful mention here; their work has spoken for itself.

As a consequence, most of the faults that were once laid at the door of the printing-house or the green-room are now more naturally traced to the very desk at which Shakespeare himself worked. There was for example his handwriting. The compositors were only doing another day's work when they tackled

a manuscript from the poet's pen. Their task was no doubt a shade more troublesome than usual, for the handwriting, in some ways the result of a sound old-fashioned education, was very different from that of the sweet Roman hand that Shakespeare at times admired in others. Had the compositors and printers known that their work was to come under the scrutiny of Dr. Greg or Sir Edmund Chambers, they might have used even worse language than I fancy I can hear ascending from the office of James Roberts or Nicholas Okes; but at the same time they might have made the extra effort that would have deprived these distinguished scholars of some at least of the most distracting but, I cannot help thinking, some of the happiest and most satisfactory moments of their lives. As it is we may accept, provisionally, as an estimate of the printers' work on Shakespeare's copy a testimonial issued by the inquirers of the Folger Library at Washington (where 74, or is it now 75, copies of Jaggard's Folio lie under regular examination) to one of Jaggard's proof-readers—'The proof reader was moderately careful but not meticulous in his work.' Even some of the very worst texts provide evidence that special efforts had gone to their production. In the First Quarto of *King Lear*, the stop press corrections alone cover 'fifty passages containing from one to thirteen changes each'.¹ The proof-reader came back again and sometimes yet again to his copy in the hope of deciphering it. He obviously believed he had the correct words there if only he could make them out; and he tried hard. If we accept, for the moment, Dr. Greg's judgement that he was working not from Shakespeare's manuscript but from a transcript of a shorthand report of the play, then the reporter must have been for his day a marvellous shorthand writer, but when he came to make his translation into longhand he must have written as difficult a hand as Shakespeare's; and their spelling and punctuation must have been almost identical in style. That there were stormy scenes when this tempest-swept play first went to press the First Quarto provides some evidence. That Shakespeare did not look in to still the storm is natural. He was agonizing over *Coriolanus*, or relaxing at the wedding of his daughter, Susanna. But if it was a pirate's work the reporter might have had time to help with his handwriting, for he does not seem to have been employed again in such ventures. But returning to Dr. Willoughby's certificate to the proof-reader, as endorsed the other month by Mr. Hinman, and accepting it

¹ *The Variants in the First Quarto of 'King Lear'*, by W. W. Greg, p. 13.

as a general testimonial to the printers' work, we can hardly now venture to say 'the punctuation is wholly in our power'. A reasonably careful printer may have set up some at least of Shakespeare's stops if there were any such indications in his manuscript.

The editor of *Macbeth*, for whom I have so far ventured to speak, might now turn and tell those who question his version that he finds a comma after 'one' in his author and sees no reason for changing it.

There is no resource open to us then but to examine the point at issue in as critical a spirit as we can command.

We all, at times, feel ourselves capable of taking the first step in criticism—a consideration of the reading from the point of view of what Hort and Westcott call Intrinsic Probability, which includes 'conformity to grammar and congruity to the purport of the rest of the sentence and of the larger context; to which may rightly be added congruity to the usual style of the author and to his matter in other passages'.¹ This is but another way of saying, fitness to the context and propriety to the genius of the author. Still, as we wish in this matter to do all in our power 'to read attentively, think correctly, omit no relevant consideration, and repress self-will', we must consider our choice in the light of what Hort and Westcott call Transcriptional Probability. 'Transcriptional Probability is not directly or properly concerned with the relative excellence of rival readings, but merely with the relative fitness of each for explaining the existence of the others.'

Here we come on the so-called canons of criticism, such as 'Prefer the harder reading', for we can all see how a scribe copying an unusual word might make it into one more familiar to himself, especially if the two words are similar in outline. But in matters of punctuation this is a more delicate task; and leaving Transcriptional Probability for consideration on the return journey to the text, let us pass to the help to be obtained from a study of the Internal Evidence of Documents. This demands a study of the general characteristics of the text in any document as learned directly from the document itself by a continuous study of the whole, in an attempt to assess the definite characteristics of the document as a witness to what it purports to tell us. And here Hort and Westcott lay down their first principle in establishing a text: Knowledge of Documents

¹ Introduction to *The New Testament in the Original Greek*. The text revised by Brooke Foss Westcott and Fenton John Anthony Hort, p. 20.

should precede final Judgement upon Readings. Of course knowledge of any document as a whole has to be built up from judgements on individual passages. 'If nobody' as Housman says 'can tell a true reading from a false reading, it follows of necessity that nobody can tell a truthful MS. from a lying MS.' But we must consider the individual readings together, systematically. From such a comparison we hope to arrive at some helpful knowledge of the habits of the scribe or author. But a study of documents inevitably raises questions about their pedigree. Just as individual readings in a document were to be considered in relation to every other reading in that document, so documents themselves are to be considered together and linked, where possible, as in a family—branches in a tree of genealogical transmission. And here Hort and Westcott enunciate their second leading principle: All trustworthy restoration of corrupted texts is founded on the study of their history.

Should any of you say, on the spur of the moment, that the critical procedure outlined by Hort and Westcott, though applicable to the study of classical texts and to those of the New Testament, is beside the point when we come to consider the Quartos and Folios of Shakespeare's works, let me remind you of the words in which Hort and Westcott anticipate this objection:

The leading principles of textual criticism are identical for all writings whatever. Differences in application arise only from differences in the amount, variety, and quality of evidence: no method is ever inapplicable except through defectiveness of evidence.

Indeed, the important advance in recent years in the criticism of Shakespeare's text has been made possible by the more systematic application of these very principles. The study of its history has been advanced by a study both of the direct and of the collateral evidence bearing on its transmission. In our zeal, however, to be systematic, or what is called 'scientific', we must not forget the first stages of the inquiry, the reagent labelled 'fitness to the context and propriety to the genius of the author', the magic bottle, to mix the metaphor a little, from which comes, like the genie in the *Arabian Nights*, the critical questionings that wrap us as in a cloud and that may, if we command the necessary charm, stand before us as the family tree of our text, so that we can distinguish the good branches from the bad and confirm our judgement on the fruit by our other senses. As in all criticism we strive, in the words of another great critic, to reunite our Understandings to our Instinct.

All this anticipates two objections that might be raised to a further consideration of the passage in *Macbeth*. Some might say, but you would not: the comma stands after 'one' in the only authoritative text we have; it makes sense and should therefore stand. Here in simple form is the critical fallacy that Housman in his invaluable lesson for beginners in textual criticism puts first among the errors we must avoid.

Open a modern recension of a classic, turn to the preface, and there you may almost count on finding, in Latin or German or English, some words like these: 'I have made it my rule to follow *a* wherever possible, and only where its readings are patently erroneous have I had recourse to *b* or *c* or *d*.' No scholar of eminence, even in the present age, has ever enunciated such a principle . . . to blurt it out as a maxim is an indiscretion which they leave to their unreflecting imitators, who formulate the rule without misgiving and practise it with conscious pride.

Either *a* is the source of *b* and *c* and *d* or it is not. If it is, then never in any case should recourse be had to *b* or *c* or *d*. If it is not, then the rule is irrational; for it involves the assumption that wherever *a*'s scribes made a mistake they produced an impossible reading. Three minutes' thought would suffice to find this out; but thought is irksome and three minutes is a long time.

Now I seem to remember reading the words: I have made it my rule to follow the Quarto or Folio text wherever it makes sense—or words to that effect—in not a few introductions to Shakespeare's text in recent years. Fortunately the practice of these critics has almost always been superior to their precepts; and we must not allow the fact that the printer put a comma after 'one' to disable what critical faculties we possess. It does make sense, but the question we are asking is, Does it make the sense Shakespeare intended?

To the opposite objection that though the printers may have had Shakespeare's manuscript before them they often made mistakes and that there is no need to fuss about a comma, the answer is that this also is true, but the immediate question is the evidence about the placing of this particular comma.

It is at this point then that one should focus all the evidence from intrinsic and transcriptional probability, from the internal evidence of the document and from the relevant evidence in documents of similar family descent. This is 'to hear all the evidence continuously'. Each fact should find a place in a system of mutually attracted units. You alter the centre of gravity of the earth when you move a stone, so our decision on

any detail affects the whole body of our knowledge, which in turn by its mass affects this or that particular.

Whether such a programme is within my powers need not, fortunately, be asked since your patience would not admit of the trial, and all I shall venture to do is to outline some of the relevant evidence, drawn however from a circle of texts that lies nearer the centre of the whole question of Shakespeare's punctuation than does the group to which the First Folio version of *Macbeth* belongs.

Turning from *Macbeth* to a passage equally famous in its own kind in *Romeo and Juliet*, that in which Mercutio is killed, one finds a similar difficulty about the punctuation. Romeo in his distress at seeing his friend wounded says, according to the earliest text with good authority behind it:

Courage man, the hurt cannot be much

and Mercutio replies:

No tis not so deepe as a well, nor so wide as a Church doore, but tis inough, twill serve

and his last words are:

a plague a both your houses,
They haue made wormes meate of me,
I haue it, and soundly, to your houses.

The Second Quarto puts a comma after 'soundly' and spells 'to' with one 'o'; so that taken at its present face value the passage would seem to mean: I have it and soundly, and then Mercutio's exhortation to his companions to go home. Though one modern editor has adopted the Quarto punctuation, the almost universal choice is for something quite different. The First Folio omits the comma after 'soundly', but the Folio version is largely a reprint of the 1609 reprint of the Quarto, and as this reprint omits the comma the Folio's omission need have no significance. But editors read:

I have it,
And soundly too. Your houses!

where 'to' becomes 'too' and goes with 'soundly'; and 'Your houses!' is Mercutio's parting objurgation. This is very different from the punctuation of the only authoritative text; and yet it is agreed by the best judges that the printer of the Second Quarto had a manuscript in Shakespeare's hand before him.

Still you may say—there were accidents in the badly lighted printing-houses of the Elizabethans, and for that and other

reasons bad patches. Fix therefore, if possible, the object of attack so that some decision becomes inevitable.

A third passage, as famous as the other two, meets this demand by putting the pistol to our heads as it were and asking

Under which king Bezonian? Speak or die.

Your decision on this passage will carry with it implications that will indicate what your final judgement on the punctuation as a whole should be, if you aim at critical consistency.

In the course of his first reunion with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hamlet, according to most editors, says:

What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!

This is what he said till Professor Dover Wilson edited the text. But Professor Dover Wilson, no longer regarding the punctuation as wholly in his power, found what he considered a very different punctuation in the Second Quarto of the play and felt bound by the very convictions that started him off on his editorial labours to follow it. For the Second Quarto is according to the best opinion straight from Shakespeare's own manuscript—handed to the printer that he might publish a version according to the 'true and perfect copy', as the title-page informs us, to replace a pirated version issued in 1603. If any version of a play by Shakespeare is printed from a manuscript in the dramatist's own hand the Second Quarto of *Hamlet* is that text; and Professor Dover Wilson, the true child of the revolution, seized upon this invaluable document as an ancient charter of liberties, much as Sir Edward Coke in the struggle leading to the great English revolution took his stand on Magna Carta. But as that, to the layman, mysterious charter of King John needed liberal interpretation before it could serve the Parliamentary party in 1634, so the Second Quarto of *Hamlet* has required a good deal of editing before it could be presented to us as a vindication of the new views on Shakespeare's text.

Let me say at once I am for Professor Dover Wilson—as I am for Sir Edward Coke, though in fairness to Charles I it should be said that I would a thousand times rather have listened to him on Shakespeare, could I have enjoyed such a privilege, than to Sir Edward Coke. Yet in the detail we are considering, the punctuation, I venture to read the ancient documents in a slightly different sense from Professor Dover Wilson's. But

though I venture on such criticism—and even were my criticism in this detail approved, and it is far from that, I would be of the same mind—I still think Professor Dover Wilson will be judged by aftertimes as the representative editor of the new movement, and any blemishes in his text regarded as honourable scars not unbecoming in a pioneer, though not to be commended in those who follow a blazed trail.

The punctuation of the Second Quarto is slight—or light, the term preferred by Professor Dover Wilson that at once engages your sympathies on its behalf. There are, for instance, none of the exclamation marks of the Folio text:

What [a] peece of worke is a man,
how noble in reason, how infinit in faculties, in forme and moouing,
how expresse and admirable in action, how like an Angell in apprehension,
how like a God: the beautie of the world; the paragon of Annimales;

For the exclamation marks we have mostly commas, and, more important, the phrases taken together in the Folio version

in forme and moouing, how expresse and admirable
in action, how like an Angell
in apprehension, how like a God

are here each split in two by a comma, while no stop of any kind separates the first from the second and the second from the third. Professor Dover Wilson therefore divides them at the commas, and rearranges the phrases:

how infinite in faculties, in form and moving,
how express and admirable in action,
how like an angel in apprehension,
how like a god:

And he argues that not only is this how the Quarto punctuates it but that read this way it makes better sense. He too appeals to the context and the genius of his author for support.

But he also feels it necessary to account for the very different punctuation of the Folio. The Folio version with its notes of exclamation he would dismiss as 'a piece of rhetoric, in which we can hear the voice of Burbage'. Now this is an old-fashioned type of theorizing that should be allowed to lapse with the conclusions formerly drawn from it. The actors were once the villains of the piece; and here is Professor Dover Wilson treating them no more civilly than Pope. Why should we suppose that Burbage delivered these lines in any other way than that indicated by Shakespeare himself, for Shakespeare was obviously

complete master of his stage by the time he wrote *Hamlet*, as the lines spoken by Burbage himself to his colleagues during this very play make clear? The bibliographer must look elsewhere for the explanation.

One of the real difficulties about the editorial procedure adopted by Heminge and Condell is focused in this very difference between the Second Quarto and First Folio texts of *Hamlet*. In the First Folio Heminge and Condell, very rightly, as Professor Pollard has taught us, reprinted certain Quarto texts—for example, the Second Quarto of *Romeo and Juliet*, which like the Second Quarto of *Hamlet* had replaced a version that did little credit to the author and his company. Why then did they not reprint the Second Quarto of *Hamlet*?

The parallel problem of the relation of the Quarto and Folio texts of *2 Henry IV* has been well treated in Professor Shaaber's recent and admirable edition of that play. In dealing with this question he has had the help of Professor Quincy Adams, and here is a bald summary of that distinguished scholar's conclusions. The First Quarto of *2 Henry IV* was printed from Shakespeare's own papers; but Heminge and Condell felt that a version with a slightly more 'literary' flavour would do Shakespeare more justice in the eyes of the reading public of their time. The Quarto contains the oaths and colloquial turns that delighted the first audiences at the Theatre. The oaths ought to go because of the Act of Abuses; and the scribe who made the version also smoothed out some of the turns in the dialogue that might sound a little crude in the reading. The Folio version is in substance a faithful one—indeed, it includes much not printed in the Quarto—but in certain details it has been edited, and these details include the punctuation. Finally, Professor Quincy Adams suggests that the scribe who made the transcript was Ralph Crane, whom Professor F. P. Wilson discovered and whose work Professor R. C. Bald has made more familiar to us. That the hand of this accomplished scribe can be traced elsewhere in the First Folio there can be little doubt.

It is on similar lines that a solution must be sought for the First Folio version of *Hamlet*. Heminge and Condell may well have felt that so important a play as *Hamlet* required the best treatment they could give it. For their care and pains we must be grateful—though we may now prefer the earlier and untouched version. Here too the punctuation was revised. Of the prose scenes of *2 Henry IV* in Quarto Professor Shaaber observes that the punctuation makes them almost unintelligible to the

reader. The Folio punctuation of 2 *Henry IV* as of *Hamlet* is very different. On the punctuation of the Folio as a whole I quote the observations of the late Dr. McKerrow—very different you will note from those of Clark and Glover:

In the majority of texts, at any rate in those that are printed from the First Folio, it will, I think, be found that though the punctuation may at first seem somewhat strange, and though it is undoubtedly less regular than we are accustomed to nowadays, it really presents no more difficulty to the reader than the old spelling does, while it often suggests the way in which a speech is intended to be uttered more clearly than does the more 'logical' punctuation of the modern texts.¹

And his judgement may be reinforced by what Professor Quincy Adams has to say on this matter in the Introduction to his edition of *Hamlet*:

I have laboured hard to supply a punctuation that may aid the reader in a dramatic interpretation of the lines. Here I have availed myself, in so far as was possible, of the actors' punctuation as represented in the Folio; for often that punctuation nicely reveals the way in which a speech was delivered.²

It is true I cannot help hearing, at the back of my mind as it were, the words of Professor Kittredge—to whom every student of Chaucer and Shakespeare will give an attentive ear—in his *Preface* to one of the very best punctuated versions of Shakespeare's text:

Theorists have dallied with the idea that what is called 'dramatic punctuation' may be discovered in the old texts; but this theory has had its day.

While I cannot think that the late Professor Pollard, or Dr. McKerrow, or Professor Quincy Adams, or Professor Dover Wilson, is rightly described as a 'theorist', I believe there is a point in the assertion which Professor Kittredge would now make somewhat differently; and I here avoid the term 'dramatic punctuation'.

The punctuation then of the First Folio cannot be ascribed to Burbage's bad style, or to the actors' indifference to Shakespeare's intentions, or to the scribe's incompetence. The six notes of exclamation from which Professor Dover Wilson shrinks are not the rhetoric of Burbage, but the inevitable stops in an edition for the reader. Where shall we find severer judges than

¹ *Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare*, by Ronald B. McKerrow, p. 42.

² *Hamlet*, ed. Joseph Quincy Adams, p. vi.

H. W. and F. G. Fowler, who sit in judgement on English usage with the terrifying impartiality of a Minos or a Rhadamanthus? 'The stop' they say, speaking of the exclamation mark,

The stop should be used, with one exception, only after real exclamations. Real exclamations include (1) the words recognized as interjections, as *alas*, (2) fragmentary expressions that are not complete sentences, . . . and (3) complete statements that contain an exclamatory word, as:

What a piece of work is man!—B.¹

The verdict must be on this count at least an honourable acquittal for Heminge and Condell unless Professor Dover Wilson charges them under some earlier statute.

But does the acquittal of the First Folio imply the condemnation of the Second Quarto in this particular? Professor Dover Wilson pleads that the Second Quarto makes better sense. He objects to the Folio phrase 'in form and moving how express and admirable' on the ground that even the *Oxford Dictionary* has to give 'express' a nonce-use to link it with 'form'. The *O.E.D.* says it means 'well-framed or modelled': Professor Dover Wilson that it means 'purposive', to go with 'action'. The word 'express', however, comes from the Latin *exprimo*, and the past participle means something pressed out as the stamp from the die, the figure on the wax from the seal; so that its early meanings are naturally linked with the idea of form. 'This is' says Holinshed, quoting Sir Thomas More,

This is the father's owne figure, this is his owne countenance, the verie print of his visage, the sure undoubted image, the plaine expresse likenesse of that noble duke.

Of what then does Hamlet say man's form is the expression? He answers this in his description of his own father:

A combination and a form indeed
Where every god did seem to set his seal
To give the world assurance of a man.

Then Professor Dover Wilson argues that to a thinking Elizabethan angels were discarnate spirits whose only form of action was 'apprehension', and he quotes Aquinas. But he does not tell us what Aquinas would have thought of the phrase with which his own reading concludes—'how like a god'. In the system of Aquinas there was, I believe, room for only one god. Whereas the man who could say

Where every god did seem to set his seal

¹ *The King's English*, by H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler, pp. 266-7.

might very well say

In apprehension how like a god.

The Elizabethans were no deep students of Aquinas; and Shakespeare and his audience obviously took a more popular and pictorial view of angels than that held by the scholar whom his contemporaries called the 'Angelic Doctor'. Angels in Shakespeare are usually feminine. 'If not divine,' says the love-struck Proteus of his beloved,

If not divine,
Yet let her be a principality

and we need no deep inquiry into the relative positions of

Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers

to grasp his meaning. In the chat about Autolykus in *The Winter's Tale* you will find the expression 'she-angel'. But if these are not thinking Elizabethans, read what the Ghost says to Hamlet:

But virtue, as it never will be mov'd,
Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven,
So lust, though to a radiant angel link'd, &c.

If a being from the other world uses such expressions, and if 'she-angels' were intelligible to the Elizabethans, then the phrase

In action how like an angel

was no more nonsense to them than it is to us.

So far it has been mostly a question of Intrinsic Probability, but Hort and Westcott ask us to consider a document in its family connexions. The Second Quarto of *Hamlet* belongs to the important group of texts that come directly from Shakespeare's own manuscript. Accepting only such texts as have been approved by Dr. Greg and Sir Edmund Chambers as belonging to this group, let us ask if *Hamlet* has any outstanding features in punctuation that at once mark, and are to be explained by, its close kinship with the other members of the family.

I have already quoted Dr. McKerrow's judgement on the Folio punctuation. In the edition his death interrupted in so untimely a fashion he had intended to reproduce the original punctuation. But he made this qualification:

There is, however, one type of irregular punctuation which I have felt bound to alter, namely those rather numerous cases in which a clause is separated by a major stop, such as a semicolon, colon, or full

point, from another to which it logically belongs, while at the same time it is only separated by a comma from one with which it has much less logical connection.¹

I shall call these two features internal and external punctuation respectively; and ask, Where do we find the most remarkable instances of this strong internal and weak, or indeed often non-existent, external punctuation? And the answer is: In those very texts that are judged by the best authorities to have been printed from Shakespeare's own manuscript. Here are some instances from *Coriolanus*, which though a Folio text is of this family.

Martius. [To *Cominius*] Oh! let me clip ye
In Armes as sound, as when I woo'd in heart;
As merry, as when our Nuptiall day was done,
And Tapers burnt to Bedward.

Cominius. [To *Menenius*] his Sword, Deaths stampe,
Where it did marke, it tooke from face to foot:
He was a thing of Blood,

Coriolanus. The fires i' th' lowest hell. Fould in the people:
Call me their Traitor, thou iniurious Tribune.
Within thine eyes sate twenty thousand deaths
In thy hands clutcht: as many Millions in
Thy lying tongue, both numbers. I would say
Thou lvest unto thee, with a voice as free,
As I do pray the Gods.

In spite of the punctuation, you cannot read these passages in any other sense than that in which all the editors have taken them. And what is more important for the present purpose the man who punctuated them can't have been in any doubt, except for a moment perhaps in one place, as to their meaning. Yet Dr. McKerrow would have had to alter the punctuation as he proposed to do 'when it might give a misleading impression of the interrelationship of the various clauses within a sentence'. Professor Dover Wilson has pronounced the punctuation of *Coriolanus* 'on the whole respectable and in places brilliant', but it is thick sown with the type of punctuation which Dr. McKerrow felt compelled to edit. To find instances comparable in number and quality you must go to the First Quarto of *Troilus and Cressida*, the Second of *Romeo and Juliet*, and as we shall see, I trust, to our Quarto of *Hamlet*. Each of these texts has its individual as well as the family characteristics. A member of this family that has been to school in the Folio will differ from

¹ *Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare*, by Ronald B. McKerrow, p. 42.

its less well-groomed Quarto cousin; but the sharp contrast between the internal and external stopping is shown by them all. And I venture to suggest that this characteristic can hardly be attributed to the printers in so many different printing-houses, but is to be traced to Shakespeare himself. Dr. Percy Simpson has shown that the punctuation of the First Folio is not the work of men who had no idea of their business; only, as Professor Bald has said somewhere, Dr. Simpson's illustrations cover all the styles contained in the Folio, and we are at present trying to make some distinction between these styles. But Dr. Simpson's book is a very arsenal of material in reserve.

Though this is a very hasty consideration of the family relationships of the Second Quarto of *Hamlet*, an examination of the Internal Evidence afforded by the document, the Second Quarto, will itself illustrate more fully some of the family virtues and failings.

On this the last lap of the argument, to save your breath and patience, I propose to classify some of the features of its punctuation under headings devised by the late Mr. Alfred E. Thiselton; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge my debt to his patient and, as I think, fruitful study. He did not, however, publish any specific study of *Hamlet*; so I adapt his findings to my present purpose. His first rule reads:

Where a clause, phrase, or even a word, is interposed in the direct line of construction, a comma is often not found at the beginning of the interposition, but the resumption of the direct line of construction is marked by a comma at its close.

As at 1. i. 35-8,

Barnardo. Last night of all,
When yond same starre thats weastward from the pole,
Had made his course t'illuminate that part of heaven
Where now it burns,

You will of course find examples like this in good modern writing—when the subject includes and ends with a defining relative clause, after which an illogical comma (as the Fowlers call it) is sometimes placed. But you will hardly find examples to match the following:

Guyl. The Queene your mother in most great affliction of spirit,
hath sent me to you. (iii. ii. 323-4)

Ham. what a wounded name
Things standing thus unknowne, shall I leaue behind me?
(v. ii. 355-6)

And many more, where the cardinal rule of modern punctuation, that the verb must not be separated by a stop from such essentially connected elements as the subject, object, or complement, is grossly violated. And even graver forms of this fault, as it seems to-day, are covered by Mr. Thiselton's second rule, really an extension of his first:

Where there is more than one interposition in the direct line of construction, or where an interposition involves intervening punctuation, there is a tendency to mark the resumption of that line by a semicolon or a colon. Sometimes even an interposition without intervening punctuation is sufficient to support a semi-colon or a colon.

As at III. i. 163,

Oph. And I of Ladies most deiect and wretched,
That suckt the honny of his musickt vowes;
Now see that noble and most soueraigne reason
Like sweet bells iangled out of time, and harsh,

The interposition

That suckt the honny of his musickt vowes

is comma'd off as it might be to-day, though no one would now dare to put a semicolon for the second comma as in the Quarto. In the next example the first comma is dropped and the semicolon stands in its nakedness:

we haue heere writ
To *Norway* Vncle of young *Fortenbrasse*
Who impotent and bedred scarcely heares
Of this his Nephewes purpose; to suppress
His further gate heerein,

'The Q₂ semicolon' says Professor Dover Wilson 'gives the same effect as the dashes' (which he places after '*Fortenbrasse*' and 'purpose'), but he does not explain how a semicolon is equal to two dashes, nor does he illustrate its use here by its employment elsewhere—and all this Mr. Thiselton does.

There are no instances, I think, in the Second Quarto of *Hamlet* of the semicolon standing alone between the subject and verb. But the period itself is sometimes employed to indicate the resumption of the direct line of construction, as at III. iii. 33:

I'le call upon you ere you go to bed.
And tell you what I know

where the full stop separates the pronoun from 'tell'.

One more instance of this use of the period—there are several

in the Quarto—will show that it obeys a logic still felt in modern punctuation:

Hora. Or if thou hast uphoorded in thy life
Extorted treasure in the wombe of earth
For which they say your spirits oft walke in death.
Speake of it, (I. i. 136–9)

We are all familiar with the habit of inserting a dash after we have built up a complicated introduction to a sentence to mark the appearance of the verb; or sometimes we repeat the subject itself, as we feel the need of some sign-post not provided by normal punctuation. The type of punctuation under Thiselton's two first headings need not therefore seem unreasonable to us. Nor am I arguing that only Shakespeare felt the need to use stops in this way. Such punctuation may be found in any Shakespeare text, but it is very prominent in the members of the family under discussion.

With this internal punctuation we find in the text the frequent neglect of external punctuation. Certain phrases stand punctuated in the midst of an unpunctuated complex. Horatio speaking of the Ghost's disappearance at cockcrow says:

and at his warning
Whether in sea or fire, in earth or ayre
Th' extrauagant and erring spirit hies
To his confine, (I. i. 152–5)

Why should there be a comma after 'fire' and none after 'warning' or 'ayre'? Or again in the opening speech of Claudius:

Now followes that you know *young Fortinbrasse*,
Holding a weake supposall of our worth
Or thinking by our late deare brothers death
Our state to be disioynt, and out of frame
Coleagued with this dreame of his advantage
He hath not faild (I. ii. 17–22)

The only stops here are a comma after *Fortinbrasse*, which actually separates it from the clause with which it goes, and another after 'disioynt'. Or again, to come close to the passage at issue, take the lines with which Hamlet introduces the Player's speech, where he tells how Pyrrhus (II. ii. 477–80)

Hath now this dread and black complexion smeard,
With heraldry more dismall head to foote,
Now is he totall Gules horridly trickt
With blood of fathers, mothers, daughters, sonnes,

Here the phrases

this dread and black complection smeard, With heraldry more
dismall

head to foote, Now is he totall Gules
horridly trickt With blood of fathers,

have internal but no external punctuation. But Professor Dover Wilson does not here hesitate to supply the grammatical stops. He follows the Folio, removes the internal commas, separates the first phrase from the second by no less than a colon, and puts a comma between the second and the third. Yet when he comes to Hamlet's words on man he says: 'if the sense of Q₂ were intended to be identical with the sense of F₁, stops denoting pauses after "admirable" and "Angell" would be absolutely necessary'. But if they are absolutely necessary here, why were they not necessary in the Pyrrhus passage? He supplied them readily enough in that passage; why should we not do the same here? We have not only the warrant of the Folio, but our knowledge of the habits of punctuation revealed in the Second Quarto when that document is studied as a whole for evidence about its own characteristics.

I am not then criticizing Professor Dover Wilson but rather exhorting him to stick to his principles—the critical principles that give his text its importance. Unlike two of his American admirers, Professors Parrott and Craig, the editors of a most useful edition of *Hamlet*—who urge him (shades of Professor Housman!) to retain on principle the Quarto text wherever some sense can be wrung from it (a rule they are careful not to observe themselves)—I ask him to consider each passage in the light of the document as a whole, and to remember the habits of the man who punctuated it.

One last note on these habits by Mr. Thiselton brings us to the very passage in dispute:

When the direct line of construction is displaced by transposition, a comma will sometimes mark the pause necessary for effective delivery.

Knowing something of the habits of this man we are not surprised to find the phrases,

in forme and moouing, how expresse and admirable
in action, how like an Angell
in apprehension, how like a God.

with internal but no external punctuation. Even if we were unable to classify satisfactorily the writer's habits we might yet recognize them. When, however, he begins 'how noble in

reason, how infinit in faculties' and then inverting the construction continues 'in form and moouing, how expresse and admirable' we can not only recognize the habit but classify it too—these are what Dr. Percy Simpson has described as 'commas with inversion'.

The passage in the Quarto is in a notation that (from abundant evidence elsewhere in the document and more abundant evidence in kindred documents) we can see may be transposed into the notation found in the Folio without affecting its meaning. Professor Dover Wilson, like all other editors, again and again makes such transpositions; but here and in a few other passages he not merely denies that the transposition has been correctly made, a fact which as an editor he has a right to establish if he can on intrinsic probability, for there are such errors of transcription, but he goes on to assert that such transpositions cannot be considered legitimate, though elsewhere he finds them not merely convenient but essential. His own practice contradicts his assertion.

Here then is a passage that places you at once on one side or the other; for there can be no explaining away the three commas in a row as a mere error of the printer or as the casual slips of the author's pen. Unless you dismiss as unintelligible the punctuation of the Quarto as a whole you must give some account of them; and if you reject the punctuation of this text, many others, and those closest to Shakespeare's manuscripts, stand condemned with it. The old chaos has returned. The value of Professor Dover Wilson's contribution to the text here comes from his being the first editor to realize this. He has tried to rescue this passage and two or three others by reading a meaning into them that will correspond with what to-day seems the obvious significance of the stops; but his interpretation is not merely intrinsically improbable, it leaves the transcriptional question raised by the Folio pointing unanswered. Further it leaves untouched the many passages in the Quarto and its kindred texts that defy his method of exegesis. Professor Dover Wilson's first and most important contribution has been to see the significance of the problem and not to shirk the issue; his second, second only in importance to the other, his *reductio ad absurdum* of what seemed the most plausible solution. Take, however, the three commas as commas with inversion, and not only are the demands of intrinsic and transcriptional probability immediately satisfied; the passage is brought into coherent connexion with the whole internal evidence supplied by the Quarto

itself as well as with that derived from kindred texts; and this evidence taken as a whole no longer stands in opposition to the conclusions now reached by scholars in their reconstruction of the history of the Shakespeare documents—we need no longer accept the view that the texts standing nearest to Shakespeare's manuscripts are those in which the punctuation is least intelligible. That the peculiarities of their punctuation, peculiarities that is when modern conventions are taken as the norm, are Shakespeare's the evidence leaves little doubt, and they are in line with what is found in the only manuscript with claims to come directly from his hand, the three pages in *Sir Thomas More*.

To Professor Dover Wilson's question the answer, I submit, must be given in the terms I have borrowed from Mr. Thiselton and Dr. Percy Simpson, for his own is clearly inadequate. The only alternative to this solution is the view that Shakespeare had no idea of the significance of such things as commas, and that his printers were equally ignorant.

Returning for a moment to *Romeo and Juliet*, some of you may now agree that the comma after 'soundly' is an internal comma for emphasis, of which there are scores in the best texts and many in this particular document itself. The external stop that we need to separate 'I have it, and soundly too' from the final words 'your houses!' is omitted, as are many similar external stops in the same text and in the Second Quarto of *Hamlet*.

In *Macbeth* the editor who prints

Making the green one, red

is hardly telling the whole truth. The Folio gives both Green and Red initial capitals. If these are for emphasis another expedient had to be found for suggesting the stress 'one' must carry—hence the comma. This is Mr. Thiselton's explanation as endorsed by Dr. Percy Simpson. But of course the scribe may have had the comma in his original and added the capitals.

The punctuation of two of the three passages under consideration was not for the general reader—what Shakespeare thought suitable for the public and Lord Southampton can be studied in his *Venus and Adonis* and *Lucrece*. The actors, however, would have had little difficulty, for Shakespeare was there to guide them. That they had on the whole a good grasp of his meaning such Folio texts as *Hamlet* and *2 Henry IV* clearly demonstrate; but there are errors, and some of them can be explained by supposing the scribes or actors had before them such a style of punctuation as can be found in the 'autograph' texts.

Having made a circuit of the evidence and having returned, or stumbled back, to the starting-point I now offer you a meaning for the passages—a meaning that has been accepted for generations—and an explanation, that has not been accepted, of how the true readings account for those we reject. The conclusion must be provisional till a much wider survey of Elizabethan practice at the desk and in the printing house is made available to us by scholars. The contemporary grammarians, unfortunately, help us no more in this difficulty than do the Elizabethan prosodists with the niceties of Shakespeare's versification. There has been little opportunity in the argument for the qualifications that the candid critic will, I trust, read into it. If, however, in the way of the world I have not done the justice to the views of others that I beg for my own, then I ask no better measure for myself. I am persuaded of the substantial truth of what I have said, but nevertheless—at the end I may fairly repeat the words that once introduced a much more authoritative discourse than this:

But natheless, this meditacioun
 I putte it ay under correccioun
 Of clerkes, for I am nat textueel;
 I take but the sentence, trusteth weel.
 Therefore I make a protestacioun
 That I wol stonde to correccioun.

ANNUAL LECTURE ON A MASTER MIND
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

RUSKIN

By R. W. LIVINGSTONE

Read 23 May 1945

THE Collected Works of Ruskin fill thirty-nine volumes—has any other English author written so much?—books about him, not only in our own language, are innumerable; few writers of the last century had so wide an influence. Recently, my wife asked in two well-known bookshops if they had any of his works, to be met in one by the inquiry, ‘Can you give me the name of his latest book?’, and in the other by the reply, ‘I will go and see: we keep him in the basement’. If you ask a modern undergraduate whether he has read Ruskin, the answer will almost certainly be ‘No’; unless the Bodleian catalogue misleads me, only three of his books have been reprinted since 1920—*Unto This Last* once, *Sesame and Lilies*, and the charming fairy-story, *The King of the Golden River*, five times. Rarely has an eclipse been so complete. Is this a ‘master-mind’, a permanent star in English Literature, or a brilliant meteor that flashed across the sky? Has the thinker with such significance for the last generation any message for our own, or is he merely a great writer?

Certainly he is that: no one can question his eminence as a master of the English language, and he is worth reading for this, if for no other reason. There is a common fallacy that his works consist mainly of purple patches. But he has two distinct styles, the first, coloured and ample—one of his sentences has 619 words and 80 stops¹—the second pungent and never wasting a word. His earlier manner, formed on Hooker and Johnson, is rich and highly wrought; in a contest with any other English writer of elaborate prose, Ruskin would win by the number of splendid passages that he could throw into the scale, and, if the test was quality, he might win there, too. (Is there anything finer of the sort than the description of the Campagna in *Modern Painters*, or the picture of a fishing-boat on an English beach in the *Harbours of England*?) Nor are these mere

¹ *M.P.* ii. 132.

collocations of musical words, whose effect is destroyed by minute scrutiny, for the detail is as fine as the colour is rich. Proust, who knew what literature is, speaks justly of the 'mathematical precision' of his style. Ornate writing is out of fashion to-day and the taste for it may not return. But Ruskin's second and mature manner is not out of date. Here he is as pungent, as forcible, and often as bitter as Swift, but more varied, with a more genial humour, with richer tones of colour, and a far greater imaginative power. The difference between his two styles is the difference between the Cicero of the *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino* or the *Pro Archia* and the Cicero of the *Philippics*: indeed the second manner of Ruskin has the qualities of an oratorical style, and there is no better model in English for an orator.

Ruskin did not like people who admired him as a stylist: it was as a thinker that he wished to be remembered. Certainly he is much more than a great writer. His name calls up a bewildering number of activities and achievements. He was the author of a theory of art which dominated his own time; in painting, he was the champion of the Pre-Raphaelites, of Giotto and the Primitives, of Tintoretto and Turner; in architecture he was the prophet of Gothic, and the unfortunate memories of his influence which survive in the London Law Courts as well as in the Science Museum and the Christ Church Meadow Buildings at Oxford should not make us forget what he did for its understanding and appreciation; he was no mean artist himself; he was an admirable literary critic—one of his phrases, 'the pathetic fallacy', has passed into the currency of English criticism—and then, in a field apparently remote from art and literature, he was the savage critic of Ricardo and Mill. Beyond all this he is associated with innumerable activities and causes. He founded a shop for selling good tea in small packets to the poor, a Guild to reclaim and cultivate barren or neglected land and generally reform England, a museum in Sheffield, a library of standard literature, a publishing house; he tried to make a road between the two Hinkseys, he swept a street in London to show how streets should be kept, he was one of the first supporters of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, the inspirer of Octavia Hill's rent-collecting scheme, a teacher in the Working Men's College, and the pioneer of the net book system; he painted, he wrote, and lectured incessantly. It is a puzzling medley without apparent coherence or principle, and there are failures and absurdities in it. But there is something else. This man saw beyond his age into our

own and was aware of evils, needs, and possibilities to which his contemporaries were blind. Perhaps he saw farther than we do ourselves.

But before we consider Ruskin's ideas, something should be said about Ruskin. Writers differ greatly in the degree to which they make their individuality felt. We read Shakespeare or Sophocles, and are hardly aware of the man behind the writing. We hear a voice, but the speaker is invisible. Others continually make themselves felt. To this latter class Ruskin belongs. His views are seen, and sometimes refracted, through his temperament. He is a vehement man, in his likes and dislikes, and in reading him one is conscious not only of opinions, but of personal preferences or repugnances. If we dislike his personality, we may be more aware of him than of his ideas and be repelled as some people are repelled by other *personal* writers, like Byron or Carlyle. If we like him, we overlook his foibles and tantrums as we overlook those of a friend, and even enjoy them. His sallies are φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι, but they cause others to shut their ears. This personal element in Ruskin's writing partly explains why some people cannot read him. He flies off at a tangent, allows momentary exasperations to flow unrevised from his pen, explodes in 'wrathful inuendoes against the whole modern world', and indulges in exaggerated statements of a truth, which allow his enemies to evade his criticisms by concentrating on the violence of their expression. The Press is described as 'square leagues of dirtily-printed falsehood',¹ and the Bishop of Manchester's advocacy of the Thirlmere water-works is spoken of as 'lascivious thirst'.² Such extravagances, and his now unfashionable insistence on the place of moral considerations in the field of art, give an easy opportunity to dismiss him as a fanciful and sentimental enthusiast. The lack of balance is in his nature, and allied to the acute sensibility which is an element in his genius; it grew with overwork, unhappiness, and ill health, and darkened into the tragic cloud of his latter years. Unfortunately his upbringing did nothing to correct it. He himself says of his education that it left 'my character cramped indeed, but not disciplined; and only by protection innocent, instead of by practice virtuous'.³ Throughout his life he suffered from the weaknesses of a spoiled child. A man of genius ought not to be an only son, or if he has that misfortune he should be sent to a boarding-school, where he may

¹ *Life*, ii. 302.

² *F.C.* 67.

³ *Praeterita*, i. 65.

learn to endure points of view that he dislikes. But Ruskin was brought up mainly by his parents in a home with many virtues but dominated by rigid evangelicalism. This did indeed impose a doctrine and system on his mind, but unfortunately it was the doctrine of a narrow creed, which, with advancing years, crumbled and broke up, leaving him without the firm foothold of a fixed faith. Other influences came to his help, very different from the Clapham School. Though never an exact scholar, he knew the classics well, as a reference to the index of any of his books will show, and his thought was deeply influenced by Greek,¹ most of all by Plato, of whom he wrote in 1876, 'Must read my Plato: I'm never well without that'.² But meanwhile this dissolution of the firm framework of dogma in which he had been brought up was a major cause of distress and inner conflict in a life of combat. Nor did he ever know the chastening, steadying influence of initial failure or slowly-won success. He had barely taken his degree when the first volume of *Modern Painters* took the world by storm. It is dangerous for anyone, doubly so for a man like Ruskin, to wake up at 24 and find himself famous.

Had Ruskin possessed, like Mill, a clear logical mind, he might have cured these weaknesses of nature and upbringing, but such a temperament was foreign and even repugnant to him: witness his strange denunciation of grammar and logic in the *Stones of Venice*.³ His own mind does not work by logical process, climbing securely step by step to its goal; indeed he disclaims such methods. 'Any man, who can reason at all, does it instinctively, and takes leaps over intermediate syllogisms by the score, yet never misses his footing at the end of the leap.'⁴ Ruskin feels first, reasons after; sees in intense lightning flashes, not by steady illumination; his thought takes form at once in pictures, or even develops from them. It is a habit of mind favourable to imaginative writing and to certain great qualities of style but not to systematic thinking, and there is truth in Matthew Arnold's complaint that 'genius is too busy in him, intelligence not busy enough' and that he tends 'to throw the reins to a whim, to forget all moderation and proportion, to lose the balance of his mind altogether'.⁵

Yet that judgement should not lead us to depreciate his intellectual power. The argument in his sustained writing is

¹ See his interesting comments on classical writers, Cook, *Life*, ii. 33 f., 40 f.

² *Ibid.* ii. 310.

³ ii. 105 f.

⁴ *M.P.* III. ix.

⁵ *Essays in Criticism*, p. 69.

closely reasoned, though it is the argument of an orator rather than of a thinker, of Burke, not of Plato or Kant. An acute analyst and a passionate enthusiast were bound up in one man. Mazzini described him as 'the most analytical mind in Europe', and this quality is seen not only in the amazing minuteness and exactness of his studies of cloud and mountain and rock forms, and of the details of architecture, but also in his penetrating insight into literature and painting—and into himself. Self-criticism is a rare virtue in writers; Carlyle—in many respects so akin to Ruskin—has little trace of it; but Ruskin knew his own weaknesses, and described them as mercilessly as any of his critics. Nothing in his writings is more entertaining than the self-critical notes in the later editions of *Modern Painters*.

But his systematic thought is the least satisfactory part of his writings. He is not a master-mind in the sense in which Aristotle or Spinoza or Descartes or Hobbes were master minds. He is something not less salutary or indispensable, a prophet, a Jonah crying in the modern Nineveh, though, unlike Jonah, with definite ideas about its reform. It is idle to ask from prophets what does not belong to their genius and function. They do not provide us with systems of thought. Much of their writing, dealing with some issue of the moment, will have at best an historical interest for the next generation, and there are elements in Ruskin almost as irrelevant to to-day as the foreign policy of Isaiah. For this reason he is one of the writers who read well in selections—few people will wish to struggle through *Fors Clavigera* or through *Modern Painters*, and even a short book like *Unto This Last* loses nothing by heavy cuts. But a well-chosen volume of his dicta would contain as much wisdom as the Maxims of La Rochefoucauld, and wisdom of a rarer, and more valuable kind. Having said so much of the man, by way of introduction and warning, let us turn to his views.

No one could guess the interests of Ruskin's later life from his earliest book, yet his progress to them was natural. The accident that his father possessed some paintings by Turner introduced the son to Turner's work, and he wrote the first two volumes of *Modern Painters* to vindicate to the public a neglected genius. This task led him to study 'the truth respecting art' and he developed a theory of it. From painting he passed to architecture, applied to it the principles which he had evolved, and there, too, became the champion of a cause—that of the Gothic style. Then, because to him art was not

merely art but essentially the manifestation of those who made it, he became conscious of its dependence on the character and circumstances of its creators. Men and their beliefs and outlook and the social conditions that moulded them began to appear as important as art, because the nature of art depended on them. The door opened on society and politics and civilization, and the art critic became a critic and reformer of life. He found himself in the world created by the Industrial Revolution and the Reform Bill. The calling of a fresh class into power changes, as no doubt we shall find in the next twenty years, the face of more than politics, for civilization reflects the interests, tastes, and character of the newcomers, and rises or sinks to their level. The English middle class, with all their great qualities, were more interested in wealth than in beauty or in human values, and, almost unaware that such things existed, sacrificed nature, architecture, and man to their god; while earlier generations created the chief beauty of our country, the English village, the Industrial Revolution left as its monument her ugliest deformity, the industrial town. It was in war against this spirit, incompatible with art and destructive of it, that Ruskin spent his life. He was haunted by the condition of England: 'On the deck, the aspect is of Cleopatra's galley—under hatches there is a slave hospital.' 'I cannot be consoled', he wrote, 'by a bit of Venetian glass for the destruction of Venice, nor for the destitution of a London suburb by the softness of my own armchair.'¹ So he turned from enjoyment and study of the beauty which he loved, and took a stonier road.

The gospel which Ruskin preached to his own day and to ours is profound, yet simple. Against the mercantile and materialist spirit of the age he asserted the claim of man as a spiritual being. Here is the centre from which his innumerable activities radiate, the consistent element in his inconsistencies, the fixed point to which the needle of the compass always returns, the directing principle of his thought. He wished to make politics, art, and life human, and to-day he might be called a humanist, though he would have hated that vague and abstract term. Nor is he a mere humanist. 'The natural phenomena under whose influence we exist can only be seen with their properly belonging joy and interpreted up to the measure of proper human intelligence, when they are accepted as the work, and the gift, of a Living Spirit greater than our

¹ *T. and T.* xii, para. 66.; *M.P.* II. xiv.

own.’¹ I now turn to consider how this belief determined his views on art and beyond it.

Ruskin’s theory of art, so powerful in his own day, has few followers now. He did indeed revolutionize our views of Italian painting—works by Fra Angelico no longer sell for a few pounds—he dethroned Guido Reni and Salvator, and established the greatness of Turner, and his minute studies in Gothic Architecture and his great chapter on ‘the Nature of Gothic’ have lost nothing in the passage of time. But, while forgetting or admitting all this, his detractors point to solid grounds for their criticisms. His aesthetic philosophy, with its unsuccessful attempt to define the exact relations in art of beauty, truth, and morals, may be excused by reflecting that he was no more fortunate in his adventure on the Serbonian bog of aesthetics than the armies of other critics who have sunk in it. But we note with astonishment Ruskin’s enthusiasm for the Pre-Raphaelites and for Landseer, and his statement that Holman Hunt’s ‘Light of the World is the most perfect instance of expressional purpose with technical power which the world has yet produced’,² and that ‘Awakening Conscience’ and ‘The Huguenot’ mark a new era. We are more than astonished when he speaks of the ‘pestilent art of the Renaissance’, and dismisses some of the greatest buildings of the world by saying that ‘an architecture founded on Greek and Roman models is base, unnatural, unfruitful, unenjoyable and impious’.³ This is not error but madness. Yet, as always, there is method in Ruskin’s madness, and this instance of it is a good introduction to his weakness and his strength.

He disapproved of classical architecture, because he regarded it as the creation of technique, of knowledge devoid of soul, of ‘handwork and head-work but not of heart-work’.⁴ Its formal perfection seemed to him mechanical and dead, compared to the infinite variety of Gothic architecture, full of energy and life, of ‘the strange disquietude that is its greatness—that restlessness of the dreaming mind’.⁴ Further, he thought that classical architecture, demanding finish rather than invention, gave less scope to imagination, and so limited the workman and made him less of man and more of a tool. (There the humanism, always behind all Ruskin’s thought, is clearly revealed.) He contrasts the men who carved the statues and gargoyles and

¹ *Life*, ii. 425.

² *M.P.* iii. 33, 97.

³ *S.V.* iii. 192.

⁴ *Ibid.* iii. 169.

capitals of medieval art, 'signs of the life and liberty of every workman who struck the stone', with the modern machine minders.

All their attention and strength must go to the accomplishment of the mean act. The eye of the soul must be bent upon the finger-point, and the soul's force must fill all the invisible nerves that guide it, ten hours a day, that it may not err from its steely precision, and so soul and sight be worn away, and the whole human being be lost at last—a heap of sawdust, so far as its intellectual work in this world is concerned: saved only by its Heart, which cannot go into the form of cogs and compasses, but expands, after the ten hours are over, into fireside humanity.¹

'You must either make a tool of the creature or a man of him.'² Gothic architecture, to Ruskin's mind, made the workman a man, classical architecture made him a tool. Hence his condemnation of the latter.

The fallacies in his view are apparent. This attack on classical architecture is partly prejudice and partly misconception. No doubt there is a more formal quality in classical than in Gothic architecture, but, though this may justify a personal preference for Chartres or for King's College Chapel, it does not justify wholesale condemnation of the Parthenon or of St. Peter's; if Gothic can be admired as instinct with vigorous life, classical architecture can be acclaimed as the embodiment of reason and law, and in its baroque forms it is certainly not lacking in movement and vitality. Equally fallacious is Ruskin's belief in the superior freedom of the workman on a Gothic building. It is partly true of the carver, but carving is only a small element even in a Gothic cathedral, and the ordinary mason has neither more nor less opportunity for originality in either style. Ruskin, like William Morris, had an unhistorical view of the Middle Ages and contrasted medievalism with an over-depreciated classicism to the disadvantage of the latter.³

Yet behind the fallacies we discern a view of life and art which deserves serious consideration. There is pungent and painful truth in the words in which Ruskin diagnoses what we have come to see as a grave disease of modern civilization—'the degradation of the operative into a machine'.⁴ Nor, however absurd this particular application of it may be, can we dismiss lightly the theory that art must ultimately be judged by the degree in which it expresses human greatness and goodness.

¹ *S.V.* ii. 159.

² *Ibid.* ii. 178.

³ G. Scott, *The Architecture of Humanism*, p. 141 f. ⁴ *S.V.* ii. 161, 159 f.

Ruskin held that the highest art should express the human soul at its best, and to any art that did less he denied the name of great.

In these books of mine, their distinctive character, as essays of art, is their bringing everything to a root in human passion or human hope.¹

Art is valuable or otherwise, only as it expresses the personality, activity and living perception of a good and great human soul. . . . All art is great and good and true, only so far as it is distinctively the work of manhood in its entire and highest sense: that is to say, not the work of limbs and fingers, but of the soul, aided according to her necessities, by the inferior powers; and therefore distinguished in essence from all products of these inferior powers, unhelped by the soul.²

All art is great according to the greatness of the ideas it conveys, not according to the perfection of the means adopted for conveying them.³

A hasty reader might suppose that Ruskin cared only for ethical or spiritual qualities in art and was indifferent to technique. This is completely to misunderstand him. It is absurd to suppose that he was indifferent to technical skill or without admiration for its masters. If you doubt this, read *The Laws of Fésole* or *Ariadne Florentina* or note the emphasis on 'execution' in all Ruskin's writings on art. But he held that no technical mastery could redeem work which failed to express 'the personality, activity and living perception of a good and great human soul'. Hence his rejection of those Dutch pictures in which 'among drunken boors and withered beldames, through every scene of debauchery and degradation, we follow the erring artist, not to receive one wholesome lesson, not to be touched with pity nor moved with degradation, but to watch the dexterity of the pencil, and gloat over the glittering of the hue'.⁴ Hence his criticism of Murillo's 'Beggar Boys' because the painter has only shown us 'a cunning beggar feeding greedily'.⁵ Hence his admiration for 'the great Greeks and Florentines', because of 'the habitual dwelling of their thoughts among the beings and interests of the eternal world'.

Errors in applying this principle do not of themselves discredit the principle itself. The real question remains. Is it true that 'Art is valuable or otherwise, only as it expresses the personality, activity and living perception of a good and great human soul'?⁶ Here we are in the presence of Ruskin's deepest

¹ *M.P.* v. 220.

² *S.V.* iii. 169 f.

³ *Life*, i. 341.

⁴ *M.P.* i. xxv.

⁵ *S.V.* ii. 191.

⁶ The phrase is characteristic of Ruskin's tendency to exaggerate. The word 'only' can hardly be defended unless by 'valuable' we mean 'of supreme value'.

belief, now generally rejected in favour of Art for Art's sake, of the view that choice of subject does not matter, that Art is an autonomous kingdom with its own laws and rights, and that if it conflicts with morals, morals must give way. The phrase 'Art for Art's sake' raises two distinct problems. The first is one for the moralist and in some sense for the politician: Should some restraint be put on an art which challenges accepted moral standards or runs counter to the ideals of the State? With this question Ruskin did not concern himself. The second problem is essentially aesthetic: Can art which delights to portray evil, sordid, or ignoble persons or scenes be truly great? Ruskin, as a humanist, denied that it could.

He did not say that a picture technically bad became good because the artist was a good man or because his subject was edifying. He did not wish art only to portray moral excellence; indeed he thought exactly the opposite. He puts artists in three classes, those who 'take the good and leave the evil', those who 'perceive and imitate evil only', and those who 'render all that they see in nature unhesitatingly', and he ranks the third type of artist highest. 'There is nothing which he is reluctant to behold, nothing that he is ashamed to confess: with all that lives, triumphing, falling, or suffering, he claims kindred . . . standing, in a sort, afar off, unmoved even in the deepness of his sympathy; for the spirit within him is too thoughtful to be grieved, too brave to be appalled, and too pure to be polluted.'¹ He did not interpret goodness in a narrow or didactic sense. There is nothing specifically moralistic in his favourite painters, in Turner, Tintoretto, Carpaccio, Bellini. He did not question the value of artistic merit, still less of pure beauty. He did not deny value to a work in which 'the services of composition and light and shade were pursued as if there was abstract good in them—as if, like astronomy and mathematics, they were ends in themselves', but he denied supreme value to it.² He held that a picture embodies and is the product of many things—of love of beauty, of fineness of hand and eye and mastery of technique, but also of moral and spiritual qualities; that, whether he intends it or not, the character, the soul, of the artist, his tastes and values, are revealed in the choice and treatment of his subject; that the soul, the character are the greatest things in man; that if art is indifferent to them, it is indifferent to what is greatest in him, and is not an expression of human nature at its best and most complete.

¹ *S.V.* ii. 185, 189.

² *M.P.* iii. 54.

Surely there is some truth in this? Surely Ruskin was right when he said that the choice of a subject 'involves all conditions of right moral choice'? Surely it makes a difference what a man delights to portray, and surely his character is revealed by his choice? Surely we must be very insensitive if we are indifferent whether a work of art reveals in its creator a trifling, ignoble, or sordid character, or the 'opposite'? Should we admire equally Toulouse Lautrec's portraits of the Paris underworld and the prophets and Sibyls of the Sistine Chapel, if they were equal in artistic power? The *Rape of the Lock* is a more perfect work of art than *King Lear*, but is it as great a poem? And in these instances what decides the pre-eminence of Michael Angelo and Shakespeare but choice of subject and spiritual greatness in treatment?

The fundamental fallacy of the Art for Art's sake school is a narrow conception of beauty, which concentrates on one aspect of it and forgets other aspects. A man with a handsome face and a deformed body is not a perfect type of human beauty: a picture in which moral or spiritual ugliness is allied with great aesthetic quality is not the highest kind of art. The human instrument is a lyre with many strings, and it is not enough to extract beautiful sounds from one or two of them while the rest are silent or give discordant notes. The great artists, the great writers, know this, and in them all the strings are in play and tune, and the lyre yields the music of its full compass. They work in the spirit of the Greeks who used the word *καλός* of noble men and actions and found the highest beauty in these; in the spirit of Plato, whose philosophy begins with human beauty and goes on to contemplate the beauty of institutions and laws, and after these proceeds to the sciences to see their beauty, 'drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, and creates fair and lofty thoughts in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows great and strong and finds at last the vision of a single science, which is this science of beauty everywhere.'¹ Here Ruskin follows the Greeks.

I am tempted to describe the theory of Art for Art's sake as a plea for cancers. A cancer is a perfectly healthy, natural, autonomous growth of an individual cell on its own account without reference to the rest of the body. The only complaint against it is that it is not integrated with the organism in which it takes its rise. Human society, no less than the human body,

¹ *Symposium*, 186.

suffers from cancers, from cells in it developing their own activities without relation to the whole. Special interests in industry, commerce, and the professions assert a right to complete independence. There is the same tendency in art and literature. Each separate cell inclines to live for itself alone, and the organism as a whole is sacrificed to the individualism of its parts. Ruskin objected to a cancerous growth of art indifferent to the spiritual nature of man. He insists that a force, so great, so powerful in its influence, was not autonomous but subject to the higher life of the whole organism. In his own time his insistence, now universally approved, on the claims of moral and spiritual ideals in the realm of economics was deeply resented; his insistence on their importance in the field of art, which his contemporaries rejected, is equally unfashionable to-day. I believe that both in art and economics he was right.

From art Ruskin turned to political and social problems which were to be the main preoccupation of his later years. It was a logical development. If great art is the product of the human soul, it cannot flourish in conditions which corrupt the soul, but must reflect their corruption: the good life can only be lived in a good society. If so, social and political questions are vitally connected with art. Hence his new interests. They appear already in the *Stones of Venice*; but *Unto This Last* is the first book entirely devoted to his new crusade, and the most permanently influential of all his works. In the field of art Ruskin, after meeting initial opposition, had carried all before him; his economic crusade brought him nothing but contempt and discredit. It took more than eleven years to sell 1,000 copies of *Unto This Last*, and Thackeray, then editor of the *Cornhill*, in which the essays on economics afterwards printed as *Munera Pulveris* began to appear, bowed to the storm of popular disapproval and broke off their publication. Ruskin himself was partly to blame. Many of his detailed criticisms were those of an amateur, to Mill he was unjust, his tone was violent and pugnacious, and nothing was visible to his critics except extravagance. Yet to-day his fundamental view is an accepted truism. He asserted that contemporary economists were not only mistaken, but unpractical, because they had misconceived their problem, and had treated man as an animated machine, forgetting that he was a moral and spiritual being. No one to-day doubts Ruskin's contention that economics is 'a science de-

pendent on more than arithmetic', that wealth may signify ill as well as good, that it cannot be treated as an autonomous power, independent of morals, that the real question is not who is losing or gaining it, but who is making or destroying it.¹

In all this we note Ruskin's consistency. Here, too, as in art, he is protesting against the cancerous tendency of a cell in the human organism to set itself up as an autonomous body, living its own life without regard to the whole. Here, too, he insists on 'the pre-eminence of soul',² and argues that all its creations exist only to subserve its perfection, and that, when they forget this, whatever ingenuity, intelligence, or genius they embody, they forget their true purpose. Here, too, he is humanist, asserting the claims of man, whom, like Plato, he believes to be the creation of God.

When we read Ruskin's views on economics and the social order, we feel ourselves in a mid-current of modern thought, and indeed it was Ruskin who did most to create the current, to supply the deepest and worthiest impulse to the effort to create a better world, and to give the Labour Party not perhaps a platform but a soul. He was in no sense a politician and never voted in his life. He could not be called a democrat, for he disbelieved strongly in equality, and his views on liberty would not satisfy a liberal, but he was democratic in the sense that he believed in the right of all men to the good life. His ideal of government, held by Carlyle in a more extravagant form, owes most to Plato; and was a mixture of Toryism and Socialism, a government by an *élite* of the wise and good. Such a view is more fashionable now than then. The rule of *élites* (of a very un-Platonic and un-Ruskinian type) has become familiar since the last war. Many features of the Soviet Revolution would have shocked Ruskin, but the practice of modern Russia is close to the following political aphorisms in *Fors Clavigera*.

The first duty of government is to see that people have food, fuel, and clothes. The second, that they have means of moral and intellectual education.

The duty of the government, as regards the distribution of its work, is to attend first to the wants of the necessitous. . . .

Since all are made to labour for their living, and it is not possible to labour without materials and tools, these must be provided by the government, for all persons, in the necessary quantities. . . . All these raw materials, with the tools for working them, must be provided by

¹ *U.T.L.* 58 f., 125; *Life*, ii. 150.

² *S.V.* iii. 172.

the government . . . ; and no . . . usurers may be allowed to live by lending sea to fishermen, air to fowlers, land to farmers, or bellows to smiths.¹

Scholars, painters, and musicians may be advisedly kept on due pittance, to instruct or amuse the labourer after, or at, his work. . . .

All this has a very modern ring.

For, while the future was still below the horizon, Ruskin discerned its major problems. He saw the absurdity of an economic system under which human beings were badly fed, housed, and clothed, while men who might have produced food, clothes, and housing were unemployed by millions. The parable in which he expounds this is so characteristic of his vivid, trenchant style that it is worth quoting:

Fancy a farmer's wife, to whom one or two of her servants should come at twelve o'clock at noon, crying that they had got nothing to do; that they did not know what to do next; and fancy, still farther, the said farmer's wife looking hopelessly about her rooms and yard, they being all the while considerably in disorder, not knowing where to set the spare handmaidens to work, and at last complaining bitterly that she had been obliged to give them their dinner for nothing. That's the type of the kind of political economy we practise too often in England. Would you not at once assert of such a mistress that she knew nothing of her duties? and would you not be certain, if the household were rightly managed, the mistress would be only too glad at any moment to have the help of any number of spare hands; that she would know in an instant what to set them to;—in an instant what part of tomorrow's work might be most serviceably forwarded, what part of next month's work most wisely provided for, or what new task of some profitable kind undertaken; and when the evening came, and she dismissed her servants to their recreation or their rest, or gathered them to the reading round the work-table, under the eaves in the sunset, would you not be sure to find that none of them had been overtaken by her, just because none had been left idle; that everything had been accomplished because all had been employed . . . and that as none had been dishonoured by inactivity, so none had been broken by toil?²

The philosophy of modern social reform is contained in his definition of 'economy'.

In our use of it, it constantly signifies merely sparing or saving; economy of money means saving money—economy of time, sparing time, and so on. . . . Economy no more means saving money than it means spending money. It means, the administration of a house; its stewardship; spending or saving, that is, whether money or time, or anything

¹ *F.C.* 67.

² *A Joy for Ever*, p. 12.

else, to the best possible advantage. In the simplest and clearest definition of it, economy, whether public or private, means the wise management of labour; and it means this mainly in three senses: namely, first *applying* your labour rationally; secondly, *preserving* its produce carefully; lastly, *distributing* its produce seasonably.¹

He saw the psychological disease of an acquisitive society, 'monetary asceticism . . . the refusal of pleasure and knowledge for the sake of money'.² He pleaded for international co-operation and urged that

it shall no more be thought (as it is now, with ludicrous and vain selfishness) an advantage for one nation to undersell another; and take its occupation away from it; but that the primal and eternal law of vital commerce shall be of all men understood—namely, that every nation is fitted by its character, and the nature of its territories, for some particular employments or manufactures; and that it is the true interest of every other nation to encourage it in such speciality.³

He saw as the gravest danger to true civilization the struggle between man and the machine for mastery, whether it appears in the degradation of the operative or in the unthinking exultation in mechanical achievement.

No changing of place at a hundred miles an hour, nor making of stuffs a thousand yards a minute, will make us one whit stronger, happier or wiser. There was always more in the world than men could see, walked they ever so slowly; they will see it no better for going fast. . . . As for being able to talk from place to place, that is, indeed, well and convenient; but suppose you have, originally, nothing to say! We shall be obliged at last to confess what we should long ago have known, that the really precious things are thought and sight, not pace. It does a bullet no good to go fast; and a man, if he be truly a man, no harm to go slow; for his glory is not at all in going, but in being.⁴

In education—and few people have written better on the subject—he anticipated the modern stress on manual training. 'All youths, of whatever rank, ought to learn some manual trade thoroughly; for it is quite wonderful how much a man's views of life are cleared by the attainment of the capacity of doing any one thing well with his hands and arms.' 'It would be well if all of us were good handicraftsmen in some kind . . .'⁵ And what an admirable interpretation of that strange phrase 'parity of status' are the words that follow. 'All professions should be liberal, and there should be less pride felt in peculiarity of employment and more in excellence of achievement.'⁶ He saw,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7 f.

² *M.P.* v. 357.

³ *T. and T.*, p. 5.

⁴ *M.P.* iii. 320.

⁵ *A Joy for Ever*, p. 162.

⁶ *S.V.* ii. 167.

too, not only the primacy of moral education, but, what is very rarely realized, the dependence of intellectual education on it. 'All education must be moral first, intellectual secondarily. Intellectual, before—much more without—moral education, is in completeness impossible; and in incompleteness, a calamity.'¹ There is the material for a whole book in that saying.

It is difficult to stop quoting. In the angry denunciations, bitter sarcasm, and passionate pleading of Ruskin's pages one after another of the spiritual diseases and needs of to-day are revealed.

What should be our final judgement on Ruskin? His immortality as a master of English prose is secure. But what of his teaching?

His eclipse is easy to understand. He is out of tune with much in the prevailing temper of our time. He had little interest or belief in the material achievements in which this age is so fertile and to which it devotes so much energy and attaches so much importance. His belief in science is as real as, but more critical than, ours. He knew that it 'has placed man on a higher platform', fought for a fuller recognition of it at Oxford, and complained of its neglect in education, expressing the modern view that 'for one man who is fitted for the study of words, fifty are fitted for the study of things'.² But he also saw its limitations and drew the distinction, which Wordsworth draws, between

The two natures,
The one that feels, the other that observes.

Science analyses a subject, but, however complete the analysis, the reality at the heart of things eludes it: the dissected body has everything of a human being except the life; and Aristotle's *Poetics* are an admirable analysis of poetry, but show no conception of or interest in poetry itself. This limitation of science Ruskin felt. As he says in words which an age of knowledge needs to remember: 'The tree of knowledge is not the tree of life.' 'We live to contemplate, enjoy, act, adore, and we may know all that is to be known without being able to do any of these.'³

There is a further point, in which, more justly, Ruskin antagonizes the contemporary mind, for he suffers from a weakness especially offensive to the realistic temper of the younger

¹ *F.C.* 67.

² *S.V.* iii. 50, 52 f., 165, 223.

³ *Praeterita*, ii. 336.

generation, its dislike of anything that seems sentimental, its revolt from any idealism not founded on the solid rock of fact. Proust speaks of 'the touching and tempting forms under which falsehood could insinuate itself into the very heart of his intellectual sincerity',¹ and applies to Ruskin his own words about the 'idolatry' which serves 'with the best of our hearts and minds some dear or sad fantasy which we have made for ourselves'.² To each age its own idols. Ruskin had his idols, and they are not the idols of 1920 to 1940.

Yet those members of the intelligentsia who feel that it is impossible to admire him and yet be up to date may reflect that one of the acutest of modern writers was his enthusiastic admirer. Proust called him 'one of the greatest writers of all times and all countries',³ translated three of his books including *Sesame and Lilies* (now often dismissed as girlishly sentimental), and saw the unity of thought behind his apparent inconsistencies. 'Les préoccupations multiples mais constantes de cette pensée, voilà ce qui assure à ces livres une unité plus réelle que l'unité de composition.' That is the point which throughout this lecture I have been trying to make—the consistency and unity in Ruskin's outlook. He had, what modern civilization lacks, a clear and noble philosophy of life, and our judgement of it will depend on our view of what life is and should be.

Matthew Arnold speaks of his generation as one in which

Each strives, nor knows for what he strives,
And each half lives a hundred different lives.

His words are true of our pre-war world, but they are not true of Ruskin. With all his distractions and distresses, he found what Nazi Germany and Communist Russia in their different ways have sought, what we are still seeking, an integrated principle of existence for the individual and the state. He conceived life as a system of which the sun is God; from whom man derives his light and in turn irradiates with it his own creations. He thought that the aim of civilization was to create good human beings, and, for that end, to make a world in which they can be good. He did not define this world of his dreams merely in terms of an improvement in the conditions of life, strongly as he insisted on it; this seemed to him the preliminary of the problem, not its final solution, for in the most prosperous world materialism in its protean forms would still be breaking in and

¹ *Pastiches et Mélanges*, p. 179 f.

² *L.A.*, p. 71.

³ *Pastiches et Mélanges*, p. 187.

the struggle of man against it would continue. The battle of Ruskin's life was fought on many fields and fronts. But on all it was a struggle for the supremacy of the human spirit over the material forces, whether economic, industrial, technical, scientific, or other, which lay insidious siege to it. For that reason his teaching is even more needed to-day than when he wrote, nor, until the nature of man or the conditions of human life change, will it lose its importance.

'HIPPOCRATES' AND THE *CORPUS* *HIPPOCRATICUM*

By W. H. S. JONES

Fellow of the Academy

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[N.B. I use 'Alexandrian' when referring to a place, 'Alexandrine' when referring to a period.]

THE pronouncement of Wilamowitz, that Hippocrates is a name without writings, has served as a text for much recent Hippocratic criticism. From a great diversity of opinion among the writers on the subject during the last thirty years, there emerges a general agreement to reject, or to view with deep suspicion, the testimony of those Alexandrine and post-Alexandrine scholars who ascribed to the historical Hippocrates various works included in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*.¹ Sometimes, of late years especially, certain of these works have been accepted as genuine, or probably genuine. But they are so regarded, not, for example, because Galen says that Hippocrates wrote them, but because they are thought to agree with the accounts of Hippocratic doctrine given by Plato in the *Phaedrus* and by Menon in the papyrus *Anonymus Londinensis*. Pre-Alexandrine evidence, it is thought, is the only evidence to be relied upon in this investigation.² It is, therefore, essential to weigh that evidence carefully. There are two references of importance in Plato, one in Aristotle, and one fairly long passage in *Anonymus*.

The first of the Plato references is brief and clear. In *Protagoras* 311 b, c we have the following dialogue:

'If you had conceived the idea of going to your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, of the house of the Asclepiads, and paying him a sum of money as a fee for your tuition; and if you had been asked what Hippocrates was, that you meant to pay him this money, what would you have answered?'

¹ It is supposed that anonymous works were sold by collectors to the Museum Library, and that the name of the famous Hippocrates was wrongly given them in order to enhance their value.

² Pohlenz, *Hippokrates*, 79: 'Plato und Aristoteles sind nicht nur die ältesten und sichersten, sondern sogar die einzigen Zeugen, auf die wir uns verlassen können, wenn wir über Hippokrates Authentisches feststellen wollen.'

'I should have said', he replied, 'a physician.'

'And what would you have expected to become?'

'A physician', he answered.

That is to say, Hippocrates taught medicine professionally, for fees, having 'graduated' as an Asclepiad.

The second passage, *Phaedrus* 270 c, d, contains many difficulties, and has raised a storm of controversy. Socrates and Phaedrus are discussing oratory.

Soc. Do you then think it possible to comprehend satisfactorily the nature of the soul apart from the nature of the whole?

Ph. Nay, if we are to believe Hippocrates, of the Asclepiad family, we cannot comprehend even the nature of the body without following this method of procedure.

Soc. Yes, my friend, and he is right. However, besides the evidence of Hippocrates, we must examine reason, and observe whether that is in harmony with it.

Ph. Yes, we must.

Soc. Observe, then, what it is that Hippocrates and true reason mean by 'examining nature'. Is it not in the following manner that we must inquire into the nature of anything? First, we must see whether that in which we shall wish to be craftsmen ourselves, and able also to make others such, is simple or complex. Then, if it be simple, we must observe what power it naturally has of acting, and of acting upon what; what power of being acted upon, and by what. If, however, it has many components, after enumerating them we must note about each what we noted about the simple thing, namely, through what natural power it acts, and upon what, or through what it is acted upon, and by what.

The last paragraph insists on the importance of correct analysis, and on observation of the actions and reactions between a thing, or between a thing's component parts, and the environment. Later, Plato goes on to illustrate this principle by examining the interrelations between an orator and the souls of his audience. He would have us infer that Hippocrates laid stress upon the interrelations between the body, or its component parts, and the environment, whether natural, as in health, or artificial, as in disease.

But what of the phrase 'of the whole' (τοῦ ὅλου) in the first sentence? Some scholars take it to mean 'of the whole man', i.e. of the human being, body and soul. Some support is given to this view by *Charmides* 156 e, where Socrates claims to have heard from a Thracian physician that the eye cannot be treated medically apart from the head, nor the head apart from

the body, nor the body apart from the soul. The informant of Socrates went on to say that Greek physicians erred in being unaware that they must include the soul in τὸ ὅλον; the whole that they treated was the body only. Here the context makes it plain that τὸ ὅλον means the whole man.

In the *Phaedrus* passage τὸ ὅλον must have a wider meaning, for obviously a man's environment is included in the phrase 'power to act and to be acted upon'. It possibly means 'the Universe', and many scholars explain it so. The *Charmides* passage is in either case a partial statement of what is more broadly treated in the *Phaedrus*. The one asserts the biological truth that man is an organism, the other, the more general truth of ecology, that man has his own place in the material world of which he is a part.

If this interpretation be correct, it may be of some importance for deciding the authorship of certain works in the *Corpus*. For the present, however, three things must be remembered: (a) Before Hippocrates the relations of man to his environment had been at least touched upon by Empedocles and others. (b) To hold the doctrine suggested in the *Phaedrus* may entitle a man to be called a 'great' scientist, but by itself it does not make him a great physician. (c) A physician might hold this doctrine strongly, and yet write books, e.g. on surgery or on diagnosis and morbid pathology, in which it was never mentioned. Flat contradiction of Plato's statements, or at least gross inconsistency with them, is necessary before a critic is justified in rejecting, on the Platonic evidence, any work for which Hippocratic authorship is claimed.

The Aristotelian evidence consists of an incidental reference in *Politics* vii. 4 (1326 a): 'just as Hippocrates would be called greater, not as a man but as a physician, than a person who is superior to him in stature.' We should note, however, that in *Historia Animalium* iii. 3 (512 b) he attributes to Polybus, the son-in-law of Hippocrates, the description of veins that is to be found in *Nature of Man* xi.

The last piece of pre-Alexandrine testimony is at once the longest and the most difficult. It comes from the papyrus called by its first editor¹ *Anonymus Londinensis*. The papyrus consists apparently of lecture notes taken by a medical student, and deals with (1) medico-philosophical terms and their definitions, (2) the aetiology of disease, and (3) physiology. For the second section the lecturer took as his authority (so scholars

¹ Hermann Diels in 1893.

agree) the history of medicine compiled for Aristotle by his pupil Menon. The account of Hippocrates here given aroused at first among students of medical history disappointment and bewilderment, not to say dismay. It appeared to be an inaccurate summary of parts of the Sophistic essay *Breaths*, a work in the *Corpus* thought by scholars not to have come from the hand of Hippocrates. Later criticism, on the other hand, holds that the Hippocrates of history is described in the Menonian account, and at least one scholar further infers that its unlikeness to the works in the *Corpus* proves that Hippocrates himself wrote none of them.

The passage in question is given below. As no other translation of *Anonymus* into English has hitherto been published, I quote from the edition I have prepared for the Cambridge University Press.

- V. But Hippocrates says that gases are causes of disease, as Aristotle has said in his account of him. For Hippocrates says that diseases are brought about in the following fashion. Either because of the quantity of things taken, or through their diversity, or because the things taken happen to be strong and difficult of digestion, residues are thereby produced, and when the things that have been taken are too many, the heat that produces digestion is overpowered by the multitude of foods and does not effect digestion. And because digestion is hindered residues are formed. And when the things that have been taken are of many kinds, they quarrel with one another in the belly, and because of the quarrel there is a change into residues. When however they are very coarse and hard to digest, there occurs hindrance of digestion because they are hard to assimilate, and so a change to residues takes place. From the residues rise gases, which having risen bring on diseases. What moved Hippocrates to adopt these views was the following conviction. Breath ($\piνεῦμα$), he holds, is the most necessary and the supreme component in us, since health is the result of its free, and disease of its impeded, passage. We in fact present a likeness to plants. For as they are rooted in the earth, so we too are rooted in the air by our nostrils and by our whole body. At least we are, he says, like those plants that are called 'soldiers'. For just as they, rooted in the moisture, are carried now to this moisture and now to that, even so we also, being as it were plants, are rooted in the air, and are in motion, changing our position now hither now thither. If this be so, it is clear that breath ($\piνεῦμα$) is the supreme component. On this theory, when residues occur, they give rise to breaths, which rising as vapour cause diseases. The variations in the breaths cause the various diseases. If the breaths are violent (many), they produce disease,

as they also do if they are very light (few). The changes too of breaths give rise to diseases. These changes take place in two directions, towards excessive heat or towards excessive cold. The nature of the change determines the character of the disease. This is Aristotle's view of Hippocrates.

But what Hippocrates himself says is that diseases are caused by the differences in the elemental components of the human organism . . .

[Gap in the papyrus]

VII.

that these diseases arise in us through inflammation. For these things apart from . . . of excessive fatigue, chill or heat. And it is because of the chilling or heating of bile and of phlegm that diseases result. But as a matter of fact Hippocrates goes on to say that diseases have their origin in either the air (πνεῦμα) or regimen, and the outline of these matters he thinks fit to set out thus. Whenever, he says, many are attacked at one and the same time by the same disease, the cause must be attributed to the air.¹ For if the air produce a disease, it will be the same one. When, however, many different forms of diseases occur, we must attribute them to errors of regimen, he says, employing an unsound method of argument. For there are times when many different diseases have one and the same cause. For surely fever, pleurisy and epilepsy may be the result of a surfeit, which produces diseases corresponding to the constitution of the body that takes it in. For certainly one and the same cause does not bring one and the same disease to every body, but, as we have said, many and various forms. On the other hand, sometimes different causes produce the same affection. For diarrhoea is caused through surfeit, as well as through acridness if there be any untoward flow of bile. From these facts it is manifest that Hippocrates is mistaken in this matter, as we shall show in the course of our narrative. Yet it must be said that what Aristotle tells us about him does not tally with Hippocrates' own statements about the origin of diseases.

This summary of Hippocratic doctrine, limited, it should be noticed, to the views of Hippocrates on the origin of disease, has three peculiar features:

1. It resembles nothing in the *Corpus* except *Breaths*, chapter

¹ Or 'atmosphere'.

vii of which has several verbal parallels to *Anonymus*. Whereas, however, the latter attributes disease to gases (φῦσαι) which arise from undigested residues (περιττώματα)¹ of food, the former gives as the cause of disease the air taken into the body along with our food, the word περιττώμα not being used. Diseases, it is said in *Breaths* vii, are due to faulty regimen, for food can be too great in bulk or too varied and heterogeneous. Along with much food much air (πνεῦμα) also must enter, for air is taken in with all our food. When there is congestion in the belly, gases (φῦσαι) traverse (διέδραμον) all the body. These chill certain parts of the body, thus causing diseases.

2. The reason given by *Anonymus* for the views of Hippocrates, namely that πνεῦμα is the most necessary and supreme component in us, we being rooted in the air by our nostrils and by the whole body, does not appear to be relevant to the Hippocratic aetiology that he has described, in which noxious gases are said to arise from undigested food. It is, however, closely related to *Breaths* iii, iv, and v.

3. The lecturer (or compiler) is astonished at 'Aristotle's' (i.e. Menon's) account; after giving a summary of it for the second time (vi. 31-43) he declares that Hippocrates himself tells quite a different story.²

There is obviously much room for conjecture in interpreting this difficult, confused, and confusing passage. A case can be made out either for taking *Breaths* as the source or for holding that the authority used by Menon is now lost. The only certainty is that the writer of *Anonymus* was dissatisfied.

This pre-Alexandrine evidence, interesting and important though it may be, is sketchy and vague. The *Phaedrus* passage gives a general principle of biological research, not easy to understand without details and examples from medical science. The Menonian passage contains a conjectural account of the cause of disease, only in part original, and very difficult for an ancient researcher to apply. Taken together they leave untouched diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, surgery—in fact nearly all that concerns the general practitioner and the specialist. How can such evidence be used to decide the authorship of works which are not concerned with these two doctrines, and therefore make no use of them? Of such a nature are many of the best works in the *Corpus*.

¹ *Anonymus* names several other physicians besides 'Hippocrates' who attributed disease to residues of food.

² Taken from *Nature of Man* and *Diseases* i.

Difficult to apply in any case as a test of authenticity, this evidence becomes yet more so when we remember that the views of Hippocrates may have changed in the course of his career, that Plato and Menon may be referring, not to written works, but to his oral instruction, and that the passage in *Anonymus* appears hopelessly garbled. In brief, the pre-Alexandrine testimony, being uncertain and inadequate, is unsatisfactory as a primary test of authorship, especially when applied to works that scarcely touch its field at all.

If Menon be referring to *Breaths*, we have perhaps in *Anonymus* v. 36 f. the first association of the historical Hippocrates with the *Corpus* of works that bears his name, although other possible contacts will be mentioned later in Note A. But with the Alexandrian commentators and glossarists, beginning about 200 B.C., comes the period when 'Hippocrates' and the *Corpus* are not connected only, but practically identified. Although each of the Alexandrian scholars had his own view about this or that work in the *Corpus*, accepting some works as Hippocratic and rejecting others, we can be quite sure that none rejected them all. Had any critic condemned the whole *Corpus* as non-Hippocratic, Galen or one of his predecessors would certainly have told us of so remarkable an opinion. Nobody, therefore, can have taken up this extreme position; so the modern critics who adopt it must assume that during the century between Menon and Xenocritus, the first Hippocratic glossarist, a revolution of opinion occurred. Their hypothesis implies (*a*) that Menon either did not know, or refused to accept as genuine, that body of scientific writing which every known authority from the foundation of Alexandria accepted without question as containing some works at least of the historical Hippocrates; and (*b*) that the old, and correct, information about the writings of the historical Hippocrates was lost and forgotten, while a new view, that genuine works are contained in the *Corpus*, took its place and won universal acceptance. And this radical change occurred (be it noted) in silence, unrecorded and unnoticed. Moreover, the supposititious works that supplanted the 'true' Hippocrates were books mostly written between 430 and 350 B.C., of which some at least must have been in circulation for a long time, as Aristotle refers to one of them, though ascribing it, not to Hippocrates, but to his son-in-law. Max Wellmann¹ believes that Diocles, a contemporary of Aristotle, was acquainted with thirteen treatises of the *Corpus* and 'presumably'

¹ *Die Fragmente der sikelischen Ärzte*, p. 64.

(*vermutlich*) with three others. If they were in circulation, however restricted, the Alexandrian authorities would almost certainly know something of them, and so would be unlikely victims of self-deception or fraud. A limited circulation was to be expected, as most of the treatises appealed to a small public only; a few of them were possibly 'published' only in so far as medical students kept their 'lecture notes', or copies of their teachers' note-books, for use in their later professional work. But however small the public may have been, we can be sure that it was large enough to reduce to a minimum the possibility of wholesale blundering among the Alexandrian librarians.

Among the books, all of them anonymous, accepted as Hippocratic by the later tradition are some which were obviously written by a really great physician. These present a body of not inconsistent doctrines, and seem to be the work, if not of one man, at least of one school. Their relation to the Plato-Menon evidence is slight, as they deal with other departments of medicine; a case can be made out, either for conformity or for nonconformity between this evidence and each of the works to which I refer.

From these works—the chief are *Ancient Medicine*, the surgical treatises, *Aphorisms*, *Epidemics* i and iii, *Airs, Waters, Places*, and *Prognostic*—has been put together that medical theory which until recently has been regarded as 'Hippocratic'. It is of the non-speculative type that is closely connected with medical practice, dealing with humours, coction, crisis, prognosis from sweat, stools, urine, the conception of disease as an *ἀγών*, the result of which depended upon the healing power of nature, the mild regimen adopted in the treatment of the sick, the influence of age, climate, and season on disease, 'general' pathology, and the concentration of attention on the individual patient.

The content of these books, and of many others in the *Corpus*, is admirable, if not as literature, at least as the embodiment of scientific thought. The reader is struck with amazement by such passages as these:

1. Declare the past, diagnose the present, foretell the future; practise these acts. As to diseases, make a habit of two things—to help, or at least to do no harm. The Art has three factors—the disease, the patient, and the physician. The physician is the servant of the Art. The patient must co-operate with the physician in combating the disease.

Epidemics I. x1.

2. The following were the circumstances attending the diseases, from which I framed my judgements, learning from the common nature

of all and from the particular nature of the individual, from the disease, the patient, the regimen prescribed, and the prescriber—for these make a diagnosis more favourable or less—from the constitution, both as a whole and with respect to the parts, of the weather and of each region; from the custom, mode of life, practices, and age of each patient; from talk, manner, silence, thoughts, sleep or absence of sleep, the nature and time of dreams, pluckings, scratchings, tears; from the exacerbations, stools, urine, sputa, vomit, the antecedents and consequents of each member in the succession of diseases, the abscessions¹ to a fatal issue or to a crisis, sweat, rigor, chill, cough, sneezes, hiccoughs, breathing, belchings, flatulence, silent or noisy, haemorrhages and haemorrhoids. From these symptoms we must also consider what their consequents are.

Epidemics I. xxiii.

3.

Fourteen Cases

Case VIII

Erasinus lived by the gully of Boötes. Was seized with fever after supper and had a troubled night.

First day. Quiet, but the night was painful.

Second day. General exacerbation; delirium at night.

Third day. Pain and much delirium.

Fourth day. Very uncomfortable; no sleep at night; dreams and wandering. Then worse symptoms, of a striking and significant character; fear and discomfort.

Fifth day. Early in the morning was composed and in complete possession of his senses. But long before mid-day was madly delirious; could not restrain himself; extremities cold and rather livid; urine suppressed; died about sunset.

In this patient the fever was throughout accompanied by sweat; the hypochondria were swollen, distended, and painful, urine black,² with round, suspended particles which did not settle. There were solid discharges from the bowels. Thirst throughout not very great. Many convulsions with sweating about the time of death.

Epidemics i.

A scholarly physician, on comparing the evidence of Plato and Menon with these three passages from *Epidemics* i, would comment upon the meagre nature of the former, and upon the depth of thought, insight into general principles, and power of

¹ 'Abscession' is a word coined to express the expulsion in the form of an abscess or rash, &c., of such parts of 'peccant humours' as are not excreted through the normal channels. The Greek word is ἀπόστασις, 'abscess' being ἀπόστημα.

² i.e. dark, or 'port-wine' coloured.

pertinent observation everywhere manifest in the latter. 'The one is mediocre,' he would say, 'the other is the writing of a genius.' Although Plato admired Hippocrates, his account of Hippocratic method in the *Phaedrus* is not closely connected with the achievements of Hippocrates as a physician; Hippocratic doctrine as described in *Anonymus* might have been held by anybody.

It is not contended that the evidence of Plato and Menon is inaccurate, or that Hippocrates necessarily wrote *Epidemics* i; I merely maintain that those who would form a correct estimate of fifth-century science must look elsewhere than in the *Phaedrus* and in *Anonymus*.

Dr. William F. Petersen published ten years ago a long work in six volumes called *The Patient and the Weather*. It is strictly technical and professional. Yet the author goes out of his way to lavish praise on the scientific thought of the *Corpus*. He devotes a whole chapter to 'Hippocrates', speaking of his 'superb clinical objectivity'.¹ In another place he says that he 'can but marvel at the intuition so displayed'.² A few pages later: 'Based wholly on clinical observation and on the logical interpretation of such observations, without the laboratory, without statistics, without the aid of all the basic sciences, there was here clearly expressed a broad principle that underlies disease manifestation.'³

The old view, that the historical Hippocrates wrote some of the works in the *Corpus*, is possibly, even probably, true, but its truth cannot be proved. There is nothing in several of them, e.g. the surgical treatises, *Aphorisms*, and the forty-two clinical histories of *Epidemics* i and iii, so contrary to a sober interpretation of Plato and Menon that an honest critic is forced on that ground to reject them. On the other hand, probability is not proof, not even that secondary and inferior type of proof, as opposed to absolute or scientific proof, which is accepted as satisfactory by historians. Erotian, Galen, and the Hippocratic scholars before them, who never dreamt of questioning the authenticity of these books, may very possibly have been mistaken without being victims of wholesale fraud. We are forced in fact strictly to be agnostics; many of us, however, feel that our agnosticism is tempered by the inward conviction that some of these works, if not by the hand of Hippocrates, at

¹ vol. i, part i, p. 16.

² p. 14.

³ p. 20. Petersen is speaking chiefly of *Airs, Waters, Places*.

least came from his brain through or by the hand of devoted pupils.

Although certainty is impossible, we are bound to look for the most probable reason why a collection of books, which even ancient authorities realized could not have been written by one man, came to be associated with the name of Hippocrates.

We ought, I think, to rule out fraud, ignorance, and carelessness. Galen and his predecessors were by no means prone to accept as genuine every work regarded as such by some of their fellow critics. Edelstein¹ even makes a point in favour of his own theory out of the fact that each book in the *Corpus* was rejected by one ancient authority or another.

A summary of the well-known features of the *Corpus* and of its components may at least point the way to a likely conclusion.

1. All the writings are anonymous.
2. The titles of many were by no means fixed in ancient times.²
3. There were several collections of Hippocratic writings so called,³ and the order of the works contained in them was not fixed.
4. Although some are redacted works, many are fragments, or a series of such, or even notes and jottings evidently not intended for publication, but for personal or private use.
5. Some may be pre-Hippocratic and a few of the third century B.C., but most were written between 430 and 350, i.e. roughly within the lifetime of Hippocrates himself.
6. All are written in 'scientific' Ionic.

The *Corpus* includes:

1. Text-books for physicians, e.g. the surgical treatises, *Prognostic, Airs, Waters, Places, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Aphorisms*, and some thirty others; many of these, including all the gynaecological books, show characteristics of the Cnidian School.

¹ Pauly, *Nachträge*, 1317: 'Keine hippokratische Schrift ist so gut bezeugt, dass sie einer Untersuchung über Lehre und Werk des H. zugrunde gelegt werden kann.' See also his *The Genuine Works of Hippocrates*, p. 237, note 4 (end).

² Littré says: 'Ces faits prouvent que les titres des livres n'y ont pas été mis par les auteurs eux-mêmes' (i, pp. 151, 152).

³ 'Toutes les œuvres d'Hippocrate dans la bouche d'Érotien et de Galien, signifient celles qu'ils connaissent' (i, p. 135). It is difficult to make accurate lists, but Bacchius appears to have known 23, Erotian 49, Galen rather more (Ilderg in Teubner edition, *Prolegomena*, xxxiv, Littré, i. 133-53, Jones, *Hippocrates*, vol. I. xxxviii ff.).

2. Text-books for laymen, e.g. *Regimen in Health*, *Regimen ii-iv*, *Affections*.
3. Polemical works: *Sacred Disease* (attacking superstition) and *Ancient Medicine* (attacking the intrusion of speculative philosophy into medicine).
4. Sophistic essays: *The Art*, *Breaths*.
5. Attempts to apply to medicine the speculative method of early Greek philosophy: *Regimen i*, *Nutrient*.
6. Material for research, note-books, and scrap-books: *Epidemics i-vii*, *Humours*.

This medley, covering practically the whole field of medicine as known in ancient times, and representing different and even opposite schools of thought, was somehow, and at some time, brought together and associated with the name of Hippocrates. There seem to be only two ways in which this could have happened:

1. By gradual accretion round a great name at Alexandria or elsewhere. But such accretion would imply almost incredible stupidity and carelessness, which, we have seen, were unlikely to exist. A few works, however, may have been added to the *Corpus* in this way; every *Corpus* was subject to such a risk.
2. By being preserved as a collection, for some reason or other, in a school, as the Platonic *Corpus* was preserved in the Academy and the Aristotelian *Corpus* in the Lyceum.

Of these two possible ways the second is *a priori* by far the more probable. A representative collection like the *Corpus* may well have been the library, or the remains of one, belonging to a master-physician or to a medical school. Tradition has it that Hippocrates burnt the library of the school at Cnidos, or Cos, in order to have a monopoly of the knowledge it contained. This legend at least shows that 'school' libraries existed, and that they were highly prized. Every medical student needs books, and the schools of Cos and Cnidos, in particular, were centres of training, as were all the schools associated with places. They must be distinguished from the sects, which centred round individual physicians with peculiar opinions of their own.¹ This obviously important side of medical science is often referred to by our authorities, and it should be specially noticed that Plato's remarks in the *Protagoras* show that a medical student

¹ A school and a sect were sometimes combined, as in the Dogmatists, founded by the son and son-in-law of Hippocrates, and in the Herophileans and Erasistrateans at Alexandria.

would commonly attach himself to the head of a school as a kind of apprentice.

A good physician, who was both a researcher and a trainer of students, would naturally collect just such a library of books as we have in the *Corpus*. He would welcome the Cnidian books¹ for their usefulness to students and to the doctor on his rounds. He might receive 'presentation copies' of essays from distinguished laymen, and would secure the best works on physical training and regimen. Notes of interesting 'cases' would certainly be included in the collection. Important matters like medical etiquette, manners, deportment, would not be left to changing tradition, but put into writing in some form or other.

It is therefore not only possible but *a priori* likely that the bulk of the writings in the *Corpus* were associated with the name of Hippocrates, not because they were thought to be written by him, but because they originally belonged to him or to his school.² When they were copied, and more generally known, it would be easy for various 'collections' to come into existence, with losses and additions, and with differences in order and in the titles. In this way our families of manuscripts may have arisen.

All this is speculative, and must not be made more so by idle conjecture. Yet it is just possible that Praxagoras of Cos, the teacher of the great Alexandrian physician Herophilus, generally thought to have been the first commentator upon a work in the *Corpus*, may have given to his pupil a copy of the Coan medical library, or even the original, for the Library at Alexandria. I make the suggestion merely to show that the hypothesis of a great deception or fraud is not the only, nor perhaps the most likely, solution of the Hippocratic problem. There may be others. On my own suggestion I would lay no stress. We shall probably have many more put forward by scholars; for the evidence provides a wide field for conjecture, a playground or training-place for students who wish to exercise their intellectual ingenuity. One or other may light upon the correct answer, but 'Even if he should chance to say the complete truth, yet he himself knows not that it is so. But about all things there is Opinion.'³

¹ See also Note B for another possible source of Cnidian elements in the *Corpus*.

² An early name for the collection was τὰ τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους, Galen, xvii B. 24.

³ Xenophanes, fr. 34.

We must, as I have said, maintain an attitude of strict agnosticism in the face of the darkness and difficulty that obscure this question. We should therefore cling all the more tightly to the sure possession that we have. There is, within the *Corpus*, the work of a medical genius, perhaps the greatest genius among all the physicians whose writings have come down to us. He inherited much from his predecessors, but either personally or through his pupils he bequeathed far more to his successors. Whether or not his name was Hippocrates, whether or not he was the man to whom Plato refers in the *Phaedrus*, the inheritance is still ours.

CONCLUSION

All research, classical and other, must, if it is to produce results of any value, start from an adequate foundation of indisputable fact. In natural science, research is by its very nature confined to verifiable facts; literary research is more exposed to error and fallacy, and lacks the all-important safeguard of experiment.

As a basis for the discussion of the Hippocratic question the Platonic evidence is too slight, the Menonian both too slight and too uncertain, and the Alexandrine and post-Alexandrine too insecurely linked to the historical Hippocrates and his school. It is fatally easy to begin with a conjecture, perhaps a plausible one, and build upon it an imposing edifice altogether unlike the equally imposing edifice built by another student on another, but equally plausible, conjecture. Such has been the fate of nearly all recent Hippocratic criticism.

There is one outstanding exception. The late Professor W. A. Heidel wrote a short work, *Hippocratic Medicine, its Spirit and Method*, published in New York in 1941. He realized that the only solid foundation on which to build are the works extant in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*. From this material can be discovered, not indeed anything certain about Hippocrates, but a clear picture of medical science and of its best work during the period when Greek thought and culture were at their highest level. Beyond this all is uncertainty.

Heidel confines his attention to this internal evidence, as it may be called. But the external evidence, both pre-Alexandrine and other, although useless as a foundation, is a supplementary aid of some value. Its proper place is to serve, not as a founda-

tion, but as a support. It affords a confirmatory test for conclusions reached by deduction from sound data.

There are, however, two pieces of preliminary work to be done before the beginning made by Heidel can be developed and the *Corpus* set definitely and finally in its proper relation to Greek thought and to Greek literature.

There is first a great need of a work on Hippocratic grammar, dialect, and style, with examples sufficiently numerous to show the linguistic affinities of every work in the *Corpus*.

Then we need a Hippocratic lexicon. Perhaps no great attention need be given to words that have little to tell us, such as λέ, καί, ἔχω, which occupy so much of Heiberg's index to the only instalment we have of the Hippocrates section of the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*. But the really significant words and phrases, those that throw light on the origin of a work or on its relationship to other works, must all be recorded. This is by far the more difficult and laborious of the two preliminaries.

With these aids, and with close scrutiny of obviously connected passages, both when the connexion is linguistic and also when it is suggested by the sense (e.g. *Airs, Waters, Places* and *Sacred Disease; Ancient Medicine* and *Regimen in Acute Diseases*), the path marked out by Heidel could be widened into a broad highway along which might travel all who, without being experts, wish to enjoy a clear view of Greek science.

Something of this work has already been done in the doctoral theses that have appeared in great numbers on the Continent during the last hundred years. But these, sectional and restricted in scope, are unco-ordinated and without common purpose. There is in them far too much beating of the air, idle speculation, trifling with unessentials, guessing at the unattainable. If a quarter of the learned labour that has been thus spent had been co-ordinated and directed to the only object within the power of scholarship to reach, the Hippocratic problem would many years ago have ceased to be discussed. Yet the words of Deichgräber (p. 172) are a warning against all over-confidence: 'Diese Geschichte zu schreiben wird aber nur dann möglich sein, wenn der moderne Arzt dem Philologen zu Hilfe kommt.'

APPENDIX

In the preceding essay I have tried to draw the main outlines of what may be called the 'Hippocratic question'. So as not to obscure them, I have withheld many points and considerations which, though pertinent, are, to a certain extent, matters of personal opinion. These I have grouped together in the form of three 'Notes', adding any other details which may prove helpful.

NOTE A. PRE-ALEXANDRINE EVIDENCE

(a) PLATONIC EVIDENCE. In *Protagoras* 311 b there is a touch of irony or contempt in the reference to fees for instruction, for Hippocrates is thus classed with the despised Sophists. This sarcastic tinge is perhaps deepened by the addition 'of the Asclepiad family'. It is like referring to a man as 'the learned Doctor'. Cf. *Republic* 405 d, where κομφοὶ Ἀσκληπιάδαι reminds one of Aristotle's τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ κομφοὶ καὶ περιεργοὶ in *De respiratione* xxi. 7. Κομψός, in fact, has a somewhat disparaging connotation.

This touch of irony is almost certainly present in the *Phaedrus* passage. After admitting that Hippocrates κολῶς λέγει, Socrates goes on to say that in spite of this the doctrine of Hippocrates must be compared with ὁλ ὄγος, in order to see if they agree. Perhaps Plato means that the *dictum* of Hippocrates may be true in medicine, but that further examination is necessary before it can be accepted as universally true. At any rate, he proceeds to unfold in obviously Platonic language his favourite method of Διαίρεσις. Littré (i. 307) saw that we have here, not a quotation from Hippocrates, but Plato's own words.

Plato apparently argues thus: 'Hippocrates says that to understand the nature of the human body one must understand the nature of the whole. This is correct, and illustrates a principle of general application. In fact ὁ ἀληθῆς λόγος, the correct principle of research, requires my method of Διαίρεσις, which is only an expansion of the summary principle of Hippocrates.'

Perhaps τὸ ὅλον means 'the pertinent whole', i.e. any unit and the environment which it affects or by which it is affected. So it may mean any 'whole' from the smallest possible up to the cosmos.

Galen (*C.M.G.* v. 9, 1, p. 55), L. Robin in the Budé edition, Pohlenz in his *Hippokrates* are among those who equate τὸ ὅλον and the cosmos; those who take it to mean 'the whole man' include Hermias (*In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. Couvreur, p. 245), Jowett, and Edelstein. W. H. Thompson's comment is interesting. He seems perplexed by the apparent *non sequitur* of the passage, saying finally (p. 124 of his edition): 'What if, after all, Plato means nothing more by ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις than the general law of the One in Many?' (i.e. ἐν πολλῶ, πολλὰ ἐν). A strange conclusion for an accomplished scholar like Thompson to draw, unless he

were bewildered by the perplexity of the problem. All the Hippocratic doctrine that can with any degree of certainty be extracted from the passage is this: to investigate the nature of the human body we must also investigate the nature of all the environment that is pertinent in any particular instance. How far Hippocrates followed Plato's method of logical analysis, or whether he followed it at all, is a matter of conjecture.

(b) MENONIAN EVIDENCE. There are more difficulties in the passage *Anonymus* v. 35–vii. 40 than those already mentioned. Is it, for instance, likely that a 'great' physician would have taken one form only of air, namely the gases arising from residues of food, as the sole cause of disease? Even the special pleader who wrote *Breaths* takes as his αἴτιον not one, but any form of air. As a matter of fact, Pohlenz maintains that Menon himself spoke only of those φῦσαι which enter the body with nutriment, and that the excretion of gases from residues is an interpolation of a doxographer who took excerpts from Menon's history of medicine (*Hippokrates*, pp. 67, 68).

It is likely enough that the lecturer or writer represented by *Anonymus* used, not Menon's actual work, but extracts or notes made, rather carelessly, by some compiler. Where we happen to have the original text used by this compiler, i.e. when he refers to Plato, the general effect on the reader is much the same as that produced by comparing the account of Hippocrates with its possible source in *Breaths* vii. Plato's views, for example, derived from various parts of the *Timaeus*, are prefixed by a discrimination of σύνθαρσις, μίξις, and διάκρσις (xiv. 16), which is to be found neither in the *Timaeus* nor anywhere else in Plato. The distinction between these terms is Stoic, as we learn from Stobaeus (Arius Didymus in *Eclogae ethicae*, 1, 17, Diels, *Doxographi*, 463, 20). Then various discrepancies occur. There are difficulties in reconciling xv. 22–4 and *Timaeus* 73 c, d, xv. 33 and *Timaeus* 73 e; xvi is a very free paraphrase of 75 a–c. In xvii. 4 the writer has (ἴνα) ἡ καρδίᾳ, φησί, πυκνικεῖνῆτος [sic] οὔσα ἀλλομένη μὴ ῥηγνύηται. In spite of φησί, this is not in *Timaeus*, nor is πυκνικεῖνῆτος. A free paraphrase of *Timaeus* 82 d, e is given in xvii. 35–43 as an actual quotation (φησί again, xvii. 36). In *Timaeus* 82 a we are given a threefold origin of disease from the four elements, but in the text of *Anonymus* (xvii. 11–17) two causes of disease only are said to be παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, though the discrepancy in this case can be cleared away by emendation. Finally, Plato does not use περίττωμα in the technical sense of 'food residue', but it is stated in xvii. 14 and xviii. 1 that he does. Some of these points are slight, but their cumulative effect is great. We are forced to conclude that either the 'anonymous' writer, or the authority he used, abridged or paraphrased the original source with great carelessness. This carelessness has affected not only the account of Plato, but also that of Hippocratic aetiology, the difficulties of which may well be due to this cause.

The writer of *Anonymus* is himself dissatisfied with 'Aristotle's'—that is Menon's—summary of Hippocratic doctrine (vi. 44 and vii. 37), and obviously considers it incorrect. When he proceeds to give what he says are Hippocrates' genuine views, he takes them from *Diseases* i and from *Nature of Man*, afterwards attributed by him (as also by Aristotle) to Polybus, thus neglecting entirely *Airs, Waters, Places*, and other works in the *Corpus* which would have afforded equally good, or even better, material. These 'real' views of Hippocrates he criticizes sharply in vii. 23: οὐχ ὑγιᾶς ποιούμενος τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν . . . 36 ὡς ψεύδεται περὶ τούτων ἀνὴρ. In fact, he shows little of the submissive veneration in which the name of Hippocrates is said to have been held in Hellenistic times.

A medical historian might be tempted to accept the hypothesis of a substitution of a fictitious Hippocrates for the real physician, were the aetiological views as given by Menon adequate and satisfactory. But to reduce all the causes of disease to flatulence only is to commit the very fault condemned by the writer of *Ancient Medicine*. It is to substitute an unverifiable hypothesis, 'philosophic' speculation, for the analysis of medical experience characteristic of the best Greek medical science, and surely characteristic of the 'great' Hippocrates.

My own view is that Hippocrates may have said, reasonably enough, that flatulence was a common symptom of disease, which pronouncement was extended by Menon (or a doxographer) to the postulate that all disease is due to it. Perhaps, however, Pohlenz is right in holding that the limitation of φῦσα to flatulence is an interpolation, Hippocrates having merely maintained that most diseases are air-borne. This view is corroborated by vi. 13–31, where the reason for the Hippocratic aetiology is said to be the importance, not of flatulence, but of air generally.

To sum up. We can be certain that Plato attributed to Hippocrates the doctrine that 'to investigate the part one must investigate the whole', and that Menon recorded as one of his medical theories the great importance of air, at least of 'air in the body'. Beyond this all is conjecture. I myself, at least, think that we are on unsafe ground if we go further, and that in any case there are insufficient data in the pre-Alexandrine testimony to afford very great help to the student of Greek medical history. I will give, however, the views of our chief modern authorities.

Fredrich concludes that all attempts to decide from the evidence of Plato and of *Anonymus* what works in the *Corpus* were written by Hippocrates are doomed to failure. 'Hippocrates did not write a work on the method of medicine. He merely worked as a genuine physician, and by example and teaching made others efficient. The authors of many books in the *Corpus* are his scholars and followers and were inspired by him.' (*Hippokratische Untersuchungen*, p. 4.)

Wellmann holds that *Anonymus* in the account of Hippocrates refers to *Breaths*, but also holds that a collection of Hippocratic works was made by Diocles, who, he says, 'als Schöpfer des ersten hippokratischen

Schriftencorpus so viel und so wenig wusste vom echten, 'grossen' Hippokrates wie wir' (*Die Fragmente der sikelischen Ärzte*, p. 64). In *Hermes*, lxiv (1929), pp. 16 ff., he assumes the genuineness of some Hippocratic works. So Wilamowitz, *ibid.*, pp. 480 ff.

Deichgräber, from the indications of the pre-Alexandrine evidence, accepts as genuine *Epidemics* i and iii, *Epidemics* ii, iv, vi; *Humours*; *Surgery*; *Instruments of Reduction*. He thinks them closely related to *Prognostic*; *Fractures*; *Joints*; *Nature of Man*; *Airs, Waters, Places*; *Sacred Disease*; *Epidemics* v and vii (*Die Epidemien*, pp. 163, 169-70).

Pohlenz from the same evidence accepts *Sacred Disease*; *Airs, Waters, Places*; *Prognostic*; *Epidemics* i and iii (*Hippokrates*, pp. 79, 80).

Nestle, also from the same evidence, considers genuine *Prognostic*; *Epidemics* i and iii; *Airs, Waters, Places*; *Fractures*; *Joints*; *Instruments of Reduction*; parts of *Aphorisms*; *Sacred Disease*; *Regimen in Health*; *Epidemics* ii, iv, vi (*Hippocratica*, p. 35).

Jaeger says: 'Aus den Angaben des Menonpapyrus für die moderne Hippokratesforschung ein brauchbares Kriterium des Echten und Unechten zu gewinnen, hat sich als ebenso unmöglich herausgestellt, wie die berühmte Charakteristik der hippokratischen Methode in Platos 'Phaidros' sich hierfür als ein ungeeigneter Ausgangspunkt erwiesen hat' (*Diokles*, p. 235).

Edelstein considers no work certainly genuine.

Litré believed that the *Phaedrus* passage refers to *Ancient Medicine*; he therefore regarded this as a genuine work of Hippocrates and used it as a test of Hippocratic authorship. His list of genuine works is: *Ancient Medicine*; *Prognostic*; *Aphorisms*; *Epidemics* i and iii; *Regimen in Acute Diseases*; *Airs, Waters, Places*; *Joints*; *Fractures*; *Instruments of Reduction*; *Wounds in the Head*; *Oath*; *Law* (vol. i, p. 293). Recent criticism rejects *Ancient Medicine* because of its differences from Menon's testimony.

There are a few other possible contacts between pre-Alexandrines and the *Corpus*. The first two are given in Litré (i, pp. 66-73).

Ctesias of Cnidos, who took part in the expedition of Cyrus the younger, is said by Galen (xviii A. 731) to have criticized Hippocrates for a certain method of reducing a dislocation. This method appears in *Fractures*. But Edelstein points out that other surgeons besides Hippocrates may have used this method, and Diels thinks it unlikely that Ctesias mentioned Hippocrates by name. See Edelstein, *The Genuine Works*, p. 241, and Withington, *Hippocrates*, iii, p. 92.

Litré (i, pp. 72, 73) thinks that *Aphorisms* vi. 19, where it is said that certain severe cuts never heal completely, is referred to three times in Aristotle, quoting *Historia animalium* iii. 11. Here again the surgical lore may have been common knowledge, so that a direct reference may not be the only explanation of the similarity.

The last instance is one that appeals to me strongly, chiefly for subjective reasons. In *Republic* 403 e Plato says that the physical condition of athletes is unstable and precarious; if they depart from their

usual regimen even to the slightest degree, they fall seriously ill. A very similar remark occurs in *Prorrhetic* ii. 1, and Adam quotes it in his note on the passage. He does not, however, quote *Aphorisms* i. 3, where it is stated that in the case of athletes αἱ εὐεξίαι are σφαλεραί. Now Plato says that the ἐξίς of athletes is σφαλερὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν. The adjective σφαλερός is not common in Plato; seven instances only are given by Ast. Nor do I remember having seen it often in the *Corpus*, but in the first five aphorisms of the First Section it occurs no less than eight times.

NOTE B. ALEXANDRINE AND POST-ALEXANDRINE EVIDENCE

The work of the glossarists and commentators raises few serious problems, although the details of it are sometimes uncertain. Some post-Galenic commentaries are still extant; pre-Galenic comment we know, with few exceptions, only from Galen himself and the Neronian glossarist Erotian, whose work survives, but not in its original form. In these two writers we can trace a tradition going backwards from Galen to the earliest scholars of Alexandria (Pauly, 1807-11, and Littré, i. 80-132). The Alexandrian tradition is linked to that of Cos by Praxagoras, the Coan teacher of Herophilus (Galen, vii. 585), and to that of Cnidos by the Cnidian Chrysippus, who was the teacher of Erasistratus (xi. 197). Alexandria soon superseded Cos and Cnidos as a training-place for physicians and surgeons, so that it is a tempting guess to suppose that Praxagoras and Chrysippus passed on to their pupils Coan and Cnidian books, and that this is a possible reason for the strong Cnidian element in the *Corpus*.

So there is a chain, twofold at first, the two parts of which—the physician Hippocrates and the *Corpus*—meet soon after the foundation of Alexandria and continue as a single combined chain down to Galen and after. The last links are strong enough, for Galen was careful, learned, and honest. But the links of both the earlier, separate chains are much weaker, and some are broken. Any supplementary evidence, therefore, outside the direct line from Bacchius to Galen is of great interest and value. Such evidence we have in the Latin medical writer Celsus.

Scholars are not agreed about the sources he used. Wellmann supposes that the chief was a Greek work by his friend Cassius; F. Marx, who published an invaluable edition of Celsus in 1915, believes that the original was written in Greek by Titus Aufidius Siculus, a friend of Asclepiades (W. G. Spencer, *Introduction* to Loeb edition, vol. 1. vii-xiv). In addition to his other authorities Celsus refers to passages in twenty-five books of the *Corpus*, although the identification is not always certain. The historical preface is in every way excellent. Where we can test its statements they are confirmed; its account, therefore, of Hippocrates, whatever the name meant for Celsus, should be treated with respect. This piece of evidence has been (rather strangely) ignored by Hippocratic students, or at least not treated seriously.

Accordingly, I will quote it in full: 'Multos ex sapientiae professoribus peritos eius fuisse accipimus, clarissimos vero ex iis Pythagoran et Empedoclen et Democritum. Huius autem, ut quidam crediderunt, discipulus Hippocrates Cous, primus ex omnibus memoria dignus, a studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc separavit, vir et arte et facundia insignis.' (*Prooemium*, 7, 8.) The phrase 'facundia insignis' is at first sight strange. But there are several works in the *Corpus* showing an unobtrusive, restrained eloquence fully worthy of this praise.

Celsus just before this passage has been saying that philosophers were the first among *clari viri* to practise the art of medicine, being constrained to do so because study, though a necessity for the mind, is bad for the body. So he plainly means by the words quoted above that the advanced study of medicine was a province of philosophy until Hippocrates made the former a separate branch of learning. This assertion is either the strict truth, or, at any rate, a perhaps playful, but only slight, distortion of it. Modern research lays great stress on the importance of Alcmaeon, Pythagoras, and Empedocles in the early history of Greek medicine; the Pythagoreans indeed studied dietetics, as Celsus says, to fit themselves for the pursuit of philosophy. If Celsus knew *Ancient Medicine* he may be referring to it when he says that Hippocrates 'separated medicine from philosophy'. A more apt description of that work could not be imagined. Littré believed (i. 295-314) that chapter xx was in Plato's mind when he wrote the passage in the *Phaedrus*, and so concluded that Hippocrates was the author of the whole book. Erotian considered it genuine, but Galen makes no mention of it. All the latest critics reject it, holding that its teaching is opposed to the account of Hippocrates given by Menon.

NOTE C. THE CORPUS

There is nothing to add to Edelstein's discussion in his *Nachträge* about the various lists of books given by ancient authorities, the earliest editions, and the Alexandrine and post-Alexandrine commentators and glossarists.

Recent criticism has made much, perhaps too much, of the ancient custom of including under great names anonymous works connected with the subjects represented by those names, without implying thereby recognized authorship. So books on Hebrew law were accounted Mosaic, psalms Davidic. Even the Platonic *Corpus* has its *dubia* and *spuria*. Such an explanation of the Hippocratic question leaves untouched the difficulty that many works in the Hippocratic *Corpus* are obviously not even Coan, and were recognized as not Coan by expert opinion, and yet were included in the collection.

The anonymity of all the various treatises and essays is to be explained partly by the custom of ancient authors, partly by private publication, and partly by the loss of the *titulus* attached to a papyrus roll. F. W. Hall, *Companion to Classical Texts*, pp. 14 and 15, has some good

remarks on this point, but it is impossible to accept in its entirety what he says on p. 26: "The philosopher or historian does not write a book and entrust a well-defined text to the pupil. He delivers orally the result of his "Research" or his "Argument", and the pupil may take it down in writing if he choose . . . here . . . must be sought an explanation of such a collection of prose treatises as that which is still extant under the name of the physician Hippocrates.' This is a possible explanation of, e.g., *Humours*, but how can it apply to carefully edited works like *Sacred Disease*, *The Art*, *Prognostic*, *Airs*, *Waters*, *Places*, to say nothing of the dialogues of Plato?

The absence of a recognized order (or orders) in ancient times is natural enough. What we call the *Corpus* would make up at least fifty rolls of average size. A fixed order of these would be difficult to maintain, although Erotian arranged the works he regarded as genuine into groups determined by the nature of their subject-matter. Fixed orders, such as those we see in our manuscripts of the V type and of the M type, belong to the days not of papyrus rolls but of *codices*.

The dialect of the *Corpus* is worth a passing notice. It is the artificial Ionic in use among scientists from the early Ionian philosophers down to the beginning of the Hellenistic period. Diocles is said to have been the first physician to write in Attic (Clifford Allbutt, *Greek Medicine in Rome*, p. 135). The use of Ionic is an indication, but no more, that the works in the *Corpus* were written before 350 B.C., the limit fixed by a critical examination of other internal evidence. There are, however, a few works that are possibly rather later.

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RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY

THE LEGISLATORS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

By HELEN CAM

Read 13 June 1945

THERE has been so much discussion, and that so learned, of the nature of law in the Middle Ages, that it will be well for me to begin with a disclaimer. What I am concerned with is not so much law as laws, not so much theory as practice, not so much forms as forces. The great American school of legal historians may be right in saying that none save God could *make* law in the Middle Ages, but the student of medieval English government is confronted with assizes, establishments, provisions, ordinances, proclamations, and statutes that men observed or infringed and that judges enforced. They existed, and they mattered; they are both a monument to human activity and an indication of human intentions and opinions. In asking how and why they came to be there I am seeking the originating impulse for legislation rather than investigating its technical validity or the authority and status of the legislator.

In Dr. Ivor Jennings's book on parliament in the twentieth century¹ there is a chapter headed 'Who makes the laws?' For one who seeks the substance rather than the form, he says, the answer to this question 'The King in Parliament' will not do. Even if you admit that the responsibility for all legislation to-day rests with the government, you have still to find the government's source of inspiration. He appends to his discussion an analysis of the legislation of one year. Seventy acts were placed on the Statute Book in 1936-7, and he traces each of them to its originating agency—King Edward VIII, the Dominions, the Cabinet, the various Government Departments, Government Commissions, the Bench, Local Authorities, 'public demand' in the press, and what he calls associated interests, such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the National Union of Teachers, the Central Council for Rivers Pollution, the National Farmers' Union, the Trade Marks, Patents and Designs Federation, and the Salvation Army. Finally, there is Mr. A. P. Herbert.

Who made the laws in medieval England? That is the question that I want to put, limiting myself to the last three centuries of the Middle Ages, to which the bulk of the enacted laws

¹ Cambridge, 1939.

belong. There can be little hope of obtaining results comparable with Dr. Jennings's from such remote records, but the question is worth asking. Though, as he says, the law knows nothing of the legislative process,¹ the historian of civilization must be concerned with it. By and large, we are a law-abiding people, approximating to Burke's ideal of a disposition to conserve with an ability to improve. Our legislative machinery is the oldest in Europe, and if it has stood up to a good deal of criticism from outside in the last twelve years and survived more serious menaces from within, it has been mainly by virtue of its contacts with the opinion of the country at large. At the moment when it is about formally to renew that contact by our customary rough and clumsy methods it is not irrelevant to consider the earlier, experimental period in the evolution of the legislative process, and the nature of the contacts of law and opinion in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.

There are three main sources of legislative activity in medieval England: the directive or planning urge in the ruler, the need for clarifying and defining experienced by the judicature, and the demand from the ruled for redress of grievances.

To the first source, the desire of the executive for order, we can attribute a large part of the legislation of the thirteenth century—such measures, e.g., as the police code built up by Henry III and Edward I from the Assize of Arms to the Statute of Winchester, the order for the holding of hundred courts in 1234, the succession of decrees on the coinage, the series of Exchequer ordinances down to Stapleton's of 1323, and Edward I's great Statute of Wales, the first colonial constitution. We have a glimpse of one of the departmental discussions, which produced such regulations in the preamble to the *Provisio super vicecomites et clericos suos* of 1298, which shows how three bishops, the king's treasurer, the barons of the exchequer, the justices of the bench, and others of the king's council, being assembled in the Exchequer on the feast of St. Valentine, had before them the problem of the literate but dishonest clerk who made out writs for levying excessive dues, and thus involved his illiterate but innocent chief, the sheriff, in penalties for extortion. They took counsel for a remedy and provided that henceforth the clerk should share his master's responsibility to the Exchequer.² Official decrees of this sort might or might not need wide publicity, and a large proportion of them were not promulgated in parliaments. I do not propose to discuss them at length; administrative

¹ *Parliament*, p. 232.

² *Statutes of the Realm*, i. 213.

legislation is with us to-day and we know all about it and its sources. But the directive impulse of the administration, and above all of the council, is a continuing influence throughout the Middle Ages, originating, selecting, and amending the measures that become laws, not least in the period when the forms of legislation would seem to suggest a receptive rather than constructive attitude on the part of the government.

The second source, the judicature, is most important in the first of our three centuries. The judgement in a particular case, formally recorded as a precedent for the direction of future judges and litigants, belongs to the period when parliaments are still pre-eminently judicial occasions, and there are several instances of such *ad hoc* legislation on the rolls of Edward I's parliaments. The Statute of Waste of 1292, as is well known, is the judgement in the case of *Butler v. Hopton* after long discussion among the king's justices in full parliament.¹ The two 'explanations' attached to the Statute of Gloucester, in effect revisions of a clumsily drafted enactment, have been traced by Mr. Sayles to two lawsuits, of 1278 and 1281, in which Eleanor Percy and the mayor and bailiffs of London, respectively, were involved.² The Ordinance *de Proteccionibus* in 1305 arose out of the particular grievance of the prior of St. Oswald's, who could not get redress from a defendant who was wrongfully pleading the king's protection.³ In 1315 the *specialis petitio* of Katharine Jordan as to some sharp practice in a plea of Novel Disseisin produced a *generalis responsio* imposing penalties to be enforced by the justices in all such cases.⁴ The transition from judicial to legislative remedy is perhaps indicated in a petition of 1318, when, in response to Robert of Mouhaut's complaint as to the penalizing of an attainted jury, the council reply that to change the laws of the realm requires the greatest deliberation, and that in full parliament.⁵ Aside from judgements, it was, of course, in the great statutes of Edward I from 1275 onwards, modifying and defining the operation of the Common Law, that the judges made their greatest contribution to the statute book.

But the most abundant source of law-making is the third: public demand, direct or indirect, implicit or explicit; and parliaments were at once the field in which such impulses could work and, as time went on, the institution by means of which men could assert and enlarge their claims to law and justice. It

¹ *Stat. R.* i. 109 f.; *Rot. Parl.* i. 79.

² *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1937, pp. 468 ff.

³ *Memoranda de Parlamento* [R.S.], p. 59; cf. p. 17, petition no. 15.

⁴ *Rot. Parl.* i. 289.

⁵ Cole, *Documents of English History*, p. 26.

is mainly, though not solely, with legislation in parliaments that we shall be concerned.

It is only possible to attempt such a survey by standing on the shoulders of others. The field opened up by Maitland in 1893 and McIlwain in 1910 has since then been explored by so many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic that the history of parliamentary legislation has been completely transformed. G. B. Adams, W. S. Holdsworth, M. V. Clarke, Eileen Power, Professors Plucknett, Morris, and Gray, Mr. Edwards, and Mr. H. G. Richardson are only a few of those on whose work I have relied in attempting to examine the processes of legislation from Magna Carta to the Reformation.

We all know that Magna Carta is the first statute on the statute roll, but we should not find it a perfectly simple matter to answer the question who made the charter enrolled there, for it took twelve years to make, and there were many hands employed. We begin with its only begetter, Stephen Langton, holding up the Coronation Charter of Henry I to the assembled barons at St. Paul's, if the St. Albans Chroniclers tell the truth, in August 1213; we go on to the unknown framers of the 'Unknown Charter of Liberties', to the equally unknown 'men of the school of Glanvill and Hubert Walter' who, as Professor Powicke tells us,¹ must have helped to draft the carefully worded clauses of the document submitted to John in April 1215, to the barons who took part in the 'Parliament of Runnymede', to the faithful supporters of John's young son who cut out the revolutionary clauses in 1216 and incorporated the amendments and additions of 1217. By now we have run through the whole gamut of baronial and official opinion, from the extreme left wing views of the five-and-twenty overkings (though even these have been recently rehabilitated by Mr. Richardson)² to those right wing moderates who stand out as the first English statesmen to catch the Whigs bathing and steal their clothes. The final version of the Charter, issued 'freely and spontaneously' by the young King Henry in 1225, the statute cited in the courts and enforced by the judges from 1226 to 1920, owes perhaps less to him than to any of the other legislators, known and unknown, whose ideas and endeavours it incorporates.

Of the fifty or sixty other legislative acts of Henry III's reign only two have achieved anything like fame, and the first of these,

¹ *Stephen Langton*, p. 122.

² *John Rylands Bulletin*, 1944, 'The Morrow of the Great Charter'.

though studiously noted in their handbooks by generations of medieval lawyers, is chiefly notorious to-day for the clause that is not there. In the Council of Merton in January 1236 all the learning and all the arguments from natural and divine law, from canon and civil law, and even, as he asserted, from the ancient custom of the land were on the side of Robert Grosseteste in urging the simple and humane proposal to bring the common law of England into line with canon and civil Law by providing that children born out of wedlock should be held legitimate after the marriage of their parents. The bishop of Lincoln and the reform party were just about 700 years ahead of their times; but the diehards who declared 'We will not change the laws of England' clearly implied that they could have changed them if they liked, in this agreeing with Grosseteste when he wrote to Justice Raleigh: 'I am not so inexperienced—*nec tam idiota sum*—as to imagine that you or anyone else can make or change laws without the king and the magnates being consulted.'¹ Then, as now, the reformer had to have the public opinion that counted on his side if he was to get anything done.

The other statute that is in all the law-books, the Statute of Marlborough, is also the product of discussion and compromise. It began with the Petition of the Barons, presented at the Parliament of Oxford in June 1258, containing the grievances both of great men like the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, of their tenants, and of the communities of the shires. The agenda of the *ad hoc* council of reform noted that the justices and other learned men were to consider the amendment of the laws before the next parliament.² Dr. E. F. Jacob³ has traced the evidence of their labours in the various drafts of the document, which, after being held up by the obstructionist tactics of the greater men and forwarded by the publicity given by the heir to the throne to the protests of the middling men, was solemnly promulgated as the Provisions of Westminster by Henry III in October 1259. Of its twenty-four clauses, ten are based on the petition presented at Oxford fifteen months earlier. Though, as Mr. Jolliffe has said,⁴ it was a document of the opposition, and a revolutionary opposition at that, it was enforced in the courts, reissued by Henry III in 1263 as a conciliatory gesture,⁵ and reissued again

¹ Grosseteste, *Epistolae* [R.S.], Ep. 24, p. 96.

² *John Rylands Bulletin*, 1933, Richardson & Sayles, 'The Provisions of Oxford'.
³ *Baronial Reform and Rebellion*, Oxford, 1925.

⁴ *Constitutional History of Medieval England*, London, 1937, p. 335 n.

⁵ Jacob, *Baronial Reform*, pp. 76 ff.

by Simon de Montfort's government after Lewes, though it may have been suspended by his defeat and death. Finally, two years after Simon de Montfort had fallen at Evesham and his followers had been disinherited at Winchester, 'The lord king wishing to provide for the betterment of his realm and for such administration of justice as the royal office entails, having called together the more discreet men of the realm, both greater and lesser, provided, established and ordained' at Marlborough a set of enactments which incorporated the whole of the 'revolutionary' legislation of 1259, with eleven additional clauses.¹ The concerns of the great men for their feudal dues, the complaints of the countryside against the oppressions of sheriffs, of magnates, and of royal justices, the grievances of tenants against their lords, the skilful devices of the legal experts, who may even have included Bracton himself and, at the latest stage, the pacific influence of the papal legate—all these interests and agencies went to the making of the Statute of Marlborough.

A hundred years later we shall find our best examples of the interplay of interests and agencies in the processes of law-making in the field of economic affairs. All England, from the king to the agricultural worker, is out to make money, and the tussle between high politics and local jealousies, associated interests and class antagonisms is informing the experimental and occasionally amateurish legislation of council and parliament. Eileen Power has depicted the interplay of motives among the different parties concerned in the establishment of parliamentary control of the wool taxes. I should like to glance at two other examples of economic legislative experiment involving various interests, and consider the Statute of the Staple of 1354 and the Ordinances and Statute of Labourers of 1349-52.

The staple for English merchants set up by Edward I had been at Bruges, Antwerp, and St. Omer by turns when, in the Parliament of York in 1318, the question of the establishment of home staples was mooted, and a conference was arranged in the following year between the merchants and the Exchequer officials with others of the council, which reported in favour of the establishment of home staples.² Political factions in the council, it seems, held up action till 1326 when, under the influence of the younger Dispenser,³ ordinances made 'by us and our council for the com-

¹ *Stat. R. i.* 19-25. Professor Powicke considers that the hand of Ottobuono is traceable in the drafting of this preamble.

² *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1914, Bland, 'Establishment of Home Staples'.

³ *Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1324-7, p. 274.

mon profit and relief of the people of all our realm and power' set up the fourteen home staples and laid down regulations for native and alien merchants, purchasers, and manufacturers.¹ In 1328, however, the matter was reopened and the different towns were asked to send delegates to an assembly of merchants at York. The London delegates, writing back to the city for further instructions, indicate the difficulties of the assembly; the towns cannot agree, the merchants of the staple want a foreign staple, and they are all afraid of incurring the enmity of the king and council if they fail to make a recommendation.² The compromise suggested by the city fathers in their reply was in fact accepted, the ordinances of 1326 were repealed in the Parliament of Northampton, and free trade 'after the tenor of the Great Charter' was established for the time being. A petition from the good folk of the community in the Parliament of York of 1334 for the restoration of the home staples was rejected and in 1340, the war with France having begun, Edward III established an overseas staple at Bruges in the lands of his continental ally. In the April parliament of 1343, in response to an inquiry from the council, the merchants put forward a long and reasoned statement in favour of home staples,³ but foreign policy still outweighed their arguments and it was not till 1353 that they had their way. In September of that year a Great Council was held, expressly to deal with the maintenance and good government of the staple. A set of carefully drafted ordinances, drawn up by the king's council at least three months earlier, according to Mr. Richardson,⁴ was read aloud to the prelates, magnates, and commons assembled in the White Chamber of Westminster Palace; any amendments proposed to be given in writing. The commons demanded a copy of the ordinances; one was given to the knights and another to the burgesses, and after great deliberation had amongst themselves they gave their opinion in writing. The magnates having read and discussed this written statement, the ordinances were issued in their final form. Only one amendment of the commons is recorded; they proposed to add eight more towns to the list of staples, bringing the number up to seventeen. The king accepted the suggestion only as far as regarded Canterbury 'in honour of St. Thomas'. The commons further petitioned that the articles of the ordinances should be recited at the next

¹ Bland, Brown, and Tawney, *Documents*, pp. 181-4.

² A. H. Thomas, *Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of City of London, 1323-64* (Cambridge, 1926), p. 52.

³ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 143.

⁴ *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, No. 25 (1931), p. 13, n. 4.

parliament, and entered on the roll of parliament, so that ordinances and agreements made in council should not be on record as if they had been made in common parliament, and to this the king assented.¹ Thus in the following April the chief justice expounded to the lords and commons in parliament how the king had established the staple in England, and how no staple could be maintained without fixed laws and customs, and therefore he had deputed the wise men of his council and the prelates, dukes, earls, barons, justices, serjeants, and others of the commonalty to ordain and make such laws and ordinances; and because he wished them to endure for ever he now caused them to be recited in parliament to endure for ever as a statute. Once again the knights of the shire were invited to get written copies and study them and, if they wished, propose amendments in writing. And after good deliberation the commons found the ordinances good and profitable for king and people and prayed that they might be confirmed, putting forward a number of supplementary proposals, most of which were accepted, and the ordinances, being confirmed, with these additions, by the king and the magnates, were finally placed on the statute roll.²

So much for the genesis of the Statute of the Staple of 1354, the fruit of thirty-five years of bargaining, diplomacy, and compromise between king, merchants, burgesses, magnates, and council. The history of the Statute of Labourers, as traced for us by that great American scholar Bertha Putnam,³ opens up another window on the processes of law-making. She appears to have caught the architect of the law in his workshop. It begins with the first ordinance 'against the malice of labourers' issued by the council in June 1349 while the Black Death was still raging, a hastily drafted emergency measure designed to check the rise of wages and prices and to prevent labourers from breaking their contracts. Its ineffectiveness was soon evident; grievous complaints reached the council of the black market in labour which made it impossible for the employers of labour to pay any taxes. In November a second ordinance was issued, providing that all excess wages might be levied from the recipients and applied to the reduction of the taxpayers' burden, and a new commission to the justices of the peace charged them with the enforcement of both ordinances. By 1351 the government felt it was safe to

¹ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 246-53; *Stat. R.* i. 332-43.

² *Rot. Parl.* ii. 254, 257, 261 f.; *Stat. R.* i. 348 f.

³ *Toronto Law Journal*, 1944, pp. 251-81. See also *Enforcement of Statutes of Labourers*, New York, 1908.

summon a parliament again, and in this petitions were put forward by the commonalty for the better enforcing of both ordinances. The statute purporting to be a reply to these petitions betrays the hand of the expert lawyer as well as the experienced administrator; and the subsequent petition of the commonalty¹ laid down the terms of the grant of the next triennial subsidy with such skill, closing all the gaps through which the over-paid labourer might escape, the tax collector cheat, or the locality be unduly penalized or favoured in the matter of tax-relief, that Miss Putnam again detects the expert adviser. The parliament roll speaks of long treaty and deliberation by the commons, and of magnates sent to advise with them, so there is evidence to bear out her contention that the inspiration of the measure comes from the council.² Miss Putnam goes farther and names the specific councillor who she believes devised the ingenious financial and legal details of the whole scheme, if not the original plan of a nation-wide regulation of wages. Her legislator is William Share-shull, justice of the peace, justice itinerant, junior judge in Common Pleas, Exchequer, and King's Bench, and chief justice of King's Bench from 1350 to 1361, in which capacity he opened five successive parliaments during his term of office. He attended the councils which drafted the first and second ordinance; he was himself an employer of labour in Oxfordshire; he was holding sessions in the summer of 1349 which could have brought him in close touch with the *popularis conquaestio* of the taxpayers; he enforced the ordinances as justice of the peace, and in opening the parliament of 1351 he told the lords and commons that the matters chiefly needing amendment were the failure to keep the peace and the refusal of labourers and servants to work as they used to do. Whether his share in the legislation of 1349-52 was great or small, we cannot mistake the combined action of the views of the employing and taxpaying class, the policy of the government, the experience of the administrator, and the skill of the legal expert in producing the first labour legislation of this country. It is noteworthy also that there were channels by which public opinion could speedily reach the government when parliaments were temporarily suspended.

What were these channels? Stubbs, seeking the origins of the importance of the commons in parliament, found it in the local

¹ *Stat. R.* i. 327.

² *Rot. Parl.* ii. 237. Elsewhere it is referred to as 'an ordinance made by the king's council'. Putnam, *Enforcement of Statutes of Labourers*, p. 268.

juries, whose knowledge of their countryside was ascertained for the use of the central government, and in the ancient communal responsibilities of township, hundred, and shire blending naturally with the newer chartered responsibilities of the urban communities to produce the representative element in parliament. Along this line, reinforced, as Dr. Post is teaching us,¹ by canonist doctrines of corporate responsibility imposed from above, we might arrive at the commons' share in taxation, but hardly at their share in legislation. It is true that the grievances of the countryside presented by a jury or elicited by inquest might, and did, issue in legislation—witness the relation of the first Statute of Westminster of 1275 to the Hundred Rolls inquest of the previous year—but a more spontaneous means of expressing the subjects' complaints and prayers was needed for parliament to become the national tribunal for righting nation-wide wrongs. That means was the petition or bill, and it is above all in the study of the process of petitioning that the most valuable additions to our knowledge of parliamentary evolution have been made in recent years. The trail was blazed by Maitland in 1893, but only in the last twenty years has exploration been seriously undertaken, notably by Mr. Richardson² and Professor H. L. Gray,³ but also most usefully by Mr. G. L. Haskins, Miss D. Rayner, and Mr. A. R. Myers. The petition, by its freedom from set forms and by its deferential method of approach, offered opportunities for the spontaneous expression of opinion; down to 1914 it was recognized as the natural vehicle for requests from the unenfranchised. We have already noted its close verbal relation to legislation in the history of Magna Carta and the Statute of Marlborough: the same point has recently been made by Mr. Edwards in connexion with the Confirmation of the Charters in 1297.⁴ A less close but highly significant relationship is traceable in the preambles to a whole number of statutes, beginning with those of that great autocrat Edward I. A king cannot be coerced, says Bracton, but you can always supplicate him. *Locus erit supplicationi.*

In the Tudor *Discourse upon the Understanding of Statutes* recently edited by Dr. Thorne,⁵ and ascribed by Professor Plucknett to

¹ *Speculum*, 1943, pp. 211–32; *Traditio*, 1943, pp. 355–408.

² *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 1927–34 (Nos. 15, 17, 18, 23, 25, 33); *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1931, 1932; *Rotuli Parliamentorum Anglie hactenus inediti* (Camden Series), London, 1935; *Select Cases of Procedure without Writ* (Selden Society), London, 1941.

³ *The Influence of the Commons on Early Legislation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1932.

⁴ *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1943.

⁵ San Marino, California, 1942.

Sir Thomas Egerton, later Lord Ellesmere,¹ the reader is warned against taking the preamble to a statute too seriously.² This is a very sound warning for Tudor times, but as regards the medieval statute there is a good deal to be said for Dyer's description of the preamble to a statute as 'a key to open the minds of the makers of the act and of the mischiefs they intend to remedy'. I will quote some of Edward I's alleged reasons for legislation in chronological order. 'Because our lord the King greatly desires to redress the state of the realm where it needs amendment, and that for the common profit of Holy Church and of the realm' (1275); 'the king providing for the fuller administration of right as the royal office demands' (1278); 'because merchants have fallen into poverty through failure to recover their debts' (1283); 'to make good the oppressions and defects of former statutes' (1285); 'of his special grace, and for the affection that he bears towards prelates, earls, barons and others of his kingdom' (1290); 'since the Abbots of Fécamp and St. Edmunds and divers others supplicated in parliament' (1290); 'at the instance of the magnates of his realm' (1290); 'on the grievous complaint both of religious and of others of the kingdom' (1292); 'understanding by the public and frequent complaint of the middling folk . . . we have decreed in parliament for the common welfare' (1293); 'having diligently meditated on the defects in the law and the many grievances and oppressions inflicted on the people in time past we wish to provide a remedy and establish the certainty of the law' (1299); 'in favour of the poor workmen of this city who live by the work of their hands, lest they should lack meat and be impoverished' (1302); 'since those who have been put out of the forest by the perambulation have made request at this parliament'³—that is, the parliament of 1305, on whose rolls four such petitions are recorded.⁴

If these preambles give the key to Edward's mind, we seem to see a benevolent and order-loving legislator, passing from concern for a complete and coherent system of law to a growing consciousness of personal and class grievances calling for redress. Without any intention of calling the nation into partnership with him, it is clear that Edward was to some extent permitting his subjects to suggest, if not dictate, matter for legislation. He was making his parliaments, held twice or thrice a year 'for the providing

¹ *Law Quarterly Review*, 1944, pp. 246-7. ² *Discourse*, ed. Thorne, p. 114.

³ *Stat. R.* i. 26, 47, 53, 71, 107; *Rot. Parl.* i. 35, 41, 79, 117; *Stat. R.* i. 128; *Rot. Parl.* i. 147, 177.

⁴ *Memoranda de Parlamento* [R.S.], pp. 18, 67, 89, 155 ff.

of new remedies for new wrongs, and for the doing of justice to all according to their need', the occasions for receiving petitions from all and sundry.

It used to be assumed that one of the functions of elected representatives was to hand in such petitions on behalf of their constituents. It may have become their function at a later date, but Mr. George Haskins¹ has proved conclusively that it was not so in Edward I's reign, for petitions were presented in large numbers in parliaments to which no representatives came, and it can be shown occasionally that special delegates were appointed by a community to present a petition when other men had been chosen as its representatives. In its origins, petitioning was a direct approach by the subject or group of subjects to the king. If the grievance alleged was a personal or local one, concerning the petitioner alone, it was most likely to demand executive or judicial action on the part of the crown, though judicial action might in a test case, as we have seen, produce legislation. Not until the fifteenth century, it seems, were the answers to requests for special or for localized favours for individuals, groups, or localities cast into legislative form. The main source of legislation was not the special but the general or common petition, which, as defined in 1346, was a petition 'that might turn to the common profit',² as distinct from one that concerned special or private interests. Such a petition might be presented by one or by many; it would be worded in such a way as to suggest that it had widespread support. From a letter of Edward's printed by Stubbs we know that the petition of twelve articles that purported to express the demands of the whole community of the realm,³ was presented in the parliament of Lincoln in 1301 by Henry of Keighley, one of the knights of the shire for Lincolnshire; Edward himself later described Keighley as acting for the Archbishop of Canterbury and other magnates of the realm who had pressed the king outrageously at that parliament.⁴ In 1301 the 'community of the realm'—the medieval equivalent for 'public opinion', that is, the body of those politically conscious and politically active—was still predominantly aristocratic. But from 1297 onwards the lesser folk, both knights and burgesses, were being drawn more and more into the vortex of politics, and the reign of Edward II established both the political value to the magnates of co-operation with the

¹ *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1938, 'Petitions under Edward I'.

² *Rot. Parl.* ii. 160.

³ Palgrave, *Parliamentary Writs*, i. 104 f.

⁴ Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* ii, at § 181 (p. 151, 2nd ed.).

'knights and the folk of the boroughs who came to the king's parliament at the king's command for themselves and for the people', as they described themselves in 1309,¹ and also the practical uses to which the petitioning technique could be put. As the fourteenth century advanced, the lords were claiming a share in the hearing and answering of petitions, and it suited them well to inspire and promote petitions which purported to be in the common interest and which were presented by those who were not of their order.

Thus, early in the reign of Edward III, though parliament was still the tribunal where remedies were sought for private wrongs, the tide of petitions of national scope calling for political or legislative action had mounted so high that deliberate classification became necessary. Miss Doris Rayner, in a close and careful study of the technique of petitioning,² has shown how between 1324 and 1334 the chancery clerks who kept the records of parliaments were working out a solution of the problem. By 1339 the two categories are officially recognized; the singular or private petition is that which concerns the individual or private interest, and it must be delivered to the auditors and triers, who will pass it on to the appropriate authority for judicial or executive action. The common petition is that which concerns the common interest, and it must be delivered to the clerk of the parliament for reference sooner or later to the king and the lords of the council, with or without the endorsement of the commons as a body. Their endorsement or avowal certainly gives it a better chance of being accepted and becoming the basis of a statute or ordinance.

As Stubbs said long ago, nearly all the legislation of the fourteenth century is based upon parliamentary petitions. According to Professor Gray, this is equally true of the first half of the fifteenth century: then the tide turns, and a growing number of statutes omit all reference to the popular request. With the accession of Edward IV the bulk of legislation shrinks markedly, and under Richard III and Henry VII only a small proportion of the acts of parliament originate formally with the commons. Whereas under Henry V 69 of his 70 statutes were based on petitions, of the 114 public acts of Henry VII, only seventeen purport to be passed at the request of the commons.

Professor Gray, following Stubbs, interprets this whole movement as the rise and decline of popular power as contrasted with

¹ *Rot. Parl.* i. 444.

² *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1941, 'The Machinery of the Commune Petition'.

that of the king, the council, and the lords. There is admittedly still much to be done in clearing up the relations of lords and commons in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, on which it may be hoped that the *History of Parliament* launched by Lord Wedgewood will throw further light, but I think we are already in a position to say that a petition purporting to come from the commons in the fifteenth century, like a petition presented on behalf of the community of the realm in the fourteenth century, might in fact have originated in a variety of sources. The petition of the magnates and community which produced the Statute of Carlisle in 1307 almost certainly was inspired by Edward I. We saw that the act prescribing the technique for applying labour fines to the relief of taxation was based on a petition that was probably dictated by a member of the council. Indeed the roll of parliament refers specifically to the advice given on this occasion by certain great men 'both with regard to the aid and for the making of petitions touching the common people of the land'.¹ In the parliament of 1401 a petition touching the Cistercian order was referred to the commons by Henry IV for their consideration, and they approved it. From another entry on the roll it appears that the petition was originally handed in by Archbishop Arundel, but the statute formed on it is described as being granted at the instance and request of the commons.² Anyone who could make out a good case for his particular demand being in the common interest might claim or allege the backing of the commons. As far back as 1327 the commons were protesting against having bills put forward in their name without their endorsement or 'avowal',³ and this practice of backing or avowing a bill put forward by an individual, or originated by the lords, or put into their mouths by king or council, is traceable throughout the period when Professor Gray is crediting them with something like the monopoly of initiative. Much of the autocratic legislation of Richard II's last parliament was formally petitioned for by the commons. To name a few instances from 1382 to 1423, petitions from the Lombard Merchants in England, from the mayor and aldermen of London, from the dean and chapter of Lincoln, from the poor commons of Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmorland, from the captains who had served in the French wars under Henry V, from the master of the mint and from magnates like Henry Prince of

¹ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 237.

² *Ibid.* iii. 457, 464; *Stat. R.* ii. 121.

³ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 10-11.

Wales or John Duke of Bedford are put forward on their behalf by the commons and bear fruit in legislation.¹

One result of this practice is that in the fifteenth century it becomes usual for outside bodies to address their petitions to the commons, in the hope that they will present them to the king and the lords. The development of this technique has been fully described by Mr. A. R. Myers.² A pictorial representation of the process is to be found in the muniments of King's College, Cambridge. On the Parliament Roll of 1444³ is a petition from the Provost and Scholars of the College Royal of our Lady and St. Nicholas addressed to the 'right wise and discrete Commons of this present Parliament' requesting them to pray the king to establish, by the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and by authority of parliament all the articles annexed, and grant to the college his letters patent to that effect. The charter based on the resulting act of parliament is preserved at King's College, and on its first sheet are a series of miniatures arranged like a flight of steps: in the left-hand margin kneel the commons with the speaker, bearing a roll, at their head. He says: 'Priount les Communes.' Above are the lords headed by the chancellor who says: 'Nous le prioms aussi.' In the centre kneels Henry VI himself, saying 'Fiat' and adoring the Virgin and St. Nicholas depicted above him to the right.⁴

Legislation originating in a petition may give the petitioners something different from what they requested. Henry V's promise in 1414 not to enact statutes whereby the commons might be bound contrary to their asking was, as has been pointed out by several scholars,⁵ no security that a statute would conform to the terms of the request, nor did it assure to the petitioners the chance of discussing and rejecting amendments. Nine years later a council minute instructed the clerk of parliament to show the acts that had been passed in the last parliament to the justices of both benches, so that they might be rendered into clear language;⁶ the final wording of the statutes was not controlled by parliament. Thus the device of 'the bill containing the form of the act desired to be enacted' which is coming into use from the

¹ *Ibid.* iii. 138, 429, 581; iv. 74, 143, 177 f., 250.

² *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1937, 'Parliamentary Petitions in the Fifteenth Century'; *Toronto Law Journal*, 1939, 'The Commons in the Fifteenth Century'.

³ *Rot. Parl.* v. 87.

⁴ *Proceedings of Cambridge Antiquarian Society*, 1931-2, p. 87.

⁵ S. B. Chrimes, *English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 161 ff., citing Dr. Pickthorn.

⁶ Nicolas, *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Council*, iii. 22.

middle of the fifteenth century is an important development in legislative procedure. It probably originated in private demands for royal grants like the King's College bill; it was used for measures promoted by the crown before it was employed for the common petition originating *bona fide* with the commons. It not only led, if Professor Plucknett is right,¹ to more exact drafting and to stricter interpretation of statutes, but it also involved parliament itself more actively and intimately in the legislative process. Legislation was no longer 'the government's vague reply to vaguely worded complaints, but rather the deliberate adoption of specific proposals embodied in specific texts emanating from the crown and its officers'. More than that: though the formal initiative might be temporarily lost to the commons in the Tudor period, their discussions and criticisms of measures would have a more practical effect on the form and content of the statutes to which, having ceased to be petitioners, they were more truly assenters than when they had claimed that function in 1414. If Professor Plucknett is also right in his suggestion that the change in attitude towards the statutes evinced in Egerton's *Discourse* is the product of procedural change rather than political theory, we should have an admirable illustration of Dicey's thesis that laws create opinion almost as much as opinion produces laws.

In scrutinizing the channels by which public opinion was conveyed to the legislative agencies we have lost sight of the sources of that opinion. 'The connection between legislation and the supposed interests of the legislators is obvious', says Dicey.² Almost every interest in medieval society, almost every element in its make-up, has left its trace on the legislation of council and parliament.

Take first the legal profession. 'We made the statute and we know what it means', said Hengham, speaking for the Edwardian bench. Judges, according to Dicey, aim rather at securing the certainty than at amending the deficiencies of the law,³ and Magna Carta and the Petition of Right exemplify that attitude. The *Quo warranto* legislation of Edward I, embodying the Bractonian theory that all governmental functions exercised by a subject must expressly be delegated by royal act or sanction illustrates well the policy of definition applied in the royal in-

¹ *Law Quarterly Review*, 1944, pp. 248 ff.

² *Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1905), p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 362.

terest. The Treason Law of 1352, assigned by Miss Putnam, like the labour legislation, to Chief Justice Shareshull,¹ also extends by defining. The judges who were instructed to put the good points of the Ordinances of 1311 into the statute of 1322² were the forerunners of those who were charged a hundred years later to clarify the wording of the acts that had just passed through parliament.

As for the common lawyers, they were undoubtedly pursuing their own interests in seeking to limit the scope of equitable jurisdiction, both in council and in chancery, by those fourteenth-century statutes to which seventeenth-century enemies of the Star Chamber were to appeal. The attack on the lawyers' membership of parliament in 1372, from whatever quarter it came, was unsuccessful.³ Possibly their help in formulating and presenting petitions was making it as useful to others as it was profitable to themselves to be elected to the common house.

The interest of the clergy is easily detected. Their hand is traceable in a series of measures, from *de Bigamis*, recorded before clerics and lawyers and accepted and published by the king's council in 1276, down to the statute for the Clergy based on their *querimonia* in 1316.⁴ In 1401, besides the statute about the Cistercians promoted by Archbishop Arundel, there is the famous *de heretico comburendo*, which corresponds clause by clause to the long Latin petition of the clergy, drafted presumably in Convocation, up to the point when the statute replaces the petition that the lay authorities shall deal with the convicted heretic 'as is incumbent on them' by the direction 'that they shall cause him to be burned before the people in some public place'.⁵

The share of the lay magnates in legislation is constant and obvious. To take one field where their interests conflicted with that of the church, Edward I's statement that he passed the Statute of Mortmain at their instance is borne out by the fact that the first attempt to limit the acquisition of land by an ecclesiastical corporation was made by the barons at Oxford in 1258. In all the anti-papal protests and enactments from 1307 onwards, as in the anti-clerical proposals of the fifteenth century, the voice of the lay landlord and patron is clearly heard. How far the magnates pulled wires in the fifteenth-century House of Commons is a matter of debate, but, as we have seen, there is

¹ *Toronto Law Journal*, 1944.

² J. Conway Davies, *Baronial Opposition to Edward II* (Cambridge, 1918), p. 583; cf. p. 492.

³ *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1931, pp. 377-81.

⁴ *Stat. R.* i. 42-3, 175 f.

⁵ *Rot. Parl.* iii. 466-7; *Stat. R.* ii. 125-8.

no question that many of the petitions addressed to the king and the lords of the council in the fifteenth as in the fourteenth century had been inspired by some of those who had the considering of them. 'They procure petitions in the name of the commons which touch the commons not at all.' The law against poachers of 1293 and the ordinance on maximum prices of 1315 were instigated by the magnates and can fairly be ranked as class legislation.¹ So, in a different sense, was the *Provisio per milites* of 1292—a code of rules for tournaments drafted by knights who took a part in such exercises, which was approved by the earls and other magnates who then requested the king to ratify them. Edward, himself an ardent jousting in his younger days, approved them as being for the common good, confirmed them by letters sealed, and ordered the sheriffs to co-operate in enforcing them.² It is as if the cup-tie regulations were issued by order in council.

There was, of course, no hard-and-fast line in England between the greater and the lesser baronage, the nobility and the gentry. Magnates and knights of the shire were at one, for instance, in supporting the Statute of Labourers. But in one legislative episode to which Miss Putnam has introduced us³ there is a tug of war between magnates and county gentlemen. For some sixty years of the fourteenth century various experiments were being tried to solve the problems of keeping the peace in the counties. The magnates advocated the appointment of one or two great men to 'keep the counties' and act as local justices, and got their way three times (in 1328, 1330, 1332); in the commons petition after petition reiterated the demand that those smaller men who since 1307 had been entrusted with the police duties of inquiry and arrest of suspects should be given judicial powers also, so that they could try and sentence peace-breakers. Such powers were given and taken away time after time; but in the end the commons had their way; the justices of the peace were to be local knights and squires, and plenty of them; not one or two great lords with estates in half a dozen counties.

A longer and less conclusive tug of war concerned another office held by country gentlemen—the sheriffdom. The tussle of the sheriffs and the Exchequer reveals something like a vested interest working in the House of Commons. The sheriffs, who were responsible to the Exchequer for the profits of local government, made up these profits in large part from the sums paid to them by their subordinates, the hundred bailiffs to whom they

¹ *Rot. Parl.* i. 101, 295.

² *Ibid.* 85.

³ *Transactions of Royal Historical Society*, 1929.

sublet the hundreds. Under the Statute of Lincoln of 1316, which purported to remedy the grievances of the magnates against oppressive and extortionate sheriffs, they were forbidden to charge too high a rate.¹ But the kings found the office of hundred bailiff a useful piece of royal patronage,² and in the early fourteenth century they were constantly separating hundreds from their shires by giving them to protégés who kept all the profits of office for themselves and paid nothing to the sheriff, who was nevertheless expected to pay in the same sum to the Exchequer as before. Naturally he tried to recoup himself from those parts of the shire which were still in his control, so that the practice was justly described as being 'to the great damage of the people and the disherison of the sheriffs'. The Statute of Northampton for 1328 provided that all hundreds thus granted away should be rejoined to their shires, and that no such grants should be made in future.³ A few grants were rescinded 'according to the form of the agreement of the common council of the realm made in parliament at Northampton',⁴ but the number of petitions from sheriffs and ex-sheriffs in the next few parliaments shows how little had been effected.⁵ The terms of these petitions, incidentally, indicate a growing reliance on parliamentary legislation. In the parliament at York in 1333 a petition from all the sheriffs of England evoked an order to the Exchequer to enforce the statute of 1328,⁶ and steps were taken in ten counties;⁷ but in the following year counter petitions from the ousted bailiffs produced a reversal of policy.⁸ In 1336 the sheriffs had further backing from the knights of the shire and the commons, and the prelates and magnates agreed that the statute should be enforced.⁹ During the years 1328-36, according to Miss Wood Legh,¹⁰ some seven to ten sheriffs had been elected to every parliament. In 1339 a common petition demanded that they should be excluded from parliament. Their numbers dropped markedly, and the agitation in their interest ceased.

¹ *Stat. R.* i. 174-5.

² See *Fine Roll Calendars*, *passim*.

³ *Stat. R.* i. 259, cap. 12.

⁴ *Fine Roll Calendar*, 8 July 1328 (p. 97); *Close Roll Calendar*, 28 Oct. 1328 (p. 346).

⁵ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 33 (No. 11); Ancient Petitions, No. 548; C. 202/C. 28, No. 229.

⁶ *Fine Roll Calendar*, p. 348.

⁷ *Close Roll Calendar*, 1333-7, pp. 63, 65, 72, 106, 114, 116, 117, 121, 125, 127, 174, 175, 176.

⁸ *Rot. Parl.* ii. 73-84; cf. Richardson, *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, pp. 232-9; *Close Roll Calendar*, pp. 210, 215, 216, 221-2; *Fine Roll Calendar*, pp. 364, 395, 443.

⁹ *Stat. R.* i. 277.

¹⁰ *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1931, p. 373.

With the accession of Richard II the subject was raised again in a slightly different form. The sheriffs asked for an allowance at the Exchequer in respect of franchises or hundreds granted out, and, though the minority government demurred at first, in 1381 the concession was made by a statute that sanctioned the rendering of accounts at the Exchequer on the accountant's oath.¹ But the Exchequer, it would seem, refused to be bound by the act of parliament. Repeated petitions, both from the commons as a whole and from the communities of the shires affected, demanded the enforcement of the statutes of 1316, 1328, and 1381, but the answer was always the same:² 'Apply to the council, which will consider your case.' Henry IV and Henry V in their first parliaments showed signs of yielding, but it was always the same story; the Treasurer and Barons refused to surrender an inch.³ By the first parliament of Edward IV the commons had a scheme completely worked out—a bill containing the form of an act⁴—and a committee of lords, according to the Fane fragment, was appointed to 'oversee the bill made for the ease of sheriffs' and 'thereupon to make report to the king'.⁵ But, as before, the answer was *le roi s'avisera*, and 150 years after the tussle began the sheriffs were still accounting for their ancient farms, depending upon the good will of the Exchequer and not on their own oaths. It is a clear instance of the limitation in practice, rather than in theory, of the effectiveness of parliamentary legislation.

After the country gentry came the merchants, who had been called into consultation by Edward I from 1275 onwards for the fixing of the old and the new customs and for the drafting of the two statutes which regulated the acknowledgement and collection of debts. We have seen their collaboration in the framing of the Statute of the Staple of 1354. Eileen Power has described their consultative assemblies in the fourteenth century, and their constant influence on fifteenth-century legislation, not only with regard to the changes in the location of the staple, but also in relation to the export of bullion and the minting of coin.⁶

If the burgesses had played their part under Edward III by

¹ *Rot. Parl.* iii. 45, 116; *Stat. R.* ii. 21.

² *Rot. Parl.* iii. 211 f., 247, 266, 280, 290, 305, 330.

³ *Bulletin of the Inst. of Hist. Research*, xi. 158; *Rot. Parl.* iii. 446, 469, 478, 495; iv. 11 f.

⁴ *Rot. Parl.* v. 494 f.

⁵ W. H. Dunham, *The Fane Fragment of the 1461 Lords' Journal* (London, 1935), p. 19.

⁶ *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History*, Oxford, 1941; Power and Postan, *Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1933), pp. 293-320.

combining with the woolgrowers against the great financial interests of the merchants, under Richard II we begin to be aware of them as craftsmen. The internecine war between the victualling guilds of London and their opponents is reflected in the legislation of 1383-4—the passing and the rapid repeal of the statutes against victuallers and fishmongers.¹ The regulation of crafts by statute begins with the prohibition of shoemakers from being tanners in 1389 and the statute for girdlers in 1391.² The apprenticeship regulations of the city of London are given statutory force in 1430,³ and with the accession of Edward IV the anti-alien sentiment of the London handicraftsmen, sure sign of contracting trade, is given free vent in legislation prohibiting the importation of a long list of manufactured goods. The first of these must, I think, be the bill 'containing the hurts and remedies of merchandises' described in the Fane fragment as having been put in by the king's own hand;⁴ if so it was not carried in that parliament, but in the following one of 1463.⁵ It is in connexion with this protectionist movement that a women's interest makes itself felt in parliament, in the petitions of the silkwomen and throwsters of London in 1455 and 1463 against the importation of various small manufactured silk goods.⁶ They were a body of domestic workers, less well organized than the crafts of cordwainers, horners, pattenmakers, bowyers, shearmen, and fullers; who also secured protective legislation in their own interests between the years 1464 and 1486.⁷

Lastly there are the special needs of the localities, in which perhaps we get nearest to the voice of the man in the street: the grievous clamour and complaint of the men of Shropshire seeking protection from the lawless men of Cheshire; those of Tewkesbury asking that the Severn crossing may be better guarded from the Welshmen and those of the Forest of Dean; the prayer for bridges on the road between Abingdon and Dorchester; the petition of the clothworkers of three Devonshire hundreds; the boroughs of Northampton and Leicester demanding a restriction of their municipal franchise; the mayor and community of Dover praying that their town may be the only exit port for travellers to the Continent; the parishioners of St. Faith's and St. Gregory's by St. Paul's asking for regulations to restrict the slaughtering of

¹ Unwin, *The Gilds and Companies of London* (London, 1908), pp. 146-52; *Rot. Parl.* iii. 142-3.

² *Stat. R.* ii. 66, 81; *Rot. Parl.* iii. 271, 296.

³ *Stat. R.* ii. 248.

⁴ *The Fane Fragment*, pp. 18-19.

⁵ *Stat. R.* ii. 396 ff.

⁶ *Rot. Parl.* v. 325, 506; *Stat. R.* ii. 374, 395 f., 493.

⁷ *Rot. Parl.* v. 566 f.; *Stat. R.* ii. 414-16, 494, 520.

beasts in their vicinity 'since they have oftentimes been greatly annoyed and distempered by corrupt airs engendered in the said parishes by blood and other fouler things, complaint whereof by the space of sixteen years hath been made as well by the Canons of the said Cathedral Church as by many others of the King's subjects of right honest behaviour'.¹ Such petitions, promoted by the commons, leave their mark on the statute book alongside the regulations by which the Yorkist and Tudor kings are restoring order to a polity broken by the civil war.

Where, in all this, we may ask, is the ordinary citizen? Is there any legislation which reflects anything more general than a class or a sectional interest? Mr. Macfarlane has called the politics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a joint-stock enterprise,² and the same description might well be applied to their legislation. The king and council undoubtedly were the guiding spirits throughout the Middle Ages, and towards the end of them the initiative was almost entirely in their hands; but that did not mean that the king's will alone was involved, nor did men think so. Egerton, writing in the early years of Elizabeth's reign, points out that it is difficult to be sure of the intent of a statute because of the number who have had a hand in it: 'So manie hedes as there were, so manie wittes; so manie statute makers, so manie mindes.'³ 'The public opinion which finds expression in legislation is', as Dicey says, 'a very complex phenomenon; often a compromise resulting from a conflict between the ideas of the government and the feelings and habits of the governed.'⁴

I suggested that the medieval equivalent for 'public opinion' is 'the community of the realm' and at the Oxford Parliament of 1258 'le commun de la terre' is precisely equated with the baronage.⁵ By 1509 it takes two words to say it in English; the *commonalty* is an estate of the realm of long standing, taking its share, but having its place beside the lords spiritual and temporal; but there is a larger whole, a *commonwealth* of England which includes all the orders of the realm, and which is defined by Sir Thomas Smith as 'a society or common doing of a multitude of free men collected together and united by common accord among themselves'.⁶ Not the least important of the common

¹ *Rot. Parl.* iii. 440, iv. 156, 345, vi. 431 f.; *Stat. R.* ii. 417, 421, 527.

² *Transactions of Royal Hist. Society*, 1944, p. 73.

³ *Discourse on the Understanding of Statutes*, p. 151.

⁴ *Law and Public Opinion*, p. 10.

⁵ Stubbs, *Charters* (9th edition), cf. pp. 381 and 383 on the election of the twelve to treat at parliaments.

⁶ *De republica Anglorum* (Cambridge, 1906), p. 20.

doings that had brought the commonwealth into being had been common action in legislation.

This common action was forced on them partly by the crown, partly by their own interests. It is perhaps unfortunate that it takes a common danger or a common enemy to evoke a common consciousness and common action. The dislike of the king's foreign servants in the thirteenth century, the anti-papal and anti-clerical feeling of the fourteenth, the jealousy of the alien merchant and craftsman in the fifteenth were probably truer expressions of community feeling than any constructive zeal. But the common action that they provoked was itself an education; the habit of anti-clerical legislation was preparing the ground for an ecclesiastical revolution. And the common action was creating the new entity—the parliament by whose authority laws were made, to whose authority as legislator the individual would appeal.

Moreover the legislative process was familiarizing men with the notion of a common weal. The conception paternalistically expounded in the preambles of Edward I's statutes had been taken over by the fourteenth-century members of parliament who accepted the distinction between the singular needs of the individual and proposals that might turn to the common profit. All those who, in forwarding their own interests, were alleging the common welfare as their motive, were helping to build up the tradition—the magnates conferring with the commons, the councillors and civil servants who drafted the petitions for them, the over-mighty subjects, the merchants, and the poor folk of the shires alike.

Again, through the practice of making the commons the channel by which the ordinary citizens' petitions are transmuted into laws, the doctrine of the electors' responsibility for their representative's financial undertakings has been extended to legislative activities also. 'Every man is bound by every act of parliament,' says Catesby in 1481, 'for every man is privy and party to parliament, for the commons have one or two representatives for each community who can bind the whole.'¹ They not only accept the authority of parliament; they see themselves as constituting that authority. 'Every Englishman is intended to be there present.'² By whatever road it had travelled, parliament had come to be the embodiment of national unity.

¹ Year Book, Mich. Term, 21 Ed. IV, cited by Thorne, *Discourse on the Understanding of Statutes*, p. 20, n. 37.

² Smith, *De republica Anglorum*, p. 49.

By common action, in pursuit of a dimly realized common good, and by acceptance of a common responsibility parliament had come to be at once the school and the expression of common consciousness. The machine and the power to drive it had developed together; the ship had found herself and was ready for the Tudor captain. If the public opinion of the sixteenth century was more truly national than that of the thirteenth, one at least of the causes had been the combined endeavour of so many sorts and conditions of men over 250 years to make and mend the laws of the land.

ANNUAL LECTURE ON ASPECTS OF ART
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

THE WESTERN ASPECTS OF GANDHARA
SCULPTURE

By H. BUCHTHAL

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HISTORIANS of Indian art generally pass over the activities of the Gandhara school of sculpture with a few unkind words. Some authors leave this chapter out altogether, others apologize for including it; most of them argue that this school plays really no part in the eastern development, but is a feeble and provincial derivative of Greek or Roman sculpture, and may without serious damage be omitted from the history of the arts in India.

It is true that the artistic merits of most individual Gandhara sculptures compare unfavourably with any masterpiece of Indian art proper, and that their style had no succession on Indian soil. Nevertheless, this western interlude left a lasting mark on the subsequent development of Buddhist art. The early Buddhist schools, which had decorated the stupas of Bharhut and Sanchi, had glorified the Jatakas and the outstanding events in the Buddha's life by a lavish display of grandiose pageantry, but the Buddha himself was never shown. These artists had created a strangely unreal world in which exuberant narrative and rigid symbolism were combined to form an ensemble of convincing force of expression. It was the semi-foreign school of Gandhara which gave to Buddhism the human image of its divine founder, and introduced for the first time western rationalism into the narrative scenes.

The fact that the western ideas and formulas propagated by this school were eagerly taken up throughout Greater India shows that the whole Buddhist world was ready for these innovations—they are but a reflection in the artistic field of a spiritual development which in course of time completely transformed the main aspects of Buddhist religious thought. The Gandhara sculptures are the first expression in stone of a new conception of the Buddha, and of a new significance attributed to the traditional legends and tales from his life. The argument, sometimes encountered in scholarly works on Indian art, that

Gandhara had no influence on the eastern development except in the iconographical field, completely misses the point. This new iconography corresponds to a new stage of religious life in Buddhist India; and the sculptures, in spite of the comparatively low standard of their craftsmanship, stand at the beginning of a new era in the history of Buddhist art.

The figure types and formulas imported from the West were not selected at random. They are all representative of the same stage in the development of ancient art, and give expression to the conception of history and to the religious aspirations of one particular epoch in the history of the Greco-Roman world. To point out isolated instances of the borrowing of classical subject-matter in the art of Gandhara has no more than curiosity value, unless these borrowings are studied in their proper context. When we have discovered their historical significance we shall be able to see the achievement of the Gandhara school of sculpture in its right perspective.

There is ample evidence that the classical influence in Gandhara is not the result of Alexander's Indian campaign, or of the subsequent establishment of Greek kingdoms in Bactria and the Indus country. The new cycle of religious sculpture which came into being in Gandhara is based on the main achievement of the art of the Roman Empire, the narrative historical relief. The Roman influence is equally obvious in the secular products of the school, though they show a much lesser degree of understanding of classical subject-matter.

Those western works which reached India in any appreciable numbers and could be studied on the spot by the Gandhara craftsmen, were not specimens of monumental sculpture, but, in the first place, small objects which Roman merchants and soldiers could easily carry over long distances. A few examples of the minor and industrial arts of Rome have been found in the frontier province,¹ and one day we may be lucky enough to come across one that can be proved to have served as a model for an existing Indian work. These unpretentious objects of daily use, with scenes which bear no relation to Buddhist mythology, show an approach to classical art which is very different from that of the 'official' religious sculptures.

The Greeks and Romans adorned most of the things with which they surrounded themselves, whether at home or abroad, in an elaborate way. Their furniture, their household and kitchen goods, their plate and domestic utensils, their arms and

armour were decorated with figural or ornamental devices. Not only nature and the universe were full of divine life—the pictorial types they had devised for giving artistic expression to the epics and struggles, the achievements and passions of their gods and heroes, were so much part of their own lives that they were admitted into their houses and assembly halls, and adorned every object fit to carry a decoration.

From most ancient times silverwork played the dominant part. Unfortunately, very little has come down to us; the importance of this precious metal can only be guessed from literary sources, which expatiate at great length on the achievement of ancient artists in this field.² To a certain extent objects in bronze, terracotta, stucco, clay, and other less precious materials, showing decorations copied from models in silver, can compensate us for the loss of the originals. The decoration of Roman lamps, for instance, consists to a large extent of standard types copied from well-known works of art.³ It is a fascinating study to trace the reappearance of these decorative devices on similar small objects found in Gandhara.

A group of small circular trays offers excellent points of comparison. Similar dishes were in use in Greco-Roman Egypt and may have served similar domestic purposes.⁴ Generally, the lower half of these toilet-dishes is left blank, and curved inwards to receive some kind of cosmetics; the upper half is decorated with some ornamental or figural device. These trays allow us to follow in detail the migration of classical mythology to the East, and to study its transformation at the hands of Indian craftsmen. They cover almost the whole range of classical imagery in its various aspects.

We find purely ornamental motives like the scallop shell (Fig. 1), which derive from the decoration of Roman lamps (Fig. 2).⁵ Then there are genre-like love and farewell scenes as known from Roman funerary sculptures—on the tray reproduced here, for instance (Fig. 3), the husband touches the wife's shoulder exactly as in a farewell scene on the lid of a Roman sarcophagus (Fig. 4).⁶ Even the drapery motives correspond to those of the Roman model.

The fish-tailed monster on which rides a Nereid or some other mythological figure was a most popular subject on Hellenistic and Roman silver plates and dishes, as well as on floor mosaics, far into late Roman and Byzantine times.⁷ Quite a number of similar disks have been found in Gandhara, with female figures riding a great variety of sea monsters, with

lions', horses', wolves and griffons' heads (Fig. 5). The rider generally sits motionless on the monster's body, completely dressed but rather summarily treated; a few carved lines indicate the modelling of the face, the hair, and the drapery. A comparison of the lower hem of the garment with that of a provincial Hellenistic silver plaque (Fig. 6)⁸ shows clearly the transformation which the classical figure style has undergone. One of these disks is especially noteworthy because the rider is seen from the back, with the head in profile, and holding a child with her outstretched left hand (Fig. 7).⁹ A nude figure in a similar view, shown by its wings to be Eros, and riding a similar sea monster, occurs in the centre of a Roman silver patera (Fig. 8).¹⁰

A tray showing a nude male figure grasping with both outstretched arms the shoulders of two females (Fig. 9), repeats the scene representing a revel of Dionysos, Eros, and Silenos, as found on the cover of a Roman mirror case (Fig. 10).¹¹ The two companions of the god are fully dressed; the gesture of Eros' left hand, with the torch pointing downwards, is faithfully preserved. The striding motive of Dionysos himself has been simplified, though it is obvious in both works that he is dancing; the main feature, the outstretched arms put round the necks of his companions, is stressed even more than in the classical example.

Another dish shows a similar Dionysiac composition (Fig. 11),¹² which derives from multifigured representations of the god with his cortège, as represented, for instance, on a Roman floor mosaic (Fig. 12).¹³ Careful comparison will show that almost every gesture and movement has its counterpart in the Roman work: Dionysos himself is leaning on his followers rather than standing, his body forming a semicircular curve; two figures, one male, the other female, support the drunken god; two others of whom not much more than the heads are visible are in the background; finally there are the two figures on the extreme right and left, the right one seen from the back and turning his head. The figures and their dress are again simplified as on the other disks.

The next example shows a rather immobilized version of the Roman formula of the myth of Apollo and Daphne (Fig. 13).¹⁴ Almost all the essential features of a Roman floor mosaic (Fig. 14)¹⁵ recur on this tray: Daphne kneeling on the ground, supporting herself with one arm on some stone or rock, while Apollo, standing beside her, grasps her other arm with his right hand.

The flowing drapery of the god has become a solid mass falling down his back; there is even a reminiscence of the original character of the drapery in that part of the cloak which extends horizontally from his right shoulder. The piece of drapery flowing over Daphne's head has disappeared, but the lower part of her body is covered with some sort of cloak falling down from the left arm and hand so as to form a continuous line leading up to her feet. It seems that the copyist did not fully understand his classical model, and reproduced his general impression of the scene, without going too much into detail. This may account for the strange interrelation of figure and drapery motives.

The last specimen from this group which will be discussed here shows the toilet of Venus (Fig. 15),¹⁶ and derives from a late Roman work which must have been very similar to the lid of the Proiecta casket (Fig. 16), an Early Christian wedding box in silver dating from the late fourth century.¹⁷ Again the main figure has undergone considerable transformation. As in the other scenes which we have just studied, the artist seems reluctant to represent the nude human body. No clear distinction is made between the drapery which Venus holds aloft with her right hand, the shell in which she sits, and the mirror; the second knee has no organic connexion with the body and seems to be added as an afterthought. The male figure in attendance is a faithful reflection of the style of the other disks; it is a great pity that this work should have come down to us in this fragmentary state of preservation—the part which is now missing might have taught us more about the transformation of classical mythological motives as practised by these craftsmen.

One thing, however, should be clear from the evidence of the few examples we have studied. For the Indian artists these figures and scenes were genre motives of purely decorative value. Nothing of their mythological significance remains. Even on the Proiecta casket, the Early Christian work just mentioned, where this and other motives taken from classical mythology occur side by side with Christian signs and symbols, they have a particular meaning within the framework of the whole programme. Here they are copied as if the Roman models were imported by pure accident, without any appreciation of their message.¹⁸

The main achievement of the Gandhara school, the creation of a cycle of religious sculpture on Mediterranean lines, implies

a very different approach to classical imagery, and is connected with a different group of Roman monuments. The models are to be found among those representative products of Roman art which gave expression to the official state religion.

The lucid and all too human simplicity of classical Hellenic religion had long since given way to a complicated syncretism which incorporated numerous foreign elements of a contradictory character. Alexander the Great himself had tried to reconcile the native creeds of Syria and Egypt with the beliefs of his ancestors; in Roman times eastern cults found homes even in the capital of the Empire. The divinity of the emperor, the Roman version of Hellenistic ruler cult, is now proclaimed with all the glamour and elaborate ceremonial of the ancient oriental monarchies. The image of the emperor takes its place by the side of those of the Roman gods, demanding the same honour and respect;¹⁹ his apotheosis becomes a frequent subject on Imperial monuments; his official functions, his campaigns and victories over the barbarians are glorified in cycles of monumental sculpture.²⁰

When, in the second century, the extension of the Empire had passed its zenith, and its stability began to decline, people realized that the attempt to achieve permanence in the material sphere had failed. Their minds turned towards the more permanent values of the spirit, towards the mysterious and supernatural. The immortality of the soul, which for some hundred years past had been the main preoccupation of the philosophers, now became a subject for popular speculation, and the belief in life after death the keynote of the symbolical language of their funerary monuments.²¹ The people were longing for a spiritual creed, delivering them from the miseries of their earthly existence, and promising universal mercy and redemption. The Messianic theme of Virgil's Fourth Eclogue, the prophecy of the birth of the heavenly child who was to be the prince of peace and mercy, and of the beginning of a golden age under the leadership of Augustus, had become part of the Imperial cult.²² Soon it was to assume a new significance in the eyes of the antique world which was thirsting for its saviour, and to be connected with the birth of Christ and the coming of His heavenly kingdom.

In a similar way the different pagan mystery cults prepared the masses for the message of the New Testament. During the first three centuries of our era, they gained more and more ground among the populations of the Empire. The forcing

house of this development was the army. The Roman legions stationed throughout the Empire and guarding its distant frontiers could easily establish and maintain contact with strange and barbarian mystery religions, such as the Thracian Horseman, or the Persian Mithra. The religion of Mithra, the hero who killed the bull and brought through this symbolical sacrifice eternal salvation to the initiated, spread with the Roman eagles all over the Empire. In the end it was conquered only by Christ Himself who blotted out human sin through His own supreme sacrifice.²³

It seems that the religious development in Buddhist India during the first centuries of our era was surprisingly similar. We know much less about the India of 2,000 years ago than about the ancient world. There are no historical texts, and inscribed monuments are few and far between. Our main sources of information for the North-West are Greek and Latin authors,²⁴ but most of them are silent on religious matters. The one thing which is certain is that during this period Buddhism underwent a significant change, which affected in the first place the conception of the nature of the Buddha himself.²⁵ This son of a local Indian king who had left his father's court and renounced his heritage in order to acquire knowledge and to practise resignation had shown his followers the way to Nirvana. During the early period Buddhism was essentially a clerical brotherhood. The first centuries of our era saw the rise of the Mahayana, a new school of religious thought which gradually superseded the old one throughout the greater part of the Buddhist world. The Buddha who in the early school had never been more than a human being, however perfected, is now accorded divine honours. He becomes a symbol of universal redemption, extending his compassion to all men without distinction; and he is served by Bodhisattvas and other beings acting as mediators between him and sinful humanity. By introducing this hierarchy of lower agents of salvation, Mahayana Buddhism becomes more generally accessible and more human than its predecessor.²⁶ The popular appeal of the divine promise of salvation may in a way be compared with that of the different mystery religions whose saviour-gods were worshipped by innumerable communities of initiated in the West. The teaching of the early Mahayana which attributed to the Buddha two bodies, one human and one quasi-eternal and divine,²⁷ is even reminiscent of the learned controversy of the Fathers about the divine nature of Christ.

In the Mahayana the Buddha's birth and early life are embellished with a wealth of legendary features pertaining to his divine origin and power,²⁸ which correspond to the standard motives of Hellenistic-Roman ruler-cult. The Romance of Alexander, Virgil's prophetic Eclogue predicting the birth of the heavenly child, Suetonius's glorification of Augustus,²⁹ and other Roman texts giving expression to the Imperial religion, all use the same language. The child is born of a divine father; the astrological constellation at the time of his birth is propitious; his future career is foreshadowed both before his birth and during his early years by mystical signs and miraculous happenings; he is acclaimed as the saviour inaugurating an age of peace and mercy. The parallel is so close that scholars have been tempted to establish a direct relationship between this official version of Roman emperor worship and the Buddhist stories told by Mahayana texts.³⁰

In the artistic sphere this relationship certainly exists. The Buddha was first represented in human shape when he had assumed divine status and had become an object of worship—in fact when there was the need for an image carrying a message similar to that of the cult image of the deified emperor. The first Buddha sculpture repeats the type of an early Imperial toga statue—perhaps it is even a conscious imitation of a statue of Augustus himself (Figs. 17, 18). Little modification was required to change the toga of the early Imperial period into the traditional garment of the Buddhist monk; the style of the statue conforms to the general development which can be observed whenever in Roman art a type created in the capital spread to the provinces.³¹ The Buddha statue is a 'provincial' work in much the same way as, for instance, an early toga statue found in the Rhineland (Fig. 19):³² compared with the Roman sculpture which is full of life and movement, the modelling is flat and more schematic, the movements are more restrained, the flow of the folds is more regular and symmetrical. The image of the sitting Buddha, on the other hand, repeats a native type which in early Buddhist art was used for a variety of purposes. In Gandhara it was elaborated into a counterpart of the standing god, and dressed with the same monk's garment which, as most examples show, was utterly unsuitable for a seated figure.³³

These two cult images stand at the beginning of Buddhist religious art in Gandhara. They play a prominent part in the new cycle of scenes from the life of the Buddha. Most of these

scenes had been represented before in Buddhist art; but never before had they been combined to form a logical and coherent cycle. At Sanchi, for instance, no general idea underlying the decoration of the gates of the Great Stupa has yet been discovered.³⁴ In Gandhara the whole range of Imperial Roman imagery was adapted to present the well-known events from the Buddha's life as a continuous story glorifying the redeeming power of the deified teacher, just as in Early Christian art Roman figure types and formulas are used to illustrate the miracles of Christ and the conversion of the earliest believers. It is this cycle on which Buddhist iconography has been based ever since.

These sculptures decorated the surfaces of stupas which have come down to us in ruins. No complete cycles have survived the destruction and neglect of the centuries. But the thousands of fragments which have come to light on the sites of ancient Buddhist monasteries all over Gandhara give us a fairly accurate idea of the nature of these cycles, of their origin, and their religious significance.

In a few instances classical genre scenes acquire a new meaning in Buddhist mythology. The ploughman with his yoke of oxen, for instance, well known from Greek and Roman coins, bronze and terracotta groups and decorative reliefs (Fig. 20),³⁵ serves to illustrate the Bodhisattva's First Meditation (Fig. 21):³⁶ the young prince attends a ploughing match and, suddenly realizing the hard lot of the toiling labourers and their straining animals, is filled with grief, and transported into a state of unconscious ecstasy. Another example is the birth of Chandaka, the Buddha's faithful servant, and Kanthaka, his favourite horse, who were born at the royal palace at the same time as their future master (Fig. 22).³⁷ In this relief two charming classical genre scenes are combined: the mare suckling her foal, and the mother with her child. The first one occurs, for instance, on a Hellenistic silver dish found in Russia (Fig. 23);³⁸ both are frequent on Roman mosaic pavements, and on the fifth-century mosaic of the Great Palace in Constantinople they are even seen side by side.³⁹

But, as a rule, the classical scenes selected by the Gandhara artists represented definite historical or mythological events of a significance similar to that of the Buddhist stories for which they were used. At the same time the artistic tradition of the early Buddhist school in India was adhered to whenever possible. The combination of classical and Indian elements produced some very remarkable results.

The Departure of the Buddha from his father's palace at Kapilavastu had been rendered by the early Buddhist school at Sanchi as a continuous narrative depicting the various stages of the journey with all the representative splendour due to this decisive event (Fig. 24).⁴⁰ But the Buddha himself is not shown. His presence is indicated by the traditional symbols, the royal umbrella above the horse while he is on horseback, the foot-steps when he has dismounted.

In Gandhara the event is represented by a single scene, with the Buddha on horseback in the centre (Fig. 29). There is no connexion between the solemn exaltation of the Sanchi narrative and this dry statement of facts. The group of the rider and his horse, however, existed in earlier Buddhist art—though of course it was never used to represent the Buddha; and a comparison with the female rider from a corner pillar of the Bharhut railing (Fig. 28)⁴¹ will show that the main features of our group are derived from the Indian tradition as established in the early Buddhist period. The proportions of rider and horse, the awkward sitting motive of the rider who nearly touches the horse's knee with his feet, his body, very plump and too small for the enormous head, hands and feet, are very much the same in both reliefs; so is the modelling of the horse's body and legs which are stiff in their joints as if carved in wood. Finally, even the piece of drapery flowing from the rider's left elbow recurs in Gandhara.

The pictorial type of the Buddha's Departure, on the other hand, is derived from the triumphal repertoire of Roman Imperial art.⁴² The emperor's triumphal departure, the *profectio Augusti*, is a common subject on Roman coins and medallions of the second and third centuries.⁴³ The same scheme is used for the *adventus Augusti*, his victorious entry into a city. He is preceded by a cursor, or a winged victory, and followed by a pedisequus. Some coins show, indeed, all the particular features of our group: the cursor in front turns back towards the rider, the emperor gives the salute with his right hand, and the pedisequus raises his standard with a gesture comparable to that of the Buddha's servant carrying the royal umbrella (Figs. 25, 26).

The *adventus* and *profectio* scenes on Roman coins and medallions are primarily commemorations of actual historical events; but at the same time they allude to the theological significance of the ceremonial entry. In the Imperial cult the emperor was acclaimed as the bringer of peace and forgiveness and saviour of the world, and his victorious arrival at the city gates was a

symbol of the coming of the Messiah. Because of its soteriological symbolism, the emperor's *adventus* commended itself as a worthy prototype for the triumphal Entry of Christ into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday; and Early Christian art readily availed itself of the Imperial formula (Fig. 27).⁴⁴ Our Departure scene in Gandhara, derived from the same pictorial type, has a similar double meaning: in the first place it is an historical narrative of an important event in the Buddha's life, and at the same time it is a symbol of his divine mission as the saviour of man.

Another institution of the Imperial cult, which, however, was not generally accepted before the third century, was the proskynesis or *adoratio*.⁴⁵ The proskynesis had been part of the Persian court ceremonial;⁴⁶ Arrian's story of Alexander's abortive attempt to introduce it at his court at Bactra is well known.⁴⁷ At first the Romans, like Alexander's Macedonians, considered the prostration before a living person as below the dignity of free men; and isolated attempts by certain emperors to enforce it were doomed to failure. An aureus of Postumus, early in the second half of the third century, seems to be the earliest official document showing a Roman citizen kneeling in adoration before the emperor;⁴⁸ soon afterwards, the proskynesis became an established feature in Rome.⁴⁹

In the art of the early Imperial period the proskynesis was reserved for captives and vanquished barbarians acknowledging defeat. We can distinguish two types: either the adoring person merely genuflects before the emperor and implores his mercy,⁵⁰ or he lies prostrate with his body bent forward and his head almost touching the ground. The first attitude occurs, for instance, on the fragment of a Trajanic frieze which to-day forms part of the decoration of the Arch of Constantine (Fig. 31); moreover, another vanquished enemy lies in the dust under the victorious emperor's horse.⁵¹ Again the relief records primarily an historical event, a Roman victory in battle over the Daces; and at the same time it is a pictorial symbol of Imperial Victory, recalling to mind the prophecy, attributed by Statius to the Sybil of Cumae, of eternal life and eternal victory for the emperor, who received the divine epithet of 'invictus'.⁵²

It is the second type of humble adoration which reappears in Early Christian art, which readily adopted the symbolism of Imperial Roman imagery for depicting the Messianic mission of Christ.⁵³ In a miniature painting of the Raising of Lazarus, for instance, the dead man's sisters lie prostrate before the Saviour appealing to His divine power (Fig. 30). The same scheme

occurs, moreover, in Gandhara, used identically for two different stories, the Dipankara Jataka (Fig. 32) and the Conversion of Angulimalya (Fig. 33).⁵⁴ In both scenes the central group is practically the same as in the Christian miniature: the standing Buddha, his right hand raised, addresses the adoring figure prostrate in front of him. There can be no doubt that the Buddhist and Christian works derive from a common prototype, and convey similar messages to the believer. The divine redeemer who brings salvation to mankind commands supernatural forces, and has the power to conquer death.

Neither of the two Buddhist scenes occur in earlier Buddhist art. But the continuous method of representation as practised by the early Buddhist schools of Bharhut and Sanchi is faithfully preserved: consecutive episodes from the same story are combined into a single sculpture and form a continuous narrative without any obvious partition between the different scenes.⁵⁵ This 'narrative style' in itself is of so common occurrence throughout the ancient world that no far-reaching conclusions should be drawn from its appearance at Sanchi or in Gandhara. But one particular feature of our Buddhist reliefs proves beyond doubt that here it was derived from a late antique model. Both these sculptures are not merely specimens of the continuous method in its usual form; in addition, the standing Buddha figure in each actually belongs to two different scenes. In the Jataka illustration the youth who has come to pay his respects to the Buddha Dipankara is first seen casting his bunch of flowers, and then prostrating himself in front of him (Fig. 32); in the Conversion scene (Fig. 33), both the attack of the murderer and his subsequent humiliation refer to the same Buddha figure. An identical scheme occurs in East Christian miniatures, in the Rotulus of Joshua, for instance, which is a tenth-century copy of an original five or more centuries older. Joshua, the hero of the story, meets the Angel of the Lord: first he challenges him, then, recognizing his heavenly nature, he falls to the ground in adoration (Fig. 34). The Angel, who is only shown once, in fact participates in both scenes. Obviously this device, which underlines the swift succession of two consecutive scenes in a continuous narrative, was in Gandhara taken over from the same classical scene which inspired the Christian miniature painting.

Throughout the existence of the Gandhara school the iconography of the single scenes is extremely stereotyped. There

are no regional differences, as in Early Christian art—or at least we have not yet learnt to see them. In very few instances only, more than one version of the same subject has come down to us. Where there is, moreover, stylistic evidence that these different versions reflect different stages in the evolution of the school, we are able to follow the development of pictorial types through the centuries, and trace the gradual change of their meaning as religious symbols. Unfortunately, this method, which yields remarkable results when applied to the study of Christian iconography, is not feasible on a similar scale in Gandhara. But in those instances where a comparison with a sequence of corresponding formulas evolved by contemporary western art is possible, we may hope to arrive at a fuller understanding of the significance of the iconographical development.

The story of Indra's visit to the Buddha, absorbed in meditation in his mountain retreat, had been represented by the early Buddhist school at Bharhut, Bodh Gaya, and Sanchi. The Buddha himself is of course invisible. At Bodh Gaya there is nothing but the empty cave in the mountain, his place of refuge, and, to the left, the Gandharva who is Indra's messenger, playing on his harp to announce his master's arrival: an historical event described purely by symbols (Fig. 35).⁵⁶ At Sanchi there is a more elaborate composition (Fig. 36), but its meaning is still very much the same. Above is the empty cave in the mountain, in the form of an Indian rock temple; strange monsters of various kinds are to be seen in the neighbourhood. In front of the cave Indra and his followers pay their respects to the Buddha. The person seen from the back is probably Indra himself.⁵⁷

This is the compositional scheme which reappears in Gandhara: the cave in the centre, and the visitors in front of it. But the general character of the sculpture and its meaning are now very different. The cave which occupies the greater part of the relief now houses an image of the sitting Buddha in meditation; and the story of Indra's visit is told with an abundance of detail (Fig. 37).⁵⁸

The Buddha occupies the centre with the immobility of an icon, separated from the rest by the sharp outline of the cave, which appears more as an artificial structure housing a cult image than as a mountain retreat cut in the living rock. Around the cave the whole mountain side has come to life. Animals of many kinds, peacefully living side by side, indicate that under the influence of the Blessed One the jungle has become a kind

of terrestrial paradise; innumerable divinities worship the Buddha, and 'throw heavenly flowers down on him from the skies'.⁵⁹ At the foot of the cave, in a kind of predella, the arrival of Indra is told at full length. On the extreme right, his elephant, still on its knees, had just allowed him to dismount; the royal umbrella indicates the presence of the god. Indra and his wife are among the kneeling figures looking up to the cave in adoration. Outside the cave, on the Buddha's right, is Panchasikha, the harpist.

This sculpture has an inscription dating it in the first half of the third century, and is a comparatively early work of the school.⁶⁰ But we know that the tradition was alive until the very end of Gandhara art in the fifth century. A magnificent relief which is at least 200 years younger, allows us not only to trace the development of style during that period, but also the spiritual development to which this iconographical scheme was subject (Fig. 38).⁶¹ We are reminded of Hiuen Tsiang's description of the locality where the visit of Indra took place. 'The precipices and valleys of the mountain which contains the cave are dark and gloomy', he says. 'Those who enter the cave to worship are seized with a sort of religious trepidation.'⁶² The academic rigidity of the earlier work, the clear separation of the divine and the human spheres have disappeared. The central figure is no longer isolated and unapproachable like an icon; the cave, with a more natural outline which closely follows the forms of the Buddha's body, connects him with the surrounding narrative rather than separates him. The whole scheme appears at the same time more vigorous and more humanized; it seems that after the divine nature of the Buddha was firmly established, his human nature has come into its right again. The idyllic scenes round the cave, too, are more animated than in the earlier relief. Lion and antelope live in the forest as good neighbours, calling to mind Virgil's prophecy of universal peace and plenty during the coming golden age; a small monkey imitates the reflecting attitude of the Buddha, who shows the way to salvation to all creatures, high and low. Unfortunately the lively pageant formed by the arrival of Indra at the foot of the cave can no longer be identified in detail.

In these two sculptures the Buddha figure has become the centre of an historical narrative telling one particular incident from his life. The transformation of the early Buddhist versions of Bodh Gaya and Sanchi is again due to the reception of western ideas, and has a close parallel in the development of

religious art in the West. From time immemorial the ancient world had known the cult of divinities living in caves. In Greco-Roman reliefs the nymphs, goddesses of grottoes and mountain sources, were represented inhabiting these popular places of worship. Symbols of the living nature surround the entrance to the caves: river gods, Pan with his pipes, peacefully grazing goats (Fig. 39).⁶³

In the Roman period the scheme of the cave sculpture was developed into a representative cult image by the adherents of the Mithraic creed. Just as the nymphs in the classical period—and as Buddha practising meditation—Mithra is worshipped in caves and grottoes. Mithra, who brings salvation to the community of initiated by sacrificing the bull, is represented in the centre of the cave performing the heroic task (Fig. 40)—just as the Buddha in Gandhara shows the way to salvation by self-sacrifice. The idea of the divine redeemer, unknown to classical antiquity, has found pictorial expression in a new type of cult image⁶⁴ which, to the followers of Mithra and Buddha alike, carries a similar promise.

Many other elements of our Gandhara reliefs recur on those Mithraic monuments which, in the last instance, derive from sculptures of idyllic grottoes inhabited by nymphs. Here is the wooded mountain side with the Hellenistic landscape; trees, birds, a reclining mountain god.⁶⁵ Moreover, in most instances, the central subject includes accessory figures, which are primarily of symbolical significance, but which introduce a narrative element into the sacrificial scene: the representative cult image is at the same time an historical narrative of the decisive episode in the god's life, told in every conceivable detail.⁶⁶ Finally, on the more elaborate sculptures, there is a whole cycle illustrating relevant symbolical events in Mithra's life from his birth to his ascension; in some cases it appropriately assumes the shape of a triumphal arch framing the heroic act of salvation in the centre (Fig. 40).⁶⁷

We have seen that this kind of narrative cycle of the life of an historical or religious hero, in which every single item has a specific symbolical significance, is a creation of Roman sculpture of the post-classical period. It tells the representative events in the emperor's life, and at the same time gives expression to the ceremonial symbolism of the Roman state religion. In Mithraic art the whole cycle, and thus the whole *credo* of the Mithraic religion, is contained in a single cult image. But in Gandhara there is a comprehensive cycle of single scenes. They all proclaim

the divine status of their hero and his power of redemption, using the same language borrowed from Roman monuments. The Visit of Indra is only one episode out of a long story. Its ultimate models can be found among classical reliefs pertaining to grotto cults; but it is not improbable that its immediate source of inspiration was the Mithraic stele. This may be the reason why in Buddhist art the Visit of Indra has become a similar representative cult image, conveying a similar religious message: the belief in after-life expressed through an historical narrative.

In Mithraic art we can distinguish between those monuments in which the narrative character prevails, and those in which it has become completely submerged by the symbolical content of the image. The different versions of the Visit of Indra in Gandhara offer again close parallels which allow us to trace the role of the narrative element in the history of the school.

The type of Mithraic relief usual in the eastern provinces of the Empire, especially along the lower Danube where important Roman garrisons were stationed, shows the central image surrounded on all sides by the cycle of scenes from the life of the god (Fig. 41).⁶⁸ They are on top of the cave as well as at the bottom where they form a kind of predella, just as the arrival of Indra and his cortège in our Gandhara sculpture. They form a continuous narrative full of life and movement, including the central scene which is here just one episode among others. The two torch-bearers face each other, turning towards the centre, and are thus brought into relation with the mystical sacrifice performed by the god. Mithra himself turns his head backwards, looking towards the left-hand part of the scene. The whole composition contains more real action than static symbolism: it is an epic narrative telling the dramatic events in a heroic life.

Another Mithraic sculpture from the same part of eastern Europe presents a very different picture (Fig. 42).⁶⁹ Mithra and the torch-bearers appear in austere and motionless frontality; their gestures do not perform actions, they only convey a religious message. Most of the accessory features of the central subject have gone, and in place of the continuous narrative there are only three single scenes, isolated by separating arches, and containing only those elements which are strictly necessary for an understanding of their symbolical meaning. This is mainly a religious document, without any narrative qualities. Nothing remains here of the classical enjoyment of worldly life and heroic action, of the love of nature and beauty.

There is a relief of the Visit of Indra, which though retaining the main features of the earlier sculptures, represents the first step towards a similar suppression of the narrative element (Fig. 43).⁷⁰ The Buddha appears more isolated than ever, like an icon in its shrine. The elaborate description of Indra's arrival at the foot of the cave has gone; and the figures round it, including Indra and his wife and Panchasikha the harpist, are not part of a story, but of an adoration scene. The same is true of the divinities throwing their flowers from the skies. The sculpture conveys very much the impression of a devotional image. Only the landscape setting is still the same: the mountain covered with trees and flowers, and the animals living peacefully together; at the top the monkey in meditation, at the bottom the lion and antelope.

In the next sculpture (Fig. 45), nothing of the particular features of the preceding reliefs is left. The subject has been adapted to fit the compositional scheme of the sitting Buddha surrounded by symmetrical groups of disciples, which in Gandhara is used for a great variety of different scenes; in some cases the particular identity of the subject represented can be established only by a meticulous study of iconographical detail. Here, the Buddha image, completely self-centred, is shown in its cave. The other elements—the formation of the rock around the mountain retreat, the gandharva to the left prominently displaying his harp, Indra with his elaborate head-dress, the elephant at the foot of the cave, and the umbrella, sign of Indra's royal dignity—help us to recognize the scene. But they are independent of one another, and not part of a story; they are nothing but different symbols of identification. They make the believer recognize the sculpture as the Visit of Indra—not as an event among others in the Buddha's life, but as one of the fundamental facts of the Buddhist faith carrying a particular theological message. The language of these symbols—though of course not the significance of the image—has come pretty near that of the earliest representations of the scene at Bodh Gaya and Sanchi, which did not yet know the Buddha in human shape.

It is significant that at this late stage which saw the triumph of the anti-narrative style in Gandhara, the symmetrical composition is sometimes given up in favour of a revival of the Early Buddhist and pre-narrative scheme of Bodh Gaya. A sculpture representing the same subject (Fig. 44),⁷¹ which clearly consists of two parts of equal importance, differs from the Bobh

Gaya relief (Fig. 35) only by the inclusion of the human Buddha in the interior of the cave, and by the addition of Indra who appears behind the harpist. Indra is on a much smaller scale than the other two persons: he is only on the point of arriving. The spiritual content of the scene would be quite as clear even without his presence; it is sufficiently expressed through the figures of the Buddha and the harpist who in this combination would recall to the mind of all the faithful the true message of the 'Visit of Indra'.

This language of symbols is most obvious in a sculpture which comes from the cycle of the Stupa of Sikri (Fig. 46).⁷² Most of the elements of the old narrative are present; but they do not combine to make a story. The Buddha in the cave has no relationship to his surroundings; the animals—lion, gazelle, ibex—rather symbolize the terrestrial paradise than live in it; the harpist and the two divinities in the skies perform empty gestures, not actions. The end of the development shows the victory of the spirit over the worldly joy of dramatic action and epic narrative—in the Mithraic and Buddhist works alike. This is more truly religious art than all the half-pagan works we have considered so far; but the heritage of antiquity is now being lost. We are on the threshold of the Middle Ages.

It is interesting to note that the history of Early Christian sculpture shows a parallel development. When victorious Christianity had conquered the disintegrating Roman Empire and was firmly established as the triumphal state religion, Christian art was at last able to enter upon the true heritage of Rome. Up to then its main task had been to decorate funerary monuments with unpretentious abbreviations of biblical scenes which had a symbolical bearing on the ultimate fate of the person buried in the tomb.⁷³ Now the pagan narrative tradition is revived, the symbolical scenes acquire historical significance and take their appropriate places in a representative cycle of the martyrdom and triumph of Christ and His Church. The second half of the fourth century proclaims the victory of Christianity with all the impressiveness and monumental hero-worship of the Roman narrative and historical relief. New subjects are introduced into sarcophagus sculpture, such as the *traditio legis*, the handing over of the Law to St. Peter, which stands for the foundation of the Christian Church.⁷⁴ The sarcophagus of St. Ambrogio in Milan, for instance, shows this scene (Fig. 47) and the *Maiestas Domini* on the fronts; relevant

episodes from the lives of the Old Testament patriarchs, fore-runners of Christ and of His work of salvation, on the lateral faces; and the Adoration of the Magi, and three young men refusing to render divine honours to the emperor's image⁷⁵ on the cover. The complementary scenes are told for their narrative qualities as well as for their significance within this monumental theological programme. The subject of the sarcophagus is no longer the redemption of husband and wife, who are seen kneeling inconspicuously at the feet of the risen Christ, but the greatness of the Church on earth and in heaven; its spiritual power is glorified in the worldly language of Imperial Roman art.

However, this 'Renaissance' of the age of Theodosius⁷⁶ did not last long. The series of fifth-century sarcophagi preserved at Ravenna shows the gradual decline of the pagan narrative tradition, which is quickly overtaken by the spiritual and symbolical conceptions of the *ecclesia ex circumcissione*. The *traditio legis* appears again (Fig. 48), but the monumentality and splendour have gone from the scene. Nothing of the action and the narrative qualities of the earlier sarcophagus remains. Christ is more majestic, and isolated from the other figures; the rows of apostles on both sides have been omitted; St. Peter's expressive eagerness in receiving the Law is intended to underline the theological significance of the subject. The Mountain of Paradise is more prominent, and the locality moreover indicated by two palm-trees framing the central group. Husband and wife are represented on the same scale as the other figures, as if they were part of the scene and of the message it conveys.

Finally, the love of purely symbolical expression prevails in those late sarcophagi from which all human figures are banned (Fig. 49). The lamb symbol, derived from the Revelation of St. John,⁷⁷ shows that the old Jewish hatred of a monumental rendering of the divine has come into its own again. Three lambs between two palm-trees, the central one with a nimb and standing on a hill out of which come the four rivulets, is all that is left of the traditional composition of Christ between Peter and Paul. This new symbol of Christ's majesty is inspired by a religious feeling which has completely renounced its pagan heritage. We have reached a stage in Christian art which even surpasses anything to be found on Buddhist and Mithraic monuments.

In the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to decide whether there was any direct influence on a large scale

of Early Christian sculpture on the art of Gandhara, or whether the Christian and Buddhist works present an independent development, the disintegration of the common classical legacy along similar lines and with the same final results. The student of the history of religions is faced with the same problem. Several accounts in the Gospels of the miracles of Christ have exact parallels in the Mahayana scriptures⁷⁸—the Feeding of the Five Thousand, for instance, or the story of Peter walking on the Sea; and it is obvious that their symbolical significance in the West and East is very much the same. These miracle tales may have been common property of different races and peoples from times immemorial; but a direct influence of early Christianity or perhaps some western mystery religion on the Mahayana can by no means be excluded. Matters may have been very similar in the artistic field.

Some comparisons between Early Christian and Gandhara sculpture reveal indeed extraordinary similarities for which no parallels exist in pagan Roman art. One side of the bridal casket of Proiecta, for instance, shows the bride sitting in the centre, both her hands raised, and flanked by two attendants (Fig. 50);⁷⁹ the figures are framed by an alternating system of arches and pediments supported by columns. On a Gandhara relief the Buddha is seen sitting in the centre, with Indra and Brahma to his right and left (Fig. 51). The figures are separated by columns; the central one is framed by an elongated arch, and the other two by hybrid structures of a kind very usual in Gandhara art, and deriving from classical pediments. The decorative system of showing single figures or scenes under alternating arcades and pediments is in the last instance derived from a group of pagan sarcophagi;⁸⁰ and it is possible that the Christian and Buddhist works go back to a common source of this kind. But it would be very difficult to adduce any pagan sculpture showing the same composition with this extraordinary similarity of the attending figures and their gestures. Moreover, the figure of the Christian bride should be compared with a Gandhara sculpture representing a bearded man, of the type of St. Peter in Early Christian art, sitting in the European fashion, with both his hands raised (Fig. 52). I do not think that it is possible to produce any pagan works as near to these two Gandhara sculptures as the Christian bridal casket.

There are numerous Gandhara friezes with the Buddha seated among his followers and disciples, who stand or cower on the ground in rows at his sides (Fig. 53). Again, there are the

closest similarities to Christian sarcophagi showing the seated Christ surrounded by standing or sitting apostles turning with comparable gestures towards the central figure (Fig. 54).⁸¹ Here, too, the possibility that the Buddhist and Christian works derive from a common model cannot be altogether excluded. But in one particular instance, the decorative system of a Christian sarcophagus can be proved to have been copied in Gandhara. Sarcophagi with rows of apostles, or a sequence of christological scenes, separated from each other by trees, are a common feature in Early Christian art (Fig. 56),⁸² but no pagan sarcophagi of this type are known to exist. Those late Gandhara friezes showing the Buddha surrounded by monks (Fig. 55), or a row of Buddha figures, framed by similar trees, derive without doubt from Christian models. It is impossible to say at the present moment whether these are exceptional cases, or whether the later stages of the Gandhara school should to any large extent be traced back to Christian prototypes.

More than any other aspect of ancient art the Gandhara school of sculpture makes us conscious of the inherent unity of artistic achievement in a world which was essentially one—though it extended far beyond the reach of Greek and Roman arms, to the limit of ancient geographical knowledge. Politically, Gandhara was never part of the ancient world. Alexander's short-lived dream of world-domination had carried a Greek army even beyond the Indus. But he had come as a hostile invader only, and after his military grip had ceased Hellenism left practically no traces in the Indus countries. To the end of antiquity and beyond, India remained to the Mediterranean peoples what it had been to the chroniclers of Alexander's campaign: the land of marvels and of incredible deeds of nature and of man. The Romans never attempted to enter upon Alexander's heritage. Their legions stopped on the banks of the Euphrates, 600 miles from the frontiers of the Kushan Empire. Gandhara never knew them as enemies or conquerors. The chief aim of Roman policy in the East was the safety of the trade routes. Roman art reached the monasteries of the North-West not through hostile armies of occupation, but through peaceful traders and caravans. The classical influence in Gandhara was not imposed from outside—it is the result of an evolution of religious ideas, of a spiritual development which corresponds to that of the latest stages in the history of the ancient world, and which looked to the West for guidance in

artistic matters. And this is why the Roman achievement was accepted in its entirety. My task has not been to accumulate single instances of imitation of classical subject-matter, but to show the significance which Roman art as a whole could assume on foreign soil if its message was fully realized.

The mark it left on the East lives on to the present day. The Gandhara interlude was the decisive break in the history of Buddhist art. The decorative ensembles of the early Buddhist school betray all too openly their 'secular' origin and the casual character of their programmes, which were not established by the Buddhist Church but had to comply with the wishes of individual patrons.⁸³ The sculpture of Gandhara was primarily a monastic art. It was a conscious means of religious propaganda, and firmly controlled by the ecclesiastical authorities. Gandhara presented the Buddhist world for the first time with a full cycle of narrative scenes forming a consistent theological programme, and carrying a religious message of universal popular appeal. This message, similar to that of the mystery religions of late antiquity and to that of Early Christianity itself, is conveyed to the faithful in the same language of pictorial types—the language first created by Imperial Roman art to glorify the divinity of the emperor.

It was the mission of Gandhara to transmit these western formulas to the native Buddhist schools in India. The North-West itself took no part in the later history of Buddhist art. The final stages of Gandhara sculpture show a decline of the narrative tradition which corresponds to the disintegration of the classical heritage in the Mediterranean world. The development we have traced here is the transition from ancient to medieval art—in Europe as in Asia.

NOTES

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1. Cf. G. Combaz, *L'Inde et l'Orient classique*, Paris, 1937, p. 255; H. Buchthal, 'The Haughton Collection of Gandhara Sculpture', in *The Burlington Magazine*, lxxxvi, 1945, p. 66, pl. I, B.
2. H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of the Silver Plate (Greek, Etruscan, and Roman) in the British Museum*, London, 1921, pp. xiv ff.
3. H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of the Greek and Roman Lamps in the British Museum*, London, 1914, p. xxviii.
4. Flinders Petrie, *Objects of Daily Use (British School of Archaeology in Egypt)*, London, 1927, pl. xxxiv and p. 37, with further literature.
5. Walters, *Greek and Roman Lamps*, op. cit., no. 721, pl. xxiv.
6. Sarcophagus with the myth of Endymion in the Museo Capitolino: H. Stuart Jones, *A Catalogue of ancient Sculptures preserved in the municipal Collections of Rome: The Sculptures of the Museo Capitolino*, Oxford, 1912, pp. 313 ff.; pl. 78. The lid is not the original one.
7. Cf. Combaz, op. cit., p. 147; D. M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus*, x, Baltimore, 1941, p. 168, with further literature; L. Matzulevitsch, *Byzantinische Antike*, Leipzig, 1929, pls. 6, 19, 20, 38 ff.
8. Here reproduced after Smirnov, *Oriental Silverwork* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1909, no. 285, pl. cx.
9. First published in *ASIAR* for 1928-9, pl. xx, 10.
10. Walters, *Silver Plate*, op. cit., no. 77, pl. viii; a similar dish in the Benaki Museum, Athens: G. Brett, 'Formal Ornament on Late Roman and Early Byzantine Silver', in *Papers of the British School at Rome*, xv, 1939, pl. vii.
11. Walters, *Silver Plate*, op. cit., no. 70, pl. viii.
12. Peshawar Museum, no. 989.
13. G. Lafaye, *Inventaire des Mosaïques de la Gaule*, Paris, 1909, i, no. 174.
14. First published in *ASIAR* for 1929-30, pl. xv, 1.
15. A Blanchet, *Inventaire des Mosaïques de la Gaule*, Paris, 1909, ii, no. 1051; cf. Val. Müller, 'Die Typen der Daphnedarstellungen', in *Römische Mitteilungen*, xlv, 1929, pp. 59 ff.
16. Peshawar Museum, no. 1103.
17. O. M. Dalton, *Catalogue of Early Christian Antiquities . . . in . . . the British Museum*, London, 1901, no. 304, pl. xv; cf. also St. Poglayen-Neuwall,

- ‘Über die ursprünglichen Besitzer des spätantiken Silberfundes vom Esquilin u. seine Datierung’, in *Römische Mitteilungen*, xlv, 1930, pp. 124 ff.
18. A number of these disks have been found in the Sirkap area of Taxila during the excavations conducted by Sir John Marshall, and following his classification of the different strata through consecutive types of masonry, they have been dated in the Bactrian–Greek or Parthian period (cf. Sir John Marshall’s excavations reports in the volumes of the *ASIAR*). This early date has up to now been generally accepted (cf. L. Bachhofer, ‘On Greeks and Sakas in India’, in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, lxi, 1941, pp. 224 ff.). Sir John Marshall himself, in his most recent publications, has abandoned this rigid stratification system (cf. his *Guide to Taxila*, 3rd ed., Delhi, 1936, p. 45 f., and *ASIAR* for 1930–4, p. 159). His doubts are confirmed by the fact that even those disks which were found in the lowest strata at Taxila reproduce mythological scenes of typically Roman iconography. They can hardly be of an earlier date than the second century A.D.; some may indeed be much later. It would be an urgent task to establish a revised chronology of Taxila, based on the results of Sir John Marshall’s excavations.
19. Lily Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, Middletown (Conn.), 1931, p. 227.
20. Mrs. Arthur Strong, *Apotheosis and After Life*, London, 1915, pp. 85 ff.
21. F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le Symbolisme funéraire des Romains*, Paris, 1942.
22. J. B. Mayor, W. Warde Fowler, R. S. Conway, *Virgil’s Messianic Eclogue*, London, 1907.
23. F. Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1913, pp. 198 ff.; F. Saxl, *Mithras*, Berlin, 1931, pp. 84 ff.
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25. Cf. the article ‘Buddhism’ by de la Vallée Poussin in *The Legacy of India*, ed. G. T. Garratt, Oxford, 1937, pp. 162 ff.
26. M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, ii, 1913, p. 183 f.; and the remarks made on a similar occasion by M. Schapiro in *Ars Islamica*, x, 1943, p. 144.
27. de la Vallée Poussin, op. cit., p. 181.
28. Winternitz, op. cit., pp. 188 ff.
29. Taylor, op. cit., p. 232.
30. W. Weber, *Der Prophet und sein Gott*, Leipzig, 1925, pp. 112 ff.
31. H. Buchthal, ‘The Foundations for a Chronology of Gandhara Sculpture’, in *Transactions of the Oriental Ceramic Society*, xix, 1942–3 (issued 1945), p. 26 f.
32. E. Espérandieu, *Recueil général des bas-reliefs . . . de la Germanie romaine*, Paris, 1931, no. 17, p. 16; L. Hahl, *Zur Stilentwicklung der provinzialrömischen Plastik in Germanien und Gallien*, Darmstadt, 1937, pl. 24, 1.
33. Buchthal, *Foundations*, op. cit., p. 28. On the squatting Celtic god cf. P. Lambrechts, *Contributions à l’étude des divinités celtiques*, Gand, 1942, pp. 21 ff.; P. Jacobsthal, *Early Celtic Art*, Oxford, 1944, p. 5 f.
34. Cf. Combaz, op. cit., p. 70 f.
35. E. Espérandieu, *Recueil général des bas-reliefs . . . de la Gaule romaine*, v, 1913, p. 263; A. S. F. Gow, ‘The ancient Plough’, in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xxxiv, 1914, pp. 249 ff., fig. 9. Cf. also E. Wooler, *The Roman Fort at Piercebridge, County Durham*, Frome, 1917, p. 151 f.

36. A. Foucher, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhara*, i, Paris, 1905, p. 340, fig. 175; H. Hargreaves, *The Buddha Story in Stone*, Calcutta, 1914, pp. 13 ff.
37. Foucher, op. cit., p. 316 f.; Hargreaves, op. cit., p. 11.
38. Smirnov, op. cit., no. 69, pl. XL.
39. G. Brett, 'The Mosaic of the Great Palace in Constantinople', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, v, 1942, pls. 11, 13; for further literature see p. 37 f.
40. Sir John Marshall and A. Foucher, *The Monuments of Sanchi*, Calcutta, 1940, p. 203, pl. 40.
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- Jaulian*, Calcutta, 1921 (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, 7), p. 40, pl. xviii a. Its date can be fixed through a comparison with the stucco images from the same site which show the same style.
62. Samuel Beal (transl.), *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, ii, Boston, 1885, p. 180.
63. F. Saxl, op. cit., p. 23 f. with further literature.
64. Ibid., p. 52 f.
65. Ibid., p. 23, fig. 84.
66. Ibid., fig. 66.
67. Ibid., p. 40.
68. Ibid., fig. 97.
69. Ibid., fig. 98.
70. Foucher, op. cit., fig. 246; Majumdar, op. cit., Part II: *The Greco-Buddhist School of Gandhara*, p. 62.
71. Lahore Museum, no. 2015.
72. Foucher, op. cit., fig. 247.
73. Hanns-Ulrich v. Schönebeck, *Der Mailänder Sarkophag u. seine Nachfolge* (Studi di Antichità Cristiana, x), Città del Vaticano, 1935, p. 40.
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79. Cf. note 17.
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82. Ibid., vol. iii (Supplemento), 1936, pp. 32 ff.
83. Marshall and Foucher, *Monuments of Sanchi*, op. cit., p. 153.



FIG. 1. Toilet Tray. London, Victoria and Albert Museum



FIG. 2. Roman Lamp. London, British Museum



FIG. 3. Husband and Wife. Toilet Tray. Haughton Collection



FIG. 4. Husband and Wife. Sarcophagus Lid. Detail. Rome, Museo Capitolino



FIG. 5. Female Figure on Sea Monster.
Haughton Collection



FIG. 6. Female Figure on Sea Monster.
Leningrad, Hermitage



FIG. 7. Female Figure on Sea Monster.
Taxila Museum



FIG. 8. Roman Patera. London,
British Museum



FIG. 9. Dionysiac Scene. Calcutta,
Indian Museum



FIG. 10. Cover of Roman Mirror-Case.
London, British Museum



FIG. 11. Dionysiac Scene. Peshawar
Museum



FIG. 12. Roman Floor Mosaic. Lyons
Museum



FIG. 13. Apollo and Daphne.
Taxila Museum



FIG. 14. Roman Floor Mosaic.
Rouen Museum



FIG. 15. Toilet of Venus.
Peshawar Museum



FIG. 16. Casket of Proiecta. Detail of
Lid. London, British Museum




FIG. 18. Augustus Statue from Prima Porta. Rome, Terme Museum



FIG. 19. Roman Toga Statue. Wiesbaden, Landesmuseum



FIG. 17. Standing Buddha. Peshawar Museum



FIG. 20. Ploughing Scene, Sarcophagus Relief.
Formerly Luxembourg



FIG. 21. The First Meditation, from Sikri Stupa.
Lahore Museum



FIG. 22. Birth of Chandaka and Kanthaka. Lahore Museum



FIG. 23. Hellenistic Silver Bowl. Detail. Leningrad, Hermitage




FIG. 24. The Great Renunciation. Sanchi, Great Stupa, Eastern Gate



FIG. 25. Profectio Augusti.
Roman Coin



FIG. 26. Adventus Augusti.
Roman Coin



FIG. 27. Christ's Entry into Jerusalem. Detail of Sarcophagus.
Rome. Lateran Museum



FIG. 28. Detail from Railing of Bharhut Stupa. Calcutta, Indian Museum



FIG. 29. The Great Renunciation. Calcutta, Indian Museum



FIG. 30. Raising of Lazarus. Detail from a Greek Manuscript Illustration. Rossano, Cathedral



FIG. 31. Dacian Battle. Rome, Arch of Constantine



FIG. 32. Dipankara Jataka. Lahore Museum



FIG. 33. Conversion of Angulimalya.
Peshawar Museum



FIG. 34. Joshua meets the Angel. Vatican
Library MS. Pal. Gr. 431



FIG. 35. The Visit of Indra.
Stone Hedge of Bodhi Gaya.




FIG. 36. The Visit of Indra.
Sanchi, Great Stupa, Northern



FIG. 37. The Visit of Indra. Peshawar Museum



FIG. 38. The Visit of Indra. Taxila Museum



FIG. 39. Relief of the Nymphs from Cave of Vari



FIG. 40. Mithraic Relief. Karlsruhe, Landesmuseum



FIG. 42. Mithraic Relief. Sofia, National Museum



FIG. 41. Mithraic Relief. Hermannstadt Museum



FIG. 43. The Visit of Indra. Calcutta, Indian
Museum



FIG. 44. The Visit of Indra. Lahore Museum



FIG. 45. The Visit of Indra. London, British Museum



FIG. 46. The Visit of Indra, from Sikri Stupa. Lahore Museum




FIG. 47. Traditio Legis. Sarcophagus. Milan, S. Ambrogio



FIG. 48. Traditio Legis. Sarcophagus. Ravenna Museum




FIG. 49. Christian Sarcophagus. Ravenna, Mausoleum of Galla Placidia



FIG. 50. Casket of Proiecta. Detail. London, British Museum




FIG. 51. Buddha between Indra and Brahma. Peshawar Museum



FIG. 52. Gandhara Sculpture. Houghton Collection




FIG. 53. Worship of the Buddha. Lahore Museum



FIG. 54. Christ between Apostles. Sarcophagus. Paris, Louvre



FIG. 55. Buddha between Monks. London, Victoria and Albert Museum



FIG. 56. Christian Sarcophagus. Rome, Lateran Museum

THE SIR JOHN RHÛS LECTURE
THE GAELIC STORY-TELLER. WITH SOME
NOTES ON GAELIC FOLK-TALES

By J. H. DELARGY

Read 28 November 1945

THE prose literature of both the manuscript and the oral tradition of Ireland is anonymous, in contradistinction to much of the poetry of the bardic schools and the songs of the later Irish peasant-poets. While marginalia and colophons have on occasions recorded the names and the genial whimsicalities of some of the scribes of the manuscripts, the authors and compilers of Irish saga-literature will for ever remain unknown.

In the unwritten and orally preserved traditions of the common people there are no such marginalia, and the tablets of memory have preserved no clue to the identity of the authors of the fireside literature, which was both the solace and delight of many generations of Irish people.

Nor shall we ever know how much we have lost, for it is but too apparent that the manuscript and the oral literature preserved to us are but pathetic fragments of an immense body of tradition which has perished through wilful destruction and neglect, in consequence of the downfall of the old Gaelic world in the disastrous wars of the seventeenth century, and the gradual decay of the Irish language during the last 200 years over almost the whole of Ireland.

Across the centuries we hear the lament of the poets of that ancient aristocratic Gaelic world at the fall of the old order, and their bitter scorn of the English planter who sits in the hall of the dead or exiled chieftain. The patrons of the old learning, of Gaelic or Norman stock, perished in the ruin of the old system, and their fate was shared by the poets and *seanchaithe*, and the learned world of the Gael. The peasant's hut was now the Gaelic scholar's study, the memory of past glories the main recompense of his labours.

But unknown to the English-speaking stranger, and despised both by the Irish aristocrat and the pedantic scholar of the schools, there remained, however, the still older culture of the eternal countryman. To this ancient, orally preserved stock of West European tradition was grafted in the course of time

portion of the literature of the upper classes and of the written tradition of the schools of native learning, common to the cultivated Gael of both Ireland and western Scotland. For a thousand years this native literary manuscript tradition had run its course side by side with, although not entirely independent of, the oral tradition of the peasant: now, by force of circumstances, the two streams of tradition were joined. Poets and story-tellers in homespun, humble carriers of an ancient culture, preserved until a century ago an oral tradition (*seanchas*) and an oral literature unrivalled in western Europe. Kuno Meyer, in a memorable phrase, has called the written literature of medieval Ireland, 'the earliest voice from the dawn of West European civilization'. In the unwritten literature and traditions of the Gaelic-speaking countryman are echoes out of the vast silence of a still more ancient time, of which hitherto the archaeologist has been the only chronicler. This venerable body of tradition survived in most parts of Ireland until the Great Famine of 1846-7, and the succeeding period of unprecedented evictions and emigration.

No real effort was made to arrest the decay of the native language, spoken a century ago by several millions of the people. The scholars and literary men of Ireland, both Irish and Anglo-Irish, who wrote exclusively in English, were in the main completely ignorant of Irish, and contemptuous of the language and the people who spoke it. Irish was looked upon as the badge of poverty and ignorance, and the oral traditions enshrined in it were almost completely unknown to the book-learned, or regarded by them as being beneath their notice.

Wherever there were Irish speakers, there too were story-tellers and singers, and the rich folk-life which even hardship and grinding poverty could not entirely eradicate. But the loss of the language over most of Ireland brought about the destruction of the oral literature enshrined in it, leaving a gap in our knowledge of Irish folk-lore which can never be filled.

Of the oral literature of the greater part of Ireland, as distinct from the orally preserved social-historical tradition (*seanchas*), but a few fragments have been preserved from the disastrous nineteenth century. A small number of tales from the Wexford-Carlow border are to be found in the works of Patrick Kennedy (1801-73), a native of Enniscorthy. A few scraps of the rich tradition of Ormonde are to be found in the early volumes of the *Journal of the Kilkenny Archaeological Society*, founded in 1849, and in the papers of John Prim, a Kilkenny newspaper

proprietor, now preserved in the archives of the Irish Folk-lore Commission. Some folk-tales in the earliest published collection of Irish *märchen*, *The Royal Hibernian Tales* (c. 1829), may possibly be assigned to north Antrim; and occasionally in the many topographical works by superficial observers of contemporary Irish life we find fragments of tales and traditions.

But the 'hidden Ireland' of the Gaelic speaker, with its wealth of tale and tradition, remained unknown until at length it was discovered by the scholars and men of letters associated with the linguistic and cultural revivals of the last decade of the century. Douglas Hyde, one of the founders of the movement for the revival of the Irish language, the 'Gaelic League', was one of the first to penetrate the *landes aventureuses* of Gaelic folk-lore, and to arouse interest in the songs and tales of the common people. Since the appearance of his first book of Irish folk-tales in 1889, many collections of tales have been published, but most of them are unknown outside Ireland.¹

The literature of the ancient and medieval world drew the breath of life from the story-teller and the singer. The tale and the song remain, but what do we know of those from whose lips they passed to the written page? The same holds good for the greater part of the enormous literature of the folk-tale; we learn almost nothing on the whole about the men and women who preserved through the centuries the oral literature of the people, together with much of what at one time belonged to the literature of the upper classes. There are exceptions in the outstanding collections of Evald Tang Kristensen in Jutland, Jörgen Moe and Johannes Skar in Norway, Wossidlo and Wissler in Germany, Carmichael and Campbell in the Hebrides, and above all, so far as my reading goes, in the monographs of the Russian folk-lorists of whom Mark Asadowsky has written in his remarkable study, *Eine sibirische Märchenerzählerin*.²

Campbell of Islay in his *Popular Tales of the West Highlands* (1860-2), and in his unpublished diaries, has many notes on his sources, written in his breezy and whimsical style. The best descriptions of Gaelic story-telling are in his famous collection, and in the equally delightful collection of Gaelic folk-prayers of his friend Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica* (1900).

¹ A preliminary sketch of a bibliography of Irish and Scottish Gaelic folk-tales by Reidar Th. Christiansen of Norsk Folkemnesamling, Oslo, is in Johannes Bolte and Georg Polívka: *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- u. Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm*, v. 52-64, Leipzig, 1932.

² Folk-lore Fellows Communications, no. 68, Helsinki, 1926.

In Ireland, curiously enough, while we have many collections of folk-tales, this important aspect of folk-lore studies has been almost entirely overlooked until our own time. There are, however, some outstanding exceptions. First of all, *The Islandman*¹ of Tomás Ó Criomhthain, and *The Western Island* (1945) of Robin Flower, have preserved the memory of the heroic age which survived until a generation ago in the islands of the Atlantic. The three collections of Gaelic oral narrative² made in recent years in Co. Galway by Seán Mac Giollarnáth, the finest of their kind from any part of Ireland, contain excellent accounts of Irish story-telling and of the old-time story-teller.

The nearest European counterpart of the tradition-bearers and reciters of Gaelic heroic literature and international *märchen* are the *bylini* singers and story-tellers of Russia. Nowhere else to-day between Ireland and the Slav countries is there any living and appreciable remnant of the hero-tale and the wonder-tale; certainly nothing in any degree comparable to the tales which are now being collected in Ireland. And nowhere else have these tales in their thousands been gathered with more respect for their content, and for their custodians, the farmers and fishermen, to whom we owe them all.

The Gaelic story-teller, properly so called, is known usually as *sgéalai* or occasionally *sgéaltóir*. *Seanchai* (also *seanchasaí*) is applied as a rule to a person, man or woman, who makes a speciality of local tales, family-sagas, or genealogies, social-historical tradition, and the like, and can recount many tales of a short realistic type about fairies, ghosts, and other supernatural beings. This type of narrative, now often called *eachtra* or *seanchas*, approximates to the German *sage*, the Swedish *sägen*, and the Danish *sagn*. These tales are still to be found in their thousands all over the country. But the number of persons—usually men—who can tell the *sean-sgéal* (*märchen*) is gradually being reduced; and soon but few will remain to recount in traditional style this once popular type of folk-tale.

Both the international as well as the native *märchen* are more generally to be found in Irish than in English, and although many folk-tales of this kind have been recorded in English, the Anglo-Irish wonder-tale of the international type compares

¹ *An t-Oileánach. Scéal a bheathadh féin*, Dublin, 1929. English translation by Robin Flower, *The Islandman*, Dublin, 1934.

² (a) *Peadar Chois Fhairrge*, Dublin, 1934; (b) *Loinnir mac Leabhair agus sgéalta gaisgidh eile*, Dublin, 1936; (c) *Annála Beaga ó Iorrus Aithneach*, Dublin, 1941. None of these has as yet been translated.

very unfavourably both as to style and content with similar tales in Irish. I have known story-tellers in Clare who could tell folk-tales (*märchen*) in both Irish and English, but it was quite evident that they told them much better in the Irish language in which they first had heard them.

There were no professional story-tellers in modern times. Neither does it appear from the evidence available that story-telling was peculiar to any class of the rural community.

Stories were told as a rule at night around the winter fire from the end of harvest until the middle of March. It would seem that a prohibition existed on the telling of heroic tales during the day-time.¹ 'Whistling at night or *fiannaíocht* by day' were considered unlucky, according to the proverb. The recital of Ossianic hero-tales was almost without exception restricted to men. 'A woman *fiannaí* or a crowing hen!' the proverb runs. There are exceptions to this rule, but still the evidence is unmistakable that the telling by women of Finn-tales was frowned upon by the men.²

Seanchas, genealogical lore, music, folk-prayers, were, as a rule, associated with women; at any rate they excelled the men in these branches of tradition. While women do not take part in the story-telling, not a word of the tale escapes them, and if their relatives or close friends make any slip or hesitate in their recital, it is no uncommon experience of mine to hear the listening woman interrupt and correct the speaker.

One of the collectors of the Irish Folk-lore Commission, Tadhg Ó Murchú, records in his diary from south-west Kerry that while he got many short tales from women, he had met only two who could tell Finn-tales (*sgéalta fiannaíochta*). One of these was a certain Eibhlín Ní Loingsigh. Her people had come long ago to Valentia Island from Dingle, west Kerry, and were famous locally as story-tellers. She had inherited her tales from her grandfather, her father, and an uncle called Pádraig Bán Ó Loingsigh. She had been in America, but had not forgotten her tales.

Of the other, Ó Murchú remarks: 'Mrs. Griffin of Glencar had almost forgotten ordinary conversational Irish through lack of practice, but the tales she still can tell in faultless

¹ See Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies*, &c., pp. 132, 143.

² *Ibid.*, p. 144, 'In Ireland I have found few women who can tell [Finn- or hero-]tales at all, and none who can compare with the men.'

The gift of poetry would appear also to be associated in the popular imagination with men, if we are to judge by the saying common in Munster: 'When poetry passes to the women in a family, it is gone from the men for ever.'

Irish. She got them from her grandfather when she was a little girl.'

One old Kerry woman remembered how she with the other children was packed off to bed one night before the story-teller began. So eager was she to hear the tales that she crept to the edge of the loft where she slept, and out of the darkness peeped down into the kitchen, and listened to the story-teller until she fell asleep.

Many of the old story-tellers believed in all the marvels and magic of the typical wonder-tale, and if some forward youth were to inquire if these things could possibly be true, the answer of most would be like that of an old friend of mine: *Bhíodh drútocht ann sa tseana-shaol!* 'There was magic in old times.' I remember vividly the horrified dismay of an old Kerry story-teller when one of his audience cast doubts on the return of the hero Oisín from the Land of Youth, questioning if Oisín had ever existed!

The repertoire of many story-tellers whom I have known reminds one of the omnibus collections of Irish vellum tradition. These old tradition-bearers, like the old manuscripts, are libraries in themselves. Questioning them, we can turn over page after page in their capacious memories, and listen to what we would have told, whether it be a heroic tale, a place-name legend such as we have in the *Dindshenchas*, a religious tale which might have come from a saint's life, a *fabliau*, a *cante-fable*, a collection of aphorisms, genealogies of local families, and so on. For here we have the spoken word where the manuscript has the written. The death of these story-tellers is a calamity, for with them dies a wealth of west European tradition. Of them it can be said that, unlettered though they may be, and in their remote recesses unknown save to their neighbours, they belong to the Heroic Age of which men read in books. In the phrase of Villiers de l'Isle Adam, *ils gardaient au cœur les richesses stériles d'un grand nombre de rois oubliés*. True, but much else besides, memories half-understood of an ancient world which has left behind no other record. They have no living counterpart in western Christendom.

In the following pages I have put together from my own diaries and from the manuscripts of the Irish Folk-lore Commission some notes and observations on the story-tellers from whom in the space of a few years many thousands of tales have been recorded.¹

¹ The Irish Folk-lore Commission (*Coimisiún Béaloideasa Éireann*) was founded by the Irish Government in 1935. The manuscripts of the Commission contained on 31 March 1945 about 788,000 pp. octavo; of this material only a small section has as yet been catalogued. Some idea of the

The art of story-telling has been cultivated in Ireland by successive generations of both aristocratic and plebeian story-tellers from immemorial antiquity, and must have attained a very high degree of perfection in medieval times. But the written saga of the manuscript is but a pale ghost of the tale that once was told, and to which men listened with rapt attention and delight; and the personality and polished artistry of that artificer of narrative prose, the mediæval *scélaige*, can only be guessed at by the student of literature who has not had the inestimable privilege of hearing the living voice of the modern reciter of Irish hero- or wonder-tale, the lineal descendant of the story-teller of a thousand years ago. For in the tales of men whom I have known, such as Seán Ó Briain or Éamonn Búrc of that wonderful treasure-house of Connacht folk-lore, the parish of Cárna, one could bridge the gap of centuries and hear the voice of the nameless story-tellers and creators of the heroic literature of mediæval Ireland.

The first story-teller I ever met in the south was a certain Seán Ó Conaill, a farmer-fisherman of the tiny mountain-hamlet of Cillrialraig, in the south-west corner of Co. Kerry.¹ Seen from the sea one has the impression that this cluster of six houses hangs between sea and sky, clinging to the precipitous slopes of Bolus Head, 300 feet above the sea. It is a lonely, wind-swept place where man has formed here and there out of the rocks and boulders and rough mountain land a crazy quilt of tiny fields to grow his oats and rye, hay, and potatoes. Past the houses the rocky road winds like a ribbon along the side of the hill to reach here at journey's end the last of all inhabited places on this edge of the known world. The little village of Cillrialraig will never fade from the fond eye of memory, for here I met the man in whose tales and traditions I found the inspiration to collect or have collected, in so far as in me lay, the unwritten traditions of the people of Ireland.

Seán Ó Conaill, when I met him for the first time in 1923, was seventy years of age. His family had lived in the same place for at least five generations, and probably even longer still. His pedigree was as follows: Seán the son of Dónal, the son of Muiris, the son of Séathra, the son of Séathra. He had a local reputation as a story-teller in a parish where there were many story-tellers and tradition-bearers. He had never left

field of investigation may be obtained by reference to Ó Súilleabháin, *A Handbook of Irish Folklore*, Dublin, 1942.

¹ See *Studies*, Dublin, March 1942, p. 39.

his native district except on the memorable occasion when he had gone by train to the famous fair at Killorglin, and had walked home again! He had never been to school, was illiterate so far as unimaginative census-officials were concerned, and he could neither speak nor understand English. But he was one of the best-read men in the unwritten literature of the people whom I have ever known, his mind a storehouse of tradition of all kinds, pithy anecdotes, and intricate hero-tales, proverbs and rimes and riddles, and other features of the rich orally preserved lore common to all Ireland three hundred years ago. He was a conscious literary artist. He took a deep pleasure in telling his tales; his language was clear and vigorous, and had in it the stuff of literature.

It was my custom to visit him three nights a week during my holiday visits to the locality. His house was a two-roomed thatched cottage, one room a kitchen where all the indoor work was done, the other a bedroom. Over the bedroom was a loft which contained also a bed, fishing gear, a spinning-wheel, and the various lumber of an old farm-house.

On the kitchen hearth was a turf fire, and on either side of the fire was a little stone seat from which one could look up the soot-covered chimney, and see the twinkling stars. To the right of the fire was a well-scoured deal table, and in the corner a bag of salt for salting fish. On this bag I used to sit, pulling in the table beside me, and there at various times I wrote down from the dictation of my friend nearly 200 pieces of prose narrative. Before we began to work, I used to help Seán and his old wife to tidy up the house: I swept the floor, strewed clean sand on it, brought in an armful of turf, and lit the oil lamp. Part of my task was to chase the hens which hopped in over the half-door. From the doorway one gazed right down into the sea, and the distant roar of the waves crept into the kitchen and was the ever-present background of the folk-tale.

While I wrote from Seán's dictation, the neighbours would drop in, one by one, or in small groups, and they would listen in patience until the last word of the tale was written. Then the old story-teller would take a burning ember from the fire, press it down with a horny thumb on the tobacco in his pipe, lean back in his straw-bottomed chair, and listen to the congratulations of the listeners, who, although they had probably often heard the tale before, found pleasure in hearing it again. Their plaudits merged into gossip, in which the events of the countryside would be discussed. Then after a while, someone

might ask the 'man of the house' to tell another story, and for perhaps an hour or so we would be transported by the wonder of the tale into the land where all one's dreams come true. Silently, the audience would listen, with a hearty laugh at the discomfiture of the villain, or at some humorous incident introduced into the tale; at times, too, they would applaud with appropriate remarks the valour of the hero fighting against impossible odds seven-headed giants or monsters from the sea, or the serried ranks of the armies of the King of the Eastern World.

In the collection of folk-lore which I took down from Seán Ó Conaill, there is for the first time in one book all the material recorded from a single Irish story-teller. The book contains 396 pages of Irish text alone, exclusive of notes and English summaries, divided as follows: *märchen* 51 (pp. 1-197); Irish Finn- and hero-tales 7; shorter anecdotes of mythological, religious, historical, or social-historical character 42; fairy-tales 45; tales of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Gaelic poets 41; a few songs and song-fragments, and a collection of various smaller items of prose and verse conclude the volume. The material in this large collection Seán Ó Conaill had obtained from twenty-seven different sources, all of whom save one were neighbours of his.

One of the finest tales I wrote from him was a version of Aarne-Thompson 425; this he had learnt fifty years before at the house of a kinsman in a village a few miles away. It was late, he told me, when he left his neighbour's fireside, the night was very dark, and the familiar pathway across the hills seemed rougher than usual. Seán was repeating the tale he had learnt as he made his way homewards, and so intent was he on his task that he stumbled and fell full length into a mountain-stream that ran across his path. 'But', said he to me, 'I didn't mind. I had my story!'

The large number of sources in this book testifies to his keen interest in folk-tales of all kinds, and suggests that he had lost no opportunity of learning them. But he has in his autobiographical notes, dictated to me, made this quite clear.

I used to watch out [he says], for someone likely to have a story, and whenever a *bacach* (beggar-man) would arrive in the village, I and my neighbours would gather in to listen to him. I had only to hear a story once to have it, and be able to tell it. Nobody knows who first composed these old stories—at least, we never got any account from anyone about them. But they are fine things to be able to tell or to listen to, so as to

be able to pass the night away, especially those which are full of action, and tell of a hero's exploits. The people who had the old tales are all gone now and the world is changed since I was young. Soon I too shall follow them.

In Seán Ó Conaill's youth story-tellers were quite common in the district, but as he grew older the old tales were not so much heard as formerly. Finally, there came a time when it was but rarely that he had an opportunity himself of practising his art in public. So, lest he should lose command over the tales he loved, he used to repeat them aloud when he thought no one was near, using the gesticulations and the emphasis, and all the other tricks of narration, as if he were once again the centre of a fireside story-telling. His son, Pats, told me that he had seen his father thus engaged, telling his tales to an unresponsive stone wall, while herding the grazing cattle. On returning from market, as he walked slowly up the hills behind his old grey mare, he could be heard declaiming his tales to the back of the cart! In this way he kept a firm grip on stories which he had not told to an audience for over twenty years; and when I began to visit him for the dual purpose of learning Irish and writing down his stories, I found that he could repeat these tales to me without hesitation.

But there were many more which he had completely forgotten. 'Many though the tales be', he said, 'which I have told to you, I have forgotten as much again; that I assure you is the truth.' This phrase might have come from *Accalamh na Senórach*, a famous medieval collection of Irish place-name stories. There it is said of the survivors of the Fianna: 'Not more than a third of their tales do these old warriors tell, by reason of forgetfulness and lack of memory'—a poignant phrase, all too familiar to the modern collector of Irish oral tradition.

When, at last, my work was done, and the last tale was written down, my old friend turned to me and said: 'I suppose you will bring out a book of these stories some day. I have told you now all the tales I can remember, and I am glad that they have been written. I hope that they will shorten the night for those who read them or hear them being read, and let them not forget me in their prayers, nor the old people from whom I myself learned them.'

Really outstanding story-tellers such as Seán Ó Conaill are now rarely to be met with in Ireland. Most of those from whom folk-tales have been recorded in recent years have been passive bearers of tradition; that is to say, they have remembered many

tales, but through lack of opportunity, natural shyness, or unfavourable circumstances, have been content to remain passive, and have neither practised telling their tales, nor given others the chance of learning them. The tale that is not told dies; the story-teller without an audience remains passive, and his tales die with him. For the art of the folk-tale is in its telling; it was never meant to be written nor to be read. It draws the breath of life from the lips of men and from the applause of the appreciative fireside audience. Although there are still many hundreds of Irish people who can tell these tales from an older world, it is but rarely now that they are told. The days of the folk-tale are numbered even in Ireland. A generation ago the situation was different in many outlying districts; fifty years ago, all over the Irish-speaking districts, and in many parts of English-speaking districts as well, story-telling was a familiar feature of the social life of the people.

Two of the best exponents of the oral traditions of the Decies (Co. Waterford) whom I have met were Mícheál Turraoin of Rinn on the sea-coast, and Seán Fitzgerald from the inland parish of Modeligo, near Cappoquin. Both of these men had an immense—I use the word advisedly—an immense body of tradition of all kinds, *märchen*, *seanchas*, songs, rimes, proverbs, quatrains and couplets, prayers, &c. But each of them was quite different. Fitzgerald, like most Irish story-tellers of the present day, was a passive tradition-bearer. He had heard a great many tales in his youth from his grandfather, and from his neighbours, but, owing to lack of opportunity of speaking Irish as he grew older, he had lost command of his store of traditions, and of fluency and accuracy in ordinary conversational Irish. One had to question him closely at times before he could recall to memory tales which he had heard or even had himself told at one time. He knew a large number of *märchen*; but except for a few which he had obviously been in the habit of telling occasionally, and for which he had a preference, his tales exhibit a rather poor narrative style. He is the best example I have ever met of a passive bearer of tradition.

Mícheál Turraoin, on the other hand, knew no *märchen*, while his brother Liam, a fisherman at Baile na nGall, was a first-rate story-teller. Mícheál was in many ways the direct opposite of Fitzgerald. His father and grandfather were fishermen, and their traditions, inherited by Mícheál, were coloured by their calling. Fitzgerald and all his people lived in a different milieu, the arable and pasture land in the valley of the Blackwater, and

Fitzgerald's traditions are clearly influenced by their rural environment. But the difference between him and Turraoin in style, language, and general attitude towards tradition is very marked. Turraoin is a very witty speaker, he is a master of idiom, phrase, and linguistic nuance; in his ordinary conversation the commonplace attains an unwonted dignity, proverbs and wit and drolleries trip over themselves from off his sharp and sometimes caustic tongue. He is a cultured man in oral letters, unspoiled by books—which he cannot read—and by the laboured commentaries of the learned. For the latter a laboured paragraph—for Mícheál a witty, well-turned phrase! 'A man without learning is like a ship without a rudder' he remarks in his autobiography,¹ and as I read I can see the ironic glint in his eye, for Mícheál has often met learned men who could give but a poor account of themselves!

A short note on my experiences as a collector of folk-lore in the Doolin district, north Clare, may be of interest. I was the first to visit the area in search of folk-tales. The Irish language was spoken only by old or middle-aged people; story-telling was but a memory; the best-informed people in the district could not recommend more than one or two likely informants. And yet, in this apparently unpromising area, I recorded several hundred folk-tales and anecdotes in a short time, and, on the whole, without much difficulty. One of the finest Irish speakers whom I met there was a certain Seán Carún, of about seventy years, a man of keen perception, who understood readily the object of my visit. I promised to call to see him again on the following day. When I called he was not to be found anywhere for a long time, but at length he returned, and we spent the evening together. Some months later, I learned from his wife that on the second occasion, when he was not to be found, he had gone into a cave in the mountain above his house to wrestle with his memory, striving to recall tales which he had heard from a native of the Aran Islands some forty years before, and which he had forgotten: he had returned in triumph with three of these tales restored to their home in his memory, and I wrote them down.

Next door to Seán Carún lived Pádraig Mac Mahon whose father had been a famous story-teller in the district. Mac Mahon gave me a number of tales, badly told and half-remembered, all that was to be got of the rich traditions of his father. Then there were three middle-aged brothers called Dillon who lived

¹ See Ó Haodha in *Béaloides*, xiv, 1944, pp. 54 ff.

close by: from their grandfather they had learnt a great many tales, and also from wandering beggar-men, but until I came along to question them and encouraged them to tell their stories, they had not bothered to tell them, save on very rare occasions: they, too, were passive bearers of tradition.

One of the best of these Clare story-tellers was Stiofán Ó Helaoire (1858–1944). He knew a great many tales, but was unknown to his neighbours as a story-teller until I revived by my importunity at the end of his life the scores of remarkably well-told tales he so willingly gave me. From that on he became an active tradition-bearer, and was much sought after as a story-teller; some of his tales were told to me later by younger and less competent reciters.

Some of the story-tellers, both passive and active, had a very large stock of tales. The following examples will illustrate this point.

One of the very few living women story-tellers is Peig Sayers, a native of Dúnchaoín at the western end of the Dingle peninsula, Co. Kerry. Most of her life she has spent on the island of the Great Blasket. Readers of Robin Flower's charming book, *The Western Island*,¹ will recall the tribute paid there to this very remarkable woman. From Peig Sayers, our collector, Seósamh Ó Dála, obtained 375 tales, of which 40 are long *märchen*. Of these 325 were written down from her dictation, the remainder being recorded on 140 Ediphone records. Not reckoned in this is a very considerable body of social-historical material, much of it illustrated by short, pithy anecdotes. Forty folk-songs were also written down from her dictation.

The same collector, Ó Dála, working with Seán Ó Criomhthain (63), Cillmhaolcéadair, in the same district, wrote down 84 short anecdotes, and obtained 276 more on 104 Ediphone records; in addition this versatile informant gave our collector 25 songs.

Two other story-tellers in this rich area of Kerry must also be mentioned. The first is Pats (Dhônail) Ó Ciabháin, from whom a large number of folk-tales and anecdotes were recorded, over 500 Ediphone cylinders being used for the purpose: each cylinder contains 1,000–1,200 words. From Tomás Mac Gearailt of Márthain in this district we have got over 120 *märchen*, apart from other material.

Turning to the west, our collector, Liam Costello, has written

¹ Oxford, 1945.

between 300 and 350 tales, some of them very long *märchen*, from the recital of Pádraig Mac an Iomaire of Cárna, Co. Galway, one of the best living Connacht story-tellers.

These are not isolated examples. From Micilín Mac Donncha of Cárna (*ob.* 1931), I compiled in a few hours a preliminary list of over two hundred folk-tales and anecdotes.

Éamonn Búrc, another story-teller of this parish, gave our collector 158 tales. Some of these tales were very long; one of them runs to 34,000 words, and is one of the finest folk-tales I have ever read in any language. The story-teller died suddenly, 5 November 1942, leaving unrecorded at least as much as he had already given us. He was one of the most amazing story-tellers I have ever known.

Here is a picture of a Kerry story-teller, now dead, from whom Tadhg Ó Murchú obtained a great many tales. He was an old man of eighty-five when this experienced collector met him (17 November 1935) for the first time. His first remark was to regret, as most of the old people do, that this work of collection had not been started twenty years before. Had he come, the old man said, even five years before, he would have been able to tell him a tale for every day in the year.

He was that *rara avis*, able to read both Irish and English. He had no regard for oral material other than long folk-tales, and it was no use to ask him for *seanchas*. Ó Murchú describes him seated at the fireside:

His piercing eyes are on my face, his limbs are trembling, as, immersed in his story, and forgetful of all else, he puts his very soul into the telling. Obviously much affected by his narrative, he uses a great deal of gesticulation, and by the movement of his body, hands, and head, tries to convey hate and anger, fear and humour, like an actor in a play. He raises his voice at certain passages, at other times it becomes almost a whisper. He speaks fairly fast, but his enunciation is at all times clear. I have never met anyone who told his tales with more artistry and effect than this very fine old story-teller. He says that his story-telling has been spoiled by being forced, through love of the tales, to tell them in English to young people who did not know Irish. In that way, through lack of practice and an appreciative Irish-speaking audience, he had lost command over his vast store of tales, and in the end had forgotten almost all of them. He does not like to tell his tales on the Ediphone recording machine, as it hampers the movements he considers essential to heighten the effect of the story. Once he became so exhausted that he gave up in the middle of a tale, but I coaxed him to continue.

Some story-tellers are shy and sensitive to the possible banter of their neighbours. Seósamh Ó Dála tells in his diaries of an old Kerry woman who insisted on having the door of her house bolted lest any neighbours should enter while she was telling stories.

There are a number of instances recorded in our collectors' diaries of fruitless visits to the houses of story-tellers on account of the presence of young people, or even of older neighbours, in whose presence the story-teller simply could not bring himself to narrate his tales. I, too, have had the same experience in many parts of Ireland. The real story-teller is a creative literary artist with a sensitive temperament, who cannot do justice to his material in an unfriendly or strange environment. Usually, he prefers one to visit him in his own home, but often one will meet with story-tellers who require the stimulus of an appreciative audience to give of their best.

Speaking of a man from whom he had as a youth, fifty years before, learnt a great many stories, Pádraig (Liam) Mac Donncha of Cárna, Co. Galway, said:

The first time I heard him tell a story he would be about forty years of age. Wherever there was a wake, it was there he would surely be. They used to set him to tell a story to shorten the night. I saw him once for two nights running telling stories at the same wake. He was so tired after that that he slept from Friday evening until Sunday morning.

He would tell stories for a fortnight, and had no need to tell a tale twice. He was able to put a *culaidh ghaisge*—a rhetorical 'run'—on a story to last for ten minutes. He had Finn-tales, and fairy-tales and *seanchas*. He had seen so many ghosts in his time that half of them would be a lot! He has been dead these twenty-five years.¹

No single factor has contributed more to the preservation of oral literature and tradition than the social institution, so popular formerly all over the Gaelic world, the *céilidhe* or *áirneán*.² In his book, *An Béal Beó* (pp. 142–3) the late Professor Tomás Ó Máille has enumerated the various forms of literary

¹ Mac Giollarnáth, *Anndla Beaga*, 327.

² See Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica*, 2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1928, introd. xxiii ff. for a description of the *céilidh* in South Uist.

There is an excellent account of a similar gathering (*scoratocht*) in Co. Cork by A. Martin Freeman in *Jl. Folk Song Soc.* no. 23, xxi ff.

The French *veillée* or *villon* is a parallel, up to a point. See Félix Chapiseau, *Le Folk-Lore de la Beauce et du Perche*, Paris, 1902, v–viii (Litt. pop. de toutes les nations xlv).

A good example of a fireside assembly in west Norway is given by Professor Knut Liestøl in *Norsk Folkekunst*, Oslo, 1931, p. 35.

entertainment practised in west Galway at these fireside gatherings. Pride of place was given to the recital of *fiannaíocht*, the prose tales and verse (*laoithe*) of the Finn cycle. Next in order of popularity came local social-historical narrative (*seanchas*); *nathaíocht* or extempore disputative dialogue in verse; *rianaíocht*, or discussions on such matters as genealogies, and current local, national, and international politics and events. The intellectual fare provided at these Hibernian Academies was often of a very high order. From the thrust and parry of proverb, quip, and quatrain, and the recitation of folk-tales and the verse of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poets, the participants would pass over to weighty discussion on the exact meaning of words and phrases, or sententious explanation of the movements of the tides, and the stars in their courses, the whole quaint medley of sober fact and riotous fancy at the disposal of all those who, deprived of formal education in their own language, sought intellectual enjoyment and instruction. No one who has had the privilege of being present at these Hibernian Nights Entertainments will ever forget the experience.

This social custom is known by other names in other parts of Ireland: *scoratócht*, *bothántatócht*, *cuartatócht*, *ránaíocht*. In the Aran Islands, Co. Galway, *áirneán* is used to denote the custom of women meeting at a certain house, after the manner of the German *spinnstube*, to spin or card wool, often by the light of the fire: but it means also a session of winter story-telling.

Such fireside literary circles are still to be met with in outlying corners of the Gaeltacht where the radio has not yet disturbed the traditional peace of these old Gaelic gatherings. But they will soon, like much else besides, be a memory: the young people of the Irish countryside are, as elsewhere, *novarum rerum cupidi*.

In writing the following note on an Ulster *céilidhe* I have had access to the valuable data on stories and story-telling compiled in the little community of Gaelic-speaking fishermen in Teilionn, south-west Donegal, by Seán Ó Heochaidh of the Irish Folk-lore Commission.

Sixty to eighty years ago but few people in Teilionn were literate, but in their isolated lives story-telling and singing had reached an advanced stage of perfection. The unlettered literary and musical critics of Teilionn, as of many other Gaelic communities besides, required of the story-teller and the singer an artistic standard of which the book-learned modern can have no conception. Keen rivalry existed between villages in both

story-telling and singing, and contestants from neighbouring districts would meet in houses selected for the purpose, where their merits were adjudged both by popular acclaim, and by the higher criticism of the older people of the community.

In every townland in the district there was at least one house to which, as a rule, the same literary clientele would resort during the nights of winter, usually from mid-September to 17 March; but the story-telling did not really start until *Oidhche Shamhna* (31 October). Ó Heochaidh points out that the old story-tellers seemed to be loath to tell folk-tales in their own homes, and would rather go to a *toigh áirneáil* than tell their tales in the presence of their own families. In the congenial atmosphere of the house of story-telling, undisturbed by the noise and prattle of children, their sensitive artistry was appreciated by the grown-up audience, mainly men, for whom these tales were intended. In return for the hospitality of the occupiers the guests attended to their simple wants, bringing turf from the stack, water from the well, and helping in various ways to put the house in order. The stage was soon set for the story-teller, a blazing turf fire provided the light, a stool or chair of the household's slender store was assigned to him in the place of honour beside the fire; and here he awaited the arrival of the visitors; some of these were old men like himself who had been preparing, perhaps for hours before, for the night's entertainment. The lanes and bridle tracks were none too good in old times, and infirm old people, crippled with rheumatism, found it hard to make their way along the rough pathways to the *toigh áirneáil*. When the house was full to the door, the man of the house would fill his pipe with tobacco, and give it to the most respected guest. The person thus favoured smoked it for a while, then handed it back to its owner; after that it went round the company from one to another. By the time the last man had had his smoke, all the current topics of interest had been discussed, and the story-telling could now begin.

The shanachies of Teilionn belonged to three classes: (1) those who could tell the long folk-tales; (2) those who specialized in *seanchas* only, and (3) the singers, and those who, while they could not sing themselves, knew the words of a large number of songs. These three distinct groups of tradition are rarely found in one person. In the *céilidhe*-house each of these three types of tradition-bearer was expected to contribute to the night's entertainment; but the teller of Finn- and hero-tales was held

in highest esteem, and his tales were more popular than the shorter and more realistic stories.

Story-telling was a feature also after 'stations', or religious services conducted in private houses; at wakes (usually of old people); at christenings; at quiltings (*cuiltéireacht*), attended only by women, gossip and *seanchas* were the rule, although songs were occasionally sung there also. Fishermen mending their nets have been known to send for a story-teller to help while away the time. Quarry-workers in Valentia Island, Co. Kerry, found relief from their labours in listening to stories, having taken the precaution of posting guards to warn them of the foreman's arrival. At patterns at holy wells, as, for example, at Daigh Brighde, near Liscannor, Co. Clare, tales and songs furnished relief during the long hours of the night-vigil. Fishermen, engaged in salmon-fishing off the rocky coast of Sliabh Liag, south-west Donegal, used to say their night prayers while waiting for the haul, and these were followed usually by story-telling. It is on record that so attentive were the fishermen on one occasion to the folk-tale being told that the look-out abandoned his post to listen, and the boat had a narrow escape from being rammed by a steamer. The tale was never finished, to the regret of the old man who, many years afterwards, recalled the incident.

The traditional phrase with which most of the longer *märchen* end is indicative of the attitude towards his traditions of the old type of Irish *seanchaí*: *Sin é mo sgéal-sa! Má tá bréag ann bíodh! Ní mise a chúm ná a cheap é.* 'That is my story! If there be a lie in it, be it so! It is not I who made or invented it.' The tale must be passed on as it has been received, unaltered, not in regard to language, but in form and plot.

The story-teller's realization of his responsibility as guardian of inherited tradition is well exemplified by the following anecdote:

An old Teilionn (Donegal) story-teller named Dônal Eoin MacBriarty was dying. A friend went to see him. The dying man had his face turned to the wall, and had apparently said good-bye to this world; but on hearing the voice of his old friend, he turned around slowly in the bed, and, fixing his eyes upon his visitor, he said: 'Is that you, Hughie Hegarty?' 'Yes,' said Hughie. 'Give me your hand,' said the old story-teller. 'You are welcome. Sit down there until I tell you the last story I shall tell in this world.'

He began the story then, and took over an hour to tell it.

It was a tale his friend had never heard before. As he came towards the end, he faltered, but continued, although with difficulty, until the last word was said. He then pressed his friend's hand, turned his face to the wall, and said not another word until God closed his eyes.

Many of the best of the old story-tellers were conscious that they had many ancestors; of them the phrase of Silius Italicus, a Roman poet of the first century A.D., could be used—he applies it to a certain Crixos, a Celtic soldier of fortune in Hannibal's army, saying in scorn that he was *tumens atavis*,¹ 'swelling with ancestors'. We may apply these words to the tradition-bearers of Ireland and to their tales besides. Here are a few pedigrees which I have collected in recent years:

1. Mícheál Mac Donncha (*ob.* 1937), Cárna, Co. Galway, from whom about 200 tales have been recorded. His pedigree reads: Micilín, son of Pádraig, son of Séamus, son of Seán, son of Éamonn, son of Seán.

2. Seán Mac Confhaola, a story-teller of Clifden, Co. Galway: Seán, son of Labhrás, son of Feichín, son of Labhrás, son of Séamus, son of Peadar, son of Liam, son of Pádraig.

3. Seósamh Mac Donncha of Cárna, Co. Galway: Seósamh, son of Pádraig, son of Seán, son of Féidhlim, son of Risteárd, son of Féidhlim, son of Aodh Buidhe.

These orally preserved genealogies embrace a period of 230–60 years, reckoning three generations to a century.

Tradition exists in many places of stories which took several nights to tell. These were romances or hero-tales, or the popular tales of Finn and the Fianna such as *The Hero of the Red Belt*, *The Daughter of the King of the White Island*, *Céadach*, *Conall Gulban*.

Campbell of Islay in his *Popular Tales of the West Highlands* tells us: 'I have heard of a man who fell asleep by the fire and found a story going on when he woke next morning.'

In Íbh Ráthach, south Kerry, I heard of a beggar-man who took seven nights to tell a story. As against this the following instances which came under my own notice may be of interest:

1. Mícheál Breathnach (*c.* 70) of Mám, Co. Galway, on 17 September 1934, told me a fine version of Aarne-Thompson 300. Speaking very rapidly, and without any interruption, he took fifty-five minutes to tell the story.

2. Stiofán Ó Helaoire (1858–1944), Doolin, north Clare,

¹ Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, col. 1171.

26 August 1930, took over an hour, reciting at great speed and without hesitation, to tell the hero-tale, *Conall Gulban*.

3. Éamonn Búrc (1864–1942), Cárna, Co. Galway, on 1 January 1933, speaking at an amazing speed, took over an hour to tell me the hero-tale, *Céadach*.

4. Seán Ó Conaill (1853–1931), Cillrualaig, south Kerry, on 5 April 1929, dictated to me slowly a fine version of Aarne-Thompson 425. I wrote it down rapidly, but it occupied me, allowing for a few short interruptions, from 1–7.30 p.m.

Many old people tell of story-tellers whom they had known long ago who could recite a different story every night the whole winter through. Ó Heochaidh, our Donegal collector, records in one of his diaries a note about a story-teller in Doire Chasain near Downings. His name was Mac Giolla Chearra. Period c. 1880. He was so good that he could keep his tales going from ‘the beginning of winter until St. Patrick’s Day’ (17 March).

There are parallels to this in medieval Irish literature. Thurneysen (*Heldensage* 67) and Meyer (*Voyage of Bran*, i. 45 ff.) give an interesting example: the poet-story-teller (*fili*) Forgall passes the winter at the court of Mongán, and tells a tale to his host every night ‘from 1 November to 1 May’. This old expression, *ó Shamhain go Bealtaine*, is still used in many parts of the Irish Gaeltacht in reference to story-telling.

The vast majority of the story-tellers known to me personally, or to our collectors, learned the greater part of their tales from members of their own family, usually father or grandfather, a few from their mothers or grandmothers. But they have learnt many tales also from neighbours, from beggar-men, and occasionally, during their work as migratory labourers in neighbouring counties. Tomás Ó Hiomhair (1846–1931), Fanore, north Clare, told me that he had obtained a number of tales from two men who came to work in his district, one from Cork, the other from Louth.

Mícheál Mac Donncha of Cárna, Co. Galway, learned many tales from his grandmother; others, like Seán Ó Briain of the same district, from their maternal relatives; it was from his uncle, Antoine Mac Confhaola, a Galway boatman, that Ó Briain got his unusually fine examples of hero-tales.

Stiofán Ó Helaoire, to whom I have already referred, had some interesting notes on his informants, all local people: one of these, Seán Kilmartin, was between eighty-five and ninety when Ó Helaoire picked up some of his stories about the year 1875; another of his sources was Pádraig Ó Haracháin, illiterate

like himself; Ó Haracháin, about the year 1880, told Ó Helaoire the popular hero-tale, *Conall Gulban*, which he himself had learnt about 1830 from another old man named Seán Nestor.

A still better example is to hand in a colophon to a Scots Gaelic oral version of a well-known literary tale from the medieval collection *Dolopathos* or the Seven Wise Masters.¹ The collector, Hector MacLean, under date 12 September 1860, says that he recorded the tale

from Janet Currie, Stony-Bridge, South Uist, who learnt it from her father about forty years ago. Her father died about twenty years ago, and was past eighty-five years of age. He learnt it from Eachann Mac Mhurchaidh Mhic Alasdair Dhomhnullaich, a maternal uncle of his, who died before Quebec was taken by the English, which took place 13 September 1759. This MacDonald learnt it in his youth from Niall MacLachluinn Mhic Dhomhnuill Mhic Mhic Mhuirich, and it came to him from Neil Currie, the Bard.²

While, as would be expected, most of our informants are old and middle-aged people, some of them as old as 96, many of them from 70 to 80, many excellent versions of the international type of *märchen* have been obtained from Irish-speaking boys and girls from 10 to 14: one boy of 9 whom I met in a house in the Joyce Country, Co. Galway, was remarkably good. Young men story-tellers of between 20 and 30 are quite commonly met with; but it is most unusual to find among them any able to tell a hero-tale in the manner of the older generation.

The men and women who have given so many thousands of tales and songs to our collectors have done so without question—*le cruí mór maith amach*—‘with all the willingness of a generous open heart’. No one had ever bothered about most of them, or listened with respect and deference to the tales and traditions which they had got from ‘the old people, now dead and gone’. The Ediphone dictating machine, it must be admitted, was a great attraction, but more than that was the desire to have preserved in writing what had so long lived precariously by memory only. Some people I have known to come on foot for six or seven miles to record their tales, enjoy a smoke and a chat with the neighbours, and then cheerfully bid good-night and trudge home again. One man would try to best his fellow,

¹ *Scottish Gaelic Studies*, iii, p. 180.

² ‘Neil Currie’ (Niall Mac Mhuirich), of the family of hereditary *seanchaithe* of the Clanranald, was the author of the famous account of the Montrose Wars in Scotland, which he wrote before the year 1700. He lived to a great age, one of his last poems being an elegy on Allan of Clanranald who fell at Sheriffmuir in 1715.

and when his stock of tales had run out, he would set off to a distant part of the parish to learn more tales from some old man, unable himself to come to the house where I was lodging. Good story-tellers, proud of their art, were intolerant of badly told tales, and sometimes stopped the unskilful narrator in the middle of his story, saying such nonsense should not be allowed to represent the real traditional narrative!

Ó Siadhail, a good Donegal story-teller, was so anxious to record his tales that in a deluge of rain and a bitter wind he walked miles over the mountains to the house where our collector was staying, to tell him two stories. When he had finished, there was a pool of water on the table where his elbows had rested, and another on the floor from his sodden clothes. But he paid no attention to this, and went home again satisfied.

An old man, long ago, in the Scottish island of Tiree, when asked why he told stories, replied simply that it was 'to help him to forget his sorrows'—*a chur seachad mo mhulaid*.

Dr. Douglas Hyde in his *Love Songs of Connacht* tells of an old woman whom he had known long ago who used to sing the old song, *An Draighneán Donn*: and whenever she came to a certain verse of great beauty—*Cidh gur árd é an crann caorthainn*, &c.—her eyes would fill with tears.

Undoubtedly, one reason for the extraordinary popularity and appreciation of oral literature and tradition in Ireland was the aesthetic sensitivity and intellectual curiosity so marked in the older generation. But the folk-tale was also the oral 'literature of escape': for an hour or two the oppressed and down-trodden could leave the grinding poverty of their surroundings, and in imagination rub shoulders with the great, and sup with kings and queens, and lords and ladies, in the courts of fairyland. The cinema for many people nowadays takes the place of the house of story-telling; the film is the modern folk-tale.

Some of the folk-tales in our collections can be traced back to *die fahrenden Leute*, the 'travelling men' (Ir. *bacaigh, lucht siubhail*)¹ who until quite recently were a common sight in most parts of the country. These poor, homeless people, many of them evicted tenants, wandered about with bag on back and stick in hand from one farmer's house to another, usually within a certain defined area. They were always sure of a shake-down on a bed of straw or rushes in the chimney-corner, or in the barn or hay-loft, and a share in the frugal evening meal of the

¹ These are the *cerda*, 'das fahrende Volk' of an olden time. See Thurneysen, *Heldensage* 84.

poor people who were their hosts. In return for a night's lodging, the 'travelling man' would entertain the family and the neighbours with the latest news of fair and market, and the gossip of the country-side and, when these subjects were disposed of, with ballads and songs and stories which he had learnt himself in his home district or had acquired in his travels. If the 'traveller' was known as a story-teller, the house which he had selected for his night's lodging was soon packed to the door with the people of the neighbourhood, some of whom came at times from a considerable distance.

One of these travelling story-tellers, some of whose tales are in our manuscript collections, was a certain Diarmuid Ó Sé, a native of Glengariff, Co. Cork. He was accompanied on his rounds by a dog, and was, in consequence, known generally by the name of *Diarmuidín an Ghaidhrín*, or 'Jer the Dog'. He was a welcome visitor wherever he went, and every door was open to him. At one of his 'stage-houses', the home of Séamus Casey, a cobbler, he used to tell stories every night until 2 a.m. for a whole week at a time.

Diarmuid would choose his night-quarters with some deliberation. On his arrival, he used to take his place at the head of the kitchen-table, where, glass in hand, sipping at his drink, with his admirers gathered around him, he awaited the arrival of others who had been apprised of his coming.¹

The house was soon filled up, the people sitting on all the available chairs, on the rungs of the ladder leading to the loft, on sods of turf, even on the floor; those for whom there was no seat leaned up against the walls, and in the silence before the tale began there was no sound save the crackle of the fire and the chirp of the cricket. Diarmuid Ó Sé must have been a master story-teller, for over a wide area from which we have obtained many hundreds of tales, the memory of his skill still lingers.

Speaking of this old travelling man, Seán (Mhártain) Ó Súilleabháin of Imleach Mór, south Kerry, one of our most valued informants, remarks: 'The other boys thought I was too young to go with them to the house where Diarmuid was staying, but I would give them the slip, and would hide under the kitchen-table, where I could listen to the tales, undisturbed. There is not a word the story-teller would say that I had not off by heart the next morning.'

¹ On the popularity of oral literature, especially *fiannatocht*, see Reidar Th. Christiansen, *The Vikings and the Viking Wars in Irish and Gaelic Tradition*, Oslo, 1931, pp. 63 ff.

But for the boy under the kitchen-table, it is certain that some of the old story-teller's tales would have been lost, as in all probability he alone of all that listening company has survived to tell them.

The following anecdote furnishes another example of the subterfuges practised by story-tellers to add to their store of tales:

A certain wandering beggar-man was inordinately proud of a long folk-tale called *Fáilte Uí Chealla*, 'O'Kelly's Welcome'; to what type this tale belonged has not transpired. He used to tell this story in the houses at which he put up on his rounds, but he was afraid that a man named Lynch in Valentia Island, who was well known as a gifted story-teller, might learn the tale and thus be a rival.

One night the 'traveller' got lodgings in the house of a farmer called Ó Conaill in Gleann, on the mainland, some few miles from Valentia. On his arrival, Ó Conaill immediately sent word to his friend, Lynch, who hurried off to Gleann, entered the house secretly, and concealed himself in a loft directly over the fireplace. On the fall of night, when the story-telling was about to begin, the beggar-man looked carefully at the assembled company, eager to hear him tell his jealously guarded tale.

'Is Lynch here?' he asked his host.

'Oh, sure he's in Valentia and probably asleep by this time!' said the farmer.

On this assurance being given, the tramp began his tale. When at length he came to the end there was a triumphant shout from the concealed story-teller, who jumped down off the loft into the midst of the startled audience. 'I have the tale now in spite of you!' cried Lynch to the poor beggar-man. Lynch began to tell the tale then to prove his words, and the dawn was breaking before he finished.

Such travelling story-tellers there have been in Ireland for many centuries. In the early literature they belong to the class described as *aes imthechta nó taistil sliged*¹ who thronged the roads of Ireland, and whose function in the life of the ordinary people was identical with the *tromdhámh* or literary-hosting of the *fíli*, singers, musicians, and story-tellers in their visitations of the homes of the great. For side by side with the learned professional-aristocratic-literary class, who recited the tales enumerated in the ancient saga-lists to their high-born patrons, there has from an early time existed amongst the ordinary

¹ Windisch, *Táin Bó Cúalnge*, line 148.

people a body of tradition and tradition-bearers and reciters of tales and popular poetry. To assume that interest in literature was confined to a small upper-class literary circle is quite unwarranted.

Before the introduction in 1831 of compulsory primary education and the establishment of the 'National Schools'—and, indeed, for many years after that date—a familiar figure on the Irish roads was the 'poor scholar', *an sgoláire bocht*, about whom many traditions remain. Many of these had spent some time at a rustic classical academy or 'hedge-school', where they had learnt some Latin and Greek, and acquired a polysyllabic fluency in pedantic English. Others were old soldiers of the type familiar to Welsh readers of Daniel Owen. William Carleton (1798–1869) and other writers of the period have left us a picture of the primitive schools presided over by these dominies: and the oral tradition of to-day has added considerably to our knowledge of them. These ragged sons-of-learning introduced tales of literary origin into the districts in which they led a roving and restless life. Many of the Irish poets of the eighteenth century belonged to this class also.

The Irish scholar, Standish Hayes O'Grady, in the introduction to his edition (1855) of *Tóruigheacht Dhiarmada agus Ghráinne* gives a list of forty Finn- and romantic tales current at that time in manuscript in the province of Munster; of these seventeen are known to me in versions recorded in recent years from oral tradition. He adds the following note:

These MSS. were for the most part written by professional scribes and schoolmasters, and being then lent or bought by those who could read but had not leisure to write, used to be read aloud in farmers' houses on occasions when numbers were collected at some employment such as wool-carding in the evenings; but especially at wakes. Thus the people became familiar with all these tales.

I myself have heard the tale of *Diarmuid agus Gráinne* recited almost word for word from this edition of O'Grady from the beginning to p. 92, by Seán Ó Conaill, the Kerry story-teller of whom I have already spoken. He had heard the tale read twice up to that point at a fireside gathering in his youth, and had retained it after fifty years as he had heard it read from the printed text. I wrote it down from his dictation as a proof of his amazing memory.

The compilation of manuscript miscellanies lasted until the beginning of this century in a few places, such as the parish of Annaghdown, near Galway. In this last stage of the tradition

the orthography has reached the lowest ebb, the manuscript being written in a barbarous spelling based on the local form of English. The poor scholars had gone; the small farmers and cottiers were now the scribes, and into these miscellanies they wrote, or had written by people no better educated than themselves, the Ossianic ballads and tales for which they hungered. These poor tattered copy-books mark the end of a continuous literary tradition; they are the last link in the long chain of Gaelic literature which stretches back unbroken for over twelve hundred years, a literary tradition which in its kind is unparalleled elsewhere.

From these, and, of course, from the earlier and better type of paper manuscript of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, derive most of the Ossianic material recorded by the collectors of the Irish Folk-lore Commission in many parts of the Gaeltacht; e.g. the dimly remembered verse (*laoithe*), portion of which is often found as prose, commonly met with in parts of Galway, Mayo, and Donegal.

Some of the tradition-bearers who may have brought tales from one district to another, belonged to the following classes, who, for many centuries, have thronged the roads and by-ways of Ireland: beggar-men; cattle-drovers; carters; pedlars; companies of farmers travelling with pack-horses to the famous butter-market in Cork (18th–19th centuries), or their counterpart from the Antrim Glens who travelled in this way across the mountains to market at Belfast or Ballymena. Others were wandering labourers (*spailpíní* or *cábóga*) who, from the poorer parts of Kerry, Clare, Galway, Mayo, and Donegal, made their way on foot to the rich farming districts of Munster, Leinster, and the north of Ireland.

Among these wandering people of the roads were itinerant schoolmasters; poor scholars in search of learning in the schools of Munster; friars and priests on their way to and from the seminaries of Douai, Salamanca, Louvain, and Rome; the soldiers of the Irish Brigade serving in the armies of France, Austria, and Spain; the *ceithearnaigh nó daoine uaisle díomhaine*, ‘the poor gentry’; *Ultaigh*, or ‘wise women’, traditionally associated with Ulster, the land of witchcraft; pilgrims to Irish and—in an older time—to famous English and Continental seats of pilgrimage, such as Canterbury or Santiago de Compostella—of such was the traffic of life in the eighteenth century, factors to be reckoned with by students of Irish oral tradition.

To this motley company must be added the poets and ballad-

singers, the pipers and harpers, fiddlers and dancing-masters, the smugglers who traded in tobacco and lace and wines from all over the Irish coast to France and Spain; the thousands of Catholic Irishmen who served in the British Navy from the end of the eighteenth century; and finally, the tradesmen: stone-cutters, thatchers, tailors, carpenters, and many others besides.

The student of the social and the literary history of Ireland must bear all of these wandering people in mind. So far they have been ignored or overlooked by the scholar who regards the matter of history as synonymous with that of the upper classes, to whom deeds and scrolls are canonical, but living tradition a thing of little account.

The oral traditions of the people of Ireland and western Scotland form a distinct unit which must be studied as a whole. The written literature of early and medieval Ireland and Gaelic Scotland is identical, and this community of culture remained intact until first the Reformation, and then the Plantation of Ulster broke the connexion with the mother-country. Irish and Scottish poets and story-tellers were as much at home in South Uist, in the country of the Clanranald, as they were in Cork and Kerry down to the middle of the seventeenth century, and, indeed, to a later period. The bardic schools survived in Scotland in remote districts such as South Uist to the beginning at least of the eighteenth century, and their influence can be observed in the tales recorded in the Outer Isles by Campbell of Islay and his associates eighty years ago.

Thus no distinction can be made by the student of Gaelic oral tradition between the folk-tales of Munster or Connacht and the tales of the Highland or Hebridean shanachies. 'The seas but join the lands they do divide.' The latest collection of Scottish Gaelic tales, recorded in Barra and South Uist in 1939 by John Lorne Campbell¹ is a further proof of the tenacity of tradition of the Scottish Gael, and is a link in the chain which binds Gaelic Ireland to the traditions of the farthest Hebrides.

The recent acquisition by the National Library of Ireland of the remainder of the Irish section of the famous Phillipps's collection of manuscripts from Cheltenham marks the end of a chapter, and it is unlikely that any important additions will be made in future to the existing body of Irish manuscripts in the libraries of the British Isles or the Continent.

¹ *Sìa Sgialachdan. Six Gaelic Stories from South Uist and Barra*, Edinburgh, 1939. Privately printed.

To these manuscripts of the literary tradition we hope in our time to see added the last Gaelic source available to the student of comparative literature and European ethnology, the collections of the Irish Folk-lore Commission, and the still unrecorded traditions of Ireland and Gaelic Scotland.

Side by side with textual criticism and the provision of definitive editions of the manuscript literature should go in future the examination of the material from a comparative standpoint. Irish literature, both written and oral, must be studied as a continuous whole. Both oral tradition and written literature have exercised considerable influence one on the other; the early sagas contain a wealth of motifs borrowed from a still older orally preserved tradition: Gaelic medieval romance shows unmistakable evidence both of the written literature, and of folk-elements, native and foreign; while, in more recent times, the paper manuscripts of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries have exercised a greater influence than has hitherto been suspected on Gaelic oral literature.¹

It should be emphasized that hitherto all our energies have been occupied with the recording of oral material, our task being to preserve what was every day being lost. Most of what has been collected during the past eighteen years would have been utterly lost had that effort not been made, for fully seventy-five per cent. of the best of our informants, all fairly old people when we first made their acquaintance, are now dead. The graveyards of the Irish country-side contain more folk-tales and traditions than we can ever hope to collect. But they will not all die; enough has even now been gathered to show how rich that long-despised Gaelic tradition must have been a century ago all over the country.

The time has not yet come when an evaluation can be made of the recorded oral literature of Ireland. There are no monographs, save a few preliminary sketches, mainly by Scandinavian scholars, no *catalogues raisonnés* of tale or motif, of custom and belief, or of any aspect of our tradition. But in the monumental guide to collectors, *A Handbook of Irish Folklore*, compiled by my

¹ The interrelations of Gaelic oral and written literature present many difficult problems. A remarkable parallel exists in the case of Iceland. Sveinsson, *Verzeichnis isländischer Märchenvarianten*, Folk-lore Fellows Communications, no. 83, Helsinki, 1929, introd. xi ff., points out that Icelandic literature down to the eighteenth century was almost entirely a manuscript tradition. The same tradition persisted in Ireland until the middle of the nineteenth century, and, especially in its later stages, had an important influence on oral literature.

colleague, Seán Ó Súilleabháin, some idea can be obtained of the huge task that still lies ahead, and a glimpse afforded for the first time of the green and fallow field which is Irish folk-lore, and which once in great part belonged to an older Europe.

Thus, while Ireland has the largest body of collected folk-tales in the west of Europe, it is, on the whole, a literature without commentary. The material is there in embarrassing richness, but until it has been collected and catalogued, no one can speak with authority on any aspect of Irish folk-lore. Furthermore, there must be an end to the pernicious and unscientific approach, so common in the past, of boldly coming to far-reaching conclusions based on inadequate and at times misleading translations or summaries of a few examples of a tale, belief, or custom, instead of consulting the original sources in Gaelic. The old tag, *Graecum est, non legitur!* might well be applied to Gaelic folk-lore.

Even a cursory examination of the canonical reference-books of the folk-tale investigator shows that the rich oral tradition of Ireland and Gaelic Scotland is almost entirely unknown. Bolte-Polivka's *Anmerkungen* may refer occasionally to a single tale in Kennedy, Larminie, or Curtin's printed collections, while giving a wealth of Germanic, Romance, or Slavonic variant material; most of the special folk-tale monographs published in the famous *Folk-lore Fellows Communications* are content with noting one or two variants from the Gaelic culture-area.

No separate catalogue of Irish and Scottish Gaelic *märchen* has yet been prepared, but preliminary sketches for a catalogue of a few international types (Aarne-Thompson 300, 301, 302, 303, 313) of Gaelic tales have been published in recent years by the Norwegian scholar, Reidar Th. Christiansen,¹ who has first-hand knowledge of the published material. The future catalogue of Irish and Scottish Gaelic folk-tales must, of course, include all the material, printed and manuscript, and the task of the compiler will be no easy one. For example, up to 1937, Christiansen lists thirty-seven published Irish variants of Aarne-Thompson 300, the evergreen 'Dragon-Slayer' type; to these can now be added seventy-one manuscript versions, making a total of 108: when all the Irish material has been catalogued this figure will be doubled, at least. Similarly, of the very popular tale, 'The Forgotten Bride' (Aarne-Thompson 313) there are 46 Irish printed versions and 75 in manuscript, a

¹ *Béaloideas*, i. 107; vii. 3; viii. 97.

total of 121. Of these and of quite a number of other Gaelic parallels to well-known European types there are more versions from Ireland than from all the available manuscript and printed sources of many Continental countries combined.

For generations to come this huge mass of printed and manuscript material will provide a field of research second to none in European ethnological and folkloristic studies. Its importance in particular to the student of comparative religion, hagiography, and medieval literature can hardly be overstressed.

The literary sagas in the form in which they have been preserved to us in the vellums of the twelfth to the fifteenth century are really tale-summaries only, containing all the essential framework and detail, which the *sgélaige* expanded when reciting the tales to an audience.¹ No medieval Irish audience with its keen appreciation of a good tale, as marked in the eighth century as at the present day, would have listened very long to the story-teller if he were to recite tales in the form in which they have come down to us. Some of these manuscript tellings would occupy a reader or reciter not more than fifteen to twenty minutes.

The folk-tale and the folk-song, as well as the saga and the verse in *dán díreach* of the literature, were never intended by their authors or by the scribes who copied them to be read only: their function was to be listened to by an audience, whether it be in the court of a king, or at the peasant's fireside, where they were recited (or, in the case of *dán díreach* verse, chanted) by the *sgélaige* or the *reacaire*. Their life was on the lips of men and not on the point of a pen scratching on a vellum page. What an Irish wonder-tale like 'Édaoin' was really like when told we shall never know, but, judging from story-teller craftsmen whom I have known, this most beautiful of all fairy-tales must have been a masterpiece in the hands of a creative cultured literary artist.

From the bombastic style of the romances of the later manuscripts we may argue that these tales also were intended to be read aloud. The thick growth of alliterative adjectives would roll trippingly on the tongue of a practised story-teller, and have the effect of impressing his illiterate audience, to whom, a thousand years ago as to-day, high-flown rhetoric had a charm and an ever-new appeal. The boastful speeches of kings and heroes, the long alliterative 'runs' and obscure passages, together with the tricks and quips of narrative were hallowed by

¹ See Thurneysen, *Zu irischen Handschriften*, i. 27.

long tradition, and were intended for the approval of the listener rather than of the reader. To read these tales is for many of us to-day a dreary duty, as we strip apart the story imprisoned in the tangled net of this beloved verbiage. But we should bear in mind that obscurity of language held an attraction for the pedantically minded though unlettered listener. One old story-teller friend of mine, speaking of old men whom he had known in his youth, was full of admiration for their 'hard Irish' (*crua-Ghaoluinn*), remarking that 'they had such fine hard Irish you would not understand a word from them!'

A characteristic feature of early and medieval Irish prose narrative is the effective and skilful use of dialogue, and this is very marked in the modern Gaelic folk-tale. 'Duels in quatrains', as a rule with a short explanatory prose introduction, have been popular for many centuries, both in the written literature and in oral tradition, and the dialogue of the folk-tale is often reminiscent of these Gaelic *cante-fables*. A good story-teller rarely departs from *oratio recta* in the first telling of a tale, but it is a common experience to find the story-teller changing over to *oratio obliqua* on retelling the same tale after a short interval.

But the best type of story-teller rarely departs from traditional usage in this respect, as he appreciates how much well-constructed dialogue can add to the effect of his tale on a critical audience, familiar themselves by everyday practice with witty, epigrammatic talk and telling riposte. As W. P. Ker remarks, the old saga-style was essentially conversational; the same may be said of the modern Irish folk-tale, in particular the hero-tale, and the 'chimerate' or wonder-tale, in both of which the Gaelic story-teller excelled.

By using the Ediphone recording machine in our work of collection we have been able to preserve traditional features of story-telling which are lost when tales are written slowly from dictation. It would be unwise to form conclusions about the style of Gaelic folk-tales based on an examination of much of what has been published hitherto. Comparisons have been drawn between the narrative style of the early sagas and of modern folk-tales, attention being directed to the use of short, concise sentences. But as saga and folk-tale were meant to be told, the story-teller of the eighth century as well as his successor, the Gaelic *sgéalai* of to-day, depended upon mnemonics and memorised tale-synopses, which they expanded later when called upon, impressing on their narrative all the skill derived from long training and experience. 'There are seven recensions

of a tale and twelve versions of every song', says a well-known Irish proverb. This traditional dictum may well refer to both the aristocratic sagas of an older time and the tales of the present-day story-tellers.

The short realistic tale (*eachtra, seanchas*) differs from the *märchen* (*sean-sgéal*) in style, structure, and content. This type of prose narrative is easily remembered, and can pass readily across cultural and linguistic frontiers and from one person to another. On the other hand, the often intricate wonder-tale requires considerable powers of memory on the part of the teller; in fact, most educated people would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to give an intelligent summary of the common hero-tale, not to mention retelling it as they had heard it. I have known many illiterate story-tellers who learned some of these twisted tales from a single telling. The number of such gifted story-tellers even in the richest districts of folk-tale is, as a general rule, very small—often only half a dozen in a community of many thousands. Out of an audience of perhaps twenty persons assembled fifty years ago to hear a story-teller of long intricate *sgéalta fiannaíochta*, perhaps only two or three picked up these tales, and remembered them, and of these again only a single individual may have retold them later. But no Irish story-teller, however gifted he may be, can hope to do justice in a foreign idiom to a Gaelic wonder- or hero-tale, with its characteristic 'runs'¹ and tricks of narrative. Jeremiah Curtin (1835–1906), the Irish-American anthropologist and folk-tale collector, found the difficulty insuperable in his otherwise excellent translations of Irish folk-tales, and both he and the interpreters employed by him had to omit these literary embellishments altogether.

Most story-tellers have difficulty in appreciating our interest in the shorter types of narrative, as in their opinion the only tales worthy of any sensible person's attention are the long folk-tales, especially the Finn-tales (*Fiannaíocht*) and the hero-tales (*sgéalta gaisge*). And both the narrator and his audience held in low esteem the tale which did not include the traditional and often semi-obscure 'runs' without which they held no hero-tale was complete. This characteristic feature of Gaelic story-telling is almost exclusively confined to hero-tales or to *märchen* which have been fitted into the traditional pattern

¹ Usually known as *córu catha* or 'preparing-for-battle' and *culaidh ghaisge*, 'battle-dress', so called from the literary 'run' in which the hero's accoutrement prior to battle is given in considerable detail.

of oral heroic narrative, e.g. Irish 'ecotypes' of Aarne-Thompson 301, 'The Kingdom Underground'. The main function of the most elaborate of these embellishments is to impress the listener, and the more corrupt and unintelligible they are the greater the effect; but they serve also as resting-places for the story-teller in the recital of long, intricate tales, from which he can view swiftly the ground he has to cover. They are recited at a greater speed than the narrative proper. Irish 'runs', some of which are unique in the literature of the folk-tale, would appear to fit into three categories (1) those based in part on 'runs' found in late manuscript hero-tales; (2) native *märchen*-runs of European type; (3) 'runs' of the common European pattern.

The subject deserves treatment in a separate monograph.

I suggest that the rhetorics of the saga-literature (from the twelfth century onward) which were committed to memory by the medieval story-teller, were recited at a greater speed than the rest of the story for precisely the same reasons as I have mentioned above in regard to the modern heroic tale. As Thurneysen points out (*Heldensage* 111) the narrative itself had no fixed form, its development depending entirely on the skill of the individual story-teller. The same holds good for the modern Gaelic folk-tale.

The oral traditions of Ireland include contributions from the many ethnic elements which make up the Irish nation—pre-Celtic and Celtic, together with Norse, Norman, English, and Scottish. By a fortunate chance a great and all-important section of the corpus of Irish tradition has been preserved in the Gaelic language. But it must be emphasized that these traditions in Gaelic are not necessarily to be associated exclusively with Celtic civilization. Apart from the huge mass of customs and beliefs in Irish as well as in English, some of the wonder-tales alone contain unmistakable evidence of having belonged to a pre-Celtic civilization, perhaps pre-Indo-European. A number of these tales may have been told in Ireland in Megalithic times; indubitably, certain elements in them go back in Ireland at least as far as the Bronze Age.

In Megalithic times the British Isles had a common material culture with Spain, North Africa, Malta, and other countries, and in certain aspects the spiritual culture of Britain and Ireland and these countries must also have had much in common.

To the ultra-conservative character of the Irish countryman, aided by the peculiar circumstances of our historical and cultural development, we owe the preservation to our own day of tales,

traditions, beliefs, and customs, and certain features of the material culture as well of a civilization of which there is no written record.

The strongly conservative character of Irish story-telling of both the old and the new order dealt kindly but firmly with the tales which sought for admission into the corpus of Irish prose narrative. The Irish power of absorption of foreign ethnical elements is to be observed also in the treatment of imported tales. From the Gaelic cauldron of rebirth they emerged Gaelic in tongue as well as in appearance, taking on Irish dress, names, and citizenship, at liberty to move freely in the company of the stock characters of Irish oral fiction. So thorough at times is the disguise that only the expert, familiar from long intercourse with his sources, can detect the stranger in the borrowed Gaelic frieze. This is the case with the *exempla*,¹ many of ultimate Eastern origin, and with the *novelle* and *fabliaux* which from oral, and later from manuscript sources, found their way into the treasury of Irish oral prose narrative during the middle ages, and from the sixteenth century on through the influence of printed jest-books of French and English provenance. The same process of assimilation may be observed in some of the religious tales which to me seem to be loans from eastern Christendom; of what period, however, cannot at present be determined.

We can, I think, with some feeling of assurance regard the oldest stratum of our existing body of folk-tales as those wonder-tales in these international register numbers, at least—300, 301, 302, 304, 313, 400. No. 402 shows a Scandinavian-Celtic 'ecotype' and also a Slavonic 'ecotype'. The Polyphemus tale has a distinct western, perhaps a Celtic 'ecotype', quite distinct from the version in the *Odyssey*. But one must proceed with the utmost caution in these dangerous western and eastern approaches. The first necessity is for a thorough examination of the material, and it is just here in this section of the wonder-tale that the Irish contribution to the study of the international folk-tale will be found to be most important.²

¹ The still very popular *exemplum* of the Three Counsels (Aarne-Thompson 910 B) occurs in the Irish version of the *Odyssey* (*Merugud Uilix maicc Leirtis*), the text of which from the language cannot be later than the twelfth century.

² The Gaelic variant material is now extensive enough to justify the study in detail of a tale-type within a restricted area; after the collection of the material itself, investigation on these lines is, perhaps, the greatest contribution we can make to the examination of the international folk-tale.

The Gaelic story-tellers excelled in the interpretation of wonder-tales, the voyage-tales (*immrama*), and the intricate overseas-adventure type of narrative. There are many hundreds of the other types in our collection, aetioloical, apocryphal, and religious tales; the *novelle*, *fabliaux*, and so on; but the old-time story-teller preferred to tell the more difficult wonder-tales, enriching them with all the linguistic and stylistic embellishments of a long-developed narrative art.

These tale-types were, in order of preference, Finn-tales; the later hero-tales (*eachtraithe*) of overseas adventure, such as *Conall Gulban* or *Céadach*; and, finally, wonder-tales of the kind listed in the Aarne-Thompson register from 300-749.

The Finn-tales, so far as I know them in oral tradition, appear to belong to two types: (1) tales of undoubted manuscript origin which have been partly remoulded and refurbished with the tricks and trappings of Irish *märchen*, and (2) tales which do not occur in manuscript but use characters and incidents from the Finn cycle as part of the intricate framework, together with stock motifs from wonder-tales of the international type. These peculiarly Irish voyage- and wonder-tales are a tangled maze of incidents dependent on the fancy and preference of the individual story-tellers, with incidents borrowed from home and abroad. They are reminiscent of early Celtic and Irish art in their fantastic and arabesque treatment of common motifs.

The Gaelic hero-tale is a curious blend of motifs, some of which are Irish, and some taken from the common stock of fairy-tale. Inside the framework strut figures from the Fianna—Finn, Osgar, Diarmuid, Conán, and overseas champions with outlandish names, who appear only in Gaelic tales of this type; but there are also in the picture characters from the international repertory of fairy-tale.

The nearest parallel to these late Gaelic romantic or hero-tales would appear to be the Icelandic *lygisögur* or 'lying-tales', which appear to owe much of their content to medieval Byzantine romance.

The most usual plot [in these romances] was built on a simple formula: take two or more persons who belong together (for instance, a pair of lovers), . . . separate them violently, subject them to all sorts of hair-raising adventures by land and sea, reunite them at the end, cause them to recognize one another, and so let all end happily.¹

¹ Margaret Schlauch, *Romance in Iceland*, London, 1934, p. 57. See also Åke Lagerholm, *Drei Lygisögur*, Halle (Saale), 1927.

A modification of this formula would suit the Irish type admirably.

Certain motifs common to both Irish and Icelandic tales of this class are (1) the hero thrown into the sea is carried by a griffin into her nest; (2) 'the recognition scene and the autobiographical narrative', as in the case of two brothers who fight one another and at length recognize each other; (3) love for a princess one has never seen, or falling in love through a dream, followed by a long voyage overseas in quest of her.

A comparative study of the Icelandic *lygisögur* and the Gaelic hero-tales would be of absorbing interest. In neither case is the material readily available, and the prime necessity is for publication of texts (with translations) in both Icelandic and Gaelic, together with a close examination of the motifs.

A possible prototype for these late Gaelic hero-tales may be the *Foglaím ConCulainn*, ascribed by Thurneysen¹ on linguistic grounds to the fifteenth century. This highly romanticized version of some incidents from *Tochmarc Émire* contains elements which are commonplace in hero-tales such as *Conall Gulban*, *Céadach*, &c., as e.g., encounter at the seashore with a dark stranger who tells the hero he must go to Scythia to perfect himself in feats of valour with Scáthach, the warrior-daughter of the king of that country; his adventures in Scythia, and later Greece, rescue of maiden in the land of the Fir Cat (Caithness?) who is to be delivered up to sea-robbers, recognition by rescued girl of her rescuer, return of hero and his companions to Ireland.

In the case of Iceland, Schlauch and others have shown how this 'matter of the East' reached Iceland, by way of the old trade routes from Constantinople over Russia to the Baltic and thence to Iceland. In this importation of foreign models and motifs a prominent part was played by the mercenary Norse and Icelandic soldiers of the famous Varangian guard at the court of the Byzantine Emperors.

How did these foreign models reach Ireland?

The Gaelic counterpart of the Varangian Guard immediately suggests itself: these were the *Gallógláigh* or 'Gallowglasses' of Norse-Gaelic stock from the Norse Kingdom of the Isles, who from the middle of the thirteenth century hired themselves to Irish princes as mercenary soldiers. These men came from the Hebrides, one of the most important stages and change-houses

¹ *Heldensage*, pp. 396 ff.; Flower, *Catalogue of Ir. MSS. in British Museum*, p. 331.

in the Norse-Icelandic cultural sphere of influence which stretched from Constantinople to Iceland.¹

Another possibility—perhaps a more likely one—is the cultural influence of the Hiberno-Norman aristocracy. Robin Flower, in his paper, *Ireland and Medieval Europe*,² has pointed to the Cistercians, Dominicans, and Franciscans as the carriers to Ireland of Continental religious learning and tradition. It seems reasonable to suppose that their patrons, the great Hiberno-Norman lords, were one of several possible intermediaries in the introduction of the ‘matter’ of the romantic tales which became so popular in Ireland from the fifteenth century on, as also of the translations or adaptations of Arthurian and courtly romances, tales of chivalry, and other similar literature.

Just as the Hebrides were in all probability a literary clearing-house for the spread of Irish-Gaelic tradition to Norway and Iceland, Sicily and Southern Italy may have played a similar part in the transmission of Eastern romance material via the Norman world to the Gaelic story-tellers of Ireland and Scotland.

My friend and colleague, Rev. Francis Shaw, S. J., suggests to me that a possible sphere of influence to be noted in this regard were the medical schools of the Continent resorted to by Irish students of medicine from the fourteenth century onwards. The southern schools such as Montpellier and the medical schools of Italy were greatly influenced by the new Arabian philosophy and medicine, especially that of Avicenna and Averroes.

‘From about 1350 there is clear evidence of the closest contact between the native Irish medical men and these continental schools of medicine, where many Irish doctors studied and obtained degrees. This would imply a stay of some years and close personal contact. It is not unreasonable to assume that these men should have borrowed other material, e.g. the ‘matter’ of the later Gaelic romantic tales.’

¹ The loss of the oral literature of the counties of Antrim and Down is particularly to be deplored. This area of east Ulster had ancient traditional links with the Isle of Man, and through Galloway and the west of Scotland with the culture of the Norse Kingdom of the Isles. A century ago, Gaelic was commonly spoken in many parts of Antrim and Down, and well within living memory a close connexion existed between the people of the Glens of Antrim and the inhabitants of Islay, Barra, and South Uist. Only a few fragments have been preserved of the Gaelic oral literature of this important area.

² Rhys Memorial Lecture, British Academy, 1927.

The question is an open one, and until the evidence, Gaelic, Icelandic, and Byzantine, be examined, more than cautious speculation is inadmissible.

The presence in Icelandic oral tradition of a number of motifs unquestionably of Gaelic origin suggests that a profitable field of investigation, hitherto almost entirely untouched, lies in the comparative study of Icelandic-Gaelic tradition.¹

Einar Ól. Sveinsson in his catalogue of Icelandic folk-tales,² refers to a number of Celtic parallels, such as the *dlög*-motif and the *Everlasting Fight*. A. Haggerty Krappe, in a short preliminary sketch of this last-mentioned motif, shows that it is an import from the Gaelic West.³ He has examined only four of the ninety-odd Gaelic examples, these four being English translations. In another study he has suggested that the characteristic Icelandic outlaw-tales (*utilegumannasögur*) have been influenced by the well-known Gaelic stories of the *sídh*-folk, who commit depredations on mortals, carry off their women, and so on.⁴

Margaret Schlauch in *Romance in Iceland*, has also referred to these and other motifs as likely to be Celtic loans in the Icelandic *lygisögur*.

The following motifs in Icelandic folk-tales may be of Gaelic origin:

(a) The magic mist (*an ceó draoidheachta*), a commonplace in both Celtic and Icelandic tradition, which suddenly appears and from which the hero wanders into an enchanted country.

(b) The use of the sleep-thorn (*biorán suain*), a stock object in Gaelic story-telling.

(c) The motif quoted by Schlauch⁵ of making certain that a dead *berserkr* will not walk after death. 'One method is to decapitate your man and then spring between the head and the body as it falls.'

¹ 'Some characteristic features in Gaelic tales seem to be due to Norwegian influence; and, on the other hand, some Gaelic, or Celtic, motifs recur in Norwegian fairytales. Some of the distinct peculiar features of Gaelic story-telling have been retained in Icelandic stories, but not in modern Norwegian fairytales.' R. Th. Christiansen, *Folk-Liv*, 1938, p. 334.

² *Verzeichnis isländischer Märchenvarianten*. Introd., pp. xxx ff., xxxvii ff., 23.

³ *Balor with the Evil Eye. Studies in Celtic and French Literature*, New York, 1927, pp. 132 ff.

⁴ *Études de mythologie et de folklore germaniques*, pp. 128 ff. = id., *Science of Folklore*, p. 83.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

Here is one of the many Irish examples of this motif:

He swept off the five heads with that blow. He caught each head in his left hand, threw each head into his right hand, and struck it against the heart and breast of the giant.

'Well for you that you did that,' said each of the five heads, 'for if any head of us had got back on the body half of the Fenian host would not have cut it off again.'¹

(d) The 'hand-down-chimney' motif is very commonly associated in Irish tradition with the motif of the Magic Helpers. Two examples are in the redaction of the tale *Feis Tighe Chonáin* (sixteenth century) and two versions of *Tóruigheacht Shaidhbhe* (end of eighteenth century). In Welsh tradition the two motifs are found together (Pwyll). In Iceland they occur in a version of Aarne-Thompson 326,² although the grasping-hand motif occurs in the older Icelandic literature also (*Biskupasögur*), and there is the well-known occurrence in Saxo Grammaticus.

(e) Setting adrift in a rudderless boat, a common punishment for criminals in Old Irish Law.³

(f) The werewolf story, very common in Gaelic tradition (*Arthur and Gorgolon. Fios Fátha an Aoinsgéil, &c.*).

(g) A fairly considerable body of tradition exists in Gaelic, and to a lesser degree in Welsh, in which monster cats appear, very often associated with yet another common character in Gaelic wonder-tales, the 'Loathsome Hag'. These unpleasant creatures occur also in Icelandic folk-lore, being loans from Celtic (probably Gaelic) tradition. The cat-stories would appear to be of Celtic origin.

(h) Finally, I wish to draw attention to an Icelandic parallel to the Irish *Echtra Nerai* story (eighth century) in Arnason: *Isl. Pjòdsögur*, i. 285—'Bakka-draugurinn.'⁴

It is regrettable that the importance to Celtic studies of Old Norse and Icelandic has not up to the present been formally recognized by the establishment of a chair in an Irish University in this kindred branch of learning. I am convinced that co-operation in the two disciplines of Celtic and Norse-Icelandic studies is not only desirable but of vital importance in the future development of both.

¹ From an unpublished Galway tale, 'An fear a chuaibh ar aimsir leis an gcroc'.

² Sveinsson, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

³ See Mary E. Byrne, *Ériu*, xi., pp. 97 ff., 1930.

⁴ See 'Nera and the Dead Man' in *Féil-sgríbhinn Eóin Mhic Néill*. Dublin, 1940, pp. 522 ff.

Modern Irish and, to a lesser extent, Scottish Gaelic oral tradition has been laid under contribution in recent years by a small number of Scandinavian scholars in monographs on tales, motifs, and incidents occurring in Old Norse literature or modern Scandinavian folk-lore. Of these scholars, the most persistent advocate of the importance to Germanic studies of Gaelic literary and oral material is the Swedish folk-lorist, Professor Carl Wilhelm von Sydow. In the following investigations of his he draws largely on Irish literary oral sources: (1) the Beowulf-epic, upon which he has written a number of important papers, viz. 'Irisches in Beowulf',¹ 'Beowulfskalden och Nordisk Tradition',² 'Beowulf och Bjarke',³ In his earliest investigations in this field, 'Tors Färd till Utgdår',⁴ he holds that almost all of this myth has been taken over from Irish sources. Similarly, the Volsunga story has in the North been strongly influenced by Irish saga material; the fight of Sigurd with Favne,⁵ and the incident of how he learned the speech of birds have been built on the well-known tale of the *dét fesa* or tooth of knowledge of the Irish hero Finn. (Taliesin furnishes another parallel.)

In another paper, 'Iriskt Inflytande på nordisk Guda- och Hjäletesaga',⁶ von Sydow shows Irish influence on (a) the *Rígsthula* song from the Edda; (b) three incidents and motifs from *Voluspá*.

As far back as 1909, von Sydow, in his doctor's dissertation, *Två Spinnsagor*,⁷ had directed attention to the importance of Celtic oral tradition.

The Danish folklorist, Inger M. Boberg, in her absorbing investigation of a folk-tale, *Sagnet om den Store Pans Død*,⁸ a comparative study of the tale of the death of Pan, occurring in Plutarch's *De defectu oraculorum* (first century A.D.), stresses the fact that the type in which a cat figures is peculiar to the British Isles. From England this form of the tale has gone to Denmark, France, the Low Countries, and Germany, from Ireland to Iceland (c. 900) and Norway.

Another study by the same scholar, *Bjaergfolkenes Bagning*⁹ is concerned with another short tale, this time about the fairies

¹ Philological Congress, 1913.

² *Vetenskaps-societeten i Lund Årsbok*, 1923.

³ *Studier i Nordisk Filologi*, Helsingfors, 1923.

⁴ *Danske Studier*, 1910.

⁵ 'Sigurds Strid med Favne', *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, 1918.

⁶ *V. S. Årsbok*, 1920.

⁷ *Svenska Landsmål och Svenskt Folkliv*, Stockholm, 1909-10.

⁸ Copenhagen, 1934. Dissertation.

⁹ *Danmarks Folkeminder*, no. 46. Copenhagen, 1938.

who are helped by a mortal and reward him. In this case, Miss Boberg concludes from a minute examination of a wide range of variants that the tale is from Eastern Scandinavia, is known outside Scandinavia only in the British Isles, to which it was brought probably in the ninth or tenth century by Danish vikings, and from England later was imported into Ireland.

Professor L. L. Hammerich of Copenhagen has examined the well-known religious legend, *The Monk and the Bird*, in an outstanding literary-historical study, *Munken og Fuglen: en middelalderstudie*.¹ He concludes that the tale was brought from Ireland to the Continent at the end of the twelfth century, in any case to Paris, most likely in a Latin manuscript, but that is uncertain, and the possibility of oral provenance cannot be excluded.

The story of the treasure of the Niebelungen and the widespread Gaelic tale of *An Bheoir Lochlannach* have been studied by von Sydow in a study published in 1934.² The tale is most probably an originally Celtic tale introduced into the Niebelungenlied. But it may have been introduced into the Continent, as was the legend of the 'Monk and the Bird' by early Irish missionaries. There is, as von Sydow points out, another possibility, which should not be lost sight of.

In studying French oral tradition one observes at once that in many points there is a striking agreement between French and Irish folk-tales, which is explained by the fact that France is an old Celtic country. This agreement must have been considerably greater one thousand years ago and still farther back in time, and the Celtic traits which one finds in the heroic sagas of the Franks may be attributed possibly to the existing native Celtic tradition which they encountered in Gaul; this is all the more reasonable when we consider that the Franks were in a minority in the conquered territory. . . . This, perhaps, is the explanation why the Siegfried-Sigurd material is so unlike all other Germanic heroic saga.

The Swedish scholar, Sven Liljeblad, an authority on Slavonic folk-lore, has studied a number of parallels between Celtic and Slavonic folk-tale motifs.³

These are (a) 'Giant without a heart', associated commonly in Gaelic tradition with the 'Naked Hangman' (Slavonic: 'The Hanged Dragon'); (b) The castle which revolves against the

¹ Copenhagen, 1933.

² C. W. von Sydow, 'Niebelungendiktningen och sägnen om "An Bheoir Lochlannach"'. *Studia Germanica tillägnade Ernst Albin Koch*, Lund, 1934.

³ Sven Liljeblad, 'En Slavo-Keltisk folksaga' in *Nordiskt Folkminne: Studier tillägnade C. W. von Sydow*, Stockholm, 1928.

sun: the Russian witch, Baba Jaga, lives in a house built on hens' feet which turns around when the hero reads a formula; (c) 'Battle of the Birds': a well-known introduction to a number of Gaelic versions of Aarne-Thompson 313.

Liljeblad concludes his monograph with these words:

To explain the close agreement between Gaelic and Slavonic folk-tales, of which the above examples are but a small selection, one must conclude that they go back to a direct connexion between Slavs and Celts before the Celtic expansion (c. 600 B.C.).

The 'Battle of the Birds' as introductory motif to Aarne-Thompson 313 has to-day a very striking area of distribution. It is found only in eastern Europe, in one example from Denmark, and in nineteen examples (eleven of which were collected since 1929) from Ireland and Gaelic Scotland. A monograph on this very important Gaelic ecotype has been promised by Professor Walter Anderson of Dorpat.

In her excellent book, *Ireland and Wales*,¹ Cecile O'Rahilly has compiled from medieval Irish literary sources a valuable list of Irish parallels to motifs and incidents in the Mabinogion: some of these are direct loans in Welsh from Irish. Professor W. J. Gruffydd, in his praiseworthy pioneer work on the tale of *Math vab Mathonwy*,² has drawn on Gaelic folk-literature, but his sources appear to have been exclusively those provided with translation, an inconsiderable fraction of the body of material available.

A very useful contribution can be made in this neglected field, as not only the older literature but modern Gaelic oral tradition in particular afford many parallels to motifs in Welsh medieval romance. *Kulhwch ac Olwen*, *Pwyll*, *Branwen*, the story of *Taliesin*, and also *Math* contain motifs, some of which, of course, have a wide international distribution, but others seem to be peculiar to Welsh-Gaelic tradition. I have space for but a few illustrations.

For example, the well-known motif in the tale of *Manwyddan* of the destruction of a field of wheat by the people of Llwyd vab Cilcoed in the shape of mice, has a striking parallel in a modern Irish folk-tale, recorded in Cárna, Co. Galway (I.F.C. MS. 158, p. 103). Two *Ultaigh*, or 'wise women' from Ulster, in the shape of beetles, steal a man's wheat. He captures them and puts them in a box. On begging to be released, they assume their human form.

¹ London, 1924, pp. 103 ff.

² Cardiff, 1928.

Similarly, the incident in *Breuddwyd Rhonabwy* of the wonderful horse: 'And when the horse breathed forth, the men became distant from him, and when he drew in his breath, they were drawn near to him, even to the horse's chest.' An Irish version of this incident in an unpublished tale recorded by me, June 1933, in west Galway reads:

The giant fell asleep. The first snore he made he brought Sir Slanders, his nephew, to the uvula at the back of his throat, and when he breathed out again, he sent him flying up to the rafters. Sir Slanders spent the night like that between the back of the giant's throat and the top beam of the rafters in the castle.

The story of *Taliesin*, as distinct from the verse, contains amongst many other folk-motifs the pursuit incident of Aarne-Thompson 325, a well-known international tale, of which there are many Irish and Scottish Gaelic versions.

Kulhwch ac Olwen has *inter multa alia* the following—apart from the beginning, in itself a widespread folk-tale introduction—(a) the magic helpers: Sugyn m. Sugnedyd who could suck up the sea on which there were three hundred ships and leave nothing but the dry strand; Hear-well (Clust m. Clustveinad) . . . who could hear the ant rise from her nest in the morning fifty miles away; Shoot-well (Medyr m. Methredyd) . . . he could in a twinkling shoot the wren between the two legs upon Esgeir Oervel in Ireland (incident also in *Math*); (b) the old woman who rushes forward to meet Kulhwch and his companions: Kai places a log of wood between her hands so that it became a twisted coil; (c) the counsel of the oldest animals, the Eagle of Gwenn Abwy, the Salmon of Llyn Llyw, &c.; (d) the shaving of Yspaddaden Penkawr. All of these are very well known in modern Irish folk-tales.

The 'hand-down-chimney' motif in *Pwyll* and in *Taliesin* has been studied by W. J. Gruffydd (op. cit.). The Irish variants, both literary and oral, are very numerous, and a study of this motif alone in Gaelic, Icelandic, Teutonic, and Slavonic tradition would certainly be of great value: the motif occurs also in the *Katháaritsāgara*; but the Gaelic-Welsh variants would appear to belong to an independent tradition, and not to be derived from Eastern sources.

In *Pwyll*, the incident of the hero at the wedding-feast, dressed as a fool, carrying a bag which is to be filled with food, has a Gaelic counterpart in a modern hero-tale, of which there are many variants.

Finally, the incident in *Taliesin* of the boastful speech of

Maelgwyn who is rebuked by Elphin, and the attempt by Rhun to bring about the downfall of Elphin's wife; this has its counterpart in the Irish *Tuatha Luchra* story (thirteenth century); and there are Icelandic and Eastern parallels.¹

Through an unaccountable lacuna in Welsh scholarship, modern Irish has been overlooked in the curriculum of Celtic Studies in the colleges of the National University of Wales. In consequence, but little use has been made by Welsh scholars of the primary sources in modern Irish and Scottish Gaelic, to the detriment of research in Welsh medieval and modern literature, ethnology, and kindred studies. No greater tribute could be paid to the memory of the distinguished pioneer in Gaelic and Welsh folk-lore, Sir John Rhŷs, than the establishment of a chair of Irish language and literature in the National University of Wales.

The pressing need of the present is the systematic and active collection of the oral traditions of the peoples of the world, for soon will come a time when no man can work, when the sources of tradition will have dried up in the drifting sands of progress, and the voice of the story-teller and tradition-bearer will be stilled for ever. Those of us who are at work in the ever-narrowing field of Gaelic oral tradition have no illusions. Our duty is clear, the task is an urgent one, and we have so little time. Nor do we derive any abiding consolation from the large collection of material which has been built up during the past ten years, for we realize only too well that this imposing array of a thousand leather-bound volumes is but a fraction of the huge mass of tradition which still awaits collection.

There are still many places all over Ireland which our collectors have yet to visit. This is true for the narrow belt of Gaelic-speaking country along the western sea-board; the main part of the country where English is the common speech has, on the whole, been left untouched, and much valuable material still awaits the collector in these areas. While the folk-tales proper and the folk-songs have long since disappeared in most parts of the country, the social-historical *seanchas* remains in most places and offers a rich and important field of research.

In our own time and before our very eyes the last stronghold of an ancient civilization is slowly disintegrating and will soon pass away for ever. In the tradition of that old Gaelic world which stretches from Lewis and Uist to the coasts of Kerry there

¹ See Schlauch, *op. cit.*, p. 72 *et passim*.

remains the tattered but still recognizable fabric of a culture which at one time belonged to the whole Atlantic area.

In this immense body of oral tradition we have the counterpart of the remains of the written tradition, neither of which can be understood independently. Both written and oral sources, combined with the archaeological evidence, form the Irish contribution to the history of European civilization.

NOTE

Reference is made *passim* to the international system of registration of *märchen* of the Finnish scholar, Antti Aarne, revised and extended by Stith Thompson—*The Types of the Folk-Tale, a Classification and Bibliography* (Folklore Fellows Communications, No. 74), Helsinki, 1928. Thus, Aarne-Thompson 425 (pp. 185, 196) is the 'Cupid and Psyche' story; Aa. Th. 300 (p. 205), the Dragon-Slayer ('Perseus'); Aa. Th. 301, 'The Kingdom Underground'; Aa. Th. 313, The 'Magic Flight'; and so on.

ANNUAL ITALIAN LECTURE
RE-READING THE DIVINE COMEDY

By E. R. VINCENT

Read 23 January 1946

AFTER six years away from Italian studies I have recently re-read the works of Dante, and in particular the Divine Comedy. My excuse for choosing for to-day's address a subject that has been so thoroughly expounded before is personal, namely, that reading the great poem as a whole without too much attention to detail has been for me a revealing experience. It has occurred to me that any reader to-day must understand Dante rather differently than he did before 1939. We have changed, even if Dante has not. It is not therefore inappropriate at this particular moment of time, as we look around at a stricken world full of ominous possibilities, to consider what we can learn from a poet who understood so well the hopes and fears of mankind.

First I would say that the modern reader of the Divine Comedy must be impressed by what he owes to scholars of different countries who for 600 years have worked to clarify the text and meaning of what is certainly a difficult book. It is not very important that they have often contradicted one another and that some have held curious opinions as to what Dante meant. Of such we may say with the poet:

Per apparer ciascun s'ingegna e face
sue invenzioni; e quelle son trascorse
da' predicanti e 'l Vangelo si tace.¹

The theorists are not really typical. Jacopo della Lana, the Ottimo, Pietro the poet's son, Benvenuto da Imola, Francesco da Buti, Boccaccio, come first in time and therefore in importance. A tradition of painstaking investigation is handed down from them unbroken to our own day. Shelves of books of reference and criticism are now available. I take this opportunity of expressing my humble thanks for what I have learnt from them in the past, although for the purposes of this paper I have gone to Dante rather than to his interpreters. I myself cannot pretend to make even the most modest contribution to the grand

¹ *Par.* xxix. 94.

sum of Dante knowledge. My intention to-day is different; it is to step into the shoes of a person somewhat neglected by the critics but constantly in Dante's mind and often directly addressed by him. I mean the shoes of the ordinary reader who is neither theologian, historian, nor aesthetic philosopher; one who goes to Dante to find out what he has to say and how far his matter is applicable to his own circumstances—that *lettore* whom Dante comforts at difficult places, for whose credence he begs, whose sympathy he sets out to win, whose curiosity he whets, and to whom he confides his own misgivings. In the *Convivio*¹ Dante stated that he wrote for the benefit of an intelligent influential lay audience of men and women unhampered by the pedantry of the *litterati*. He could not have foreseen the invention of printing and the vast reading public of to-day, but he certainly appealed to the widest audience known to him. The *lettore* Dante had in mind was not a learned man, and therefore neither the Divine Comedy nor the *Convivio* was written in a learned language. Abstractions are given a form and place, and scenes of dramatic interest enliven instruction, for a reader without special training. It is for him that the 'bella menzogna'² of poetic allegory adorns knowledge where it would otherwise be arid and unpalatable. It is for his 'picciolletta barca',³ his frail craft, that the wide unsailed expanse of the ocean of truth is made as smooth as possible by the music of harmonious words. Dante's presentation of lofty themes to the common man in the vulgar idiom was resented in his own day by such as Giovanni del Virgilio and subsequent interpreters have too often forgotten the importance the poet attached to such a reader. The choice of the vernacular implies that Dante wanted as many readers as possible, and for this reason he was deeply concerned with the acquisition of fame. Why a poet wants posthumous fame is a general question of great interest inappropriate for consideration now, but it can at least be said that Dante gives the impression of wanting fame to attract readers rather than readers to confirm his fame. He frequently enlarges on the vanity of a mere notoriety:

Non è il mondan romore altro ch'un fiato
di vento, ch'or vien quinci e or vien quindi,
e muta nome perchè muta lato.⁴

Dante wanted readers because he had a message for all, a

¹ *Conv.* i. ix.

³ *Par.* ii. 1.

² *Conv.* ii. 1.

⁴ *Purg.* xi. 100.

message of such supreme importance that he dedicated the full vigour of his passionate nature to the task of giving it.

O sacrosante Vergini, se fami,
 freddi o vigilie mai per voi sofferesi,
 cagion mi sprona ch'io mercè vi chiami.¹

Under the driving stimulus of his mission he endured hunger, cold, and night vigils. Years of toil made him lean, and he died a disappointed exile in a distant town at what we should now call an early age. The predominating impression one gets on re-reading the Divine Comedy is that of a man with a message.

Before considering what this message may be and if it can have an actual, apart from an antiquarian, interest for the world to-day, I should like to illustrate what I have already said or inferred as to Dante's view of poetry. The first obvious statement to make about the Divine Comedy is that it is poetry. Following Aristotle Dante stated that the proper function for art was in the imitation of nature.² Art may thus be considered the offspring of nature, just as nature is the offspring of God; art is, as it were, the grand-child of God. The better the imitation, the nearer to God, the better the art. Dante's admiration for the carvings he imagined as examples of pride or humility in Purgatory is for their verisimilitude:

Morti li morti e i vivi parean vivi:
 non vide mei di me chi vide il vero.³

When he despairs of describing how one passes from waking to sleeping it is because he falls short of accurate imitation:

come pintor che con essempro pinga.⁴

If the poet in the vulgar tongue does not go straight to nature he should imitate the classical poets:

Idcirco accidit ut, quantum illos proximius imitemur, tantum rectius poetemur.⁵

The word imitation is inclined to suggest a process of reproduction without conviction or personality, and it therefore seems wrong to use it in connexion with a poet as personal and convinced as Dante. It is necessary to observe the result of his imitation. He learnt chiefly from Virgil 'lo mio maestro e 'l mio autore'⁶ the way to use what he calls in the *De Vulgari Eloquentia*⁵ the tragic style, there defined as a combination of worthy subject, dignified verse, lofty construction, and choice vocabu-

¹ *Purg.* xxix. 37.

² *Inf.* xi. 97.

³ *Purg.* xii. 67.

⁴ *Purg.* xxxii. 67.

⁵ *De Vulg. Eloq.* ii. 4.

⁶ *Inf.* i. 85.

lary. Virgil's influence is, however, far greater than any definition can suggest. The Divine Comedy is a monument to the classical influence which was not to impose a slavish formalism till much later in the history of literature. Imitation alone does not produce great poetry and Dante's real inspiration came from within:

I' mi son un, che quando
Amor mi spira, noto, e a quel modo
ch'e' ditta dentro vo significando.¹

On the other hand, unschooled inspiration is mere incoherence:

But it is in the exercise of the needful caution and discernment that the real difficulty lies; for this can never be attained without strenuous efforts of genius, constant practice in the art and the habit of the sciences. . . . And therefore let those who, innocent of art and science, and trusting to genius alone, rush forward to sing of the highest subjects in the highest style, confess their folly and cease from such presumption.²

Just as Giotto, his contemporary, moved from the conventional stylization of an earlier school to a truer, more natural kind of painting, so Dante's 'stil nuovo' was a return to nature. It was primarily nature illumined by art that he saw and admired in Virgil. But, however deeply interested Dante was in poetry as a technique and an art, I think it is plain that he did not set out to create a great work of art for its own sake. The beauty of form, proportion, and music of the Divine Comedy is the 'pastur[a] da pigliare occhi',³ the bait to capture our attention for what he has to say. It is important to appreciate this simple fact, for if we would rescue Dante from the pedants by emphasizing that he is a poet writing poetry we can fall into error unless we appreciate the function he gives to poetry.

To attract a great audience of common men Dante realized that he must rival the most famous poets of the past. With the certainty of genius he knew he had the power and resolution to do so. He exercised his right to walk as a peer with Homer, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, and Lucan.⁴ He must out-do them.⁵ His revered senior Brunetto Latini is made to foretell his success.⁶ Minerva, Apollo, and all the Muses guide him on his way.⁷ He recognizes that his genius is inspired from above.⁸ In moments of enthusiasm he even hopes that the truth he speaks may be recognized in his own day and in the triumph of right

¹ *Purg.* xxiv. 52.

² *De Vulg. Eloq.* ii. 4, trans. Ferrers Howell.

³ *Par.* xxvii. 91.

⁴ *Inf.* iv. 100.

⁵ *Inf.* xxv. 94, 97.

⁶ *Inf.* xv. 70.

⁷ *Par.* ii. 8.

⁸ *Par.* xxii. 112.

over wrong he shall be acclaimed and crowned with laurel in the heart of Florence. But his immediate hopes were not realized and it is to posterity he looks, to those who, as he says, will call his time antiquity. In the changing procession of *posterit* we, for a brief moment, represent the *lettori* addressed by Dante. What response, if any, can we make in 1946 to a man who died in 1321?

Here I would make a short digression to protest against some vulgar English misunderstandings of Dante's character and aims. If we consider the adverse criticisms directed against the poet in this country (a task greatly simplified by the invaluable researches of the late Paget Toynbee, Fellow of the British Academy¹) we find it arises from two main causes, the first a legitimate difference of taste, most pronounced when canons of strict classical elegance prevail; the second—ignorance. When Horace Walpole wrote that 'Dante was extravagant, absurd, disgusting, in short a Methodist parson in Bedlam'² or Sir Richard Clayton attributed Dante's 'absurd and burlesque images' to a 'want of correct taste',³ they simply meant that the principles of eighteenth-century poetry were different from Dante's. Another cause for complaint, often genuine but also frequently due to ignorance, was based on a puritanism that disliked Dante's outspoken acceptance of life as he saw it and as it is. This puritanism affects even some of the most distinguished of nineteenth-century English Dantists who instinctively resent and avoid reference to the vileness and cruelty of which man is capable and which Dante includes as an essential part of his consideration of human nature.

One of the marks of the ignorant critic is that he limits his comments to the *Inferno*. The Divine Comedy is a long book, the *Inferno* comes at the beginning, and for every reader who wins his way up the Mountain of Purgatory to Paradise there are thousands who stick in Hell. For the latter Dante is the 'gloomy poet' only interested in sin and torture, and such references as these are far the most common in uninformed English criticism. Another class of pseudo-readers tries to pick the icing off the cake. They isolate lyrical or dramatic passages such as those of Paolo and Francesca, Ulysses, or Ugolino. They find their justification in the prejudices of Voltaire or the statements of such as Martin Sherlock who in 1780 wrote: 'Take away from the Divine Comedy five or six beautiful passages and

¹ Paget Toynbee, *Dante in English Literature*, 2 vols., Methuen, 1909.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 549.

four or five hundred verses, what remains is only a tissue of barbarisms, absurdities and horrors.¹ Even Shelley, who knew Dante well and learnt from him, speaks of: 'those fortunate isles laden with golden fruit, which alone could tempt anyone to embark in the misty ocean of his dark and extravagant fiction.'²

There is one libel on Dante's character which persists with the tenacity of an evil weed. An anonymous writer in 1784 wrote, 'it was natural for Dante to send his enemies to Hell'. The same thing was repeated in other words by Sir Walter Scott and Wordsworth, neither of whom had any real knowledge of Dante. The protests of Carlyle had little effect in stopping the libel, which is the sort of remark that seems clever at a dinner party. And now Mr. Aldous Huxley, in a book published in 1945, puts into the mouth of one of his characters the old gibe that Dante revenged himself on his political opponents by putting them in Hell and rewarded his friends by promoting them to Purgatory and Paradise. 'What could be sillier or more squalid?' adds Mr. Huxley with reference to Dante's behaviour.³ And what more inaccurate? The contrary is true, for Dante's sense of justice caused him to condemn many for whom he felt warm personal sympathy. That Dante suffered owing to the policy of Boniface VIII and that this Pope is condemned by him to Hell is no more a matter of personal revenge than if one of the suffering millions of Europe judged Hitler in the same way. Without wasting more time I would refer those interested to that objective critic Edward Moore, who emphatically repudiates what he calls 'a shallow and ignorant suggestion'.⁴

Non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa⁵

The main difficulty in attempting to express one's impression of the Divine Comedy is that the book is something like life itself. It is a whole composed of a countless number of dependent and related parts. The very comprehensiveness of Dante's view of the world and his unrivalled power of co-ordinating and concentrating the most diverse material within the bounds of his art can easily lead us astray. If we attempt to unravel the great synthesis we may find we have reverted to chaos, or at best, isolated something that only has meaning in a

¹ Paget Toynbee, *Dante in English Literature*, vol. i, p. 376.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 217.

³ Aldous Huxley, *Time must have a Stop*, 1945, p. 125.

⁴ Edw. Moore, *Studies in Dante*, Second Series, Oxford, 1899, p. 219 note.

⁵ *Inf.* iii. 51.

combination we have just broken up. The Divine Comedy is one and indissoluble; it is the record of Dante's understanding of man in all his relationships. We cannot therefore separate his view of man as a soul that 'by good or ill deserts in the exercise of free-will becomes liable to rewarding or punishing justice',¹ from his view of man as a citizen living in society, subject to human laws, with rights and duties towards his fellows. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to recognize Dante's special concern in handing on to us that part of his philosophy we can call political. A political understanding of the Divine Comedy has been brought into disrepute by those who understand politics in too narrow a sense or find satisfaction in tracing political allegories in specific episodes of the poem. They are inclined to see nothing but politics where others have seen nothing but theology. But Dante had no apparent difficulty in reconciling what man should be and what he should do. The function of government must be, indeed, to order affairs in such a way that man may not be impeded in the exercise of his spiritual faculties. Although the contemplatives stand above the law-givers in Paradise and the temporal power is described as a first-born son to the ecclesiastical, yet there is no real subordination 'inasmuch as mortal felicity is in a certain sense ordained with reference to immortal felicity'.² To object that Dante takes his politics to Heaven as though they were an unworthy legacy from his past better cleansed away in Lethe is to misunderstand his philosophy. His politics are an essential part of his understanding of life learnt in the bitter school of experience. He had been in power in his own city and thrown out of power with ignominy. He had been tricked, traduced, ruined, and condemned. He knew all about politics as practised, but that did not deter him, indeed it must have incited him, to consider politics as they might and should be. Are we, however, entitled to say that his message to his fellow men is chiefly a political one? In part answer to such a question we can pose another. Could any man, any layman, at the end of the thirteenth century consider that the world stood in such immediate need of instruction in the Catholic Faith that he should spend himself utterly in providing it? Did Catholicism stand in need of definition or illustration after Thomas Aquinas or of examples of active faith after St. Francis and St. Benedict? Was not the thirteenth century notable for the witness it had borne to the validity of the Christian Faith? Dante is an orthodox child of that century

¹ *Epist.* xiii, [x], § 8, 25.

² *De Mon.* iii. 16, 134, trans. Wicksteed.

with no new message in the field of Belief. Even where his original mind oversteps boundaries, it is never apparent that he is a conscious innovator, still less a Luther, as some have believed him to be. It is in the practice of Belief that he finds the world astray, and it is in order to show man to himself, vile, cruel, and factious, yet potentially divine, that he suffers the pangs inseparable from the creation of art from experience. The Divine Comedy is not, that is to say, a work of theology expressed in poetry.

The importance that Dante gives to a consideration of government is suggested at the beginning of his work on the subject *De Monarchia*. There he states that a knowledge of temporal government is the most important of truths that need exploration and that none has attempted it. In this arduous task he will 'keep vigil for the good of the world'.¹ Despite the existence of works on similar themes he is conscious of his function as an original teacher. In the Divine Comedy itself two episodes concerning the vicissitudes of the governing Powers of Church and Empire occur to one's mind in this context because in both Dante is particularly enjoined, first by Beatrice,² then by St. Peter,³ to tell the world what he has seen and heard. I refer to the symbolic changes to the chariot of the Church, in particular its relations with other Powers at the summit of Purgatory, and to the fulminations of St. Peter against the abuse of Church power on the very threshold of Empyreum. Dante, that is to say, does not here treat political conditions as incidental to his broad theme but as the subject for a lesson to be taught by him and learnt by us. Politics are interwoven into the very texture of the Divine Comedy. The urgent need for reform is constantly in Dante's mind. His own bitter experiences lend a passionate reality to his attacks on unworthy Popes, dilatory Emperors, sinful rulers, and factious citizens. Such attacks recur throughout the mystic journey and strike a harsh note in the joyful realm of Beatitude. They constitute the destructive side of his criticism, but the positive side is equally obvious. Just as the Jews were the chosen people from whom the Son of God arose, so the Romans were, in a secular sense the elect, and Aeneas, the forerunner of the Emperors. The Popes were given authority over spiritual matters, the Emperors (and Dante associates the medieval with the ancient Roman Emperors) over secular matters. In the Heaven of Mercury Justinian expounds to Dante the fated progress of imperial power and

¹ *De Mon.* i. 1.

² *Purg.* xxxii. 103.

³ *Par.* xxvii. 64.

rates the modern Ghibellines for misappropriating the eagle as their symbol no less than the Guelphs for opposing the Roman bird. The apotheosis of supernational, international power is to be found in the exalted place reserved for the Emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg in highest Heaven.

Dante's specific political teaching as seen in his works is as clear as it is inapplicable. It was impossible then and, in the form in which he stated it, it is impossible to-day. That a divinely appointed temporal Power descended from the Roman Empire should hold sway over all other rulers and that a co-equal Power in the person of the Pope should exercise a complementary spiritual jurisdiction requires an impossible division of functions by the governors and of loyalties by the governed. Dante's understanding of world government is, I venture to think, as little acceptable to the ordinary modern reader as his astronomy or physics. Why, then, if politics is such an important part of the theme, do we rise from a reading of the Divine Comedy with a sense of having received great benefits?

Dante's world was cursed with strife and division of every kind. In Italy factions cruelly persecuted one another within the cities and cities were constantly at war between themselves. In the larger kingdoms of Naples and Sicily he could see little that was good. In one withering passage¹ he upbraids the rulers of France, England, Scotland, Austria, Bohemia, Spain, Portugal, Navarre, Majorca, Cyprus, Hungary, Norway, Serbia. Evil everywhere. The Papacy corrupt; the Holy Roman Empire ineffective. With complete clarity he appreciated that all this turmoil and misery was due to the *Avaritia*, the selfish greed, of man. The first reform must be an ethical one, for the only remedy was the practice of Christian principles. The teaching was the duty of a purified Church. Associated with such reform there should be a reorganization of the responsibilities of government. And for Dante, as we have suggested, the sanctions for the political system he advocates are no less sacred than those for the Church itself. All kings and princes should yield that part of their sovereignty sufficient to give force to an international Power able to administer justice to all for the common good. He argues as follows: the ultimate purpose of man's life is to exercise his spiritual faculties according to his free will; the aim of government is to create material conditions propitious for such activity; the first material requirement is peace. 'Universal Peace is the best of all those things which are ordained

¹ *Par. xix. 115.*

for our blessedness. And that is why there rang out from on high, not riches, not pleasures, not honours, not length of life, not health, not strength, not beauty, but peace.¹ Only a supreme supernatural Power can insure a peaceful world, but it must have the necessary force. For says Dante, 'since justice is a virtue that refers to others, how can one act in accordance with her if he have not the power of rendering to each what is his due. Whence it is obvious that the more powerful the just man is, the more ample will justice be in her operation.'² Any such superior ruler must take account of the varying conditions of different countries and not impose local regulations. It is only in matters of the broadest principle that the international authority should intervene, for, as Dante points out as an example,³ the Russians are different from the inhabitants of Central Africa. Peace and just government are not, of course, ends in themselves, for they do not prevent sin. The exercise of each man's free will still permits him to act rightly or wrongly, to become better or worse. But under the security of just peace he can most favourably strive for the higher aim.

All this strikes the modern reader as very much to his purpose. That Dante saw the hope for such an international Power in the Holy Roman Empire then in the throes of its dissolution and believed that an imminent reform was possible with the coming of some inspired leader whose advent he prophesied, and that he attempted to sanctify it by a logic that no longer convinces us, is less important than the fact that he saw the dangers of unchecked local sovereignties and looked beyond them to a unifying principle of justice. It is precisely what the world is desperately striving for to-day, some Institution that shall maintain justice and peace for the common good equipped with the force to guard them.

In his appreciation of this necessity the modern reader is closer to Dante than his father or grandfather could have been. In the nineteenth century, when Dante was most widely read in this country, the world was a more comfortable and more stable place. Since those days we have seen how frail a thing civilization is and what efforts are necessary to hold the dikes of order against chaos. We have seen so much cruelty and suffering that the *Inferno* cannot shock us as it shocked them. Belsen is as terrible as Hell. We know better now why Dante insisted on the reality of sin, pain, and torture, and we understand the urgency with which he sought in the faith and knowledge of ancients

¹ *De Mon.* i, iv, trans. cit.

² *Ibid.* i. xi.

³ *Ibid.* i. xiv.

and moderns for principles of order by which men might live and hope. His world was not unlike our own, for although Copernicus has shifted it from a central position in relation to the universe, nothing has yet deflected the individual's chief interest from himself. *Avaritia* is still the wolf in the way. Our grandfathers saw science as a beneficent ally, but it is now recognized as possibly the most terrible of threats. Immeasurable force controlled by intelligence is relegated by Dante to the sump of Hell in the persons of chained giants, chained and extinct, in case they should serve the god of war.¹ They are now active and unleashed. The reader of to-day cannot afford to read the Divine Comedy in any other way than to discover if a work that sets out to teach him how to live can indeed do so.

Let us attempt to suggest what is essential in the Divine Comedy, apart from its specific moral and political lesson. Dante recognizes the worth and dignity of the individual man. Each man has absolute freedom of choice between good and evil and thus enjoys complete individuality. The sublimation of this idea may be found in the belief held by Dante that each angel constitutes a distinct and separate species in himself. Even the sinners in Hell, degraded beyond all hope, torn, burnt, flayed and frozen, mocked and tormented, yet keep an individual consciousness that often lends them a kind of furious dignity. Even though a man has exercised his free will to choose wrong he can still remember the privilege of his choice and look at horror 'com' *avesse l'inferno in gran dispetto*.² When freedom of will has been exercised aright there is no discrepancy between the will of God and the will of the individual. Liberty and authority thus become the same thing. But nothing can force choice on the human spirit, neither circumstance, nor the influence of the stars, nor even the predestination of God.

Of all the gifts a bounteous God bestowed
at the creation, that which made appeal
most to himself and most his goodness showed,
and hence the best, was freedom of the will;
which to all thinking creatures, and alone
to them, was granted and is granted still.³

During his life Dante had full experience of love. The internal evidence of his poems, the legitimate inferences we can draw from passages in the Divine Comedy, together with the statements of his first biographer, agree that he passionately loved several women. Unlike the ageing hedonist who comes to

¹ *Inf.* xxxi. 51.

² *Inf.* x. 36.

³ *Par.* v. 19, trans. Bickersteth.

consider such love as a matter only for repentance, he drew on his experiences to enrich his life and art. He grasped all the best of earthly passion until he could concentrate the white heat of creative love on the image of one woman and place her in magnificent pre-eminence by the side of God in Paradise. Beatrice as an abstract personification never ceases to be the feminine mistress of Dante's heart. No one who reads the Divine Comedy with sympathy can doubt that. But how much Bice Portinari, Gemma Donati, Gentucca, la 'Pietra', la Donna dello Schermo, la Donna Gentile, la Pargoletta or any other woman gone with the *neiges d'antan* contributed to that effulgent image no one can ever know. What is certain is that Dante learnt to reconcile profane with sacred love and to embody it as an essential part of his harmonious scheme of life. The Thomistic theory of love as the source of all human action is expounded in the XVIIth canto of *Purgatorio*. Love can be directed rightly, wrongly, remissly, or in excess. If wrongly directed it produces pride, envy, anger, *acedia*, avarice, gluttony, or lust, the seven capital sins. In Paradise well-directed human love is fused with the love of God and finds expression in a glory of music, light, and movement. Wherever Dante treats directly of love in any of its manifestations, even as a guilty passion, we have the impression of a kind of bright light by which the colourless respectability of many worthy commentators seems as inappropriate as the sensual mysticism of Dante Gabriel Rossetti. Love for Dante is neither philanthropic benevolence nor eroticism, it is a first principle of life.

As a man goes on his way through the world exercising his free will under the compelling stimulus of love he has two guides, Reason and Faith. Faith is the Christian Faith, clarified by logic as far as that is possible, but ultimately inexplicable. Reason is competent, however, to deal with all temporal relationships. Virgil is the embodiment of the latter function with a duty to lead man up to the Earthly Paradise. He stands for order and good sense. As the poet of the Roman Empire he symbolizes a supernational Power that should heal political strife among nations.

The Divine Comedy is a scientific work in the sense that, amongst other things, it is an exposition of the knowledge of the time in regard to the physical world. The disposition of the after-world is in accord with the Ptolemaic cosmography. The balanced geography of the globe emphasizes the privileged position of Jerusalem and Rome. Even the apparently doctrinal

often includes a consideration of physical matter as, for example, in the theory of generation and the creation of the soul. The stimulus for Dante's researches was curiosity; his eyes, as he says, 'were always avid to see new things'.¹ His method was experimental and he describes experiment as the source of human knowledge: 'esperienza . . . ch'esser suol fonte ai rivi di vostr' arti'.² We find in the *Divine Comedy* experiments in optics and wave-motion, observations on sound, light, and heat, and records of innumerable phenomena made with scientific care. The satisfying truths of arithmetic and geometry are constantly occurring to Dante's mind as demonstration for his assertions. His scientific curiosity is with him at the climax of the poem where he imagines he is looking into the radiant essence of God himself and attempts to observe the place and form of the fusion of the human and divine. His simile, the last simile in the book,³ is that of a geometrician striving to understand the principle involved in squaring the circle. Surrounded by cruelty, pain, and selfishness Dante lays hold on the science of his day to fortify the religion that alone promises charity towards and amongst men. He does not, as the mystic does, renounce his intelligence because he recognizes regions it will not penetrate. The errors of astronomy, for example, he imputes to the incompetence of the observer rather than to the science itself.⁴ Nor does his Faith dissuade him from looking forward. With his Ulysses he can pass in imagination beyond the set boundaries to uncharted regions, not, however, into 'perilous seas in faery lands forlorn', for romanticism is not to be expected in an Italian trained in the school of scholastic logic. The call of Ulysses to his followers to advance, experiment, and discover is made in the name of human dignity:

Considerate la vostra semenza:
fatti non foste a viver come bruti,
ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.⁵

The ideas that give meaning to the *Divine Comedy* are not displayed in an unreal setting. Abstractions do not echo along impossible galleries of the mind. They are embodied in the warm flesh of experience. The sights and sounds of real life accompany the reader through the landscape of the imaginary after-world and constantly remind him of what he has known.

The episodes of the *Divine Comedy* are carefully planned in relation to time and are narrated with a constant sense of time.

¹ *Purg.* x. 104.

² *Par.* ii. 95.

³ *Par.* xxxiii. 133.

⁴ *Conv.* ii. 13 (14).

⁵ *Inf.* xxvi. 118.

Virgil's frequent advice to Dante not to waste time is significant of something more than general moralizing. The poet realizes that he has only so much time for his urgent work and he must apportion it as a tailor does his cloth.¹ When he digresses he apologizes as in the XXIXth canto of *Paradiso*. The scheme of rhyme, canto, and cantica is the architecture by which he controls his exuberant material and avoids digression. The background of his action, of all action, is eternity in which a thousand years, repeats Dante, is as the twinkling of an eye.²

His feeling for space is similar to his feeling for time. The globe seen in proper perspective is a petty place engulfed in a vast expanse, just as the present minute is swallowed in eternity.³ Nevertheless the poet's world and after-world are in careful proportion, so much so that the reader of the Divine Comedy feels he is watching an orrery rather than scanning the flat pages of a book.

In Time, and through Space, Dante goes on his journey; down through the cramped passages and horrible gulfs of Hell, up the difficult mountain of Purgatory to launch into the upper void. The ordinary *lettore* who can read the Divine Comedy as a whole has this advantage over more painstaking students: he can, perhaps, better appreciate the movement of Dante's imaginary progress. It is a kind of dance in which the poet moves, now steadfastly down and round, now in a boat, now on the back of fabulous creatures, now caught up by his guides, now by angels, now winning his way inch by inch like a rock-climber, now wafted up in ecstatic trance. Round him wheel the symbols of his experience, damned souls in rushing droves, happy souls in chanting *carole*. Questioning, watching, weeping, hating, hoping, loving, he passes onwards. At the end of the journey is that immobility from which all movement derives, the Universality 'là 've s'appunta ogni ubi e ogni quando'.⁴

Standing four-square in the ubiquitous never-forgotten environment of space, objects in the foreground are described with a clarity and an economy of words only attained by great poets. Dante's similes taken from common everyday experience have the quality of plastic art. His stars, streams, mountains, winds, trees, animals, and birds are all real. He has not only cogitated on them as a philosopher but felt them as a poet. His understanding of human nature goes far beyond what is implied in judging men to be damned, perfectible, or saved. He is

¹ *Par.* xxxii. 139.

² *Purg.* xi. 106.

³ *Par.* xxii. 135.

⁴ *Par.* xxix. 12.

deeply interested in the subtlest differences of character, half-tones, intermediate positions, evanescent moods, crepuscular effects. He tries to catch the impression of objects sinking through water, or half in and half out of water; of the state between waking and sleeping; of dreams. He wants to know how his own mind works, how the mechanism of clocks works, how the Universe works. With a supreme effort of art he has brought the infinite variety of things into proportionate relation.

The greatness of Dante does not consist in the originality of his philosophy for he is expressing the beliefs of his time, nor in his advocacy of Christian principles, nor even in his political teaching, but in the fact that from the deeply felt and contemplated experiences of a single man he has created something of universal application that has outlasted the apparatus of beliefs and sciences he used to express them. Truth still shines through the now discarded scaffolding of his logic and Virtue is still intact behind his scholasticism. It is the record of his own experience that gives authentic reality to the poem.

Many modern readers of the Divine Comedy are likely to find Dante's philosophy unacceptable, but they must be fascinated by the way the medieval mind can reconcile science with morals and both with Faith. They must envy a time when material and spiritual values could be logically argued to devolve from a Creator who gave meaning to everything. The cry to-day is for a Faith and a morality strong enough to save mankind from self-destruction. The need is urgent, but it is difficult to recognize in the modern world any comprehensive system of knowledge and behaviour such as is so magnificently portrayed in the Divine Comedy. I do not, myself, think that either a general acceptance of scholasticism is probable or that a return to medievalism is a likely solution for present troubles. Nevertheless in the Divine Comedy we can recognize an example of what we need to-day: a comprehensive view of life that sanctifies politics, accepts the discoveries of science, reconciles both with Virtue and encourages Faith, Hope, and Charity. Such an example is what Dante has to offer us to-day.

OBITUARY NOTICES



C. F. BASTABLE

Photo. Chancellor, Dublin

CHARLES FRANCIS BASTABLE

1855-1945

CHARLES FRANCIS BASTABLE died at his home in Rathgar, Dublin, on 3 January 1945.

He had been born in Charleville, Co. Cork, in 1855, son of an Episcopalian clergyman. Educated at Fermoy College, Co. Cork, he entered Trinity College, Dublin (the University of Dublin), in 1873. He graduated in 1878 with Senior Moderatorship (First Class Honours) in History and Political Science, the course for which then included some study of political economy. Immediately after graduation he read Law, and was called to the Irish Bar in 1881. It is remarkable how many of his distinguished predecessors in the Whately Chair were also lawyers. In 1882 he proceeded to the degree of M.A., and took that of LL.D. in 1890.

In 1882 he was established in his life's work—he was elected to the Whately Chair of Political Economy in the University of Dublin. This Chair had been established fifty years before by Archbishop Whately, with the conditions that the occupant should be selected by competitive examination and should hold office for five years only. In the third quarter of last century, when money was money and income-tax negligible, the stipend of £100 per annum attached to the Chair (and paid, from 1832 until his death in 1865, out of Whately's own funds) attracted spirited and 'quality' competition. In the preceding half-century this Victorian mode of selection had yielded a remarkable number of distinguished and original economic thinkers, including such names as Mountifort Longfield, J. E. Cairnes, and Isaac Butt. The man whom Bastable surpassed in 1882 ultimately became Lord Chief Justice of Ireland. All the outstanding economists of that spacious period—in Ireland as well as over the water—suggest the reflection that perhaps the best economists have had their minds formed in some other more exacting discipline, and tempered by contact with some other more humane profession.

In 1887, on the expiry of Bastable's first statutory term of five years, the regulations governing the Chair were altered so as to permit it to be held for longer periods. Bastable was re-elected to the Chair on the new conditions, and retained it until his retirement in 1932—after fifty years' tenure, a record memorable

not so much for its mere duration as for its persistent civilizing influence upon successive generations of students. No student of Bastable's could escape the realization that here was a citizen of that Platonic Republic of men of intelligence, sense, and goodwill to whom the artificial 'national' distinctions of our modern world are not only irrelevant but mischievous.

In 1902 he was appointed also Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law, and in 1908 Regius Professor of Laws in the University of Dublin—this latter Chair also he retained until 1932. In addition, he was appointed Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law in Queen's College, Galway, in 1883, and retained the appointment until 1903. He was also well known as lecturer and external examiner in other universities.

He took an active part in the proceedings of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, of which he acted as Honorary Secretary from 1886 to 1895, and was Vice-President from 1896 to 1915. Its *Transactions* contain many of his papers written between 1882 and 1893. He had also been one of the original Fellows of the Royal Economic Society, and a member of its first Council. In 1894 he was President of the British Association, Section F. In 1921 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy. On the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921 he served on its Fiscal Committee which reported in 1923.

His principal publications were:

- (a) *The Theory of International Trade, with some of its Applications to Economic Policy* (Dublin, 1887; 2nd ed., London and New York, 1897).
- (b) *The Commerce of Nations* (London, 1892).

In these books he expanded and developed the Free Trade doctrine founded on the Classical premisses—and it is well to remember now that, in spite of the factual weakness of all those premisses, the conclusions of principle founded on them have not been seriously shaken by Hellenistic calculations of how one 'nation' may score off others under emergency conditions by using the weapons of trade restriction.

- (c) *Public Finance* (London and New York, 1892; revised three times and reprinted frequently until 1903, and in constant demand still as a text-book). Though its apparatus is now inevitably dated, this remains the best text-book in English for its organization, synoptic treatment, and sense of proportion.

He contributed also a number of articles to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th, 10th, and 11th Editions) and to Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy*. His principal periodical contributions were written for the *Economic Journal* and were mainly in the field of Public Finance.


The circumstances of his appointments laid on him a heavy burden of lecturing, mainly in legal subjects. During the whole of his academic life Bastable was an active teacher, lecturing regularly on economics and jurisprudence until his retirement at the age of 77. Within the limits of economic teaching possible in the restricted but expanding curricula of the University, he could not confine himself to his own special interests, and had to expend his lecturing gifts upon the teaching of general economic theory. His chief intellectual interest was in Public Finance, a field in which, for the British Isles, he was a pioneer, and laid the foundations of a systematic study, foundations which, as mentioned above, have not yet been bettered. In his later years he was reluctant to revise thoroughly his work on Public Finance, thinking this was a job for a younger man who could do it more radically than himself.

For four years he served on the Board of Trinity College as a representative of the non-Fellow Professors. When, however, a revision of the Statutes of Trinity College in 1918 permitted the offer of a Fellowship of the College to non-Fellow Professors, he declined the honour. He was a man of retiring disposition, of considerable diffidence, and with an extreme love of his home. His former students remember with affection his gentleness, his natural friendliness, his encouragement, and his reluctance to impose an opinion or a point of view upon their judgement. In lecturing, his principal characteristics were a broadness of outlook and an understanding of conflicting schools. His preference and his skill lay in placing before his students opposing points of view or differences of emphasis, and inviting the students themselves to use their brains in choosing between not-quite-reconcilable opinions.

His health, never very robust, had already begun to fail, and after his retirement in 1932 he lived a very secluded life. In his later years he suffered from cataract, but he never lost his cheerfulness and his pleasure in receiving visitors, and talking to them with his old vigour and vivacity. Until the final loss of his sight, too, he kept contact with all the modern outbreaks of virtuosity in the economic field. Among his last acts was the expression of the wish that his large library, including many unique series

of periodicals and first editions, should be placed at the disposal of the School of Economics in the University of Dublin. There is in this collection much unpublished material, the eventual publication of which must be considered.

G. A. DUNCAN



JOHN WILLIAM MACKAIL

JOHN WILLIAM MACKAIL, O.M.

1859-1945

BY the death of J. W. Mackail on 13 December 1945 the Academy lost a distinguished ex-President, a fine classical scholar with a wide knowledge of English and European literature. He wrote many volumes of criticism, chiefly on Greek and English poetry, which, while they witness to profound learning, are instinct with the love of literature and especially of poetry for its own sake. This love, based on an intimate understanding, it was his aim to stimulate in others, because he believed that poetry was not merely an enhancement of life, but an inspiration and a guide.

He left some notes on his family and early life, in which he records that the Mackails were a sept of the Clan Cameron, not numerous but widely distributed over Scotland. The only celebrated member of the family was Hugh Mackail, 'the martyr', executed for high treason in Edinburgh at the age of 25 after the Pentland Rising of 1666. He became a national hero of the Covenanters, and is described in a contemporary elegy as 'a child of the Muses and the Graces', a description admirably fitted for his descendant.

Mackail's father, John, was the eldest son of a tenant-farmer in Ayrshire. He proceeded from Coylton school to Glasgow University, where he took the M.A. degree and qualified for ordination. G. R. Gleig, Chaplain of Chelsea Hospital, engaged him as tutor to his two boys, and after he had become Chaplain-General to the Forces, nominated him to the chaplaincy of the 42nd Royal Highlanders, then quartered at Malta. In the Disruption of 1843 Mackail joined the Free Church and in 1846 resigned his chaplaincy and returned to Scotland. In June that year he married Louisa Irving Carson, youngest daughter of A. R. Carson, a good classical scholar, then Rector of Edinburgh High School, whose wife was a cousin of Edward Irving. Appointed Minister to the Free Church in Calcutta he made many friends there, but in 1852 lung trouble developed and he returned to Scotland permanently invalided. The Mackails settled first in Rothesay, then at Ascog, and afterwards moved to Ayr for the rest of their lives.

Their son, John William, was born at Ascog on 26 August 1859. He went to school at the Ayr Academy, the Rector being Dr. James Macdonald, father of (Sir) George Macdonald, the

antiquarian, whose academic career was very closely like Mackail's. In 1874 Mackail entered Edinburgh University and took the four years' Arts course. William Yorke Sellar was then the Professor of Humanity and his influence did much to determine the direction of his pupil's interests. He also formed an intimate friendship with the Professor and his wife, which lasted throughout their lives. In 1877 with Sellar's encouragement he sat for a Balliol scholarship, and was elected to the Warner Exhibition, open to candidates of Scottish birth, and given the rank of Honorary Scholar. Before going into residence he spent some months at the University of Göttingen.

At Balliol he proved himself undoubtedly the most distinguished undergraduate scholar of his year. Besides first classes in Moderations and Lit. Hum. he won the Hertford and Ireland scholarships and later the Derby and Craven scholarships. To these classical distinctions he added the Newdigate Prize in 1881 for a poem on 'Thermopylae', a virile and straightforward presentation of the story with some fine but never exaggerated pieces of description, which is a characteristic foretaste of his English style. His tutors at Balliol were Evelyn Abbott, Lewis Nettleship, and Strachan-Davidson, with the last of whom he had a close and lasting friendship. It was an unusually brilliant undergraduate period at the college at that time and among Mackail's contemporaries were Samuel Alexander, A. C. Clark, H. C. Beeching, George Curzon, Sidney Lee, and Bowyer Nichols. The love of English and of poetry was strong among them, and Mackail combined with Beeching and Nichols to produce a volume of verse called *Love in Idleness*. When years afterwards at a college dinner the scholar who proposed Mackail's health twitted him with waste of his time, he replied: 'In the course of his life my friend will learn that love is a very serious thing and idleness still more serious.' Many of the poems were afterwards (1891) included in a volume by the same three authors called *Love's Looking-Glass*. Mackail's contributions show a sensitive ear for language and rhythm and not a little poetic vision. In lighter vein he joined in the production of the *Masque of Balliol*, a series of epigrams on dons and undergraduates, which won much notice at the time and was reprinted by Blackwell in 1939, when Mackail wrote an article on it in *The Times*.

After taking his degree in 1882 Mackail was elected a Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol and his friends expected him to settle down into what would, no doubt, have been a distinguished

academic career. But two years later he accepted from Lord Carlingford, the President of the Privy Council, an appointment as an Examiner in the Education Department of the Council, which subsequently became the Board of Education. Here he spent his official life until his resignation in 1919, having become an Assistant-Secretary in 1903. A colleague in the office writes that in the earlier years he was concerned mainly with routine work in the administration of elementary education, but that after the passing of the Education Act of 1902 he took an active and important part under the Hon. W. N. Bruce in establishing a satisfactory system of secondary education in the country. Grants were extended to other subjects than natural science, a balanced curriculum introduced, and adequate standards of finance and teaching were secured. Most of the public schools in this period voluntarily applied for inspection by the Board—a significant proof of the acceptance of its authority in secondary education. For all this, especially for the soundness of policy and the full support of the Inspectorate, Mackail was largely responsible; in fact 'he took a leading part in creating a real revolution'.

Though Mackail's work at the Board was thorough and conscientious, and in the later years distinguished, it happily was not so pressing but that it left him leisure to pursue his innate love of literature and to begin the steady flow of production which lasted through his lifetime. It will be convenient to consider independently his strictly classical work and his more general writings on English and other literatures; the distinction is to some extent false, for not only do several of the volumes contain essays which fall under both of these categories, but he habitually regarded all literature as one. His first publication in 1889 was a prose translation of Virgil's *Eclogues* and *Georgics*; it is written in the traditional style of translations, but with a freshness and an occasional brilliance of phrasing which attracted attention to it at once. There are signs that he felt himself more at home in the *Georgics* than in the *Eclogues*, of which he was later to write that 'the execution is uncertain, hesitating, sometimes extraordinarily feeble'. Of much greater importance was the edition of *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology*, published in 1890, for it was largely pioneer work. Mackail accepted with an occasional variation the text of Jacobs and made little comment on the traditional minutiae of scholarship; for to him all through his life the classics were not material for ingenious investigations of textual and linguistic problems, but the living

expressions of experience. Nevertheless there is ample erudition in the introduction and notes, both built upon careful and critical study. The translations are neat, crisp, and felicitous; and two features in the introduction foreshadow Mackail's future work, one the sensitive insight into the thought and feeling of Greek poets at different periods, the other the constant reference to modern and especially to English poets and to sculpture, painting, and music. For in the broader sense he regarded all art as one. The book is an extraordinary achievement for a man of thirty, busy with his professional life. Perhaps even more remarkable is the volume on *Latin Literature*, published in 1895. Many generations of students have been brought up on it, and though later publications may be more strictly scholarly and intensive, yet re-read to-day it still has its freshness; its brilliance is not dimmed and its insight seems as true. It covers the whole range of Latin poetry and prose from Andronicus and Naevius to the early Christian writers and at no point suggests second-hand knowledge. Its judgements are sometimes startling in their boldness. That on the *Eclogues* has already been quoted, and to it may be added the statement that Silius Italicus' *Punic War* 'may fairly contend for the distinction of being the worst epic ever written'. With these we may contrast the enthusiastic, yet sober, criticisms of Lucretius and of the *Aeneid*. As might be expected, the prose-writers do not receive quite such sympathetic treatment as the poets, though there is a fine appreciation of Cicero as a letter-writer, whom 'the letters to Atticus place at the head of all epistolary stylists', revealing as they do 'what the real man was, with his excitable Italian temperament, his swift power of phrase, his sensitive affections'. In the early years of the present century Mackail was engaged on a verse translation of the *Odyssey*, the three volumes being published respectively in 1903, 1905, and 1910. He chose for this purpose a quatrain stanza, rhyming in the first, second, and fourth lines. It is done in an easy, simple style, reminiscent occasionally of William Morris, which allows a certain looseness of structure and a frequent overlapping of sentences from one quatrain to the next. But most readers have probably felt that, though it is a remarkable *tour de force*, the limitations of form and rhyme prevent it from giving the full spaciousness of the original. In 1910 appeared a volume of *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, but as it is one of the three which resulted from his tenure of the Professorship of Poetry at Oxford, it will better be considered with its two companions. These lectures also caused a gap in

Mackail's strictly classical publications, which were resumed in 1923 by a small volume on Virgil in the American series 'Our Debt to Greece and Rome'. In this book he does not, as other writers in the series had done, attempt to trace the influence of Virgil through the centuries, but rather to show the significance of Virgil at the present time, and that, too, not so much directly as by a penetrating study of the poet's environment and of his aims at different periods of his life. It is a small but stimulating book. *Classical Studies* (1925) is a collection of detached papers and lectures written or delivered at various times. Some of them have a direct bearing on the educational value of Greek and Latin, such as the lecture entitled 'What is the Good of Greek?' given at Melbourne in 1923 and the Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on the Classics in Education, drafted by Mackail in 1921. Others are more definitely literary; outstanding among these are a paper on the 'Virgilian Underworld', in which he draws attention to the apparently Minoan element in Virgil's description of the palace of Dis, and a delightful study of 'Penelope in the Odyssey', in which her character becomes alive and substantial.

The largest undertaking among Mackail's classical works was certainly the edition of the *Aeneid* which was published in 1930. Professional scholars expressed themselves as disappointed with the book, for it lacked much to which they were accustomed. There was no attempt at a recension of the text and Hirtzel's 'vulgate' (Oxford Classical Texts) was taken as its basis. Critical notes were very brief and only recorded variants of the six 'primary' manuscripts. On many of the famous cruces there was no discussion of rival opinions, but merely a subjective and sometimes dogmatic statement of 'the right view'. But such criticism was based on a misconception of what Mackail had tried to do. He was not unaware of previous criticism and had himself digested most of it. Nor did he despise the minutiae of textual, linguistic, and metrical comment, but for him it was ancillary to the appreciation of poetry as poetry: 'a great part of my labour', he writes in the preface, 'has consisted in discarding accumulated material in order that the work of art may not be encumbered by masses of scaffolding.' In 'A Lesson on an Ode of Horace' given in a course for Teachers of the Classics in 1920 (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 60 ff.), Mackail had given a fascinating example of his method; 'encumbrances' were 'discarded' and the structure and language of the Ode revealed as poetry. So in the *Aeneid* there is much in the introduction and

the prefaces to each of the Books on the structure and intention, with a subtle and delicate detection of unfinished or unadjusted passages. The notes, which often deal with points unnoticed in the 'professional' editions, elucidate and illustrate Virgil's meaning and frequently give the *mot juste* for translation. They are, as a sympathetic reviewer remarked, 'a treasure-house', and the edition as a whole is to be used 'as a valuable supplement to rather than as a substitute for the older ones'. Regarded as what its editor intended it to be, the *Aeneid* is an original commentary written from an angle of vision all too rarely taken up by commentators on the classics.

The election of Mackail to the Professorship of Poetry at Oxford in 1906 gave him the opportunity of using his store of literary knowledge in a wider field than hitherto. He lectured more frequently than most holders of the Chair and his lectures were well attended and highly appreciated. He published them in three substantial volumes: the *Springs of Helicon*, 1909, *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, 1910, and *Lectures on Poetry*, 1911. Though the bulk of the poetry on which he commented as Professor is either Greek or English, he included in the last of the three volumes lectures given elsewhere on Virgil and on the *Divine Comedy*—Mackail was a great Dante scholar—and two of the Oxford lectures were on Arabic poetry, which he knew only in translations. The range is wide and the subjects might at first sight seem miscellaneous. But through them all run two threads which bind them together. These are enunciated in the 'Definition of Poetry', which opens the third volume, and become more explicit in the concluding lecture on 'The Progress of Poetry'. The first is the conception of poetry as at once a function of life and therefore sharing life's quality of movement, the interpretation of life and therefore organic, and also a pattern of life, which, in words which Mackail quotes more than once from W. B. Yeats, 'condenses out of the flying vapours of the world an image of human perfection'. And the second thread is the belief in the continuous progress of poetry, at least in the western world. This he sees, as Gray did in the Ode, constantly referred to in these volumes, as passing from Greece to Rome and from them both to England, always moving, constantly changing, yet ever the same, like the movements of a flock of sheep, which, as Mackail quotes from Lucretius, seen from a distant hill looks like a still patch of white. He does not deny the occasional advent of other influences, such as that of Italian and even of Arabic poetry, which influenced the early

French epics and through them Chaucer. It is perhaps not remarkable that there is no reference to German poetry, which might seem to lie outside the general current, but it is odd in one to whom the language and thought of the Bible meant so much that there is but little recognition of Hebrew poetry as a formative influence on the English poets.

It is not possible within the limits of a short memoir to give any full account of these three notable volumes; all that can be done is to record a few salient points. The *Springs of Helicon* deals with three great English poets and contains studies of Chaucer, Spenser, and Milton. Each of the three is seen against his historical and cultural background, and the development from one to the other is clearly traced with passing estimates of intermediate writers and tendencies. Chaucer roughly represents medieval romance, influenced by French and Italian poets and specially by Boccaccio; Spenser comes at the Elizabethan turning-point between romance and classicism; and Milton with relics of romanticism in his earlier work passes to full classicism in *Paradise Lost*. In all three reviews the main features are clearly depicted and occasional criticisms on structure, language, and metre give a glimpse of the rich learning and careful study which lie behind the apparently easy manner of the discourse. The *Lectures on Greek Poetry* form the most substantial volume of the series and range from Homer to Apollonius Rhodius. The treatment conforms to that in the *Springs of Helicon*, Homer being regarded as 'medieval', the lyricists representing the entry of romance, Sophocles the completely classical, and the Alexandrians the embodiment of developed romance, largely in a period of decline, with the exception of Theocritus, who as the pioneer in pastoral poetry and in virtue of his outstanding gifts is to be reckoned among the classics. Perhaps the outstanding lectures in the volume are those on 'The Homeric Epic', which contains fine criticism of Hesiod and the *Odyssey*, and that on Theocritus, which brings out his characteristic qualities and compares him in detail, not without some strain, to Tennyson. The last volume of *Lectures on Poetry* is more miscellaneous in character and contains discourses on Virgil—the only Latin poet dealt with in the series—on the *Divine Comedy* with an interesting examination of the meaning of 'comedy' as used by Dante, two lectures on Shakespeare, and two on Arabic poetry as the inspiration of the French ballad-epics. It opens and concludes with the two lectures on the 'Definition of Poetry' and the 'Progress of Poetry', which have already been noticed as giving

the underlying theory on which all Mackail's criticism is based. The three volumes constitute a massive and impressive record of the five years of his Professorship.

Mackail's critical work after the Oxford period is contained in three volumes, *Studies of English Poets*, 1926, the *Approach to Shakespeare*, 1930, and *Studies in Humanism*, 1938. In these books he put together lectures and papers read at different times to learned societies and other audiences. In the first volume he treats of some of the less known English poets, Fanshawe, Thomson, Young, and Collins, and, though his heart was always with the great classics, he shows the same penetration and understanding of the lesser lights. The last three lectures are devoted to poets of his own day, William Morris, Swinburne, and Tennyson; for all he claims a place among the great English poets. *Studies in Humanism* has a still wider range and includes such practical subjects as 'What is the Good of Greek?' and the lesson given to a vacation teachers' course on 'An Ode of Horace', to which reference has already been made. Mackail here ranges abroad and treats of Dante, Ariosto, and Erasmus; there is also a charming lecture on the 'Pilgrim's Progress', in which he maintains that Bunyan's allegory has a vivid reality both in the story and in the characters, and an amusing discussion of *Bentley's Milton*, where he insists that the emendation of texts requires common sense above all else. The *Approach to Shakespeare* has greater unity, being a series of lectures delivered on the Lord Northcliffe foundation of University College, London. Mackail had dealt occasionally with Shakespeare in the earlier books, but here, speaking to students, he was able to give rein to his admiration and enthusiasm. There is a valuable lecture on 'The Shakespearian Canon' and successive chapters on the Comedies, the Tragedies, and the Romances. Each play is submitted to acute, but always sympathetic, analysis, and the burden which runs through the whole book is the simple exhortation: 'Read Shakespeare, read him and re-read him and absorb him.'

This large output of critical work is not easy to judge. If one attempts to read the volumes on end, it can hardly be denied that they produce a certain impression of monotony; for Mackail's faithfulness to his own principles and his insistence on poetry as at once the interpretation and the pattern of life result in a reiteration which is sometimes tedious. But the lectures—even those belonging to a series—should, of course, be read as individual wholes and judged, somewhat like a drama,

by the effect produced on the audience at the moment. And in all cases the result must have been to send them with renewed eagerness and a fresh insight to the reading of the poets of whom he spoke. Again the very precision and beauty of his style—marred perhaps here and there by a certain preciosity of epithet—may pall; but it is often relieved by a subtle and penetrating humour. In a sense, no doubt, Mackail was an amateur; he was not a Jebb or a Housman or a de Sélincourt. But two answers may be given to such criticism. In the first place it is impossible to read any one of his appreciations without becoming conscious of the learning on which it is based and the long study of technical details which was given to its preparation; the very facility of the finished work is deceptive. And this was intentional; learning was for Mackail an aid to criticism. Secondly—and far more important—he was an amateur in the fullest and best sense. What filled his own mind and what he strove to convey to others was the true love of poetry, which he sometimes felt was being lost in the mass of academic analysis. He loved poetry because he had experienced its supreme value as a guide to life, and he had the artist's sense of the beauty of words as the expression of thought. It was this love which he wanted to kindle, or to rekindle, in his own generation, and perhaps, if he had been asked for 'the conclusion of the whole matter', he would just have said 'Read poetry'.

Apart from his classical and general literary criticism there were two other fields which Mackail entered. In the early period he published two works of a religious character, the *Sayings of the Lord Jesus Christ*, in 1894, and *Biblia Innocentium*, the Old Testament in 1893 and the New in 1901. The former is a collection of our Lord's sayings culled from the four Gospels and arranged under headings, such as 'The new Law', 'The Mission of the Church', 'The Cost of Service', &c. The wording of the Authorized Version is not closely adhered to and the Greek often retranslated into more modern phraseology. It is a valuable anthology, putting together what is scattered in the Gospels. *Biblia Innocentium* are stories told for children in simple phrases, in the first volume from the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, in the second from the Gospels and the Acts with the addition of some of the legends of the early saints. The books are probably unknown to-day, but would be admirable for use in the primary schools—which is indeed most likely what they were intended for.

The second field which Mackail entered—and adorned—was

that of biography. Twice he was asked to write memoirs of old friends, those of George Wyndham (1925) and of J. L. Strachan-Davidson (1926), his tutor at Balliol and afterwards Master of the college. Their subjects form an interesting contrast, Wyndham the politician, poet, and lover of the arts, living a full life in the world, Strachan-Davidson academic, engrossed in the affairs of his college and university, leading a life without incident and writing in the comparatively narrow field of Roman Constitutional Law. But in both memoirs Mackail's interest lay in the personality and 'flavour' of the man, which he admirably brought out. Of the two Strachan-Davidson's is probably the more successful, since quotations could be made freely from his letters; Wyndham's letters are printed *in extenso* and form the greater part of the two large volumes. The *Life of William Morris* (1899) is written on a much larger scale; it is a book to which one can return again and again and always enjoy. Mackail's marriage in 1888 to Margaret, only daughter of Sir Edward and Lady Burne-Jones, brought him inside the circle of 'The Brotherhood', and Morris and his family were intimate friends. He makes judicious use of letters, sometimes in short quotations, sometimes in full reproduction. The incidents and background of the life are vividly drawn, and the complex character of the poet, artist, and socialist agitator is welded into a single picture, which is dominated by the individual 'Topsy', always himself at home and in public. Passages like the description of the 'Red House', life at Kelmscott, and the final comparison with Dr. Johnson dwell in the reader's mind. The book had no doubt a wider appeal than most of Mackail's works, but there would probably be general agreement that it is the best of them, and one of the best of English biographies.

Not content only to write on the subjects which he had at heart, Mackail worked hard for them. He was one of the founders of the Classical Association and delivered the address at the opening meeting at Oxford in 1905, and often read papers at the annual meetings or to one or other of the local branches. He was for many years Chairman of the Council and President of the Association in 1922. Late in life he was elected President of the newly founded Virgil Society. He gave a similar devotion to the English Association, of which he was President in 1929. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1914, became a member of the Council in 1921, and served with distinction as President from 1932 to 1936. Many honours fell to his lot. He was appointed Professor of Ancient Literature in the Royal

Academy in 1924 and liked to recall that he had Dr. Johnson as his predecessor. Balliol made him an Honorary Fellow in 1922. He was an Honorary LL.D. of Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Adelaide, and Belfast, a D.Lit. of London, a Litt.D. of Cambridge, and his own University conferred the D.Lit. upon him at Lord Halifax's inaugural Encaenia in 1934, when it gave him pleasure that the Public Orator presented him in a set of Latin Hexameters. In the following year His Majesty conferred on him the Order of Merit, a signal recognition of the position which he held in the world of letters.

Mackail was a handsome man, 'rather tall and stately', as the Balliol rhyme of his undergraduate days described him; in later years his white hair, hardly thinned by time, and his white moustache enhanced the natural beauty of his face. He had a beautiful speaking voice, and a scrupulous precision of enunciation with a slight Scottish intonation added to its charm. He was as a rule a reticent man, and though he talked well on subjects which interested him, few but his intimates knew much of his inner life. His manner was always suave and courteous and indicative of a consistent humanity of outlook. He was a loyal and devoted friend and many will remember the warmth of his greeting. He had in fact, to use the words of Gilbert Murray's *Religio Grammatici*, quoted by the President of the Classical Association after his death, 'the philosophic temper, the gentle judgement, the interest in knowledge and beauty for their own sake'. His house in Kensington was the resort of men of letters and of artists, and there Mackail's own charm was supplemented by the gracious hospitality of Mrs. Mackail. They had one son and two daughters; two of their children, Denis Mackail and Angela Thirkell, are well-known writers, though in a different sphere from that of their father.

CYRIL BAILEY



ALFRED WILLIAM POLLARD

ALFRED WILLIAM POLLARD

1859-1944

ALFRED WILLIAM POLLARD was a scholar. But like many of his countrymen who have earned that title he had much more than scholarship in him; and though it is with his scholarship that this memoir must be mainly concerned, it would be seen altogether out of focus if it were not seen as only one aspect of a man more than usually many-sided and complete. Indeed, he might perhaps have contributed nothing at all to learning but for an accident: the bad stammer he caught from an elder brother at the age of three and was never afterwards able to throw off.

As this stammer was the first thing one noticed about him, a word upon it will be appropriate at the outset. For mere acquaintances a sore let and hindrance to intercourse and understanding, once you got to know him it was felt as almost an added grace, since it lent pleasing ripples to the current of his talk, and ever and again an engagingly explosive force to some wise or witty remark. His lectures were generally read for him by a friend; but he sometimes ventured to speak in public, especially after the death of his two sons in battle had inspired him with new courage and energy. The second fell in October 1915; and in November Pollard was at Cambridge for his Sandars Lectures. They were delivered by Stephen Gaselee; but as an experiment he spoke himself for five minutes at the beginning of the course, and for another eight minutes at the end; 'quite successfully', he wrote to me at the time, and added:

It may interest you to know that I think I can trust myself to speak without risk of a breakdown on three conditions:

- (i) I must be quite sure that what I have to say is reasonably worth saying.
- (ii) I must be quite sure of the order of my ideas.
- (iii) I must leave the words pretty much to the inspiration of the moment.

It was like him to think it all out clearly and set it down in this systematic fashion; and a great many 'unscripted' speeches by non-stammerers would be the better if they followed these simple rules. They worked so well in his case that after his appointment in 1919 as honorary Professor of Bibliography in the University of London, he managed to conduct a class at

King's without difficulty and very much to the benefit of the students. But his greatest triumph of the sort, and one of the bravest acts of his life, was the personal delivery in the Great Hall of the same college on 23 April 1923 of the Annual Shakespeare Lecture of this Academy. As A. W. Reed, who was present, writes:

It was a wonderful feat for him to perform before a crowded assembly in a large hall. He raised his voice to about the pitch at which a minor canon intones the Litany and almost monotoned the lecture. When he checked I did not feel embarrassed; nor did he look it; he simply made a little cadence and resumed his note again.

Though he did not know it, Reed was himself partly responsible for the success of this incantation; for, as another friend tells me, Pollard afterwards remarked, 'On my way there I thought: if I manage it, it will please Reed. And then I was quite happy.'

Pollard's pen was as ready, articulate, and direct as his tongue was halting; the one a compensatory effect of the other. Certainly as a writer he was an almost incredible combination of facility, good humour, and exactitude. He could write too under practically any conditions: a good deal of his bibliographical journalism was, I believe, composed in the train between Wimbledon and Waterloo, as also was his book on 'practical morality';¹ and when the line became electrified he found the oscillation a distinct stimulus to invention. It was the stammer also which made him a librarian, and hence, for a man of his active mind, a bibliographer and a scholar. The Pollard that came out in conversation at his ease, with friends who knew when to supply the obstructed word and when to let it find its way of itself, was one who might have been a famous judge, an eminent doctor, a saintly bishop, a great statesman, or even a successful man of business, but not I think a distinguished professor; since, though but for the stammer a born teacher and greatly admiring born teachers like W. P. Ker and Walter Raleigh, he was less academically minded than any other learned man I have known; while his wide-roving curiosity, his intense and passionate interest in every phase of modern life, would very soon have driven him from 'parochial' Oxford had he begun by settling down there. Thus, if there are few names on the roll of our deceased Fellows more likely to retain the permanent respect of scholars than his, scholarship was not the first or even the second thing in his life,

¹ See below, pp. 275, 302.

while he was inspired by no ruling ambition, like his friend Housman, 'to build himself a monument'.¹

He worked hard at scholarship, with as much zest as any, and with greater skill, knowledge, and urbanity than most; but it was always something of a game, which he found himself unable to take quite seriously, while it amused him, at times even saddened him, to watch others offering it their heart's worship. He was, in fact, in the strict sense of the word, an amateur. When I first realized this it came as a shock. I was speaking enthusiastically of a very learned and very elaborate book on a subject of great interest to us both, when he broke in: 'Yes, b—but rather b-b-Byzantine, don't you think?' Coming from the Hon. Secretary of the Bibliographical Society and our leading authority on fine books, the sentiment took my breath away. Yet it was characteristic, and not in the least caused by a 'superior' attitude. 'A very self-effacing person,' as Sir Frederic Kenyon describes him, and humbly conscious of his own imperfections and shortcomings, none of them very evident to his friends, what surprised him was that people he considered far more gifted than himself should devote their lives exclusively to erudition. And when someone once called him a scholar of international reputation, he replied, 'Do you know what *that* means? Six old men in various countries of the world know my work, and don't approve of it.' A few words upon matters he ranked higher than scholarship will be found at the end of this paper. He did not often speak of them. 'No one', he writes, 'has any business to talk about the big things of life unless he is really feeling them in his bones.' But he gave much time and thought to them, and their effect upon his character was felt by all with whom he came into contact.

In 1934 Pollard reached the age of seventy-five and his friends, after much debate among themselves which he was finally called in to decide, commemorated the occasion by presenting him with a select bibliography of his writings. He was fond of telling the story of a man who bought himself a top-hat as a birthday present for his wife, so that she might have the pleasure of admiring him in it. The story of this seventy-fifth birthday present is similar. For it is clear that he proposed a bibliography in order to give his friends pleasure, while it presently appeared that it was to be prefaced by an autobiographical sketch designed to save them trouble, since (as he confided to me at the time) 'it ought to be of service some day to the fellow who has to write

¹ *A. E. Housman*, by A. S. F. Gow, p. 15.

one of those bothersome Academy memoirs'. He never got beyond 'My first fifty years', because he fell on the back of his head from a pair of steps while cutting off a bough in his garden in 1935, which made concentration, and therefore written composition, exceedingly difficult for the rest of his life. But a brief summary of his later career, 'From Fifty to Seventy-Five', was added by Dr. (now Sir Henry) Thomas, the two were printed with the Bibliography, and a specially bound copy of the little volume was on 6 July 1938 presented to its principal author by Gaselee in the Board Room of the British Museum. Those familiar with it will recognize how much it has been of 'service to the fellow' responsible for the ensuing memoir; and I only wish that the autobiographical portion, which I shall refer to as the *Sketch*, full of humorous and revealing touches as it is, were not too long to be quoted in full. For the rest, as will appear, I have drawn upon the memories of friends, upon two penetrating appraisements by Mr. F. C. Francis, referred to below, and upon a packet of letters Pollard wrote me, mainly between the years 1915 and 1919, when I was living at Leeds.

In 1916, for example, I find we were exchanging family histories, and this academic life of him, after stating that he first saw the light of day at 1 Brompton Square, Kensington, on Sunday, 14 August 1859, shall begin with an unacademic quotation.

My dear Dad was born in 1808, the son of a stumpy little schoolmaster, who kept a very swagger private school on the site now occupied by Brompton Oratory, and the grandson of another schoolmaster, who was master of the Green Coat School, Westminster. My father was a Doctor and a fine simple hearted Englishman, who till the year of his death at 81 was full of vigour. In his prime he was hot-tempered and not always a wise parent, but as I was the youngest I knew him only in the mellow age. He was a good Doctor and loved his fellow creatures as a good Doctor should. He married imprudently when quite young, and had six children by his first wife. . . . Then when he was about 43 he married my mother, who was about 25, the daughter of a Woodbridge man, who owned ships, and traded in corn and coal and other things and made a small fortune, and lost the better half of it by the failure of a bank, without being greatly concerned, as he was a dear old-fashioned saint; and my mother was her father's daughter.

And in a later letter he relates that his mother had a stroke when I was 15 and died just as I finished my examination for Greats. Trying to be a comfort to her was an education to me during those six years, but I wish I remembered more of her before her illness.

In all this there is much, both of nature and of nurture, which

throws light upon the mature Pollard as his friends knew him. Thus one of his staff, who came to know him very well, writes: 'Pollard at first surprised me by talking of *loving* certain men, mostly younger men, whom he helped; and I only once heard him speak severely of any man.' On the other hand, the unwisdom of his father above hinted at, concerned religion, like the unwisdom of many English parents in the second half of the nineteenth century: the good Doctor of Brompton was in fact 'an intolerant Protestant, who only learnt wisdom slowly', with the result that all four children of his second marriage became Ritualists, and the youngest a hater of sectarianism, who dreamed of a church in which all might delight to worship.

Pollard's schooling was significant of the future also. After a couple of years at a dame school he entered, at Easter 1870, King's College School, then housed in the basement of the building next to Somerset House, which King's College still inhabits; and so began a lifelong association with both institutions. Twenty-seven years later, the school having in the meantime moved from the Strand to Wimbledon Common, he and his wife and his children 'followed it and took the nine years' remainder of a lease of 10 Lauriston Road, within five minutes' walk of the school', to which his elder boy was then sent, and of which he himself later became a governor; while he was made a Fellow of the college in 1907, attended innumerable meetings there of the Shakespeare Association, Early English Text Society, and other bodies, conducted classes within its walls as honorary Professor of Bibliography, and delivered the British Academy lecture above referred to in its Great Hall. The school too gave him the interests which in due course brought him to a fellowship of this Academy. For, though Richard Morris, Middle-English scholar and Skeat's collaborator, 'did not talk about Chaucer' to little Alfred Pollard, who was at first placed in his form, 'English was very well taught' by another well-known scholar, J. W. Hales, and through his tuition he presently gained a school exhibition in the subject. To Hales also, he tells us, he owed his love both for Chaucer and for Shakespeare.

For Chaucer he gave me so much enthusiasm that in April 1876 I walked to Canterbury in what I imagined to be the track of the Pilgrims, their slow progress of about fifteen miles for each of the four days just suiting my modest powers as a pedestrian.

These powers had already been well exercised for six years, as King's is a little over $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Brompton Square where

his father lived, and the boy had 'formed the useful habit of walking there and back, up to Hyde Park Corner, through the Green Park, and along Pall Mall and the Strand'. A Londoner born, a London schoolboy, London and Wimbledon remained his headquarters and generally his home for the rest of his life, if we except the four years he spent at Oxford.

Classics was of course the main school subject. A year earlier than the exhibition for English, and 'just before I was 16, I was awarded the School scholarship for classics . . . the first of several occasions on which I did far better in an exam. than on my knowledge I had any right to'. And then follows in the *Sketch* a paragraph about examination successes at Oxford which must be quoted in full.

In November 1876 I tried my luck for a Balliol scholarship, with the pleasant reward of beginning a long acquaintance with A. C. Clark, one of the successful candidates. The following Midsummer I got a scholarship at St. John's College, Oxford, thanks to having read the early numbers of the *Nineteenth Century*, in which the setter of the Essay paper seemed also to have been interested. Alfred Housman won the other scholarship at the same election, and to my great profit we were given rooms on the same stair. His friendship was the best thing I got from Oxford. I was not expected to achieve more than a second in Classical Mods., but by attention to set books and a little polish conferred on my proses (verses I gave up!) by an excellent coach, C. H. Gibson of Merchant Taylors, I secured a First, to the pleased surprise of my tutors. When 'Greats' was drawing near I was perturbed by an invincible habit of falling asleep whenever I tried to read any treatise on philosophy, especially if by T. H. Green, then the leading Oxford philosopher. One day, in the Undergraduates' library at St. John's, I took down a bulky volume by a disciple of Herbert Spencer: John Fiske. To my surprise I kept awake and soon found myself provided with a handful of formulas which could be applied without much difficulty to a considerable variety of topics. Thus at Midsummer 1881 I was placed in an unusually small First Class. When during 1882 I tried in succession for two 'prize' fellowships at Queen's and Jesus, the examiners were more exacting. An opinion obtained for me from one of those at Jesus was that I might make a good journalist.

Nor is that the end of the story. As Oxford found no use for this 'double first' with a stammer he returned home; and in due course obtained from the Archbishop of Canterbury, through the instrumentality of his godfather the vicar of Brompton, a nomination to compete for a place in the British Museum. Whereupon, to continue in his own words,

I attended at the Secretary's office at the Museum to fill up a form in

which I had to state what languages I could offer, and was persuaded by a friend there 'just for the sake of appearances' to add to my meagre stock of languages, Latin, Greek, and French, a fourth language—Italian, in which I had read a few cantos of the *Divina Commedia* with the aid of a crib. In November (1882) I was warned that I should be examined in the following January, and that translation from Italian would be one of the subjects. Others were Geography, Arithmetic (including Civil Service Tots), and Algebra, in all of which I was pretty rusty—more so in Algebra than I realized, as at half time I had only answered $3\frac{1}{2}$ questions out of 13. Fortunately I pulled myself together and nearly finished the lot, while having made a diligent study of Manzoni's *I Promessi Sposi* in the intervening weeks, I got a higher percentage in translation from Italian than I dare mention. It was my last examination, and my old luck carried me through.

This tale of the Lucky Examinee's Progress was obviously written by a man of unusual humility who enjoyed a more than ordinary sense of humour; an auspicious endowment for one destined to have much dealing with Chaucer and Shakespeare. It is also clear that an important cause of this uninterrupted series of examination triumphs was the readiness of pen already spoken of, combined with that capacity for intense application, that intellectual alertness and grip, which enable a first-class journalist or barrister to size up a problem or a situation and set down its essentials on paper with attractive simplicity and in the shortest possible time. And if we add to humility and humour and a quite exceptional mental agility, other qualities which proceed therefrom, such as a self-effacing administrative ability of a high order, a complete lack of pompousness or fuss in dealing with others, and a literary style at once 'delightfully informal' and engagingly personal, we have most of the characteristics which were later to bring him honour with the officials of his department and in the world of scholarship.

But at the time he wrote Pollard had a special reason for these reflections about examinations. After the fall in the summer of 1935 which virtually put an end to authorship for him, he only managed, as far as I can discover, two pieces of continuous composition, apart from letter-writing, the *Sketch* from which the reflections are taken, and 'Some Reminiscences of A. E. Housman', contributed to a memorial number of *The Bromsgrovian*, the magazine of the poet's old school. And since the *Reminiscences* were chiefly of Oxford days, it was inevitable that they should include some comment upon Housman's amazing failure in Greats, the same Greats in which Pollard had himself scored

a First Class, though he says nothing about this last to the Bromsgrovians. As one of Housman's two most intimate undergraduate friends, he was naturally asked by the bewildered Oxford world of 1881 if he could suggest any explanation. How had it come about that on some of the papers Housman had hardly attempted to offer any answers? What had he been doing with himself beforehand?

The only explanation I could offer at the time was that I believed he might have occupied himself too much with the text of Propertius, and that remained the only explanation I could offer to myself or to anyone else, until in the emotion caused by the news of his death I realized that for a man who was, if not already a great scholar, at least a great scholar in the making, it was psychologically impossible to make the best of his knowledge on subjects in which he had lost interest.

Evidently success in examinations belonged to 'journalistic' minds like his own which were prepared 'to make the best of' any subject the authorities required, and if they were also favoured with a stroke or two of luck they might even secure a First.

Fellow scholars in the same year at St. John's, living on the same stair for three years, and during the fourth sharing rooms out of college with another undergraduate, Pollard and Housman enjoyed at the most critical period of their lives a close friendship which must have been a tremendous experience for the lad from Brompton, who, cut off from the world by his stammer, a day-school boy, and early robbed by her illness of a mother's attention, had probably never before known intimacy with a fellow human being. And the intimacy soon ripened into affection on both sides, which lasted the rest of their lives, though for reasons presently to be explained they drifted apart after 1881. That Pollard admired Housman and regarded him as a great man goes without saying. Yet, while he paid full honour to his friend's powers he could not help regretting the use he put them to. Not being a classical scholar I never heard him speak of the Manilius, but I do not doubt that he considered it 'Byzantine'. Of *A Shropshire Lad*, the title of which he was proud to think had been suggested by himself, he often spoke, as it was for a time one of my favourite books of poems; but, highly as he placed it for craftsmanship, he could only groan in spirit over the gallows and graveyards which formed its principal themes. What then did these two young men, so utterly different in temperament and outlook, talk about in the second quad at St. John's and later in the rooms in St. Giles? Not much, it seems,

in the latter, which they shared with Moses Jackson, the Mercutio of the trio (whom Housman's biographer describes as 'a scientist and an athlete whose contempt for letters was unconcealed'),¹ seeing that with his finals before him and conscious that close application was his only hope, Pollard after Hall 'mostly retired to work by myself in the lower room, leaving the other two on the first floor'.² But it is an easy guess that during the first three years poetry and religion provided them with their chief topics. Housman's 'favourite English poet in these early days', the *Reminiscences* inform us, 'was Matthew Arnold, whose *Empedocles on Etna* he recommended to me'. This recommendation was an important event for Pollard. I find several references to Arnold's poetry in my letters of 1916; and in one he observes:

I think some of it has entered more deeply into my outlook on life than any other poetry. Alfred Housman used to say that the lengthy song of Empedocles contained 'all the Law and the Prophets', which isn't true. But it does contain a much better version of Ecclesiastes, while the piece which begins 'In the deserted moonlit street' (I never can remember the title) does almost rise to prophesying.

He defends this verdict in a later letter by exclaiming: 'You don't realize what it was to grow up between Huxley and Herbert Spencer'; and in a later letter still, written in reply to one preferring the claims of Robert Browning, he develops the point as follows:

Yesterday evening I read *Rabbi Ben Ezra*, *Empedocles on Etna*, and *Saul*, one after the other, and think all three of them very wonderful. I grant you that *Saul*, and *Rabbi ben Ezra* too, are much bigger than *Empedocles*, and yet I think that personally and in my own life the feeling of strength and certitude I have derived from Arnold has been of more practical help than the hope and consolation I have got from Browning. So there!

'Strength and certitude from Arnold!' I can hear the modern critic cry; and 'What a thing to say of poetry anyway!' On which I can only observe irrelevantly that, by the time I reached the age which Pollard was in 1916, I had come to agree with him.

One more point about his friendship with Housman before I leave it. Bewildered and grieved at his brilliant friend's failure at Oxford, with its obvious effect upon his spirits, and ashamed at his own success in the same examination, 'I got it into my head', he records, 'that the sight of me reminded Housman of his troubles, and was unwilling to thrust myself on him more than he might welcome.' And so—though he occasionally saw him

¹ A. S. F. Gow, *A. E. Housman: a Sketch*, p. 9.

² *The Bromsgrovian*.

after they began life in London, he at the Museum and Housman at the Patent Office; helped him unobtrusively whenever he saw a chance; got him to contribute three verse translations for a volume of *Odes from the Greek Dramatists* (which I suspect was partly devised in order to draw his friend out); persuaded Kegan Paul to publish *A Shropshire Lad*; and even wrote him a testimonial in support of an application—the intimacy ceased. As Housman lived in rooms with the cheerful and ebullient Jackson, the sacrifice was probably mostly on Pollard's side. But selfless self-effacement and a delicate consideration for the feelings of others were part of his nature. The story, however, has a joyful ending, which shall be given once again in his own words:

After 1897, when I moved from Kensington to Wimbledon, I saw still less of Housman, though occasionally we corresponded, and there was a jolly interlude when Jackson, who had left the Patent Office for the Headship of a native college in India, was home on leave, and he and Housman dined and slept in my house. When I retired to rest I found an apple-pie bed awaiting me and I think the Professor of Latin was a fellow victim, though I'm not quite sure he wasn't an aggressor. Anyhow, we became very youthful and light-hearted. In 1911 I went up to Cambridge to hear his inaugural lecture in his second Professorship and was richly rewarded by the cry of pleasure with which I was greeted when he caught sight of me after it. I think that somehow my presence seemed to him a recognition that he had reached his haven at last.

Pollard was twenty-four years old when he joined the British Museum, and four years later he married Alice England, a teacher at the Manchester High School for Girls, who had previously taken the Natural Science Tripos at Cambridge, an unusual feat for a woman at that period. Mrs. Pollard was indeed a remarkable woman. Of strong intellectual bent and with pronounced views on many subjects, a friend of the Pankhursts and keenly interested, as was her husband, in the movement for the emancipation of women, she was very far from being either a blue-stocking or a mere feminist. From first to last he was very much in love; and his admiration was almost as great as his affection. It was in many ways an ideal union; none the less so perhaps that she had her own circle of friends and would pay them long visits while delicate health often took her abroad. Each was happiest in the other's company and shared to the full each other's intellectual interests; yet they lived their own lives and were not in any way forlorn when one was absent. Indeed from the time they were married it was a matter of principle for them to spend at least a fortnight in the year apart.

They often 'disliked it very much', but stuck to it. The first ten years of marriage were passed in London, where their three children were born: Geoffrey in 1888, Joyce (now Mrs. Charles Roberts) in 1889, and Roger in 1891. They moved to Wimbledon, as I have said, in 1897 in order to be near King's College School, and inhabited two houses there in succession, the second of them being 40 Murray Road, which remained Pollard's home from 1906 until he died. Both homes were close to the common, which was good not only for the children but also for their father, who, a walker from youth, could take a 'breather' almost from his front door at the end of a stuffy day, or a stuffy week, at the Museum. The move also brought him close to one with whom his name will be associated as long as men continue to take an interest in Shakespearian scholarship. For a mile or more across the Common lived Walter Wilson Greg.

I never saw the Pollard family as a whole. But I came to know three members of it intimately; and doubt whether the suburbs of London at the beginning of the twentieth century could show a household happier, saner, richer in intellectual and spiritual values, or more conscious of its social responsibilities in the widest sense, than that at 40 Murray Road, Wimbledon. It was also typically English. When war, which ended the Pax Britannica of a hundred years, broke out on 4 August 1914, Geoffrey was twenty-six years old and a lieutenant in the Royal Artillery, which he had entered from Woolwich six years earlier. By 22 August he was near Mons with his battery, the 119th, and after two months' incessant fighting was killed on 24 October, a very gallant officer, and mentioned as such in dispatches. Roger, on the other hand, was in August 1914 just down from Oxford, where he had been a classical exhibitor at Merton, and had made up his mind to serve his generation by devoting what from all accounts were considerable gifts as a teacher to work in an elementary school. But he at once joined up, was shortly after given a commission in the 5th Battalion of the Royal Berkshires, crossed to France on 31 May 1915, and was killed fighting with the utmost bravery on 13 October, not many miles from where his brother had fallen almost a year before. Some idea of what the country lost through the sacrifice of these fine spirits can be gathered by those who are fortunate enough to possess two little books which Pollard printed in their memory: *On Active Service: Letters of Geoffrey Blemell Pollard* (1915), and *Two Brothers: Accounts Rendered* (1916).

His own personal loss affected him in a way at once surprising

to his friends and yet entirely in keeping with his character. In 1915 he was fifty-six years old, prepared, I have been told, to descend by easy stages into the vale of old age, becoming a little of a valetudinarian, even beginning to fancy walking was bad for him, and more and more engrossed in his books to the exclusion of other interests. His boys' heroic deaths rejuvenated him; he felt that he must do what in him lay to take their place in the world, forgot about his flat-footedness, and threw himself with the utmost vigour into all sorts of social and religious activities. Of these his membership of the Anglican Fellowship and of the committee of the Central Library for Students were perhaps the most conspicuous examples; the one a small body of active-minded Anglicans of every shade of churchmanship who combined devotional fellowship with the untrammelled discussion of religious problems; the other, one of Albert Mansbridge's offspring, at that time struggling to get on its legs, though now a national institution well known to all as the National Central Library. Many individuals as well as societies also found gain in his loss. One of them was the writer of this memoir, who was bereaved of his father in the same twelvemonth as Pollard was bereaved of his sons. It seemed natural that we should adopt each other. He was helped by it, I believe; and I received more grace from that adoption than from anything, except one, that has happened to me in life. It is perhaps worth noting that this friendship had nothing originally to do with Shakespeare at all; our partnership in that adventure did not begin until two years afterwards, and was for me an uncovenanted blessing. It is, I think, due to his memory to record also that the example of unflinching courage which he set in 1915 proved a great inspiration when a single ordeal of the same kind as his double one came to me a generation later.

One last point to complete the outline of this epic. The dreadful year 1915 was the year in which he thought out and wrote out two of his principal contributions to Shakespearian scholarship, *Shakespeare's Fight with the Pirates*, the Sandars Lectures delivered at Cambridge within a few weeks of Roger's death, and *King Richard II: a New Quarto*, published early in 1916. The second, with its elaborate tabulation of the errors and corrections in the four successive Quartos before 1623 and the folio of that date, involved more sheer drudgery than any of his publications before the *Short Title Catalogue* which was also completed at a time of bereavement. 'It's dogged as does it' is a good anaesthetic for a broken heart.

Pollard's career as librarian began on 22 February 1883 when, the *Sketch* tells us,

I presented myself at the British Museum, inflicted on the Principal Librarian (as he was then called), Sir E. A. Bond, one of the two worst stammers I have ever achieved, and was then escorted to the Department of Printed Books. . . . The Department had not always been a happy place, but it was certainly a happy place to me during the 41½ years I worked in it, and though the pay in my early days was so meagre (£120 per ann., with an annual increment of £10) that it needed a lot of work after official hours,¹ besides a little private income to supplement it when a family had to be supported, I can't imagine any other means of living out of which I should have got so much interest and pleasure.

It is always difficult to write the life of a great civil servant, because what goes on behind the closed doors of a government office is of necessity private for some time after his death. But the Academy has two of Pollard's immediate colleagues among its members, and when asked they readily responded to a request for impressions of his official career. First, then, Sir Frederic Kenyon, who as Director of the British Museum, 1909–30, was Pollard's chief for seventeen years, writes as follows:

As a colleague at the Museum, Pollard combined the maximum of helpfulness with the minimum of self-assertion. He had an active and enterprising mind, fertile in initiative, but unobtrusive in advocacy of his proposals. He had a gift of persuasion without violence, and hence he generally got his way without offence. He won the entire confidence and friendship of my predecessor, Sir Edward Maunde Thompson, and I need not say that I was always grateful for his advice. Moreover he was the most self-effacing of public servants. There would have been great advantage to the public service if he had succeeded to the Keepership of Printed Books several years sooner than he did, but he was unwilling to be promoted at the expense of an older and deserving colleague, preferring to continue his work unobtrusively in a lower capacity. It is no wonder that all his colleagues were his friends, and his eventual retirement after a short term as head of his Department was much regretted by all.

What was the impression Pollard left on the minds of his juniors at the Museum? For an answer to this question I applied to Sir Henry Thomas, his successor, the first to be known as Principal Keeper of Printed Books, from whom some time ago I received a letter marked 'the first dictated and typed letter ever issued from this department', which taught me that Pollard's

¹ Shorter then (9 a.m. to 3 p.m.) than now.

pen, which seemed ever-busy out of office hours, must have been even busier during them. In reply to my inquiries Thomas writes:

When I entered the B.M. in 1903, G. K. Fortescue was Keeper of Printed Books, and under him there were three Assistant Keepers—afterwards called Deputy Keepers—W. R. Wilson, A. W. K. Miller and G. F. Barwick. Fortescue's great interest was his Subject Index; Wilson, an old man with poor sight, who had retired from the position of Superintendent of the Reading Room, pottered with correspondence and light duties; Miller, a fine scholar, edited the General Catalogue; and Barwick superintended the Reading Room.

Pollard (helped by Proctor in his special line) had been in charge of the Antiquarian work of the Department, for which his own interests and his Bibliographical Society experience naturally fitted him. When I joined the B.M., Proctor had just been lost in the Alps, and Pollard had to assume full charge of the Incunabula. It was he who shaped the purchasing policy of the Department, with its concentration on fifteenth century books and English Books to 1640, though of course in published statements he attributed the policy to his chief, Fortescue. With his practical experience of book-making, and his knowledge of the ways of printers and publishers, he was always the one to plan the Department's extraordinary publications.

His Museum work and his work for the Bibliographical Society played into each other's hands. Hence the strengthening of the B.M.'s collections of Incunabula and of English Books to 1640, leading to the Museum's Catalogue of XV Century Books and the Bibliographical Society's *Short Title Catalogue*, both planned by him. He also organized most of the special exhibitions and planned and wrote much of the various catalogues and guides for them—Shakespeare and Bible centenaries, for example. Also the Catalogue of the Huth Bequest, which he mainly negotiated.

In all his special tasks he liked to associate with himself such of his young men as showed willingness and aptitude. He encouraged those who displayed a predilection for studies of their own choice. Others, both within and without the Museum, he started on productive careers; and they would probably never have made good without his help, though none but his intimate friends would be aware of this.

His Keepership was a short one—5½ years—made difficult by the aftermath of war. He was interested in the members of his staff of all ranks, and tried to do the best for them, as well as to get the best out of them. He was the first Keeper I knew who planned the spacing out of his staff to ensure a reasonable succession in key posts, both for the good of the Department and for the satisfaction of reasonable ambitions. But gaps and jams caused by the war years make planning difficult, and there were no doubt disappointments. A man of his mental calibre naturally found it somewhat difficult to suffer fools gladly. He could be

stirred to occasional flashes of temper. As a corrective he developed a love for his fellows as part of his philosophy, or rather his religion, as one would expect of the anonymous author of *Life, Love and Light*.¹ He is the only man I know who showed his respect for the young men who had fallen in the first world war by raising his hat every time he passed the Memorial inscription at the entrance to the Museum. Yet some of his young men have criticised him for confusing them and their names when they came back temporarily or finally from the war; an uncharitable selfishness, for the memory of a Keeper with a staff of nearly 150 is heavily taxed, and Pollard was also bearing the burden of the loss of his two sons, and of some fine young men, their contemporaries, on his staff.

It must be admitted that his memory did show signs of being overburdened in his last years at the Museum—an indication of what proved to be his weak point and his worst affliction after his accident.

Thomas adds that some of Pollard's juniors complained that he was inclined to be 'schoolmasterish', and suggests that this was probably 'a natural result of his attempt to organize and tighten control over the upper as well as the lower staff'. He then concludes:

I never noticed anything to justify the complaint, but I expect those who complained were those who most needed a little schoolmastering. However, they must have had some justification, for Pollard himself recognized his tendency, and I know he asked some of his senior advisers, when he became Keeper, to warn him if he became 'too schoolmasterish'.

'The need of supplementing' the meagre salary from the Museum, the *Sketch* relates, 'led to pleasant jobs and still pleasanter friendships.' The friends included the publisher Charles Kegan Paul, F. J. Furnivall, and D. C. Lathbury, editor of the *Guardian*; and the principal jobs, before Pollard became involved with the *Library* and the Bibliographical Society, were the editing of Chaucer and writing about the fifteenth century generally, books and articles on early printed books, and at first review-work and later occasional leader-writing for the *Guardian*. Of these the most important both for Pollard and for scholarship was his editing of Chaucer, culminating in the *Globe Chaucer* produced in 1898 with the assistance of three collaborators, a volume which by some strange oversight is not even mentioned in the *Sketch*. But on this side of activities I can fortunately quote the testimony of his friend and sometime pupil, Stanley Bennett of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, who writes:

Pollard's great services to bibliography, and his remarkable work on Shakespearian bibliographical problems, have tended to obscure the

¹ See below, p. 302.

services he rendered to English Medieval literature. His first published paper was on 'The Gilds of the Middle Ages' (1876), and much of his early career was devoted to the study of the literature of the 14th and 15th centuries. As a result, from 1886 a series of volumes edited by Pollard gave students of this period much needed help. First we may take his work on Chaucer. His little *Chaucer Primer* (1893) was a model of what such a work should be: accurate, concise, and nicely blending information with criticism. Five years later the *Globe Chaucer* appeared under his general editorship, with an admirable general introduction by Pollard, as well as a first-rate introduction to *The Canterbury Tales*. This popular edition was the result of ten years' labour, and took its own line, despite the powerful influence of Skeat's 'Oxford Chaucer' and 'Student's Chaucer'. It at once established itself as a handy, reliable edition of Chaucer's poems. From time to time after this Pollard edited individual tales, and never allowed other interests completely to overwhelm his love for Chaucer.

The second great service he rendered was in presenting texts of the medieval drama. His first venture here was the production of his now classic book of specimens of pre-Elizabethan drama: *English Miracle Plays, Moralities, and Interludes* (1890). This work, with its admirable Introduction, first made much of our old drama available to the ordinary reader, and it has been re-published again and again since 1890. It is not too much to say that practically everyone has made their first acquaintance with the Miracle and Morality plays in the pages of Pollard's specimens. He also edited *The Towneley Plays* (1897) in conjunction with George England, and later with F. J. Furnivall brought out a text of the *Macro Plays* (1904). Both of these were edited for the Early English Text Society, and gave students a reliable text edition for the first time.

Another valuable contribution to Medieval studies was made in his Introduction to a volume of *Fifteenth Century Verse and Prose*, in a re-issue of Arber's *English Garner* (1903). At this time fifteenth century literature was in a curiously unfortunate position. On the one hand Furnivall and his editors were putting out editions of the work of the 'drivelling monk' Lydgate and of other writers of that period, and were trying to convince readers of their merit, while another body of critics could scarcely find words bad enough with which to characterise the literary output of most writers of this century. Pollard saw that both parties had missed the real contribution made by the century, and drew attention to the wealth of lyric, carol and drama of the period. 'To say that English poetry was dead when verse like this was being written is absurd,' he wrote. 'It was not dead, but banished from court.'

Turning from his early editing and literary work to his bibliographical work of the same period, I now ask another friend, Dr. Victor Scholderer, his close colleague at the Museum, and now President of the Bibliographical Society, to take up the tale.

Pollard's early interests were much more linguistic than bibliographical, and it was probably not until his entry into the Department of Printed Books at the British Museum in 1883 that he gave thought to such matters; even three years later it is recorded of him that he had not yet had much to do with early books. But there was plenty of opportunity at the Museum and the easy official hours of those days allowed ample leisure for private work. Pollard's 'first excursion into the gentle art of book-building' was an article 'On Some Old Title-Pages' in the *Century Guild Hobby-Horse* of 1888 and another article on Geoffrey Tory, the famous sixteenth-century scholar-printer, appeared in the same periodical in 1889. Bookmen and publishers soon gave him recognition and by 1893 he was editing a series of 'Books about Books' and himself contributing thereto a volume on *Early Illustrated Books*. It was entirely consonant with the rest of Pollard's personality that he should have conceived for the Italian primitives a youthful enthusiasm which seemed to his elders, as he himself smilingly admitted, to require some damping down, but it had a specially fortunate result in the shape of a monograph on *Italian Book Illustrations, chiefly of the Fifteenth Century*, published in 1894 in connection with P. G. Hamerton's *Portfolio*. It is Pollard's most substantial contribution to a subject in which he never ceased to delight and admirably exemplifies the ease of his style and the lucidity of his exposition.

The year 1892, which saw the foundation of the Bibliographical Society, saw also the entry into the Museum of Robert Proctor. 'His reputation as a specialist had preceded him', Pollard wrote, 'and I remember asking Dr. Garnett (then Keeper of Printed Books) rather dolefully as to whether he would absorb all the antiquarian work there was to do.' That might well have happened had Pollard not been what he was, but although Proctor 'had no love as a rule for working in collaboration' the two soon became fast friends on a firm bibliographical foundation: to quote Pollard again:

The friendship was of a kind less unusual, perhaps, than it may sound. On almost every subject on which it is possible to argue we held diametrically opposite views; but we had so many tastes and interests in common that we had never any time for controversy, but accepted each other quite happily, with a little occasional chaff, and only a very rare explosion when we had unguardedly strayed on a dangerous subject,—after which we went back to books.

Discussions between Pollard, the Liberal Imperialist as he described himself, and the fiery Republican Proctor, who headed his private diary with the words 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' in red ink, were doubtless unlikely to pass off in judicial calm. But their collaboration bore remarkable fruit in the volume of *Three Hundred Notable Books added to the Library of the British Museum under the Keepership of Richard Garnett*, the selection for which was made, the descriptions written and the book passed through the press by the two men in sixty-eight days, so

as to be ready on the day of Garnett's retirement, 20th March, 1899. This piece of work well shows what energy and concentration Pollard, who was much less robust than the tireless Proctor, was always ready to put forth at need. Meanwhile, in 1895, he had suggested to his publishers 'a bibliographical quarterly, the life of which should be limited beforehand to three years', to be edited by himself. The result was the three spacious volumes of *Bibliographica*, the layout of which, including the attractive border reproduced on its covers from an Italian incunabulum, was of course due to Pollard, and for which he wrote on a variety of matters connected with early French and Italian books, together with an article on English book-sales—the whole a characteristic combination of sound book-building with good bibliography.

About the turn of the century what may be called the bibliophilic period of bibliographical studies was coming to an end, and Pollard's attention, like that of the Bibliographical Society to which he was for so many years a devoted secretary, began to turn elsewhere. *Old Picture Books and other Essays on Bookish Subjects*, which appeared in 1902 and consisted almost entirely of reprints of articles already published, is in some sort a valediction. About the same time he was engaged in a last collaboration with Proctor on the magnificent Catalogue (published in 1907) of the early printed books in the Pierpont Morgan Library, he himself editing the whole and describing the illustrated books, while Proctor described most of the rest. There can, however, be little doubt that Pollard's subsequent contribution to the study of early printing would have been much smaller than it actually proved had not Proctor perished in the Austrian Alps in September, 1903. The publication in 1898 of his *Index*, that great landmark in the study of the subject, had induced the Trustees of the British Museum to call for 'a full-dress catalogue' of the incunabula under their care and Proctor had been actively engaged on the preliminaries at the end of his life. The task now suddenly devolved upon Pollard and constituted for ten years the bulk of his official work; the entry 'Catalogue of Incunabula' is first found in his departmental diary in April 1905, and almost at once becomes normal. He spoke of being 'burdened' with this task

for which I had no natural equipment. Out of loyalty to the Trustees and to Proctor's memory I did my best, and was taught by the work as it went on. . . . I am sincerely thankful for the strenuous mental discipline which it imposed on me. . . . If I have made any useful contribution to the bibliography of the English Bible or of Shakespeare it has been due to the task imposed on me of determining what does, and what does not, constitute a valid proof of the country, town, printer and date to which an anonymous piece of printing can be assigned.

And, in turn, to listen to Pollard himself going straight to the heart of some problem of early printing, marking out the precise limits of fact and conjecture and putting the result with the clarity, succinctness, and, often, humour, to which the impediment in his speech gave a peculiar

quality was for his juniors a 'mental discipline' of the first order. The words 'no natural equipment' refer to a certain impatience with repetitive detail, but the precision with which he kept the wood in focus could prove uncommonly disconcerting to a disciple bemused with the multitude of trees.

The first volume of the Catalogue appeared in 1908, and Pollard prefixed to it an introduction setting forth the scope and methods of the work in some 15 large quarto pages. This is a model of its kind. The proneness of the subject to turn into a labyrinth of technicalities is masterfully repressed, and perfectly clear writing springing from perfectly clear thought ('limpid' was his own word for this desideratum) carries the reader along without interruption, nor is there any lack of those stimulating obiter dicta which Pollard could always slip into his argument. His share in the routine work of the Catalogue grew less as time went on, but when in 1913 the third volume concluded the descriptions of the German incunabula, he contributed to it a general introduction dealing with their subject-matter and the trends of contemporary thought revealed thereby, which was a new departure and returned a highly specialized study to much needed contact with wider issues. Pollard wrote this con amore, in a remarkably short time and with a minimum of 'looking up'; once again those powers of concentration which had enabled him to put into shape a whole book of 'practical morality for men and women' amid the quotidian unquiet of suburban train journeys stood him in good stead.

Officially Pollard was called upon to deal with a quite exceptional situation when Alfred Henry Huth died in October 1910, and was found to have bequeathed a free choice of fifty books, manuscript and printed, from his superb library to the Museum. The selection had to be made promptly from the five large volumes of Huth's catalogue, and whoever has had occasion to weigh against each other the claims of a number of almost equally desirable books will appreciate the burden thus laid upon Pollard. With what success he discharged his task is shown by the Catalogue of the Huth Bequest published for the Trustees early in 1912, but the price paid was a temporary breakdown through over-exertion. The same year, nevertheless, also saw the publication of a most attractive volume on *Fine Books* in the Connoisseurs' Library, containing an account of the invention of printing which in a brief compass could hardly be bettered and forms a useful corrective to the heroics of many of Gutenberg's countrymen. Pollard reverted to the subject in the congenial paper on *The Human Factor in Bibliography* which was his presidential address to the Edinburgh Bibliographical Society in 1923, and a short quotation from this may serve to show the insight with which he related purely technical information to its wider significance:

I have a distinct mental picture of [Gutenberg] as a rather thriftless inventor, without any driving power or business ability, producing (when he wanted to borrow money) a small sample as a proof of

what he could do, but never doing it. I see Schoeffer as a lad with a gift for cutting type, and Fust, the goldsmith, as a shrewd man of business, sizing up Gutenberg and sizing up Schoeffer and at last losing patience with Gutenberg . . . and starting with Schoeffer's help . . . to print the 42-line Bible which is commonly called Gutenberg's. Interpreting the evidence on strictly business lines, I believe that to be the only possible conclusion. On the other hand, the 'business man' . . . may always lose some of his business habits, and a violent quarrel between Fust and Gutenberg on a purely personal question, if evidence of it ever came to light, might make my reconstruction . . . much less probable.

Pollard's final contribution of any length to these studies took the form of a paper on *The Building Up of the British Museum Collection of Incunabula*, read to the Bibliographical Society shortly after his retirement from the Keepership of Printed Books in 1924.

This is perhaps as good a point as any for saying something of Pollard's connexion with the United States, since it was originally a continuation in a still more intense form of his labours on the incunabula at the Museum. Though he is well known in America, as is shown by the honours there accorded him towards the end of his life; and though he was for many years a close friend and active co-worker with the eminent American scholar Miss Henrietta Bartlett,¹ an enduring monument of their partnership being the delightful *Census of Shakespeare's Plays in Quarto*, 1916, 'published under the auspices of the Elizabethan Club, Yale University'; he only once crossed the Atlantic, and might as well not even have done that for all he saw of America and Americans when he got there. The episode, though he can hardly have enjoyed it at the time, provides one of the most entertaining incidents of his life, which he recounts in the *Library* for December 1920 with his own inimitable blend of tenderness and humour, under the guise of an obituary notice of General Rush C. Hawkins, a private collector of 'fifteeners', as the Americans prefer (so wisely) to call incunabula, who after publishing a book on the *First Books and Printers of the Fifteenth Century* in 1884 began about twenty-five years later to pay frequent visits to the Museum, evidently in the hope of securing someone there to catalogue the collection he had been getting together meanwhile. For a time he had hovered about Robert Proctor. But—to continue in Pollard's words:

when Proctor met his death and I took up his work, as best I could, the

¹ Miss Bartlett tells me she possesses a large collection of his letters, written between 1914 and 1935, which she proposes to bequeath to the University Library at Yale.

General came more frequently to me, and after a little while began asking me to recommend him some one who would catalogue his collection. My recommendations were not received favourably, and at last the old man (he was already 77) told me he wanted me to come myself. I must already have been very fond of him, as the ease with which he persuaded my unadventurous self to carry over half my 1908 holidays to 1909, cross the Atlantic (I am a very bad sailor) and locate myself for six weeks of furious work in Providence, where I did not know a soul, still surprises me when I think of it.

I wish I could go on quoting, for it makes an excellent story. But readers who want more must be referred to the *Library* article. Summing up the whole experience in retrospect, Pollard wrote in the *Sketch*:

I never concentrated all my brains on any piece of work with the intensity I needed to get through my job in the six weeks I was in Providence, and it is an abiding regret to me that I only found out the best shop for cream ices on the day before I left. Of the kindness I received, more especially from George Parker Winship, then Librarian of the John Carter Brown Library, at Providence, I haven't words to say enough.

It seems only right, therefore, that Mr. Winship should have the last word upon it. Here is a passage from a long and interesting letter he was good enough to send me the other day; a passage which has a relevance wider than the episode of General Hawkins, though I do not suppose everyone will agree with the views it expresses about Proctor's methods.

I think he found me useful, because I dropped in at his work room, virtually every late afternoon, as he was finishing the day's stint, and it gave him a listener, who understood the lingo, with whom he could check up the day's results, go over doubtful conclusions, and take stock of the way the work was going. Then we would go for a walk, in directions where we would be sure not to meet anyone whom I would have to introduce to him.

This was where I came closer to understanding him, strength and weakness. He spoke almost daily of his lack of Proctor's brilliance of intuition and apparently limitless store of type details. But after he left and I began to think things through, I came to realize that Pollard with his pedestrian plodding, was making fewer mistakes to plague successors than Proctor with his epochal brilliancy. It seemed to me that Pollard, as an incunabulist, was hamstrung by the Museum's commitment to the Proctor legend. He gave the very best of his years to the B.M. Catalogue of Fifteeners, doing it in ways he did not really believe in, and was not temperamentally equipped to do effectively—as a loyal effort to co-operate with a German opus. It was a tragic sacrifice.

The visit to Providence had one compensation, which you may be able to use. My impression is that this was the very first time that Pollard had spent so many days on end with fifteneers—or any books perhaps—that were intact, just as they came out of hiding. Time and again he would refer to the fact that at the Museum he was surrounded with priceless treasures, occasionally unique specimens, which were nearly all showcase copies out of famous collections, but virtually all of them dolled-up (or is that an Americanism?) having lost most of the sidelights on flyleaves and original covers when re-covered in gilded morocco with squared edges.¹

Pollard's work for the *Library*, for the Bibliographical Society, and for the text of Shakespeare all hang together and are best considered as one continuous story. What he did by way of helping us to understand the origins and development of the Authorized Version of the Bible, though not the least of his triumphs, was in the nature of a digression, and was undertaken for a special occasion. Nevertheless, it could only have been accomplished by one who was at once thoroughly conversant with fifteenth and sixteenth century literature and an expert bibliographer, so that it forms a kind of link between the one and the other, though it belongs chronologically to a later chapter of Pollard's career. Sir Frederic Kenyon sums up his achievement in this field as follows:

The Tercentenary of the Authorised Version of the Bible in 1911 brought an invitation from the Oxford University Press to contribute a bibliographical introduction to their reproduction of the original Bible of 1611. Characteristically, Pollard did not content himself with the story as already set out in existing works, meritorious as some of them were, but set himself to re-examine the original records. In this examination he found himself, as he said, 'constantly hampered by the lack of a collection of original documents'. Many had never been printed in full; others were only with difficulty accessible. He accordingly suggested to the Press the preparation of such a collection; and his suggestion was cordially accepted. The result was a volume entitled *Records of the English Bible* (Oxford 1911), consisting of 'original documents relating to the making, printing and publishing of the English translations of the Bible, from Tyndale's New Testament of 1525 to the appearance of the version of 1611', to which was prefixed an introduction of 76 pages, putting together the results in a continuous story. A good deal of new light was thrown especially on the attitude of the authorities to the several translations; the identity of the real first edition was established beyond dispute; and the whole story was placed on a firm

¹ This, Sir Henry Thomas notes, applies mainly to the Grenville Library and, in a lesser degree, to the King's Library.

foundation of fact which is not likely to be shaken. The whole work, introduction as well as documents, besides being published separately, was prefixed to the folio facsimile of the first edition of 1911, and the introduction by itself to the octavo edition. In addition, Pollard wrote the description of the printed editions for the *Guide* to the Museum Bible Exhibition on the same occasion.

No detailed account need here be given of Pollard's work as contributor to and editor of the *Library* or of his activities as Hon. Secretary of the Bibliographical Society, since we have his own history of the *Library* down to 1930, while the present Hon. Secretary has twice dealt with the Society's debt to his predecessor, once in the obituary notice in the *Library* for 1944 and more fully still in the admirable opening chapter of *Studies in Retrospect* (Bibliographical Society, 1945). Adhering then to my purpose of trying to make this memoir a portrait rather than an official record, I shall content myself by noting a few personal traits which the foregoing accounts reveal.

Scholderer observes above that though Pollard knew very little about bibliography or early books when he entered the service of the Museum, by 1888, five years later, he was producing his first-fruits in this field. During the same period he had evidently managed to persuade his chiefs of his bibliographical proficiency, for when J. Y. W. MacAlister, librarian of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, was about to launch a periodical called the *Library* in December 1888 and consulted Pollard's immediate superior, Richard Garnett, for the name of a competent person to help him run it, an introduction followed as a matter of course and thus began Pollard's connexion with a journal to whose destinies he was linked for nearly forty-six years. During the first ten years or so, while it remained a monthly and more or less tied to the Library Association, he contributed to each number 'short reviews of any books of bibliographical interest on which I could lay my hands'; and, he tells us, 'thereby contracted a habit of writing descriptive notices of any book on bookish subjects whether I could claim to possess the particular knowledge required for expert criticism or no'.¹ To which piece of information, written in 1930, he added the following footnote:

From the frequency with which the initials A. W. P. appear at the end of notices in every number of the present series of the *Library*, it is obvious that the habit continues. But specialist reviewers are hard to find.

¹ The *Library*, 4th ser., x. 402.

Three of my friends edit other quarterlies which partly overlap our subjects, and where the subject touches literature or libraries they have a better claim to the best man.

It is not difficult to guess that one of these friends was McKerrow, who was at this time struggling with some difficulty to get *The Review of English Studies* on to its feet. Pollard, one of the busiest men in Britain, was always particularly sympathetic towards others in a similar, or, as he liked to believe, a more desperate, predicament. Thus all his retrospective references to MacAlister emphasize two points: that he was terribly overworked, and that therefore it was his, Pollard's, duty to do all in his power to save him trouble. I suspect, in fact, that Pollard became virtually co-editor of the *Library* long before 1899 when, with the beginning of the second series, his name appeared as such on the cover and title-page, and that from 1899 onwards MacAlister had very little indeed to do with the journal directly except to retain responsibility for the financial side of it, a responsibility which of course came to an end when the Bibliographical Society took it over in 1920. In saying this I should wrong Pollard if I in any way appeared to detract from MacAlister's merits. He was, I do not doubt, everything that Pollard claimed him to be; and it seems pretty clear that, quite apart from his remarkable achievements as medical librarian, he was the true father of modern English bibliography, since he not only founded the *Library* but was a prime, if unseen, mover in the foundation of the Bibliographical Society. Had he not, however, been fortunate enough to find in Pollard a kindly nurse for both these babies, almost from the day of their birth, they would probably have perished in the cradle.

'Engaged as I am', writes Mr. Francis, 'in the day to day business of the Bibliographical Society, I find it hard to realise that I met Pollard on only two occasions, so deeply and vividly do I seem to feel his personality in every department of its activities. There was a sureness and a familiarity, amounting almost to virtuosity, in the way he handled the Society's affairs.' The 'Bibliographical Society' was in fact his child in everything but its begetting; for though founded in July 1892, it did not come under Pollard's direction until October 1893, and he had deliberately refrained from joining it earlier. It is not difficult to guess why. In his account twenty-one years afterwards¹ of the Society's origins he writes charmingly, if with the suspicion of

¹ *Trans. of the Bib. Soc.*, 1913-15.

a twinkle in his eye, about W. A. Copinger, its founder and first President. But, to judge from the extracts given by Mr. Francis,¹ his letters to Copinger in 1893 and 1894 were not intended to charm, though of course entirely polite. They make it clear that he undertook the secretaryship with the greatest possible reluctance and at a time when he was already so busy he scarcely knew how to turn round; that having undertaken it he was determined to run the Society in his own way; and that, realizing his President had a thoroughly woolly mind,² he adopted towards him from the outset the sharp and pointed style to which alone wool might be expected to respond. Talbot Baines Reed the first Secretary had fallen ill, and Copinger wrote to Pollard at the beginning of August offering him the secretaryship. Pollard left the offer a month unanswered, and, when, in response to an urgent appeal from Baines Reed he at last replied, his letter, almost brusque and exceedingly business-like, named the terms, and concluded: 'I am quite aware that you may think these conditionings arrogant, but my time is my one valuable possession and I can't risk having to imitate Talbot Baines Reed in taking a six months' holiday.' As Pollard's salary at the Museum was at that date still less than £250 p.a. and he had a wife and three children to keep, what he says about the value of his time was only the bare truth. But he knew very well that Copinger could not do without him, and he made up his mind to have the whip hand of him from the outset. To what effect he used the whip may be seen from Mr. Francis's other quotation, this time from a letter about a year later. Copinger had promised a paper on incunabula for his presidential address in December 1894, and then changed his mind; upon which his Hon. Secretary writes:

I am bitterly disappointed at the proposed subject of your address at the Annual Meeting. As I have already told you, I have set my face against all schemes, plans, suggestions for work, treatises on method etc. During its first year the Society produced nothing but these and did not get on in consequence. To have to announce a Presidential address on 'Work for Authors with a Bibliographical Tendency' is a personal rebuff, and a great disappointment to me in my work. I am neglecting my private business in order to further the interests of the Society, and

¹ The *Library*, 4th ser., xxv. 83-4.

² Scholderer (*Studies in Retrospect*, p. 40) notes that Copinger's chief contribution to bibliography, the *Supplement to Hain* (1895-1902) 'came in for severe but just reprehension' in Pollard's *Bibliographica* (vol. ii) 'as a compilation insufficiently critical of its sources and therefore likely to be rather an obstacle than a help to progress'.

I take it very hardly that you can not make time to knock up a paper on the excellent subject you proposed some time back.

The letter illustrates not only the forceful side of Pollard's character but also his general attitude towards bibliographical and literary problems. He was interested in getting things done, and not much in general theories about the nature and purpose of bibliography; in bibliographical works rather than in the bibliographical faith. Yet when driven by stupid misrepresentation to defend the activities of a fellow bibliographer, his 'lovable and inspiring friend' Robert Proctor, he could already in 1903 recite a bibliographical creed which implied, if its modest wording did not actually express, most of the claims since made for it. A Mr. J. D. Brown, Borough Librarian of Islington, annoyed that the Bibliographical Society was not making itself useful to borough librarians 'by providing students of all kinds with complete or selective bibliographies of every useful subject, properly annotated and indexed', foolishly consented to pour forth in the pages of the *Library* his scorn of those who frittered away their time in quarrelling over blank leaves, printers' signatures, the typographical mysteries of the fifteenth century, and such-like 'egotistical hobbies'. Pollard's reply is still fun to read, and must have delighted Proctor and the Society when it appeared in April 1903. But its main interest for us now is what he says about the purpose of Bibliography. 'The business of the bibliographer', he states, is 'primarily and essentially the enumeration of books. His is the lowly task of finding out what books exist, and thereby helping to secure their preservation. . . . When the bibliographer has brought books to light and printed lists of them, whether chronologically . . . or under their authors, I submit that he has done a great part of what can reasonably be expected of him.' This, which is obviously inspired by Proctor's classical work on incunabula, was in turn to inspire Pollard's own classical *Short Title Catalogue*. Upon 'what remains over when this great part has been accomplished' he finds space for the mention of two points only: first, that the history of typography, which Proctor was illuminating, was not only important in itself as a contribution to knowledge, but likely to have beneficial effects upon modern printing; and, second, that so long as literature in order to be communicated has to take material form, so long will it be to the advantage of the little world which cares for literature that every point which concerns this material form should be carefully and thoroughly investigated. It may even be that an examination of the 'quads and quoins of Aldus' [a sneer of

Brown's] may possess as much real literary interest as a new disquisition on the relations of Shelley and Harriet Westbrook, or whether George IV did or did not behave shabbily to Sheridan on his death-bed.¹

This second claim, supported by instances of the bewilderment and pitfalls that beset literary editors ignorant of the elements of bibliography, is, I think, the earliest statement of the right of Bibliography to be regarded as an instrument of textual criticism though to some extent anticipated by the definition of Bibliography as 'the grammar of literary investigation' which is quoted from an unnamed source in Copinger's first presidential address.

But getting things done was always Pollard's main preoccupation, and the first thing was to get the Society going, as Mr. Francis shows.² He succeeded, mainly owing to three shrewd moves, which illustrate at once his business acumen and his knowledge of human nature. One of his first steps as Secretary was to induce the Council to announce its intention of closing the roll on 21 May 1894; an action which had the desired effect of causing a large accession of new members, 'the majority of whom would otherwise never have joined' as Pollard explained twenty years later;

seeing that in the case of every society with at all a reasonable programme, there exists a large body of potential members, who have no objection to paying their guineas, but who, as long as they know the door will always be open, continue to sit outside, with the placid intention of walking in a little later on.

A second cause of the Society's success was its Illustrated Monographs, which were apparently largely if not entirely of Pollard's design,³ were of course expensive to produce, but were well worth the cost since they furnished members with a number of very fine volumes as tangible evidence of the benefit of belonging to the Society. And lastly there was the *News Sheet*, which Pollard, directly he became Secretary, substituted for the postcard on which notices of meetings had hitherto been announced.

This characteristic Pollard production [writes Francis] exhibits in a charming fashion his urbanity, his ready pen, his easy familiarity. He carried on the *News Sheet* uninterruptedly from February 1894 to January 1920, only giving up when the Society, by taking over the *Library*, provided itself with a regular means of communication with its members.

¹ The *Library* 2nd ser., iv. 161-2.

² *Studies in Retrospect*, pp. 7-8.

³ The earliest of them, which set the model for the rest, 'gave me', he tells us, 'an opportunity for a pretty piece of book-building' (*Sketch*, 12).

It was his 'own idea' to start with and it was his sole responsibility (he wrote 138 out of the 140 numbers) from first to last. He was rightly proud of it and laid it aside with regrets that there was not a monthly 'News Sheet evening' during five months of the year.¹

At the end of the nineteenth century Pollard's foster-child the Bibliographical Society, now nine years old, could boast of a full roll of members and a noble row of Illustrated Monographs, together with other publications, including five volumes of *Transactions*. At the same date, the *Library*, after completing its tenth volume, had started a fresh series with Pollard's name on the title-page as co-editor. Thus, largely under his inspiration and guidance, though he himself owed much in inspiration and instruction to his daily intercourse with Robert Proctor, the preceding decade had seen a great advance in bibliographical studies in this country and particularly the accumulation in the publications just named of a considerable amount of fresh or freshly interpreted bibliographical material. So far, however, from resting on these laurels, he made the year 1900 the occasion for issuing a new challenge to the Society's members. In retrospect, thirteen years later, he remarks that, though at this time in a very flourishing condition, the Society had 'one undeniable and very awkward fact . . . to face. It had issued nine Illustrated Monographs, which had cost about half its income, and not one of these had been concerned with an English subject.' And in its other publications, he continues, 'our English work was meagre and miscellaneous, in fact almost scrappy'.² It was with thoughts like this in mind, no doubt, that he had written in the *News Sheet* for June 1900:

So many of the Society's publications have dealt with foreign subjects, that papers on points of English book-lore would be especially welcome.

Upon which Francis comments:

By good luck or good management—looking back it is difficult not to believe that good luck followed on good management—the Society was able to change its course into channels which have led directly to the fields of its greatest successes.³

The challenge in the *News Sheet*, and the response it met with, undoubtedly mark the turning-point in the development of bibliographical studies. Pollard's 'good management' of a decade was now crowned by a stroke of great 'good luck'. For we may

¹ The *Library*, 4th ser., xxv. 84.

² *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society*, xiii. 18.

³ The *Library*, 4th ser., xxv. 85.

be pretty sure that what he wrote in June 1900 had some relation to the fact that a year before a young Cambridge man of 24, named Walter Wilson Greg, had submitted for publication by the Society *A list of English Plays written before 1643 and published before 1700*, to use the title under which the list was published early in 1900. Pollard indeed himself implies it, when he writes in his *Sketch*:

If I remembered the day on which the offer was received it ought certainly to be printed in red both in my private calendar and in that of the Society, which up to that time had concerned itself almost exclusively with foreign printing and book-illustration. Thanks to Dr. Greg and his Cambridge friend, Dr. McKerrow, who just then was in Japan and joined the Society a year or two later, the work of the Society thenceforth became predominantly English.

Yet Greg, discussing the same historical point, hands the laurels back to Pollard. Remarking that 'the importance of bibliographical investigation for literary and particularly textual studies' was not fully recognized 'till the early years of the present century', he continues:

I think that the real pioneer of this movement was A. W. Pollard. He was probably the first instance of a scholar versed in the editing of English texts who was also a trained bibliographer; but though it was inevitable, or at any rate natural, that realization of a fruitful connexion between his two lines of study should come to him, it seems to have come almost unconsciously. Cautious and conservative,¹ he never flaunted it as a new discovery; but he quietly impressed on others the need in all textual matters of never losing sight of the actual pieces of paper or parchment upon which the words of an author had been preserved, or of the material processes of transmission.²

'Britain', a foreigner once remarked to me, 'is the only country where two men will pause at a doorway, each waiting for the other to go first'; and the truth surely about this doorway, which happens to be the main entrance to modern English textual criticism, is that Pollard and Greg went through it arm in arm with McKerrow immediately behind.

As undergraduates in the 'nineties at Trinity College, Cambridge, Greg and McKerrow had discussed together the editing of Elizabethan drama and the textual problems involved, discussions which 'often lasted into the small hours' and were continued 'on the Grantchester grind'.³ What first led them to

¹ On this see below, p. 292.

² *Studies in Retrospect*, p. 28.

³ 'Ronald Brunlees McKerrow', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1940, p. 49.

contemplate that particular line of study Greg does not tell us in his memoir of McKerrow. But it is a fair guess that the example of Aldis Wright, their own Vice-Master and the presence in the college library of one of the finest and richest collections of Shakespearian Quartos in the world, backed by a very useful if miscellaneous body of fifteenth-, sixteenth-, and seventeenth-century English books, provided one incentive; and that another came to them from London in the *Library* and the publications of the Bibliographical Society. The very fact indeed that the latter had up to then been mainly concerned with incunabula and foreign printers would of itself suggest to eager and youthful scholars, with the spirits of Capell and Aldis Wright prompting them, that great things might be in store for those who carried bibliographical inquiry forward into the age of Shakespeare. Not that the harvest of the earlier field was yet carried. Its extent and variety had only recently been revealed in Proctor's *Index* (1898); and after Proctor's untimely death in 1903, Pollard's main official task for the next ten years, as we have seen, was that of 'planning and directing the early volumes of the great *Catalogue of Books printed in the XV Century now in the British Museum*'.¹ How much Greg's conception of bibliography and his achievements in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century bibliography owe to Proctor, Pollard, and the *Catalogue* for which they were in the main responsible, appears from an eloquent paragraph on the subject in his chapter of *Retrospect*, which culminates in the sentence 'It was the work of the incunabulists, and of those who followed their lead, that transformed bibliography from a study the main interest of which was artistic to one governed by the method of scientific enquiry.'²

One way of writing Pollard's life would be to consider it as a series of friendships with scholars younger than himself. Sometimes he had two or three of such friendships going at the same time; and almost always, while his chief function was discussion and encouragement of the scholar's particular problems in the light of his own wide general experience, he took a hand at some time or other in the attempt to solve them. And in the matter of help, as one who received much of it well expresses it to me, 'not only did he respond, he initiated, i.e. he made opportunities for those younger friends of his, and for their work, before they asked: he *thought* about them and their work, transferring to them what he might have concentrated on his sons.' Of such friendships those with Robert Proctor and W. W. Greg were far

¹ *Sketch*, p. 13.

² *Studies in Retrospect*, p. 27.

the most important and productive, both for himself and for English scholarship. By a strange fatality it happened that he lost Proctor very shortly after he first came to know Greg, so that Greg was in a sense Proctor's successor. McKerrow, moreover, returning from Japan in 1900, and settling in London, made up the famous trio, who spent much of their life at the Museum; and, in Professor F. P. Wilson's words, 'made that library and its neighbouring restaurants—especially during the summer migration from America—the best centre for Elizabethan studies in the world'; while, as the same writer notes, 'so close was their co-operation, so frequent their consultations, that in their early writings it is sometimes impossible to disentangle the work of one from that of another'.¹

Pollard seems to have been led to take a hand himself with the problems of Shakespeare's text by two distinct occurrences. First, two 'charming little fat volumes' arrived from different sources at the British Museum, one in 1902 and the other in 1906, both belonging to the early seventeenth century and containing nine Shakespearian or pseudo-Shakespearian Quartos; and these volumes were so strikingly similar in appearance as to suggest to the trained eye of Pollard that someone sometime before 1623 had made an attempt to issue a collected edition of the plays in anticipation of the appearance of the First Folio. Secondly, the Oxford University Press published in 1902 a facsimile of the First Folio with an ignorant and magisterial introduction by Sidney Lee, which provoked Greg to a severe review wherein the real nature of the problems involved in an attempt to define the copy of Shakespeare's original texts was for the first time envisaged, if only in part. Pollard put his discovery about the nine Quartos on record together with a tentative explanation in the hope of obtaining, he tells us, further evidence on the matter. He received not only further evidence but further facts as well, which last were pointed out, in the main by Greg, and so led to the framing of a more satisfactory explanation of the publication, now accepted by all as one of the main pillars of Shakespearian textual theory. It was, too, Greg's remark on the 'copy' for the Folio in his review of Lee that obviously set

¹ *Studies in Retrospect*, p. 76. I should like to take this opportunity of acknowledging my debt, both in the compilation of this brief memoir and in my general understanding of the origins of the bibliographical study of Shakespeare, to this masterly historical essay. If what I have to say here bears a slightly different emphasis, it is because I have to view the subject mainly from the angle of the senior partner of the trio.

Pollard thinking along lines leading in the end to the publication in 1909 of his *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos*, which Methuen commissioned him to write as an Introduction to the facsimiles of the four Shakespeare folios that they issued shortly afterwards. The observation or establishment of facts and the framing of a provisional theory to account for them; the discovery of additional facts irreconcilable with this theory; the framing of a better theory to cover the better-known textual situation: such is the path things took at the beginning and the path they have gone since—the path of all scientific development. But while Pollard and Greg thus played into each other's hands, they did so the more successfully because of the difference in their spirits and the diversity of their gifts, a difference and diversity which help, I think, to explain the problem which some have found puzzling, of their respective shares in the preparation of the last-named book, which, appearing under Pollard's name in 1909, was at once recognized as epoch-making to use a much abused term, and, though some of its conclusions have since been modified, will always rank as the *Instauratio Magna* of modern English textual criticism.

As to the book itself Pollard acknowledges in the Preface his 'deep obligations' to his friend 'for constant help and sympathy', and continues:

In some sections of this study Mr. Greg and I have been fellow-hunters, communicating our results to each other at every stage, so that our respective responsibilities for them have become hopelessly entangled. In others he has been distinctly my leader. If it had not been for his ungrudging permission to use his work as my own, I should have been hampered at every turn. For the final presentation of my case I alone am responsible, but he has spared no pains to keep me in the right path, and without his comradeship I should never have finished my task.

When we view the acrimony and jealousies which have characterized so much of English scholarship in the past, these words are as revolutionary in temper as the chapters that follow them are in their conclusions. Pollard, ever ready to help others without stint, was equally anxious when himself a borrower to give full credit for the debt. Yet we must not abuse his generosity and habit of self-effacement by pressing his words too far. I did not know him in 1909; but we had endless talks later about things Shakespearian, in which *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos*, for which I did not disguise my admiration, was of necessity often referred to. And he never gave me the slightest indication that

(apart of course from the chapter on the Quartos of 1619, in which his obligations to others are laid bare step by step as the argument proceeds) the book as a whole was not his in form and substance and conception, as a man of his frank and generous nature must have done had matters been otherwise. That in writing it he was inspired to some extent by Greg's review of Lee in 1903, which probably first revealed to him the weakness of Lee's position,¹ is unquestioned. But that review contains no treatment of the old copyright system, except a confession that 'we know very little about it', no hint of the capital distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Quartos,² and no discussion of Heminge and Condell's preface to the Folio, which are the principal topics of Pollard's book. And, when all is said, no one who knew Pollard's mind can doubt that the book is his or fail to recognize, as his also, the robust humanity which breathes from it. To repeat words I wrote twenty-three years ago:

If I were asked to say how the new criticism chiefly differs from the old I should not think first of bibliographical methods, or of the way in which our accumulated knowledge of the Elizabethan theatre has been brought to bear upon textual problems; I should single out something much simpler and more fundamental. It is that belief in the essential integrity of ordinary human nature which, like the English law, regards a man innocent until he has been proved guilty. Acting on this faith, Mr. Pollard has refused to believe three gloomy doctrines of the old criticism: (1) that all the quartos printed before 1623 were stolen and surreptitious; (2) that most of the textual idiosyncrasies of the Quarto and Folio texts were to be put down to drunken aberrations of Elizabethan and Jacobean compositors; and (3) that Heminge and Condell were either knaves in league with Jaggard to hoodwink a gullible public, or else fools who did know how to pen a preface. And by refusing to believe these things he has rediscovered Shakespeare's manuscripts for us and much besides, at which as yet we can only guess.³

¹ Pollard's friendly welcome to the Oxford facsimile in 'Notes on Books' (*The Library*, Jan. 1903) shows that he was at first unaware of the misleading character of Lee's introduction, which he had probably merely glanced at. Lee was a distinguished member of the Bibliographical Society, which explains the Hon. Secretary's request that the review should be 'polite', though I can see a twinkle in his eye as he made it, since Greg was at that date the *enfant terrible* of English scholarship and had recently served up Churton Collins as a Thyestean repast to readers of the *Modern Language Review*.

² Pollard was, I think, quite unconscious that he had been partly anticipated here by Halliwell-Phillipps, who was himself unconsciously following Capell, or that Halliwell-Phillipps had been before him in a discussion of Heminge and Condell's preface.

³ pp. 76-7, *Studies in the First Folio*, 1924, ed. by Sir I. Gollancz.

That still seems to me, and, I believe, to many other scholars, what *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos* stands for in the history of Shakespearian criticism; and if it does not speak the whole truth about the book and its origins it undoubtedly reaches the heart of the truth.

One of the difficulties of writing the history of a rapidly developing branch of research, like the transformation of Shakespearian studies by the 'new bibliography', or indeed of writing history of any kind, is that fresh advances or significant events generally look very different in retrospect from what they seemed at the time; and yet it is often their impact upon contemporary minds which determines their real place in the chain of causation. Some of Pollard's textual theories are now superseded by better ones or have been put out of court by the discovery of facts which he could not then have known. Yet many of these even, by stimulating research in new directions or provoking healthy discussion, have played their part in the rearing of that structure which is taking shape as modern textual scholarship. In this slight attempt to estimate what he did for his generation it may therefore be useful, and is certainly only fair, to see how he stood in the eyes of an authoritative critic ten years after the publication of the book just mentioned. Here then is what Greg wrote in 1919; and it serves better than any words of mine to round off this section of my memoir.

It was the year 1909 that saw the publication of Mr. A. W. Pollard's handsome volume on *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos*, by far the most systematic and critical work that had yet appeared on the subject and one that marked the opening of a new era in Shakespearian studies. This was hardly recognized at the time, since much of the material was descriptive merely and few perceived that the Author's acute criticism of the Good and Bad Quartos upset many of the most cherished superstitions of Shakespearian editors. For Mr. Pollard, once his innate conservatism has been overcome, proves himself one of the most revolutionary of bomb-throwers, and the considerations, thus unostentatiously advanced, forced us to reconsider all traditional views regarding the transmission of Shakespeare's text, while the author was probably aware, though he was too modest to say, that this purely bibliographical problem of transmission is nine-tenths of the battle in textual criticism.

For some years after this no work of first-rate importance appeared, but investigation was nevertheless quietly proceeding in several directions. It was in 1916 that this bore fruit. In the purely descriptive field Mr. Pollard and Miss Henrietta Bartlett, in *A Census of Shakespeare's Plays in Quarto*, did for Shakespeare Quartos what Sir Sidney Lee had done years before for the First Folio. Of greater significance, however,

was a little square volume that appeared the same year containing a facsimile of *A New Shakespeare Quarto: Richard II, 1598*, in an elaborate introduction to which Mr. Pollard made some very pretty textual investigations, and incidentally directed fresh attention to the admirable pamphlet on *Shakespearian Punctuation* compiled in 1911 by Mr. Percy Simpson with the assistance of Mr. R. W. Chapman.

Meanwhile in 1915 Mr. Pollard had delivered at Cambridge four lectures as Sandars Reader in Bibliography . . . printed in the *Library* for 1916 and republished the following year as *Shakespeare's Fight with the Pirates and the Problem of the Transmission of his Text*. In these at once sober and brilliant papers Mr. Pollard pursued his investigation of the Good and Bad Quartos, dealing with the occasion and extent of piracy, the form and condition of dramatic manuscripts, and the nature of the copy for the Shakespearian Quartos. The central conclusion to which he leads his readers is nothing less than the probability that some at least of the first quartos of Shakespeare's plays were set up from Shakespeare's own autograph manuscripts, and the certainty that the majority are at least very much nearer to those manuscripts than critics have generally suspected or editors ever allowed. The far-reaching consequences of such a conclusion will be obvious to all. . . .

Another event upon which those interested in Shakespeare may congratulate themselves was the delivery by Mr. Pollard of a course of bibliographical lectures at King's College, London. This gave him the opportunity of piloting a small class through several interesting problems in the bibliography of Shakespeare, and some of the more important and permanent results achieved were set forth in two articles on 'The York and Lancaster Plays in the Folio Shakespeare', which appeared in September 1918 in *The Times Literary Supplement*. The same journal further published in January and March 1919 three important articles headed 'The "Stolen and Surreptitious" Shakespearian Texts' in which Mr. Pollard and Mr. Dover Wilson, working in collaboration, attacked the problems why and how some of Shakespeare's plays were pirated and illustrated their contentions by an investigation into the text of *Henry V*. In August and September appeared two further articles dealing with the *Merry Wives* and *Romeo and Juliet*. . . .

Scores of able critics in the fields of classical and sacred literature, and a few in that of English, have attacked the problems, and to some extent explored the principles, of text-transmission. But what has seldom been fully realised, and never, I believe, explicitly stated, is the fact that both text-transmission and even certain features of the so-called higher criticism are at bottom a purely bibliographical problem, to be attacked by strictly bibliographical methods, and only to be solved by an adequate understanding of bibliographical conditions. Herein lies the importance of Mr. Pollard's work; for it is only when the true nature of a problem is apprehended that systematic investigation can replace more or less fortuitous, even if acute, guesswork; and once the conditions of the

problems are laid bare all sorts of lines and methods of investigation suggest themselves, which could never previously have been suspected.

The science of Critical Bibliography has been fortunate in having for its founder one to whom years of official work and private adventure have made the technical details of bibliography a second nature; whose mind, if diffident of entering on novel speculations, pursues any trail on which it sets out with remorseless logic and unflagging ardour, yet with constant balance and candour; and who possesses a literary style in lucidity and flexibility admirably fitted for the exposition of minute and often complicated argument.¹

Much has happened and many new things have been discovered since this was written; yet I doubt whether the writer would wish to alter the general lines of his appreciation if he were asked to bring it up to date. The only point I would question is the reference, twice made, to Pollard's innate conservatism; and I can remember being slightly amused at the time when the article was first published by a passage elsewhere in it which represented the reverend Keeper of Printed Books, as Pollard became in 1919, being led into dangerous courses by a headstrong disciple called Dover Wilson. I have heard him *talk about* his conservatism in a quizzical fashion; but I never saw any signs of it. And I find more than one of his friends would agree. An Elizabethan scholar, who was probably more intimate with him than I was and certainly saw more of him during the last twenty years of his life, writes:*

I never knew anyone of his generation less given to conservatism of mind than he was or more ready to grasp and respond to a new idea. Intellectually he was too robust to be conservative; he did not need to be; and he had too much humour.

Anyhow, though I should find it hard now to distinguish his ideas from mine in the work we did together during 1918-19, I am quite certain that Safety First was the motto of neither partner. But then I only knew him after the death of his sons had taught him that if one wished to get things done in this imperfect world, even in the narrow field of bibliography, one must take risks, often great risks. In our joint attack upon the problem of the Bad Quartos (for he was deeply involved in the second of two articles on *Hamlet*, 1603, which appeared under my name in the *Library* for 1918, as well as sharing in the *Literary Supplement* articles above mentioned), we took such risks with our eyes open. The theories we then advanced, except for a stray suggestion here and there, are now as dead as mutton. Yet

¹ *Modern Language Review*, xiv. 383.

when in 1919 Robert Steele hailed those published in the *Supplement* as 'the most important advance in Shakespearian textual criticism yet made', and Greg agreed in the article I have quoted above, their praise, though rashly enthusiastic, was not altogether beside the mark. For I think it is fair to claim that, themselves owing much to Greg's edition of the 1602 Quarto of *The Merry Wives* (1910), they proved the main stimulus to far greater advances in this particular sphere. I refer to Greg's classical monograph on *Alcazar and Orlando* (1923), which he did us the honour of dedicating to us, to Alexander's notable *Shakespeare's 'Henry VI' and 'Richard III'* (1929), and to a later and I think scarcely less important essay, *The 'Bad' Quarto of Hamlet* (1941), in which G. I. Duthie, a former student of mine, 'thoroughly demolished', once again to quote Greg, who wrote a preface to the book, 'the elaborate structure erected with such superabundant subtlety' twenty-three years earlier. By 1941 Pollard had mostly given up reading books; but I was able to tell him about this one and its author. It pleased him to hear he had a promising grandson and to think that the field in which we had sown wild oats in 1918 was producing such excellent wheat.

In June 1919 I found myself committed to the preparation of a complete edition of Shakespeare for the Cambridge University Press. I should certainly not have added this burden to an already heavy load of official duties had I not felt that Pollard was behind me. I consulted him at every step, and still have letters from him on the problem of abbreviations, which was being bedevilled at the moment by the metrical theories of a wild man called Bayfield, with whom (because he was a lonely soul) Pollard had struck up a friendship, and on the more difficult problem of translating the punctuation of the original texts into a form acceptable to the general reader; while I find among my papers a typescript copy of my Textual Introduction with three or four alterations and additions, all later incorporated, in Pollard's handwriting: evidently he then accepted its various sections as fair statements of the position as understood at that date. I also possess an earlier letter written to me shortly after I received the proposal from Cambridge, from which I may quote a few sentences, as an illustration of his common sense.

I don't think you will ever produce a standard text of Shakespeare. I hope you won't, as it would mean giving up too much of your life to it. If the Cambridge Press wanted you to produce a real standard text to cut out the Globe and any rivals to it you would have to give at least

ten years to it.¹ But you ought to be able to produce a provisional text which will be better than anything existing, though not sufficiently demonstrably so to cut 'em all out. Three bits of advice: (1) Don't accept or refuse any fee they offer till you've consulted me; (2) reserve your freedom to produce another text if you please later on; (3) get all the advice you can as to textual principles before starting, but don't try to edit Shakespeare by a committee.

One vivid moment stands out in my recollection of those years. He often spent part of his summer holidays with me and my family. One afternoon we were seated together on the sands at Hunstanton, and I was reading, rather sleepily, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in the Furnivall facsimile of the Fisher Quarto, when the significance of the mislineation at the beginning of Act V suddenly flashed upon me. We were both instantly awake; and he later translated our glee into seemly 'go-to-press' prose as follows:

Thus we can look over Shakespeare's shoulder, not only when he is in the first heat of inspiration, but also when he is revising, though in truth in this case he seems to have been better inspired in his second thoughts than in his first. Such a nugget is not likely to be found very often, but to have lighted on even one of this size and quality must hearten any literary goldminer to seek for others.²

He called the nugget mine; but 'handy-dandy', as Lear says, had he been holding the book the discovery might have been his.

Pollard was appointed Keeper of Printed Books in 1919, and for the next five and a half years he had no time for anything but occasional essays on Shakespeare. 'At present', he wrote to me in October of that year, 'when I am home from the B.M., a batch of business letters usually carries me on to 10 p.m., and then I think it's too late to do anything. How I used to get in an average of 3½ hours a night homework is now a marvel to me.' But there were compensations, for he writes a month later:

I've had two energetic days at the B.M., and was vastly pleased yesterday morning by the news that the Museum Clerks Association had held a meeting and voted to accept my ruling on the overtime question, and had also passed a vote of thanks for the care and trouble I had taken in answering them!!! Today I've held a Committee on which were my three probable successors in the Keepership and obtained their assent to a policy as to the spending of our grant for Bookbinding (now £16,500) which I hope will thus be consistently carried out for the next twenty years!

¹ I think that ten years later he would have agreed that this period was too short by twenty years.

² *Shakespeare's Fight with the Pirates* (2nd ed.), p. xxvi.

The hard-driven Keeper managed to supply a new Introduction in April 1920 for the second edition of his *Fight with the Pirates*, which appeared as the opening volume of a 'Shakespeare Problems Series' to be published by the Cambridge University Press under our joint editorship. In this he made a brief survey of recent advances in textual criticism, and outlined the procedure we proposed to follow. Once again I quote what seem to me the salient passages.

Some apology is perhaps needed for one who has already written, or helped in writing, four books on Shakespeare bibliography, now taking part in planning a new series of booklets on the same subject. The best plea in mitigation that can be offered is that one bit of work has led to another, often with the help of an idea borrowed from a friend, and that in a research so largely new it is only by taking one step at a time that any sure progress can be made.

And he reinforces this point in his conclusion, which runs:

By dealing with them [the problems of Shakespeare's text] in separate booklets we hope to continue to advance safely, step by step, and to use the experience gained from the problems of one group in dealing with those of another. It is all pioneer work and we ask for the indulgence which pioneers may fairly claim and which up to the present we gratefully acknowledge has been most generously extended to us.

The word 'safely' was, I think, inserted in this second passage as a humorous hint to both editors; and if the younger one has not always taken it, 'Step by step' was his motto from the beginning and still is. One of the volumes in the series was to have contained a thorough revision of the articles on the 'Stolen and Surreptitious Texts', for which Greg's *Alcazar and Orlando* offered a splendid lead in 1923; but we were both busy officials with scanty leisure for scholarship, and the opportunity never came. Pollard, indeed, never again wrote anything on Shakespeare except lectures and articles, including two on the general problems of the text, viz. the British Academy lecture of 1923 and his contribution to *A Companion to Shakespeare Studies* edited by Granville-Barker and Harrison in 1934. Yet his personal influence may be seen or felt in nearly all the new Shakespearian developments of this period. He wrestled manfully with the stubborn spirit of M. A. Bayfield on the subject of versification; he encouraged and believed in J. A. Fort's theory of the Sonnets, with Southampton as the 'fair youth', so that Sir Edmund Chambers's adherence to the Pembroke theory in his *William Shakespeare* came as 'a real blow' to him in 1930 and one he

returned with interest;¹ Muriel St. Clare Byrne acknowledged in the Preface to her *Elizabethan Life in Town and Country* (1925), 'his unfailing encouragement, criticism and help during eight years of Elizabethan research'; similarly Caroline Spurgeon confessed that in the later stages of her work on *Shakespeare's Imagery* (1935), 'the enthusiastic interest and encouragement of my friend Mr. A. W. Pollard have been untold help and support to me, as has also his experienced and wise counsel';² he became one of Harold Child's consultants for letters and articles on Shakespeare offered to the *Literary Supplement* and was thus able to assist Signor Orsini in bringing to the notice of English scholars his important discoveries about the use of stenography in the pirating of plays;³ he secured for the 'Shakespeare Problems Series' *A Study of 'Love's Labour's Lost'* (1935), the first of Miss Frances Yates's essays on the influence of the foreign academies upon Elizabethan literature; and there must be many other students to whom he held out a hand.

But more important than any of these ministrations was the support he lent to two major events in Shakespeare criticism at this period. The preface to *Shakespeare's Handwriting* published by Maunde Thompson in 1916 concludes 'with the fullest expression of my obligations to my old friend and sometime colleague Mr. Alfred William Pollard, whose wide knowledge of Shakespearian bibliography and literature is so willingly imparted to those who seek his help'. Maunde Thompson's claim that three pages in the manuscript play of *Sir Thomas More* (Harleian MS. 7368) were in the hand of Shakespeare himself, resting as it did upon a single, if eminent, palaeographer's 'general impression' of the six indubitable signatures, was unlikely to win assent even with experts, unless it could find support from other lines of evidence. But Pollard at once recognized its capital significance; encouraged me to explore the spellings and misprints of the 'good quartos' to see whether they threw any light upon the problem, with results which were announced in a joint paper read before the Bibliographical Society on 16 December 1918; secured the consent of the Keeper of Manuscripts for the exhibition of two of the pages concerned in a museum show-case with a label containing the words: 'One of these passages, of which the open pages form part, may well, it

¹ See his review of Chambers in the *Library*, xi. 380-1.

² *Shakespeare's Imagery*, p. viii.

³ *Times Literary Supplement*, 4 Dec., and 11 Dec. 1930; the *Library*, 4th ser. xiv. 313-38, 351-2.

has been suggested, be an *autograph* composition of Shakespeare's; used this exhibition as the occasion for an unsigned article ventilating the whole matter, which appeared in the *Literary Supplement* on 24 April 1919; and finally set to work organizing the publication of a collection of essays illustrating different aspects of the problem which appeared in 'Shakespeare Problems Series' in 1923, with contributions from himself, Greg, Maunde Thompson, myself, and above all from R. W. Chambers, who wrote a brilliant chapter on 'The Expression of Ideas—particularly Political Ideas—in the Three Pages and in Shakespeare', which did more to convert the ordinary Shakespearian than all the palaeographical and bibliographical arguments put together. Not that the scepticism which greeted the original statement of Maunde Thompson's thesis was altogether silenced. Indeed, Pollard claimed no more for the book than that its object was 'to strengthen the evidence'. Yet as time went on the claim seems to have been accepted by a wider and wider circle of scholars, and the appearance of *Shakespeare's Hand in the Play of 'Sir Thomas More'* is seen to have been almost as great a landmark as that of *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos* fourteen years before. Once again Pollard had got things done.

The other outstanding contribution to Shakespearian studies in this decade has already been mentioned, viz. Mr. (now Professor) Alexander's *Shakespeare's 'Henry VI' and 'Richard III'* (1929), which likewise appeared in the Shakespeare Problems Series and with an Introduction by Pollard. The book was, like others of its kind, an expansion of a preliminary investigation printed, doubtless on Pollard's recommendation, as two articles in the *Literary Supplement*¹ of 9 October and 13 November 1924. These articles, writes Pollard in the Introduction to the book, 'started a correspondence between us on 1-3 *Henry VI* and *Richard III*, with a view to a joint study of them as one of the "Shakespeare Problems" in this series. In the end the book has been written by Mr. Alexander alone, under a fire of criticism from myself, and my task is reduced to writing this introduction.' What history lies behind these words only Professor Alexander could tell us. For my present purpose it is enough to note that nothing shows more clearly the suppleness and resilience of Pollard's mind—the terms 'conservative' and 'revolutionary' are equally irrelevant

¹ e.g. Greg's *Alcazar and Orlando* was preceded by a similar kite in the *Literary Supplement*, which under the editorship of Sir Bruce Richmond played an important part in presenting the 'new bibliography' to the general literary public.

because both imply mental rigidity—than his ready acceptance of Alexander's views, and the Introduction he wrote in support of them. For in protesting against Malone's assertion that Shakespeare began his career as a dramatist by revising the plays of other men, Alexander laid his axe at the root not only of a basic assumption upon which most scholars had proceeded since Malone's day, but of one of the main props in the hypothetical structure Pollard and I had together erected in our attempt to explain the Bad Shakespearian Quartos.

If Mr. Alexander is right [the first section of Pollard's Introduction concludes], we must . . . argue from the text of 2 and 3 *Henry VI* as it stands in the Folio and from nothing else, and with no prepossession whatever in favour of the theory that Shakespeare was in the habit of rehandling other men's plays. We must in fact start afresh.

And having thus recalled us all to scratch, he proceeded to get quick off the mark himself by launching forth into an entirely new theory of Shakespeare's activities before 1594. That, partly owing to *my* innate conservatism, I have hitherto preserved an agnostic attitude towards this theory and have not followed Alexander as far along the road as he did, only makes me more conscious of his open-mindedness and ever-young buoyancy of spirit.

Yet as it happened this Introduction was the last thing but one he was to write on Shakespeare or on any subject apart from a few reviews and the *Sketch* and *Reminiscences* above spoken of. And even this was in the nature of an aftermath. By 1929 he had reached his seventieth year, and though in conversation his mind seemed as fresh and as active as ever, it clearly grew less productive, as the entries in the *Select Bibliography* show. The year 1926 in fact probably marks the end of a phase; for in June of that year he lost the inspiration and support of his wife Alice; and then, turning as ten years before to sheer drudgery as an anodyne for pain, he carried through to completion the great book by which his name is best known throughout the world, *A Short Title Catalogue of Books printed in England, Scotland and Ireland and of English Books printed abroad, 1475-1640*. Either event, each after a different fashion, was an experience that might have aged any man. *S.T.C.*, as it became known from the first, was originally projected by him in a paper entitled *Plans for Bibliographical Work on the Sixteenth Century*, read before the Bibliographical Society on 21 January 1918. As usual in retrospect he made light of the affair after his humorous fashion. 'The Hon. Secretary, having failed to find anyone else to read a paper

on this afternoon, had been obliged to produce one himself.' He accordingly announced a subject, 'but his energies having just been rather exhausted in ransacking the Printed Books Department at the British Museum for rarities to be conveyed to the place of safety from air-attacks' the material for the paper turned out to be 'much less copious than he had anticipated'. So the Preface to *S.T.C.* opens and then goes on:

Very little was said as to the results of his incomplete researches; it was easier to occupy fifty minutes in plans for future work, so he demonstrated, readily enough, that with the catalogues already in print, if only information as to the early English books in the Bodleian could be made available, the way lay open for a 'short-title handlist' of extant English books of the sixteenth century, 'leaving a full-dress catalogue to be produced when we know enough to make a good one.' There was an interesting little discussion, and the Secretary went home, secretarially satisfied that he had done his duty in filling a gap, but personally a little ashamed at having ambled off on a rather old horse from the subject announced.

This account, readers will observe, is a continuation of the Tale of the Lucky Examinee quoted at the beginning of the memoir. But on this occasion the award for intellectual alertness and readiness of pen was no longer the grant of a scholarship or a First Class to the scholar himself, but a generous gift to his fellow-students and a 'heavy rod', as he admits it to have been, for his own back. By promising to assist the enterprise up to £600, to lend it half his time, and to accommodate its apparatus of notes and documents at his own house, G. R. Redgrave, Vice-President of the Society and chairman of the meeting at which Pollard's paper was read, at once made the project feasible; it was approved at a meeting in the following April; and at the next annual meeting (20 January 1919) Pollard was able to announce that the collection of material was well under way, and held out hopes of 'the completion of the copy of the "Short-Title Catalogue" within the next three or four years'. Actually, from first to last, it took between eight and nine. As ever, Pollard was careful to make most scrupulous and full acknowledgement in the Preface to his numerous helpers, without whom the task could never have been accomplished, and printed the names of a dozen of them on the title-page. Yet it was generally recognized at the time, and should be made clear to posterity, that he was in more than formal sense editor-in-chief from the outset, and during the final stages himself shouldered the bulk of the work involved.

Early in 1924 [the Preface tells us], the lay-out of the catalogue was the subject of frequent consultations with Mr. Frederick Hall, the Controller of the Oxford University Press, and when the Keeper of Printed Books was superannuated in August of that year he returned to the Museum, after a brief holiday, to work as a 'reader' in the final revision of the catalogue and passing it through the press;

a task, he adds, 'which has taken two years—more than twice as long as was anticipated'. Yet its sequel, in the form of a rearrangement of the entries in chronological order, was already hinted at in the Preface, while the difficulties involved were being enlarged upon in a paper—once again knocked up by the Secretary, he tells us, because somebody else had failed at the last moment—read to the Bibliographical Society on 21 November 1927. But though *The Annals of English Printing* was planned out and the work on it got going, our Ulysses was not to reach this new port.

An account of the honours that came to him, during the eleven years separating the retirement which ended his official career from the accident which ended his career as an author, is given in Sir Henry Thomas's brief summary entitled *From Fifty to Seventy-Five*, written in 1936, from which I now quote.

During his Keepership, Dr. Pollard's work began to be recognized and rewarded by academic and national honours. He had long before, in 1907, been made a Fellow of King's College in London, a fact which he modestly omits to record in his *Sketch*. In 1921 he received the honorary degree of D.Litt. from Durham University. In 1922 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy, and in the same year was awarded the C.B. Next year he was made an honorary Fellow of his old college in Oxford, St. John's. His work was also pleasantly rewarded in America. In 1921 he was made an Honorary Foreign Corresponding Member of the Grolier Club in New York, and he is also an Honorary Member of the Club of Odd Volumes in Boston.

Then, after speaking of the 'numerous interests and activities' that he carried forward with him into his retirement, Sir Henry continues:

These he increased in 1930, when, in succession to Dr. Furnivall and Sir Israel Gollancz, he became Director of the Early English Text Society. Since then, however, advancing years and the need for concentrating on many tasks undertaken but not finished, have compelled him gradually to reduce his commitments. In 1932 he resigned the professorship of Bibliography at King's College. In 1934 he handed over the editorship of the *Library* and the Hon. Secretaryship of the Bibliographical Society to Dr. McKerrow, who had for more than twenty years acted jointly with him in the Secretaryship. On his

retirement from Office he was made an Hon. Member of the Society; he had already been awarded its gold medal for his services to bibliography. That same year 1934 he was one of three representatives of the library world to receive the honorary degree of Litt.D. in the University of Cambridge on the occasion of the opening of the new University Library. The esteem in which he is held in the United States of America may be gathered from the fact that he was recently elected an Honorary Member of the Bibliographical Society of America, and that he is the only non-American to be so honoured.

I am proud to remember that his last publication, probably his last piece of writing to be printed, always excepting the *Sketch* and his reminiscences of Housman, was an article on Shakespeare in which we collaborated together once more. It was, I have said, a habit of ours to spend a week or so together in the summer; and the pitch selected for our joint holiday in 1934 was Malvern and its Festival, where incidentally we had an entertaining encounter with Bernard Shaw, who after an introduction by Barry Jackson engineered by Mrs. Shaw, lectured to us for about a quarter of an hour on the exact structure of the Elizabethan stage, his notions being wholly derived to the best of my recollection from a visit to Oberammergau some years earlier. Just before this holiday Miss Katherine Garvin, collecting a team of essayists for a projected volume on 'The Great Tudors', had invited us in turn to contribute the chapter on Shakespeare, and each in turn, pleading pressure of work, had suggested an application to the other. This led to a protest on her part against such cat-and-mouse treatment which reached us at Malvern; whereupon we decided to make amends by writing the thing together. It was roughly planned out on the spot, so that we could later compose sections of it alternately, passing the draft to and fro by post. Everything went like clock-work; when the last sentence was finished we found that we had written almost exactly the number of words required; and if anyone ever read it I doubt whether he would have been able to guess how many sections there were, assign them to their respective authors, or detect the points at which the pen changed hands. When his heart was inditing of a good matter Pollard's pen was as ready as ever, down to the accident of August 1935.

At the beginning of 1936 I moved to Edinburgh and became much absorbed in a new life; and though I now had an excuse to go and stay at 40 Murray Road whenever I was in London, those occasions could not be frequent, so that I did not see him more than two or three times in the year. The war came in 1939

to make visits far more difficult both for me and for his daughter, Mrs. Roberts, whose home was in Bath, while for one reason or another nearly all his friends left the neighbourhood; all in fact, I believe, except Henry Thomas, who, tied to the British Museum, stuck out the blitz at Wandsworth Common and continued to visit him right up to the end. 'His last years', a friend wrote at the time of his death (8 March 1944), 'must have been rather miserable and dreary, I'm afraid.' Lonely they certainly were; and one often thought of him sleeping in that little house in Murray Road, while the Nazis bombed South London. Yet, though he confessed in a letter written on 10 August 1942 that he was growing 'tired of excess of solitude', I doubt whether he ever found life dreary, still less miserable, except perhaps during the last ten days, when he suffered pain from his thigh, fractured by a second fall; and even that was eased, one is thankful to think, by long periods in which the mind was wandering or unconscious. I spent a night with him in April 1943, and found him his own cheerful self, though ever since the crash in 1935 his mind had been apt to play him tricks, chiefly in the form of small lapses of memory. What he complained of was, not solitude, but excess of solitude. Always, as I have noted above, something of a recluse, because cut off from others by his stammer, he was, as he once told me, 'much more contented with his own company than most people'.

But contentment was not merely the fruit of habit, and solitude did not mean to him, as it means to many, vacancy of mind. For he had an inner life to retreat to. Scholarship, I repeat, was not the first or even the second thing with this scholar. What stood second was what he called 'practical morality' or his duty to his neighbour; what stood first was religion, which was in his eyes 'practical' too if it was anything at all. In 1911 Macmillan published an anonymous book under the title of *Life, Love and Light: Practical Morality for Men and Women*. Addressed to a generation which still implicitly accepted the utilitarian philosophy, it opened by asking them to reconcile these assumptions with the historical accounts of three deaths cheerfully accepted, that of Byrhtnoth and his loyal companions at the Battle of Maldon A.D. 991, that of Father Damien on Leper Island A.D. 1889, and that of Socrates in Athens 399 B.C.; these deaths being selected as supreme examples of the three ideals of conduct most admired by civilized men and women, viz. Courage, Self-sacrifice, and the pursuit of Truth. After this the writer, who was of course Pollard, as he publicly admitted later in an article on 'The Faith

of one Layman' which appeared in *The Guardian* on 19 October 1916, went on to discuss with penetration, sympathy, and wisdom, and with complete lucidity and candour, the chief moral problems that confront human beings in modern society as they make their way through life. Roger, youngest of his three children, came of age the year after the book was published, and as it was dedicated 'To the writer's domestic critics', the year of publication was no doubt a father's choice. But, as he explains in the Preface, 'the idea of the book dates back some thirty years to the time when the author was preparing for that finest of all examinations, the old (unspecialized) school of Literae Humaniores at Oxford', to the time in fact when he himself stood on the threshold of life like his children, two of whom were never to pass beyond it.

It is hoped [the Preface continues] that it is none the worse for having been kept simmering for a good many years, during which the author has had his share of the common joys and sorrows of life.

Before he came to write *The Guardian* article just mentioned, the soil of Europe had been drenched with blood and the world's burden of sorrow become almost unbearable, his own share being heavier than most. Yet he could still say:

While I believe I have learnt much during the last few years, I do not think there is anything in the book I want to disown, though I hope now for more than I hoped when I wrote it.

Life, Love and Light was the work of a Darwinian, who was always ready to remind himself and others that he entered the world in the same year as *The Origin of Species*, and writes (again in *The Guardian* for 19 October 1916):

A great part of my intellectual life has been spent in trying to harmonise with the doctrines of the Church of England a whole-hearted belief that man has ascended to his present stage of development through a series of lower forms during tens of thousands of years.

And when he said 'a great part' he meant it, surprising as it may seem to those who have followed his crowded life up to this point of the memoir. A devoted and devout son of the Church of England, for whom a daily service was as necessary as daily bread, he felt nevertheless that some of her doctrines and formularies were out of keeping not only with modern cosmology but even with Christianity itself as understood by the modern conscience.¹ One form taken by this discontent was an attempt

¹ He once told me he could find very few psalms appropriate for use in an office of Christian worship. But he rejoiced in the Athanasian Creed.

to find light by studying the religions of others. Accordingly, some time before 1910, he joined The London Society for the Study of Religion, founded in 1902 by von Hügel, Claude Montefiore, and others, with a restricted membership consisting in fairly equal proportions of Moslems, Jews, Anglicans, Roman Catholics, and Free Churchmen. Pollard was a regular attender, often wrote papers (I can remember reading a paper for him), the last recorded under his name being one on Idolatry in 1932, while he remained a member down to 1937.¹ The Society's proceedings are not published; and it is noticeable that apart from *Life, Love and Light*, his intense interest in religion only finds expression in print after the death of his sons, and that between 1915 and 1925 a number of pamphlets and other publications on religious matters appear among the books and articles on Shakespeare and bibliography in the *Select Bibliography*. Most of these were written for or in connexion with the Anglican Fellowship, of which, as noted above,² he became a member after 1916 and a member of committee in 1918; from whose meetings he derived very great stimulus and encouragement, both in his personal life and in regard to his ideas of prayer-book reform; and which brought him the valued friendship of men like Clutton Brock, Percy Dearmer, and Kenneth Mozley. Here is no place to discuss this section of his writing; nor does it touch more than the periphery of that inner life which, I believe, occupied his thought more and more after 1915, and of which it would be still more inappropriate to speak here, even had I the knowledge to do so. Yet the portrait I have been trying to draw would be incomplete and untrue without some indication of its existence. Perhaps I can best supply it by relating another incident of our holidays together.

One wet evening in the summer of 1915, only a couple of months after the death of Roger, we found ourselves, owing to circumstances beyond our control, at a 'concert party' on the pier of a sea-side resort. It was a deplorable show, cheap in every way, and full of equivocal jests about the men in the trenches. I was in agony for his sake, the more so that the large audience enjoyed every moment of it; and having no opportunity of a word with him after it was all over, I went to bed thinking how dreadful an experience it must have been for a man who had just lost two sons at the front. I little knew him. Next morning I no sooner began to stammer out my shamefaced

¹ I owe some of these facts to the Rev. Professor Cook, at present Secretary of the Society.

² See p. 268.

words of dismay than he cut me short by declaring that he had spent a very pleasant and instructive evening.

'You see', he went on, 'it set me thinking. The Church will never be right until it can attract big audiences like that, and give them as much pleasure. And, thinking this as I went to sleep, I dreamed; and in my dream I saw the universal Church. It was made up of three distinct Orders. The first, to which the vast majority of people belonged and whose votes determined everything, called itself the Order of the Children of God. Two rules only were required of its members: to have a good time, and never to do anything which might prevent other people having a good time; which last,' he added, 'if you think of it, embraces almost the whole of practical morality. The second, to which only a small minority belonged and which possessed very little power, was the Order of the Disciples of Christ; and they had to live up to the Sermon on the Mount. No hanky-panky! Live up to it!'

I can still hear the fierceness in his voice as he said 'Live up to it!' He stopped, and I thought for a moment he had forgotten the third order. But presently he went on, almost shyly, in low tones, 'And there was another order with no power at all; for there was no Pope in this Church. They were very few indeed, and no one even knew who they were. People called them the Passionates, and they took upon them all the sins and sorrows of the world.'

I cannot, of course, reproduce his exact words; but what I have written is not far out, for I remember those moments well. And when I thought of him in his last lonely years, lying night after night on Wimbledon Ridge while the Nazis rained their bombs from the sky all about him, I used to wonder whether he had joined the Passionates.

J. DOVER WILSON

CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS

p. 264. *Housman's failure in 'Greats'*. For another and I think more persuasive explanation see an article by Mr. A. S. F. Gow in the *Oxford Magazine* for 11 November 1937.

p. 277 (foot). *a German opus*. Dr. Scholderer writes: 'If Mr. Winship means the *Gesamtkatalog*, that runs on totally different lines and did not begin to appear until Pollard had practically ceased work on the incunabula.' See next note.

p. 286 (add to n. 2). As Dr. Greg points out to me, one of the main interests of Pollard's career is that this transformation took place in his person: he began as one interested à la William Morris in 'fine books'; the example of Proctor and above all Proctor's death, which obliged him to carry on his work, transformed him into a first-class scientific bibliographer. Greg thinks Winship's diagnosis (p. 277) completely wrong.

p. 288 (l. 19). *Instauratio Magna*. One critic objects that Pollard 'makes no pretence at laying down general principles as Bacon did'. But I was thinking, not of Bacon, but of his title; and still hold that 'The Great Regeneration' is a not inapt description of what *Shakespeare Folios and Quartos* did for English textual criticism.

p. 289 (end of n. 1). As Greg's review of Lee appeared in July 1903 and that of Collins's *Greene* not until April 1906, this last inference is incorrect, though I can still see the twinkle.

p. 297 (end of n. 1). This note, entirely correct as regards Sir Bruce Richmond, is incorrect as to Greg's *Alcazar and Orlando*, the preliminary sketch of which appeared in the *Library* for October 1919, not in the *Literary Supplement*.



GEORGE FREDERICK STOUT

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1860-1944

THE life of Stout was impressive in its span. He lived contemporaneously with so many of the men who, from the later decades of the nineteenth century, have contributed to the philosophical outlook of our age. And this contemporaneity was not merely chronological. He liked to talk with men younger than himself, and he so talked to them that they accepted him as one of their own generation.

In 1860, the year of his birth, Mill had just published his book *On Liberty*, and was about to engage in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. These two works might fairly be taken to characterize the general background and the central preoccupation of Stout's intellectual life. He looked at every practical social question from the standpoint of a philosophical liberal, but his mental energies had as their chief point of focus Mill's problem of 'our knowledge of the external world'.

His first appearance in the pages of the history of philosophy is in an entry in the diary of Alexander Bain recording that on 27 May 1889 he attended a meeting of the Aristotelian Society when a paper was read by Stout on 'The development of the distinction between the Physical and the Mental, considered from the Psychological point of view'. No début could have been more fitting. Stout's whole life had the character of a prolonged philosophical discussion, of which the relation of the physical and the mental was the central theme. The argument began at Cambridge. It was continued at Aberdeen and at Oxford; it was carried back to Scotland for the thirty-three years of his professorship at St. Andrews, and then to the antipodes. He spent the last years of his life as one of the liveliest members of a lively philosophical circle in the University of Sydney.

Stout had been born at South Shields, where he had spent his youth. He had gone up to Cambridge in 1879. Classics and ancient philosophy were followed by the Moral Sciences Tripos, and he was elected to a Fellowship at St. John's in 1883. There followed a period of great intellectual development in which the combination of critical and constructive abilities was apparent from the outset. In 1892 he followed Croom Robertson as editor of *Mind*, an office which he filled with distinction until 1920. He succeeded, as few others have succeeded, in combining the

performance of time-consuming editorial duties with writing books of his own. He achieved this largely because nearly every paper he wrote is found to fall in place in what must have been, in outline, a preconceived plan.

Stout was at St. John's at the beginning of the golden age of Cambridge philosophy. Great philosophical developments, like great civilizations, seem often to come about through the clash of contrasting cultures. Cambridge in the eighteen-eighties was the meeting-point of diverse streams of thought. Here, and at this time, the classical British tradition in the philosophy of mind was giving way to a larger synthesis and a subtler analysis, both of mind and of nature. Here, and at this time, too, a beginning was being made to repair the great breach in the picture of the universe that had gaped in the pages of philosophy since the time of Descartes.

Cambridge had already begun to develop its technique for saying things with clarity, simplicity, and precision. Stout lectured on the history of modern philosophy, and with reference to these lectures, we have the testimony of G. E. Moore that he has 'a quite exceptional gift for seizing on some particular point of importance involved in a confused philosophical controversy, and putting that point in the simplest and most conversational language; he is particularly direct, and utterly free from anything approaching pretentiousness or pomposity'. But Cambridge philosophers were then less concerned with how things should be said than with what they deemed important to say for our proper understanding of and our behaviour in the world in which we live.

In 1874 Sidgwick had published what C. D. Broad has described as the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written. In a letter to Bain regarding this book, Sidgwick had said: 'It is an old hobby of mine to rehabilitate Butler, but now that I can persuade no one, I begin to suspect my arguments.' He need not have worried had he known that through the work of Stout, and through Stout's influence on others, Butler's psychology at least would need, half a century later, very little rehabilitation.

The most powerful influence upon Stout during his Cambridge years was, however, that of James Ward. In the larger world Bain was still the dominating figure in the psychological scene but it was through Ward's article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published in 1886, that the tradition that Bain represented received its mortal wound; and it was through Ward that a new

epoch was begun in which psychology was transformed by a biological approach and enriched by continental streams of thought. Stout assimilated Ward; and the writers, British and continental, in whom Ward had shown less interest, he explored on his own account. The *Analytic Psychology* was completed by 1896 and by this time Stout had to explain that his debt to Ward was to be seen as much where he disagreed with his teacher as where he agreed.

The publication of the *Analytic Psychology* coincided with his appointment as the first Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology in the University of Aberdeen.

This gave him the opportunity to prepare, as foreshadowed in the *Analytic*, a systematic exposition of psychology 'from a genetic point of view'. The publication of this, his second major work, again coincided with translation to a new post. The last year of the century stands out in the life of Stout by reason of three important events: in 1899 he married Ella Ker; Oxford University, by appointing him its first Wilde Reader, admitted that psychology might be possible; and Stout, by producing the *Manual*, established its existence in this country as a fact.

The tenure of the Wilde Readership enabled Stout to pursue his reflections on the matters with which Oxford was preoccupied, and in the fields in which Oxford excelled. He had for some time entertained the greatest respect for Bradley and he realized perhaps more clearly than anyone else how profoundly important for general psychological theory were some of the things that Bradley was saying at that time. It might in fact reasonably be claimed that the collapse of traditional associationism was due as much to the acumen of Bradley as to that of Ward. In Stout these two influences combined in a subtle and extremely powerful synthesis. He remained at Oxford for four years. In 1903 he was appointed to the chair at St. Andrews.

The influence of Bradley had at first been shown in Stout's treatment of the concept of activity, in his account of association of ideas, and in the doctrine of 'relative suggestion'. During his residence at Oxford his attention was directed to a closer analysis of Mr. Bradley's logic. His appointment to a chair of Logic and Metaphysics might have been expected to confirm this new direction in the course of his thought. For a year or two this was indeed the case. But in the comparative freedom from the immediate pressure of an established philosophical circle, the inward prepotencies reasserted their sway. Thereafter, with un-deviating consistency, Stout's intellectual life remained devoted

to the philosophy of mind. His circumstances provided the most favourable conditions for the development of his systematic philosophy, the main lines of which were already well defined. And the invitations in 1919 and 1921 to give the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh afforded an opportunity for a formal presentation of this philosophy to the world. But these lectures were destined never to appear. His 'system', too, was destined never to appear, at least not through his published writings.

The *Analytic Psychology*, the *Manual*, and the much-revised version of the Gifford Lectures in his *Mind and Matter*, are each works of the greatest philosophical importance. But even collectively, and supplemented by the informative *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, they fail to present his view of the universe on the panoramic scale that that view finally assumed in his own mind.

The pen was not his natural medium of expression. His writings have the dry elegance of the best philosophical prose of the nineteenth century. There are one or two papers, as, for example, the devastating examination of the *Philosophy of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson* in which he loosens the rein on his playful controversial humour. There are many passages and some whole papers in which he achieves an amazing combination of lucidity and compression. But in his writings as a whole, he rarely adapts his exposition to the tempo of an impatient reader. He wrote hardly a sentence that contained a superfluous word, and his paragraphs contain few digressions, but he found it difficult to make a philosophical point and then to leave it alone. The restless activity of his mind, his range of information, the wealth of his associations, his anxiety to forestall, his willingness to concede, and his readiness always to restate his thesis in the various ways required by critics simple, subtle, or perverse, combine to convey a specious impression of prolixity. The fact is that he always deployed the whole of his intellectual resources like a general with innumerable battalions under his command.

His public lectures, so far as they were 'public', were similar to his writings. He lectured, in fact, by reading out what he had previously written down. This was not conducive to a wide diffusion of his influence. Physically he was a very small man. He was small in every way except in intellect and personality. But even in his bodily parts he was all there. Everything was small, but everything was present in due proportion. Even his voice was small. Thus it was that a wit reported upon a lecture

to the Academy: 'Stout disappeared behind the lectern and was neither seen nor heard for an hour.' His voice, however, was right for the ends for which he wished to use it. His natural medium was the intimate personal conversation, and his public lectures often ended in a private conversation. Even at the largest philosophical conference, he was apt to forget the presence of the assembly. Very soon after the opening of the discussion of his paper he would descend from the platform, point an emphatic little finger at the heart of his protagonist (for preference Samuel Alexander), and the argument proceeded as though they alone occupied the room.

Stout was never at a loss for someone to talk to. In the earlier decades of the present century, St. Andrews enjoyed a vigorous philosophical life. He, John Burnet, and A. E. Taylor occupied their chairs at the same time, and nearly every philosopher in the country came to St. Andrews for one reason or another. Quite a few passed through the University as lecturers on the way to their chairs. Others came to deliver the Gifford Lectures, to receive honorary degrees, to act as examiners, or just with the good and simple purpose of making a call on Stout.

The intellectual life to which Stout contributed was, however, by no means wholly philosophical in content. Stout had the widest interest in literature; and history, especially military history, ranked in his recreations almost with chess. He would talk with almost anyone on almost anything. Even his caddy, who had reluctantly to report that the professor would never be a very distinguished golfer, felt constrained to add: 'but mind you, in conversation he's a rare intelligent wee mon.'

The most broadly based of the conversational circles of which Stout was the centre was that which was commonly described as 'Mrs. Stout's Discussion Club'. It was so described because Mrs. Stout was the only member who knew its rules and constitution and it was generally left to her to elect its members. There was also a chess club, the procedures of which were equally informal. This club had a long history and a large membership, but it rarely had more than four members at any one time. It was, in fact, not so much a club as a class, as this word is used in logic—the class of residents in St. Andrews who played chess with Stout.

In the summer, and on the bright days of the St. Andrews winter, too, Stout would take long walks with one or other of his colleagues—west over the dunes to the mouth of the Eden, east along the cliffs to the Rock and Spindle Rock, or inland

along Lade Braes. Any of these paths might truly be described as the St. Andrews *Philosophenweg*.

The Stouts owned a car which neither Stout himself nor Mrs. Stout could drive; but there was always a willing niece or some young lecturer to make that engine go. Every year many picnics were arranged. The first of the season always took place on whatever might be deemed by Mrs. Stout the appointed day for summer to come in. It might snow on that day, but this picnic would be held. There are many of their friends who cherish memories of Stout discoursing imperturbably against the background of a blizzard from which the party was protected only by the tenuous defences of that draughty car. Wherever Stout might be, the argument would be followed wherever it might lead.

In these free, spontaneous discussions, one gained a growing sense of participation in the development of a master plan. As his earlier papers to the Aristotelian Society grew into chapters of the *Analytic*, so in these later conversations, the paragraphs of *Mind and Matter* and *God and Nature* were falling into shape. Points that seemed intolerably obscure in his writings were quickly illumined in the informally spoken word. So often a casual remark or a quick rejoinder to a comment gave one the sense of an intuitive apprehension of the idea in itself behind the mere phenomena of his published formulations.

How much of Stout's philosophy is preserved for history yet remains to be determined. A full appraisal will be possible perhaps only in the light of reliquia awaiting publication. Whoever may undertake to give a definitive exposition will have no easy task.

The greatest difficulty will be to draw the line correctly between the real changes in his views and changes merely in expression. Real and important changes undoubtedly occurred, but these might be introduced without significant changes in his terminology. He would use old and familiar words, his own and those of others, with a new significance. This, in fact, is one of the reasons why so many failed to get the measure of his great originality. Whilst the younger men expressed old doctrines in a new philosophical language, Stout was apt to express a novel thought in archaic terminology.

On the other hand, what sometimes appears to be a revolution in thought was in fact a revolutionary restatement. He was an acute and incisive controversialist, but he always tried to see his critics' point of view. In consequence, he was always ready to

change his terminology and to make concessions. Fundamentally, he was less concerned to rebut than to incorporate the points that were made against him. It is for this reason, perhaps, that throughout his intellectual life he had no spiritual crises, no dramatic phases of conversion. He had an extraordinary capacity for assimilation. He accepted no philosophy but his own, but every other philosophy was grist to his ever-grinding mill. 'I have got them all in my system,' he once allowed himself to say with the modest and satisfied smile reminiscent of that on the face of the proverbial amiable tiger. And, indeed, he *had* got them all, swallowed, digested, and transformed.

It is for this reason extremely difficult and certainly misleading to attach to him any conventional labels. He was described as an idealist and as such he certainly began. But in later life he vehemently protested: 'But I am as good a realist as any,' and the protest was well founded. Sometimes, when he was being especially emphatic about the embodiedness of the 'embodied mind', one was tempted to regard him as something of a 'Behaviourist' and the positivistic streak in his philosophy should not surprise those who remember his acknowledged debt to Hobbes. He was, in fact, almost everything a philosopher could try consistently to be. Most philosophers are distinctive in virtue of what they deny. Stout was distinctive in the surprising range of his affirmations. Encyclopaedic in his knowledge and universal in his sympathies, he devoted his life in effect to a synthesis of all philosophies.

Stout came to believe that the things we see around us are in all essential respects what they appear to be—solid material things of various shapes, sizes, and colours, emitting sounds and smells, moving about, and producing various changes in each other and in us. He believed, too, that we are in all essential respects what we appear to ourselves to be—spiritual beings who know, feel, and will in pursuit of the ends that we desire. In the defence of these and similar beliefs he rightly claimed to be a philosophical exponent of the doctrine of common sense.

He came also to believe, however, that through reflection we could get to know things about ourselves and the world which are not at first apparent to common sense and are not established by the evidence of science. Reflection led him to believe that we and the material objects in the world around us are much less diverse in our natures than is commonly supposed. We *are* spiritual beings but we are not *purely* so. We are

'embodied minds'. The chief implication of his phrase is that of mutual entailment of the properties of matter and the properties of mind. To be a mind at all one must *be* a body. (It is not enough to have one.) More surprisingly, to be a material thing one must exist within a certain unity that is characteristic of mind. As the mind is embodied, so is the world ensouled.

Though the mutual entailment of mind and matter seems to be implied in Stout's exposition, the argument for the animation of nature is different from the argument for the material embodiment of mind. It rests in the main upon an analysis of causality. Causal process is observed under the most favourable conditions in the case of our own activity. The teleological nature that it here displays is not, however, to be regarded as peculiar to the case in question; it is characteristic of causality in general. And so we are led as philosophical scientists to share with early man and all the poets the belief that nature is not merely mindless matter, but that it is something 'akin to and essentially one with our own mental life'.

Thus are we gradually edged by varied and subtle arguments from what at first appears to be the defence of the naïvest beliefs of common sense to what is vaguely but fairly described as 'metaphysical speculation'. But even as a metaphysician, Stout was not so much a transcendentalist as an extrapolationist. He had little interest in questions of deductive logic, and less in dialectical arguments. He would have claimed to be a thorough-going empiricist and that his methods were inductive. He shared with the phenomenalist the belief that our experience is a fair sample of the larger whole of which it is a part. He differs only in the analysis that he gives of this part. He had, one suspects, a fairly detailed theory about the nature of inductive reasoning. 'We establish the principle of induction', he once said, 'in the course of using it.' Unfortunately, this cryptic statement receives no detailed amplification in his published writings. There can, however, be little doubt that in the detailed and subtle analysis of the inductive processes implicit in the perception and 'ideal construction' of the external world which form so large a part of the thesis of the *Manual*, Stout was developing a method which was later to be used in the great extrapolation of mind into the physical world.

A life of 84 years, however, was just not long enough for the task that he had undertaken. He had almost, but not quite, completed a philosophical system in the grand style. Through the three major works we begin to see the outline of a truly

impressive edifice with something of the dimensions of the system of Descartes, of Spinoza, or of Kant. But again, the age was not the most propitious for the kind of philosophical work for which his powers were most adapted. He did not live, philosophically speaking, in an architectural period. Speculative construction was giving way to critical analysis. But even as an analyst, Stout could more than hold his own.


He attracted few disciples but no one among his contemporaries has exercised a more pervasive influence. He was philosophically at home in Cambridge, in Oxford, and in Scotland, and he has been closely studied in five continents. He was throughout his life the philosopher *par excellence* upon whom younger generations could respectfully sharpen their wits. He enjoyed being a whetstone as much as being a knife. The devotion of a disciple was probably one of the few things by which he could have been bored.

Stout retired from his chair in 1936. Later, he went to a young country and entered with characteristic zest into the enjoyment of new ways of life. There he lived and talked, as he had always lived and talked, in the main with men younger than himself, sharing with youth everything except youth's moods of disillusionment. He had lived through queer times, including the darkest years of the Second World War, but never for a moment did he seem to doubt that the world was a good place to live in. 'Life has never been a cheat to me,' he said on one of the few occasions on which he talked about himself, and he made the remark on one of the last of his walks with a friend. From all accounts it is clear that his life at Sydney was of a piece with his life at Cambridge, Aberdeen, Oxford, and St. Andrews. It was a life of philosophical reflection which found the freest expression, not so much in books or lectures, as in witty and instructive conversation with those who succumbed to his irresistible simplicity and charm. But to those, the many, who knew him best at St. Andrews, the picture that remains in the memory is of the life that was lived behind the gaunt grey façade of the house on the Scores.

It is late morning on one of those pale bright days of early summer. Somewhere in the lower floor of Craigard Mrs. Stout is busily occupied with those practical affairs which her husband is not supposed, or not allowed, to understand. She is making the final arrangements for an expedition in the afternoon, or for the entertainment of the guests expected in the evening. Stout has returned from his morning lectures, and has climbed

up to his high attic study to divide his attention, as only a great philosopher, with something of the schoolboy in his constitution, could divide it, between two divergent tasks. On his desk is a chapter of the Gifford Lectures, under revision, and nearby on a low side-table, set out on the board, is an unfinished game of chess.

C. A. MACE



OLIVER ELTON

OLIVER ELTON

1861-1945

OLIVER ELTON was the only child of the Rev. Charles Allen Elton, B.D., and of Sarah Amelia, daughter of John Ransom, solicitor, of Holt, Norfolk. He was born on 3 June 1861, at Gresham Grammar School, Holt, where his father, sometime Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, was headmaster. His grandfather, James Elton (1791-1863), Recorder of Tiverton, had married Emily Freeman Oliver, daughter of Thomas Oliver, the last royal Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, of whom Oliver Elton contributed a full biography to the *Proceedings of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* for 1931 (1932). Here it is suggested that one or more of Thomas Oliver's forebears may have emigrated from Bristol, 'where Olivers had long abounded'; here also, in a footnote, there is a genealogy of James and Emily Elton's descendants, with the direction 'For Elton family previously see the (incomplete) account in Burke's Landed Gentry'.

Oliver Elton was not to remain long in Norfolk. When he was about five years old his father had to resign his post as the result of a grave illness, and the family removed to London. From 1870 to 1887 (when his father died) they lived in Kent, latterly at Belvedere. Except for one term at a private school he was taught at home by his father until he went to Marlborough College, which he entered as a Foundation Scholar in 1873, afterwards winning a Senior Scholarship. Among various prizes was one for English Literature. Here there began a life-long friendship with Sir Edmund Chambers. He left Marlborough in 1880 with an open classical Scholarship at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and a School Leaving Exhibition. At Oxford he followed the classics curriculum, obtaining a Second Class in Moderations in 1882 and a First in 'Greats' in 1884. Arthur Sidgwick, Frederick York Powell, Michael Sadler, Charles Eliot, Leonard Huxley, and D. S. MacColl, whose sister he afterwards married, were some of his Oxford friends. 'He was already noted by the discerning as one of the keenest critical minds among youthful members of the University'; at this period too he read widely, and with thorough assimilation, outside the prescribed syllabus and in more than one language. To the *Oxford Magazine*, started in 1883, he contributed some articles and reviews, but chiefly verse, original and translated.

From 1884 to 1890 he lived by tutoring privately in London and by working for Captain James's coaching academy, where he taught chiefly Latin. His marriage with Letitia Maynard MacColl, fourth daughter of the Rev. Dugald MacColl, of the Free Kirk, and his wife Janet (born Matheson), of Glasgow, took place in 1888, and they went to live in Bedford Park, West London, where many teachers, artists, and writers had gathered, including York Powell and J. B. Yeats, with whom the Eltons formed a close friendship. There was a society called the 'Calumet', devoted to all kinds of free discussion and long after remembered with pleasure.

In 1890 Elton was appointed independent lecturer in English Literature at Owens College, Manchester, and held the post for ten years, until his election to the Chair at Liverpool. It was also in 1890 that C. E. Montague came to Manchester and another firm friendship was begun. There was much intercourse between the writing staff of the *Manchester Guardian*, to which Montague was attached, and the teaching staff at Owens College; groups who took their meals, exercise, and leisure in company were formed, and again there was a small private talking society, which lasted more than a decade. At the *Guardian* office were also W. T. Arnold and Arthur Johnstone, the music critic. It was, for Elton, a time of much happy acquaintanceship and varied activity, including in the Easter vacation of 1892 a visit to Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, where he lectured. During the Manchester years his three sons, Geoffrey (died 1927), Leonard, and Charles were born.

Between 1889 and 1903 he produced several editions, suited to the class-room, of Shakespeare's plays (*1 Henry IV*, 1889, *King John*, 1890), and of Milton's early poems (five separate booklets, subsequently brought together). These remained long in print although much later he was heard to speak deprecatingly of them as *péchés de jeunesse*. By the date when the latest of them appeared (*Comus*, 1893) he must have been well advanced with his translation of the mythical matter (Books i-ix) in the *Historia Danica* of Saxo Grammaticus, which he essayed at the instance of York Powell and which was published for the Folk-Lore Society in 1894. As is well known, the original presents, besides much other legend, the story of the Danish prince Amlethus in its earliest form, and Elton contributes a substantial appendix on 'Saxo's Hamlet', with reference to possible sources, and with speculation upon Saxo's use of them. The translation as a whole was a considerable service to all students

of Scandinavian mythology, the more because of Saxo's odd and troublesome Latin and because no previous translation had been made save into Danish. The greater part of the long introduction to this volume, 'a full statement', as Elton said later, 'of Saxo's contribution to Northern lore', was written by York Powell, and apart from some pages on Saxo's life and the nature and value of his work, Elton's task was to provide linguistic rather than critical or historical interpretation.

In this regard it is easy to recognize his next undertaking as one of greater pith and moment, more congenial too, and giving fuller play to his gifts. This was his study of Michael Drayton, prepared at the invitation of the Spenser Society and printed for them in 1895 with their selection from Drayton's writings. It was published separately by Messrs. Constable, with enlargements and revisions, ten years later. 'Nearly everything as yet known about this poet ought to be found in this brief volume', brief, but still authoritative. By 1905 Elton was able to clear up some doubts concerning Drayton's personal character entertained meanwhile by W. J. Courthope, and the critical pages are distinguished by the command of just reflections, apt phrasing, and enlightening metaphor which marks all the later work. The biographer was inherently well qualified to appreciate Drayton's bent and capacity for 'high emprise', the resourcefulness of his spirit, and the scope and variety of his output. The torch of Draytonian scholarship has since been taken up by a band of Elizabethan investigators and when at last, in 1941, the great Shakespeare Head edition of the Works, begun by the late J. W. Hebel, was completed by Mrs. Tillotson and Mr. B. H. Newdigate, the collaborators showed a grateful consciousness of their debt to Elton's pioneering labours and perceptions.

It must have been about 1895 also that he was asked to contribute a volume on *The Augustan Ages* to the series known as *Periods of European Literature* and edited by George Saintsbury. Here was a more formidable task. For who at thirty-five could undertake without misgiving to decide, and then condense within the compass of about four hundred pages, what may and what must be said about 'the age of reason' in its multitudinous aspects, and with due regard for national *differentiae*? As Elton says himself, 'the bibliography of a few decades . . . is enough to damp the freshest vanity'. Yet his knowledge of the various literatures, especially in the English, French, and Germanic tongues, was at the outset, or soon was made, adequate, and he was well served by his training in philosophy and the ancient

classics. Thus he could write helpfully on the systems of Descartes and Leibniz in relation to contemporary thought; and make glancing comparisons of Henry More or Malebranche with Plato, of Boileau with Lónginus, of Holberg with Molière, or of Filicaja with Gray. There is a wealth of comment, making for precision and perspective, and a firm grasp of the intellectual and aesthetic background; and under the author's guidance the reader is led towards a conception of the Augustan achievement which is itself Augustan in its tempered verve, its clearness of vision, and its balance of sense and sensibility. The deficiencies of the age are not overlooked, but neither are the compensations and positive virtues. For though 'the saving process of human thought was forced for generations to beggar the sense of beauty' (a sentence marked as containing the chief general idea of this book), the strength and greatness of Bossuet or Swift, the importance of Racine or Locke, are duly asserted. There are delicate Paterian impressions, too, of styles or atmosphere, as where praise is given to Racine's 'steadiness of sweet and open sonority' or where the breath of fresh woods and pastures new is felt in the writings of Anne, Countess of Winchelsea:

The poetry of a tree, its service rendered of shelter and shadow, its honourable fate, when its stock is spent, of falling by the winds that prevent the woodman's axe,—to hear of these things, amidst the full swing of the urban literature, is to sit refreshed, with a presentiment of change, outside the clamour and vapour and opulence of Rome.

Like other volumes in the same series this one has an assured standing; and in its layout and method it has a bearing upon the later surveys in that it is rather a conspectus than a history, affording opportunities for personal estimates and *aperçus*. This volume was published in 1899.

While he was at Manchester Elton gave much attention to the theatre and was drawn into the writing of dramatic reviews. After a time it was decided to collect, under the editorship of W. T. Arnold, the notices which he and Elton, with Allan Monkhouse and C. E. Montague, had contributed to the *Manchester Guardian*, and a volume called *The Manchester Stage* resulted in 1903. For this Elton wrote also an introduction on the relations of theatre and press besides six of the notices. This venture was not very successful, largely, it may be supposed, because the interest of a performance, as distinct from the play performed, does not often long survive the moment of the passing show. Here and elsewhere Elton showed his respect for

the actor's craft and his appreciation of stage performances as generally necessary for the full understanding of the dramatist's intentions; yet it is easy to believe him in agreement with Aristotle in thinking 'spectacle' the least among the elements of dramatic composition or 'the least concerned with the art of poetry'; and like many others of his time, and later too, he often preferred the imagined to the observed rendering of plays with any strong measure of poetic value and intensity. It was not merely that he could suffer under the inadequacies and ineptitudes which frequently mar the public representation; it was rather that in the more exalted forms of drama there is so much that in the hurry of the accumulating business must escape the interpretation of even the best actors. This explains his sympathy with Lamb's reflections on the acting of Shakespeare, which he put subsequently with his own modification: 'the actor tells us much we did not know, but he can never dream in our stead; and the essence of Shakespeare's or Marlowe's poetry is to set up reverie unconnected with its actual subject.' These are words which might carelessly be taken to underrate the value of the communal experience, the mutual give-and-take between actors and audience, whereby even the element of poetry, when present, may gain power and instancy. But the actor receives his due again in another later observation: 'audiences will for ever watch Hamlet and Falstaff; and here the best critic is the player; he comes nearer to the poet than the writer can ever do.'

One of Elton's closest friends at Manchester was Arthur Johnstone, musical critic to the *Guardian*, who died in 1904; and Elton collaborated with Henry Reece to produce the book of Johnstone's *Musical Criticisms* (1905), writing part of the memoir.

In 1900 he was elected to the King Alfred Chair of English Literature at Liverpool in succession to Walter Raleigh, recently appointed to the corresponding chair at Glasgow. He began the new work in January 1901, and for the next twenty-five years he was mainly absorbed in teaching and administrative duties, and in the writing of the three two-volumed surveys of English Literature which appeared in 1912, 1920, and 1928, respectively. These two occupations, academic and authorial, will have separate attention below; but first it will be convenient to speak of two other works, the *Life of Frederick York Powell* (1906) and *Modern Studies* (1907).

The last-mentioned was a gathering of material already

published over a number of years. The inaugural lecture at Liverpool on Tennyson is included. 'Modern' has the larger connotation which allows the volume to open with an account of 'Giordano Bruno in England', and to continue with 'Literary Fame, A Renaissance Note', and a paper on 'Colour and Imagery in Spenser'. There is also 'A Word on Mysticism' which ranges widely. But most of the subjects were modern also in the more restricted sense, for five of the eleven papers are devoted to literature of the day or the day before, Tennyson, Swinburne, Meredith, Henry James, and 'Living Irish Literature', and two are largely concerned with recent academic studies, 'The Meaning of Literary History' and 'Recent Shakespeare Criticism'. In this volume Elton's critical abilities are revealed in something like full expansion and security, partly, it may be guessed, because the themes are of his own choosing, and not least because the fair assessment of performances which have yet to be 'placed' must call out all a critic's power to distinguish between the transient and the enduring. Not all the views and judgements here put forward are unassailable to-day, forty years on; but there is no mistaking the liveliness of response, the connoisseurship or 'sense of varieties in accent and gesture', and the gifts of imagery and resilient phrasing by which those varieties can be discriminated. Elton had the rare gift which enables a critic to enter so fully into the minds of his subjects that their inspiration seems to be born again, their notes re-echoed, and their craftsmanship not merely described but re-enacted. There is much indeed in these papers that bespeaks the 'critic as artist'. But there is more than can be wrought by a versatile impressionism, there is a pervasive sanity of judgement, issuing in many perceptions and pronouncements which have stood the test of time.

One other feature must be recorded. The criticisms are firmly based in knowledge and scholarship, and the scholar shows his respect and gratitude for the aid supplied by earlier investigators, with little in them sometimes beyond the gust for investigation. Whatever else Elton is remembered for it should be for this. His ready acknowledgements are connected with his passion for fair play, which he thought these predecessors did not always receive, and violations of which in the field of learning, as elsewhere, he was quick to notice and resist. This is well illustrated in some reflections on a sentence by one of his contemporaries, who had commended 'the rapid, alert reading' of Shakespeare's plays, and rather thoughtlessly and unluckily

added a fling at 'all the faithful, laudable business of the antiquary and the commentator'. To this it is replied that in so far as the implied doctrine is not obvious 'it will not do'.

Many of them have felt the poetry of Shakespeare. Theobald read the poet's text 'alertly' though perhaps not 'rapidly', and his emendations have the stamp of genius, if they are sometimes better than the truth. They would not be stigmatized as 'laudable'. Moreover, the antiquaries and commentators are as mixed a company as any that inhabits a play of Shakespeare. They number forgers and pedants, lunatics and Baconians, pulpiteers and Ulricis and Rymers. Among them also are Delius and Malone, and some living men who deserve well. They are modest men and benefactors in their time, and it is a poor thing to step carelessly among their prostrate forms, especially when we cannot do our work without their help.

Accordingly, when the scholar York Powell died in 1904, there was fitness in the decision that Elton should write his biography. Elton had been much impressed by the Scandinavian labours of Powell and Vigfusson (to whose memory this *Life* is inscribed), had caught their zeal, and no doubt learnt something from their methods. He was also qualified by a personal friendship of nearly twenty years' standing and the task was surely the more agreeable not only because of this, but because Powell was in so many ways an inspiring subject, a great humanist, a man of character and wit, with a lovable and inspiring personality; he was one who, as Elton put it, 'radiated encouragement and affection with the help of a rich intelligence'. The planning of this work is characteristically spacious, the life and letters in one substantial volume and the 'occasional writings' in a second; and Powell lives again in these pages partly because he is thus freely allowed to speak for himself, but also in no small degree because of the lucid portraiture and apt comments of the biographer. The comments are important in the present connexion for what they can tell us of Elton's own character and views. Thus having mentioned the first class which Powell obtained in the School of Law and History, and the satisfaction which such an honour gives, he adds his own estimate of what it means:

So highly does our custom rate the average worth of fifty short and hasty essays, done under cruel pressure of time, by a young man just of age, as the fruit of a few years' training. It is indeed not strictly a training for any occupation except journalism, where the conditions of the schools are nightly more or less reproduced. However enlightened

the tutor, of the Schools he has to think. The real discipline in the craft of research comes later, if at all, and its first step is to unlearn undergraduate method.

It would be wrong to conclude that Elton thought little of undergraduate curricula and their possibilities. He taught undergraduates at Liverpool for twenty-five years with devotion and great success. This, however, was but one item in his academic stewardship while he held the Liverpool Chair of English Literature; and of that stewardship a more general account will now be in place.

In January 1901, when he took up his duties, Liverpool still had no more than a University College affiliated to Manchester and Leeds, but the anti-federal movement in Liverpool, which under the staunch guidance and advocacy of John Macdonald Mackay, Professor of History, had been gathering weight, was now culminating; and in 1902 the College became a University with full rights to shape its own destinies and determine its own procedures. Elton had thrown his strength into the fray on the side of independence, and, when that was secured, was of those who did most to work out the constitution and settle the character of the new University, having great regard for the principle of self-government and for that of freedom for the Faculties to manage their own affairs without mandarin interference. Naturally he had a particular affection for the Faculty of Arts as a special focus of liberal notions and humane enlightenment, and after his retirement remained a very attentive observer of its fortunes.

With York Powell he had watched with keen approval the emergence at Oxford of the Honours School of English Language and Literature, though he never lost his respect for a classical training as a preparation for a literary career. When the corresponding school at Liverpool was instituted it had its own character, which it has retained, providing for examination in two parts and, in the final year, for certain special studies, which included the making of a longish essay or miniature thesis on some subject allowing for a measure of fresh investigation and of individual appraisal. There was thus even at the undergraduate stage some grounding in the 'craft of research'. By the time of Elton's retirement the Liverpool School had attracted a number of promising students whose subsequent history often showed the benefits of their pupilage. In the work of teaching Elton secured the help of such active spirits as Dora Yates, W. T. Young, J. D. Sloss, J. P. R. Wallis, Grace Treney,

(all trained in the School), Dixon Scott, Lascelles Abercrombie, and Robert Hope Case. Another collaborating scholar and friend was John Sampson, the University Librarian, whose unsurpassed edition of Blake's poems was admirably supplemented by the edition of the 'Prophetic Books' prepared, on Elton's initiative, by Sloss and Wallis. With his colleague in the Chair of English Language, Henry Cecil Wyld, Elton had some difference of opinion (without loss of personal harmony) about the academic programme and, for a time, the two Departments went separate ways. But soon after 1921, when Wyld was succeeded by Allen Mawer, the separation was repealed and since then the School of English has been a unity, all its students partaking of both disciplines, though with emphasis, at choice, on either the linguistic or the literary side.

As a lecturer Elton was somewhat impassive, facing his respectful auditors with an appearance of aloofness, and refusing to court their favour by displays of facile brilliance. In the memory of one who heard him 'his theme was so much present to him that he himself seemed almost absent. All the light was concentrated on the subject for dissection and the surgeon was in the shadow, self-forgotten.' As a tutor he was eagerly on the watch for signs of life, while setting his face against all flummery or slapdash, especially against any failure to acknowledge indebtedness to authority. His students recognized the worth of what he gave them in both capacities. They recognized also the benefits of the personal friendship he offered them and many will still remember gratefully the hospitality they received from him and from Mrs. Elton in their home.

But perhaps his colleagues had the fullest opportunities for appreciating his human sympathy, his strong support of all good causes and of all wise departures from precedent, and his sense of honour. He could be fierce in combat and his rectitude was all the less vulnerable because it had no flavour of self-righteousness. His physical presence alone would have made him a conspicuous figure in the University, but he stood out even more by these gifts of character and by the wit which gave buoyancy to his advice. Because of his willingness to serve the University and his marked capacity for business, he held various administrative offices connected with the Faculty of Arts, the Senate, and the Council; but he kept business in its place, heeding more the ends it is meant to serve, and feeling, as he once put it, that the presence of University students in the community, 'their power of will, their fair behaviour, and the

effectual or the gracious part that they may play in life, should be our best credential'.

All this time the fabric of the three Surveys of English Literature was slowly being erected. They appeared at regular intervals, further evidence, it may be, of Elton's systematic habits: 1780-1830 in 1912 ('nearly five years' work, he noted), 1830-1880 in 1920, and 1730-1780 in 1928. There is system also (not too slavishly observed) in the construction of each, and in the treatment of individual authors: first a *curriculum vitae*, with a list of writings, then an interpretation of the salient works, with appreciative comments, and finally a tentative discovery of general characteristics, with special reference to style, always one of Elton's major interests. For the more important writers, a brief bibliography is given. Nothing quite like these Surveys had been attempted before. The nearest English analogue perhaps is provided by Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, especially for the method. Two other names suggest themselves: Sainte-Beuve and Pater; for the *Causeries du Lundi* are recalled by the constant endeavour to perceive and define the relations between the work and the personality which informs it, and by the sympathetic but carefully balanced estimates; and there is also not a little of Pater's delicate probing, and deliberate but sensitive style. The work as a whole is that on which Elton's repute as scholar and critic most firmly rests and it is needless here to dilate on merits which so many students of English literature have had occasion to observe for themselves. A few isolated reflections may, however, be in place:

1. The tide of respect and admiration for the literature belonging to the first decades of the nineteenth century was culminating towards its close and in the earliest years of the twentieth. There was a substantial body of biographical, historical, and critical writing on the 'romantic' period, but still room for a fresh and comprehensive assessment. To this period then, by an easy choice, the first of the Surveys was devoted, yet in no spirit of unchastened enthusiasm. The epigraph (from Hazlitt) is significant: 'I have endeavoured to give a reason for the faith that is in me;' and the reason presides, without prejudice to the claims of the other faculties concerned. The same period becomes a sort of touchstone in the tracing and evaluation of what went before and after, the matter of the two succeeding works; but in these other motives were at work, like the desire to offer the great Victorian performance a tribute from one born too late to admire it unquestioningly, and too soon to under-

estimate its importance or fail to mark the diversity of gifts which it implies; or the desire again to assert the positive, and not merely the relative, virtues of our literature in the middle and later years of the eighteenth century.

2. A survey, as here conceived, and as opposed to a history, implies a certain freedom from the temptation besetting the historian, to fit his material into a theoretical scheme, so that each event may be seen as a recognizable feature in a line of development; such efforts being sometimes frustrated by the unexpected and unaccountable vagaries of genius. Elton considers qualities and values without neglecting idiosyncrasy or forcing explanations; and is thus enabled to bring out the complexity of English literature in any of the periods under examination.

3. While the surveyor is thus at liberty, on suitable occasions, to 'number the streaks of the tulip' he does not fail to 'mark general properties and large appearances'; so that the reader of these volumes can take from them a heightened awareness of trends and meanings. Often help is afforded by summary statements occurring in introductory or concluding chapters, or thrown out elsewhere by the way. Thus in a retrospect of eighteenth-century poetry Elton offers both a brief definition of the more progressive phases and a kind of profit-and-loss account of what was involved in the new developments, with an appropriate emphasis on the loss:

If we look back over this great body of verse, or through any good anthology, we are naturally struck by the slow, sure invasion of a new style and temper, more intense, more exalted, and taking fresh account of the face of nature, of the nature of man, and of whatever may lie behind them both. It is a change in the 'shaping spirit of imagination', and is in no way confined to poetry. If it does us any good, we can call this the 'romantic movement'. There is no need to question the traditional valuation of this great event. We all know what poetry gained by it. It is more needful to-day to realise what she lost. She lost a certain sober, delicate ideal of form, and a peculiar just correspondence between form, tone, and thinking, which has never been recovered and is only now being properly valued. The ideal is always there, if only we will go back to it. To do so is to refine our sense of measure when we are being carried away by greater and more splendid things which do not possess that virtue.

4. We for our part may do well to consider in the light of Elton's work what has been gained and lost in the field of critical and historical investigation through the attentions of

younger labourers. We have gained knowledge about the intellectual circumstances, the 'climate of opinion' which in so many ways affected our Elizabethan and our seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. We have learnt more about the psychological processes involved in the making and appreciation of literature. New light has been thrown upon the inner coherences and correspondences, the various manifestations of likeness in difference, perceivable in single works or passages. What we have lost, or are at least in danger of losing, is a certain power of imaginative response and critical balance, assisted by versatile taste and wide reading in European literature; of which the results used to appear in an ability not only to read English literature with alertness and freshness of mind, but to see it steadily and see it whole. Of this ability in Elton his Surveys provide sufficient proof; and if these are taken in conjunction with his book on the Augustan Ages and his later account of English poetry, *The English Muse*, it is plain that there is not much of the first moment in our literature which he has left untouched.

Still within the period of his Professorship at Liverpool there were other activities: his editorship of the *Festschrift* presented to Professor Mackay on his retirement in 1914 after thirty years' service, a volume to which Elton contributed a Preface and a humorous address in an appropriate Burnsian style and metre; his visit as lecturer to the Punjab University in the winter of 1917-18, on the return from which four vessels in the same convoy were lost; and the writing of various lectures, essays and reviews, some of which were brought together in *A Sheaf of Papers* (1922). Among these not the least notable is the discussion of 'English Prose Numbers', originally published in *Essays and Studies* (English Association), vol. iv (1913), and now revised. Elton had a sensitive ear for rhythm, perhaps to make up for an almost complete deafness to musical pitch; and here he took the opportunity offered by the wide neglect of this subject to analyse and summarize the modes in which prose rhythm seems to make itself felt, in gradations of feet, invasions of metre, and concluding 'cadences'.

The same volume contains the Warton Lecture of 1914, on 'Poetic Romancers after 1850', 'Milton and Parties' (another English Association piece), and papers on 'Hamlet the Elizabethan' and certain French and Russian writers. Elton's study of Russian began during the War of 1914-18.

Towards the end of 1925 he was invited to go as visiting

professor to the University of Harvard. He therefore gave up his occupancy of the King Alfred Chair a few months before he was to retire under the limit of age and exactly twenty-five years since his tenure began. On leaving he received handsome tribute from his colleagues, pupils, and friends, who presented him with his portrait, painted by Augustus John, and with a cheque for over £300, which he at once devoted to the founding in the University of the 'Oliver Elton Prize' (for an essay). Very soon he became a Professor Emeritus.

He was in America from January 1926 for the remainder of the session, during which he was also Lowell Lecturer at Boston. On returning he and Mrs. Elton settled at 293, Woodstock Road, Oxford, a convenient house with a pleasant garden and a view from his study at the back over Port Meadow to Wytham Woods.

On retirement there was no remission of activity. There was first the third Survey (1730-1780) to be finished, and after that, time allowed for many fresh occupations. He had no thoughts of a 'modern' survey, 1880-1930, partly no doubt because he did not care to express himself on the work of living authors, some of whom might not yet have shown their full capacities. But a stronger reason may be gathered from the Epilogue to the Victorian Survey, where he justifies the closure at 1880 as 'a genuine date in our literature'. In nineteenth-century literature up to about that date he found 'nobleness' to be the salient quality. Now it begins to fail and with it the liberal enthusiasm of spirit and amplitude of style in prose. About the succeeding fifty years he would have spoken with generous recognition of the positive achievements, but also, inevitably, in the mood of one who notes with regret the passing of that noble temper and who, in his words, 'sighs as he seems to watch the last rays, and the lordly pillar, of that lighthouse-landmark receding in the mist'.

But there were large tracts of English literature about which he had written comparatively little: the pre-Renaissance field, the Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, the seventeenth century generally up to 1680; all of which with more (including twentieth-century writers no longer living) is covered, so far as poetry is concerned, in *The English Muse* (1933). Here there is greater compression than in the Surveys because more than a thousand years are compassed within a single volume; but the spirit and method are similar, with the stressing of individual qualities and values, and with judgement rather by a poet's intention than

by rule, although absolute standards are not set aside. Here again is the pervasive gusto and discrimination, and the characteristic crispness of phrase. Some of the *comptes rendus* are brief indeed; but this is inherent in the design: 'the book is meant as an introduction; or as a companion to an imaginary, and most imperfect, anthology'. As such it is more than sufficient, and even the expert will enjoy fresh illuminations. Thus, to go no farther, no one has displayed with more sensitive recognition the artistry of the Old and Middle-English verse-writers; and who has better described the mood and quality of the *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*?

No other work that has sunk into the general memory is so full of abstract phrases; but these suit the inscriptional character of the whole; and also the timeless, universal nature of the sentiment. This is lasting, like the churchyards themselves, elm-hung and history-haunted, of the South and Midlands. He gives voice to our feeling, so hard to define, for the stranger dead who are there and yet not there, and for whom we are neither happy nor unhappy. The reflection on what the departed villagers might have been under brighter stars is not tragical, and hardly pathetic; it is pure reverie; it is only the poet, not they themselves, who are disappointed. We are made, for some reason, to learn the *Elegy* by heart at an age when this sentiment is all Greek to us; but there is no harm in that, for experience only brings out its power.

Meanwhile, in 1928, a friendship of nearly forty years' standing was terminated by the death of C. E. Montague; and in the following year Elton's biography of him was published. This is a characteristically self-effacing work, with much quotation from Montague's letters and other writings, and with much material supplied by relatives and friends. Yet here again the biographer's personality can be discerned in the choice of material and in the lines of the portraiture. Indeed, some of the sentences might be self-portraiture, where the vigour of Montague's mind or his native modesty and reticence are remarked. The two men had much in common and Elton gives a just impression of Montague's high attainments as journalist and man of letters, although 'no full-dress criticism is attempted of his style or his writings'.

Elton's special interest in Slavonic poetry, Russian and then Serbo-Croatian, was much fostered during his retirement, and this, with his talent for verse, led to renderings in English metre which appeared in the *Slavonic Review* and which are reproduced and supplemented in *Verses from Pushkin and Others* (1935). Here there is an introduction which explains his principles and prac-

tices in translation, describes the poets concerned, and invites the reader not to let his views of Russian life and character be too exclusively dictated by the novelists. Theirs, it is suggested, is a too partial presentation of the darker or more ineffectual elements. 'The soul and genius of the race are best seen in the poetry.' This volume was followed by Pushkin's *Eugeny Onegin in English Verse* (1938) and by *Verses from Mickiewicz's Pan Tadeusz* (1940). Quotation must here be kept within bounds, but there is room for one example, Pushkin's verses 'To the Brownie':

To thee, our peaceful ground invisibly defending,
 Here is my prayer, O Brownie kind and good:—
 Keep safe my hamlet, and my garden wild, and wood,
 And all my cloistered household unpretending!

May never rainstorm hurt these fields with perilous cold;
 May no belated autumn hurricane assail them!
 But helpful, timely snowfall veil them
 Above the moist, manuring mould!

By these ancestral shades stay secret sentinel;
 See thou intimidate the midnight robber spying;
 Guard from all ill unfriendly eyeing
 The happy cottage where we dwell!

Patrol it watchfully about; thy love betoken
 To my small plot, and stream embankt that drowsy flows,
 And this sequestered kitchen-close
 With ancient crumbling wicket-gate and fences broken!

—Love, too, the hillock's slope of green
 And meadows that I tread in idle rumination,
 The cool lime-shades, the maples' murmuring screen:—
 These are the haunts of inspiration!

He did not give up teaching, although this was now more sporadic. He lectured at Bedford College in 1927–8 and was Lecturer in Rhetoric at Gresham College in 1929–30. He returned to Harvard for the session 1930–1. There were also some single lectures, which, with other material, are gathered in *Essays and Addresses* (1939). Here will be found more Slavonic studies (Pushkin, Chekhov, Čapek); the British Academy Shakespeare Lecture of 1936 on 'Style in Shakespeare'; the presidential address to the English Association on 'Robert Bridges and *The Testament of Beauty*' (1932); an article on 'The Present Value of Byron', two recent Manchester lectures, 'Reason and

Enthusiasm in the Eighteenth Century', and 'The Nature of Literary Criticism'. The volume ends with memoirs *in piam memoriam* of George Saintsbury and James Fitzmaurice-Kelly. Elton also wrote the memoirs of Saintsbury and of Lascelles Abercrombie for the Academy *Proceedings* (1933 and 1939). Among his latest publications was his biographical account of J. B. Yeats prefixed to the collection of *Letters* which appeared in 1944.

Besides his Fellowship of the British Academy (1924) Elton received many academic rewards, an honorary Fellowship of his own Oxford College, and honorary doctorates of Durham, Manchester, Edinburgh, Oxford, Liverpool, and Reading.

During some of his later years he suffered from a dangerous condition of the heart which forebade strenuous physical exertion; but he had fortitude and a sound constitution; and remained in full possession of his faculties until the end. He died, after a short illness, at Oxford on 4 June 1945, having reached the age of eighty-four on the preceding day.

It would be rash for me to attempt any full delineation of so rich a character and personality, and it is unnecessary too, for the work he has left behind exhibits the man himself no less than his gifts of scholarship, insight, judgement, and craftsmanship. *Abeunt studia in mores*, but, equally in this instance, *mores in studia*; and in his concern for the accurate analysis, the just estimate, even for the just word and the right rhythm, we need not try to distinguish artistic from ethical allegiances. The same exactness and faithful dealing appeared in his management of ordinary affairs, in which he took for granted an answering honesty of purpose in his associates. He was genuinely surprised when this expectation was disappointed. He was a loyal and patient friend and he was eager to help younger scholars with advice or encouragement, which he would offer unassumingly, as from one labourer in the vineyard to another with similar interests and capacities. There was no hint of condescension or parade. His nature precluded the unprovoked stridencies which can be mistaken for signs of strength, though it precluded also the ineffectiveness which sometimes goes with modesty. In conversation there might be some initial reserve, and he was embarrassed by displays of unregulated emotion. But once common ground had been established, as it could be very quickly, there was no check to the warmth and lambency of his spirit, the gaiety of his wit, and the lively returns of sympathetic understanding. He admired the French

type of civilization more than the Germanic and there was a French poise and deftness of touch in his personal intercourse as in his writing.

There was something French also in his abiding respect for the reason, which he upheld as the safest guide towards the right conduct and understanding of human affairs. It was not narrowly conceived, for it included 'Reason in her more exalted mood', which admits of vision. The limits of the logical reason were fully admitted; the claims of vision, as of the affections and the moral emotions, must be allowed; but reason must decide upon their validity. 'At the worst, it must keep the position of a co-partner whose signature is requisite if the cheque is to be honoured.' And in the Epilogue to the Victorian Survey there are remarks on the function of reason in modern life which have their relevance to-day. Referring to the late nineteenth-century change of spirit making for reaction towards *a priori* philosophy and mysticism Elton observes, by way of explanation:

That reason, and science, and the enthusiasm of humanity, which spoke out so bravely in the third quarter of the last century, left many facts of human nature, emotional and spiritual, out of their reckoning, and made too hasty a synthesis; that these facts, as always happens, revenged themselves upon the theories which overlooked them; that reason, in consequence, became awhile discredited; that the task of reason is to catch up with the facts that she had ignored, and to reassert her natural supremacy; and that to do this service for reason is the business of that coming age which most of us will not live to see.

Elton's own gift of reasoning and of scientific precision is palpable in his critical writing, though his other gifts made him an artist as well. How he saw his special province is perhaps best indicated in what he wrote on 'The Nature of Literary Criticism': an activity which he distinguishes from scholarship, or theorizing, or psychological inquiry, whatever help it may willingly derive from these quarters.

Criticism is none of these things, for it is *practical*; an art or craft like drawing; and all these other kinds of knowledge may serve it as drawing may be served by a knowledge of anatomy. It is also a *product*, like the poems which are its subject-matter; and it may itself be an art-product, if the critic, as so often has happened, is himself a poet or has a poetic soul.

And it is because Elton had such a soul that he is in the true line of succession represented in English criticism by Sidney, Dryden, Johnson, Coleridge, Arnold, and Pater.

He did not often expose his views on ultimate questions of

philosophy, and when he did it was apt to be with some apology for amateur procedure and with avoidance of abstruseness. His attitude to religious doctrine was avowedly agnostic and he lost the chance of at least one Oxford Fellowship because this attitude was known. Yet he well understood various types of religious experience and sympathized with the mystical temper, especially the kind which favours hopefulness and buoyancy, and offers no hindrance to 'sanguine and creative energy'; and now and then there are hints, as in parenthesis, of a personal metaphysic, which, whatever it may owe to other minds, carries the authority of fresh and reasoned pondering. Thus in the dialogue on 'Poetry and Life' (in *A Sheaf of Papers*) there is a glimpse of tentative speculation on the mystery of evil and suffering: the kind of poetry which admits, but in the end resolves, pain and discord 'follows the law which in our sanguine moments we discern may somehow be obeyed in the order of things. Not a mere happy ending; but an ending, a final effect, a total progress, which on retrospect gives satisfaction on the whole. We have been through an imaginative experience, which we would rather have had than not have had.'

And perhaps the kind of summary tribute which Elton would like best, because it does not sound too pretentious, is to say that he has helped us, in spite of all distress, to take satisfaction in 'the order of things', and that we gratefully enter his life and works on the credit side of the cosmic balance-sheet. He persuades us to 'think nobly of the soul'.

L. C. MARTIN

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ANDREW GEORGE LITTLE

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1863-1945

ANDREW GEORGE LITTLE was born on 28 September 1863. He was the second of the three sons of Thomas Little, the rector of Princes Risborough. His mother was Ann Wright, a woman of great charm, whose home had been at Chalfont St. Giles. Thomas Little was the very best kind of parish priest. The eldest of eleven children, he was born and brought up at Corrie, six miles from Lockerbie in Dumfriesshire, and had the good fortune to be taught at the village school by a Mr. Monsey, one of those inspiring dominies who have shaped Scottish boys and sent them on to the universities. The stories told about Thomas as boy and man are singularly consistent. He had a remarkable influence upon others, whether he knew them well or made friends with them in a casual meeting. His memory was long cherished with gratitude and affection in Princes Risborough.

Andrew lost both his father and mother when he was about thirteen years old. On medical advice the rector went with his wife to Italy—the boys were at school—but had to leave owing to an illness contracted by Mrs. Little. She died suddenly at Paris on the way home, and her husband, a sick man, never recovered from the shock. He died a few months later, in November 1876. The three boys were given a home by their uncle, Dr. David Little of Manchester, one of the leading ophthalmic surgeons of his day. Many years later, in November 1902, two days before the doctor died Andrew wrote to his aunt: 'I have felt for many years very deeply and the present circumstances bring it home to me still more nearly what an enormous lot we three owe to Uncle David, ever since the day of my Father's funeral when he took charge of us and rescued us from the danger of slack surroundings and brought us back into the bracing atmosphere of work and duty.' All the same, life in Manchester was dull for Andrew and his brothers until Dr. Little married a lady nearer their own age than he was. Then, in a house with a good garden in Victoria Park, they were very happy with the doctor and his wife, whom they called by her Christian name and regarded as an elder sister, and, as the years passed by, with the children. One of these cousins, Miss Dora Little, writes:

I always loved Andrew from a small child upwards, but, alas! never

saw enough of him. His wit and tremendously hearty laughter will always remain vividly in my mind. Our old nurse had the greatest admiration for 'Mr. Andrew'. . . . He was always so delightful with children and my mother remembers him saying that the greatest hell on earth would be never to see a child. . . .

And, referring to later years, Miss Little speaks of his instinct for doing 'charming little things'. In 1887 the three nephews had Mrs. Little's portrait painted 'as a token of gratitude for the happy home my father, as their guardian, had given them, and for all he and my mother had been to them. It was Andrew's idea and he who chose the artist, Sir William Richmond.'¹

Andrew was sent by his parents to a preparatory school, Durham House (better known later as The Grange) at Folkestone. His brother Frank recalls that the headmaster, the Rev. A. L. Hussey, had no great opinion of Andrew's abilities. He thought that he was very slow and that he did not make much effort to learn. If this were so Andrew certainly woke up at Clifton, where he went in 1878, two years after his father's death. In May of this year Dr. Percival, then headmaster of Clifton, had offered the post of master of the upper fifth to Charles Edwyn Vaughan, a young man of twenty-four, afterwards well known as a writer on English literature and political thought and as professor of English language and literature in Cardiff, Newcastle, and Leeds. Andrew Little owed more to Vaughan than to any other man. His influence upon him during his Clifton days and afterwards was profound. He gave him both the stimulus and the wider outlook which he needed and made him aware of the mental and spiritual values which came to mean most to him. Among other things he taught him that writing is the surest refuge from boredom and that something of philosophy is indispensable for a fruitful knowledge of history. In 1882 Andrew went up to Balliol, just bereft of the presence but not of the influence of Vaughan's cousin, T. H. Green. And his first teaching post was at Cardiff, close to Llandaff, where Vaughan's uncle, the famous dean, was still at work with his pupils in the companionship which Dr. Coulton has described so well.²

At Oxford Andrew read for honour moderations in classics

¹ Mrs. David Little survived Andrew, and died in November 1946.

² After Vaughan's death in 1922, Little prepared for the press his *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau* in two volumes (Manchester University Press, 1925). He prefixed to this work a fine memoir of his friend.

and then turned to history, in which he took a first class in 1886. He had adequate means, made friends easily, and worked steadily. Riding, until he gave up his horse in 1918, was his only recreation. From his undergraduate days until he left Cardiff he hunted, generally riding to hounds once a week during the hunting season. His interest in politics was strong. A letter written on 8 February 1885, just after the news of the fall of Khartoum had reached England, shows deep feeling controlled by the good sense always so characteristic of him. After he had taken his degree he decided to study in Germany. He told Bishop Stubbs that he 'intended to go into *Domesday Book*. Stubbs chortled and said it was much more important to get out of it', and foretold that nothing would come of it. The prophecy was justified, for Andrew, in his own words, found himself in a Serbonian bog. He attacked a difficult subject in the wrong way and in the wrong place; but he learned a great deal from his experience.

He went first to Dresden where he studied German with Fräulein Gottschalk, well known to Oxford scholars as a teacher. He then went to Göttingen where he worked for about a year, from the spring of 1887 to the spring of 1888, under Ludwig Weiland, the disciple of Waitz, and one of the editors of the volumes of 'constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum' published in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*. Weiland was a good scholar and a stimulating teacher. In one of his letters to Mrs. David Little (28 April 1887) Andrew writes:

This evening at 6 o'clock took place something which I have looked forward to as a vague possibility for two years now, it ought to be something great, oughtn't it? It was a discussion between students and professor on the principles and practices of the critical examination of original historical documents—a pretty heavy and dull affair to have on one's mind 2 years! Weiland was the professor; he is quite splendid—only spoke today generally—of methods etc, and quoted a few screamingly funny examples of documentary falsifications. I did not know the subject was capable of such a treatment. Next Friday we begin real work on original documents. I am afraid my pleasure will be a little spoiled when I have to make a speech in German—but never say die! He is going to examine some of the English documents this term and I shall try to show then that even an Oxford historical student doesn't get all his knowledge at secondhand.

Andrew obviously got what he felt that he needed in Göttingen. He enjoyed the discipline in historical method. He talked

German with an old lady, Frau Dr. Hummel, who was exceedingly kind to him and, when the tête-à-têtes in German became wearisome, proceeded to teach him Italian. As he acquired proficiency in the language he entered more easily into the interests of his companions. One day he read a paper to the historical society, and won much approval, though the paper was 'somewhat too highpitched for the rather beery atmosphere that pervades a *Kneipe*'. He found good friends. He wrote: 'It made me really very dismal to leave Göttingen: people were very good to me and seemed very sorry that I was going. One gets up a lot of affection for a place where one has been for a year. I felt too that my time there was very well spent and that an era of my life had come to an end.' At times he had not been happy. The subject which Weiland had suggested to him was not congenial and, as the professor ruefully admitted, he had led him on a wild-goose chase. It made him feel that he was stupid and dispirited him. And he was depressed by the news of his greatest friend, Charles Warrack, who was seeking health in vain in Italy and Algeria. His happiest time was when Vaughan came to stay with him. Vaughan helped him to carry the four big folios of *Domesday Book* from the University library to his room, and read to him bits of his history of political philosophy.

Weiland was impressed by Little and testified to his capacity to treat historical problems 'even of a difficult sort, thoroughly and according to the scientific methods'. The outcome of his researches was a note in the *English Historical Review* for 1889 on 'Gesiths and Thanes'.

On his way home Little went to Berlin to see the body of the Emperor William lying in state before his funeral. He wrote a detailed and vivid description of the scenes in the city and of the crowds, and added an appreciation of the new emperor, Frederick (13 March 1888):

The funeral takes place on Friday and ought to be very imposing. I shall try to get a decent place somewhere. The new Emperor will probably not take part in it—the weather is too unfavourable. There is a report that he was in Berlin today; but I don't believe it. The more one hears of him the more one hopes he may live. There is an old prophecy said to date from the 16th century to which the old Emperor is said to have attached importance (as he certainly did to others of the like kind) that an Emperor would arise who would restore the Empire to its old might and conquer all its foes, and would live longer than any of his predecessors; he would survive his son and hand on the Empire

to a weak grandson, under whom, however, the Empire would rise still higher. Who knows whether this may not have depressed the Crown Prince? A new spirit is visible already in the Emperor's decrees—in the mourning-decree that he would leave the time to the people themselves in their various localities; and in the Manifesto to the People that appeared yesterday—also in [a] letter to Bismark. One sees a reverence for the Constitution worthy of an Englishman, which Emp. Wilhelm and Bismark have not shown. Everything is not, it would seem, to be ordered from the head-centre, not to depend on a few men, but Government is to become the business of the people; they are not to have everything done for them, but are to do things themselves, and feel their own responsibility. The mention of Arts and Sciences in the Manifesto is very remarkable, and I should think quite original in a document of this kind. I don't know whether the Germans will in their hearts agree with the very peaceful character of the policy sketched out—with the truth, which every paragraph of the Manifesto would seem to bring out—that 'Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war'. The German youth of the present day seems to me to be distinctly war-loving.

After his return to England Little spent four fruitful years in research in Oxford and London. He deserted *Domesday Book* and the Anglo-Saxon laws for the friars. A casual remark made by his tutor, A. L. Smith, had already aroused his interest: 'Read Brewer's introduction to *Monumenta Franciscana*; you would like it.' He *had* read it, and now he determined to devote himself to ecclesiastical and academic history, and especially to the history of the Grey Friars or Franciscans or Friars Minor.¹ He lived mainly in London, but spent a good deal of time in Oxford. One letter, written from Oxford to Mrs. David Little, describes 'a great thing' which had happened to him on 12 November [1890], the day on which the letter was written.

Just as I was starting for a ride, a youth came up to me and said, 'The G.O.M. is coming to tea with me today: do you care to come?' It is needless to say that I did care to come. There were only four of us—the other three being undergrads. and younger than myself. We waited, not expecting that the old man would turn up as it was raining hard. Presently Mrs. G. turned up and we hailed her joyfully as an earnest of better things to come. Soon after the well-known head appeared in the doorway. He looked beaming but very muddy and

¹ 'Fratres Minores is the best Latin translation of Grey Friars. *Fratres grisei* is occasionally found as a popular and non-official translation, e.g. *Political Poems and Songs*, ed. Wright (R. S.), i. 256: "Inter fratres griseos sic est ordinatum".' (MS. note by A. G. L.)

said he had a tragedy to tell. Coming along the High [to Magdalen] with his umbrella in front against wind and rain, he had fallen over some sacks of coal on the pavement (that is rather characteristic of Oxford streets by the way, in the dark). He was none the worse and seemed to regard it as a huge joke, but it might have been very serious. He is extraordinarily young—really blessed with eternal youth—the youthfulness of the soul. He merely frivelled, humbugged his wife, and talked about the historic significance of pork, which he had discovered was of great ethnological importance, especially in relation to Homer and the Phoenicians. He had just met Burdon Saunderson for the first time and was tremendously impressed by his appearance; it was evidently a problem to him how a vivisectionist could look so magnificent. I did so want to talk politics but thought it better not to begin; they were not mentioned.

Little had his share of interruptions and domestic anxiety, but his life was uneventful, placid, and happy, and its story is soon told. In the autumn of 1892 he became the first independent lecturer in history in University College of South Wales at Cardiff. In July 1898 he was made professor. In 1901 he resigned his chair on account of the bad health of his wife, whom he had married in 1893. In 1902 he settled in Sevenoaks in a house called 'Risborough' in recollection of his father's and his own early home, and there, on 22 October 1945, he died. His wife was Alice, the daughter of William Hart of Fingrith Hall, Blackmore, Essex. He had first met her in 1882 at her aunt's home, Waltons Park, a beautiful place on the borders of Essex and Cambridgeshire, where Andrew and his brothers and the Hart family were wont to spend some of their holidays. 'We had a married life', writes Mrs. Little, 'of great happiness, in spite of my frequent indifferent health, which Andrew bore with unflinching and amazing, kindest patience.' How much he, in his turn, owed to the companionship and to Mrs. Little's encouragement is known to all their friends. They had a full life. Little was a good citizen, deep in many academic activities, in frequent touch with scholars at home and abroad. The envelope of a foreign letter which he once sent to me was addressed, I noticed, to 'The University, Risborough'; and in a sense Little did build up a 'school' of his own in his Kentish retreat.

He had been a good professor. As a teacher at Cardiff he set a high standard and enlarged the scope of his subject. This involved him in controversy with the 'patriots', which seems to have come to a head in the senate in 1900. His refusal, which caused some debate, to draw rigid distinctions and to provide

independent instruction in the history of Wales at the expense of other subjects, was probably wise at the time and certainly did not imply indifference to Welsh history. He wrote a capital little book on *Mediaeval Wales* (1902) which, though it appeared after his retirement, was the outcome of a course of popular lectures given in 1901, and found an immediate welcome in the other colleges of the University of Wales. He brought to Cardiff, young though he was, a mature judgement and the influence of wide historical movements in scholarship. The memory of his work still lives in Wales. He was always so much more than a learned man. After the establishment of the University of Wales in 1893, and especially after his promotion in 1898, his quiet influence was felt throughout the academic life of the country. He inspired trust and affection. One of the advantages, stressed by the Principal of the college in Cardiff, of his appointment as professor was that he henceforth would have a place on the Senate. I cannot do better than quote the testimony of Vaughan, who had been made professor of English and History in 1889 and had surrendered the teaching of history to his new colleague, but old pupil and friend, three years later. Vaughan left Cardiff in 1898, but after Little's retirement he wrote an appreciation of him for the college magazine. Here are a few excerpts:

For the last nine years he has been inseparably bound up with all that is best in the life of the College; with its social intercourse, with the working of its various Societies, with the transaction of its business; and, above all, with its intellectual energy. And it is no small thing for the College to have had, during that time, a man of such wide sympathies and so sound a judgement, as well as of such deep learning and scholarly training, on its Staff. . . . Though he had started life with no intention of becoming a teacher, he soon took to the work like a duck to the water. . . . His distinction as student and teacher is but a small part of what he has contributed to the life of the College. Where, for the last nine years, would the College have been without his disinterestedness, his energy in extending his influence, his sound judgement, his keen interest in individual students, his self-sacrificing devotion?

Except for an application at Edinburgh in 1899, Little made no attempt to get another chair; but he was not a recluse. In 1901 he accepted an invitation from Professor Tout to teach palaeography to graduate students who were engaged in research work in Manchester, and, after the necessary arrangements had been made he began in 1902 those weekly or fortnightly visits to the northern University which continued with few breaks during the greater part of each academic year until

1928. He was not the first to lecture or give instruction in palaeography in a British university, but I think that he was the first to gather about him, in a systematic though informal way, groups of students who, as members of a school of history, were trying to learn how to write history. Neither Tout nor his colleague Tait believed in 'spoon-feeding', but they did believe that graduate studies are as important as undergraduate studies in any academic society which professes to advance learning; and Little, with his vivid recollections of all he had looked forward to as an undergraduate and all he had learned in Göttingen, was just the man to supplement the guidance given by the professors to their pupils. He took much care. He prepared collections of facsimiles of manuscripts ranging from Carolingian minuscule to Tudor script and distributed them, at a ridiculously low charge, to the members of his class. He was patient and precise in the exposition of technicalities, but he also made his pupils realize the significance of the texts as historical documents, and encouraged them to write papers on the manuscript sources upon which each of them might have to rely. Above all, he made them feel that they were his fellow workers, whatever their particular interests might be. The hours which some of us spent in Little's class were some of the happiest and most stimulating in our lives as students of history. His accuracy and learning won our immediate respect; his gentleness and humour and personal interest made him our friend.

His public spirit made him a familiar figure in much wider circles. His high sense of duty was combined with wide human sympathies; and he was a source of strength to learned bodies, the Royal Historical Society, the Canterbury and York Society, the Historical Association, and, after his election as a Fellow in 1922, the British Academy. On the whole he was able to relate his special interests in Franciscan history to his furtherance of educational and learned enterprises. His frequent contributions to the *English Historical Review*, the sixteen biographies which he wrote between 1890 and 1895 for the *Dictionary of National Biography*, his accounts of the friaries of various orders in Lincolnshire, Worcestershire, Oxfordshire, Dorsetshire, Yorkshire, and Kent which, between 1906 and 1927, filled more than 150 closely packed pages of the *Victoria County Histories*, and a score or more casual essays and papers, in books, magazines, and local periodicals, all either extended or popularized knowledge of the history of the friars, and of the English Grey Friars in particular. They were to a large extent preparations for what was to have

been his greatest work, a history of the Franciscans in England. On the other hand, his sense of duty was responsible for his failure to fulfil this purpose. The secretaryship of the ecclesiastical section of the International Congress of Historical Studies held in London in 1913 or the co-editorship of the volume of essays presented to Professor Tout in 1925 might be taken in his stride, though they involved much correspondence and other labour; but his work in the War Trade Intelligence Department (1916-18) during the first world war,¹ his preparation for the press of Professor Vaughan's big book on political philosophy (1922-5), and his devoted service as President of the Historical Association (1926-9) made serious inroads on his time and energy. He undertook the last responsibility only after much hesitation, but as a former chairman of the publications committee and as a warm advocate of the aims of the Association he felt that he must accept the nomination. It meant that he would have to attend many meetings and travel among the local branches, and it came just when he was ready to settle down to his comprehensive history. Then, in 1928, his friend Paul Sabatier died, and he found himself committed to the preparation for the press of the famous scholar's new edition of the *Speculum Perfectionis* (2 vols., 1928, 1931), a labour of love, no doubt, but also a most tiresome and perplexing task. After this the state of his health enabled him to do little more than finish various pieces of work which he had in hand and to put together some of his earlier papers. He had already had one operation in April 1916. In 1937 he had to undergo a much more serious one. Throughout the second world war he lived in a dangerous area in a time of incessant anxiety, and without the domestic help upon which his wife and he had always been able to rely. He worked hopefully in his house and garden, kept in touch with local life and his old friends, made new friends of those who were given a place in his home, and published a collection of papers. His last work, not yet published, is a revision in an English form of his edition of Eccleston.

He had been a Fellow of the British Academy since 1922. He received the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from the

¹ H. W. C. Davis, the vice-chairman of the department, admitted him with reluctance. He observed, 'it is like cutting wood with a razor'. A report on the iron and steel resources of Austria and Germany is said to have won warm praise from Earl Balfour; but most of his work was done as one of the editors of 'Daily Notes'. He left the Department in November 1918 and received a grateful letter from Davis for his care and thoroughness in this uncongenial task.

University of Oxford in 1928 and from the University of Manchester in 1935.

At first sight Little's historical work may seem narrow and to lie outside the main field. He was not so widely known as some of his contemporaries were, either at home or abroad. He received no foreign distinctions, although he devoted his life as a scholar to the poor man of Assisi. Yet this way of looking at him is most misleading. His first book, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (1892), has the same sort of importance in English historical literature as had those other Oxford books, R. L. Poole's *Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval Thought* (1884), and Rashdall's *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (1895), and it probably had a more immediate and continuous effect than they produced. It gave fresh and wider significance to medieval history, submitted a neglected subject to the standards of exact scholarship, greatly broadened our knowledge of unpublished material, and linked with learning, some of which was his own, but more of which lay hidden in the treasure-house of western thought and endeavour, a theme of perpetual charm and interest to the spirit of man. As his powers grew and his range broadened, Little's work became in itself a source of inspiration, not alone for students of his subject but for all who wished to see the barriers between this and that field of learning broken down. Never forgetful of the early influences under which he had learned history and always ready to advance them, he was one of those who can explain the unity of life in the past, and in doing this make a great library a less mysterious place. The man was not lost in the scholar. Those who knew him well would be inclined to agree with his oldest contemporary, who wrote after his death that Little, since Maitland, came nearest to the idea of what an historical scholar can be.

Most of Little's work consists of studies in critical scholarship. Its range and intensity can best be realized by an examination of the bibliography printed with the address presented to him in 1938. Its value as a contribution to medieval history can only be estimated by specialists. A mere detailed summary of it would be tedious and unsatisfactory. Some general observations, however, should be made before I refer to Little's outstanding books and papers. From the first he saw the Franciscan movement as part of a wider development in religious, ecclesiastical, and educational life. He was no naïve enthusiast devoted to the *Poverello*. Indeed, I fancy that his concern with the lives of St. Francis and his disciples was mainly due to the efflore-

scence of Franciscan studies which followed the publication of Paul Sabatier's famous book shortly after his own *Grey Friars in Oxford*. Inevitably and eagerly he took his share in a movement of which he can hardly have been aware when he began; yet he regarded the history of the mendicant orders as a whole, and of their academic activities in particular, as his subject. From one point of view his work was an expression, suggested by his special interests, of his belief in the value of local history and of his desire to make more accessible to the general student and to specialists the technicalities of his craft. It was connected with the influence which he exerted, as a leader in the Historical Association, in the promotion of the study of local history and in the preparation of annual bibliographies of current historical literature, and with his wise and skilful direction of the committee which prepared, for the Institute of Historical Research, a report on the way to edit documents. The publication, early in his career, of his *Initia operum latinorum*, to which I shall return, was the finest example of a natural quality which, throughout the history of learning, has blessed scholars of generous and gracious minds—the wish to share with others the profits of their labours. Little, like the late P. S. Allen, regarded our academic society as an unselfish brotherhood with no frontiers except the frontier imposed by the duty to maintain a high standard.

His Franciscan studies widened Little's circle of friends both at home and abroad. He did not labour, like P. S. Allen, under the pleasant compulsion to make a systematic survey of manuscript sources in foreign libraries, but he was familiar with the chief collections and made some important discoveries, and, like Allen, he had ties, sometimes very close ties, with fellow scholars in the west of Europe and Italy. Numerous letters to him from Sabatier and the Franciscan brothers in Quaracchi, notably Father Livarius Oliger, show how the discussion of minute points of scholarship was enlivened by warm personal regard and the memories of happy visits. He spent a summer in Paris during his Cardiff period, was in Florence in 1895, in Rome, Assisi, and Florence in 1909, in Florence, Assisi, Siena, Ravenna, and Venice in 1922. Co-operation with continental scholars became a matter of course after the publication in the *English Historical Review* in 1902 of a long review of recent researches into the sources of the history of St. Francis, a paper which was translated into Italian by Professor R. Casali for the *Miscellanea Francescana*. The French and Italian periodicals devoted to

Franciscan studies sought contributions from him. As his correspondence reveals, he was regarded by scholars in related fields of study as a source of information about manuscripts. His work on Roger Bacon provides a good example of this and of his ability to bring scholars together. His account of Bacon in the *Grey Friars in Oxford* was the first expression of an interest to which he returned throughout his later life. He gave vigorous encouragement to, and for many years prevailed upon the British Academy to support, Mr. R. R. Steele's *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, the first fascicule of which appeared in 1905. He organized the commemoration in 1914 of the seventh centenary anniversary of the traditional date of Bacon's birth (1214). A volume of essays was compiled and a memorial stone was erected on an old wall which is regarded as a remnant of the medieval friary in Oxford. While he was preparing the volume of essays, Little approached the distinguished scholar, Pierre Duhem of Bordeaux, who, in the course of his labours on his great cosmological work, *Le Système du monde*, had already published an unedited fragment of the *Opus Tertium*. Duhem ultimately sent to Little his essay on 'Roger Bacon et l'Horreur du vide' (*Commemoration Essays*, pp. 241-84), but at first had thought of writing on Bacon's early *questiones* on the *Physics* of Aristotle. Little lent him rotographs of the important manuscript at Amiens (Amiens no. 406) containing most of Bacon's earliest work, which had not been thoroughly examined since Victor Cousin had described it in 1848 in the pages of the *Journal des Savants*. After Duhem's death in 1917 another Baconian scholar, the Franciscan Ferdinand M. Delorme, who then lived in Limoges and had used the rotograph lent to Duhem, begged for another copy. Little had no other copy and that lent to Duhem had disappeared. Father Delorme, however, succeeded in finding it and used it, in co-operation with Mr. Steele, in his edition of the *questiones* published in the *Opera hactenus inedita* (Fasc. xiii, 1928).¹ During these years Little did much work on Bacon. In 1928 he delivered to the British Academy the masterly lecture in which he summed up the results of all recent work on this 'master mind'.

At this point we naturally come to his best-known enterprise, the formation of the British Society of Franciscan Studies, for

¹ Letters from Duhem and Delorme, and information from Mrs. Little. Little had first examined the Amiens MS. about 1907 and in 1928 seems to have had it sent for his use or for Mr. Steele's to the British Museum. The rotograph was later given, with other rotographs, to the British Museum.

three of the twenty-two volumes issued by the Society between its reconstitution in 1907 and its dissolution in 1936-7 contain editions of works by Roger Bacon. The Society was originally founded in September 1902 as a British Branch of the International Society established by Paul Sabatier in the previous July. Sabatier was its honorary president until his death in March 1928. The desire to give more emphasis to the publication of texts and studies and to provide money for the same led in 1907 to the reconstruction of the Branch as a British Society with a higher subscription. The story of its activities has been told by Little himself.¹ It is a part of the history of Franciscan studies and only concerns us here in so far as it throws light on Little as organizer, editor, and scholar. Throughout his was the leading spirit. From 1905 he was chairman of the committee as well as honorary general editor and, after Sabatier's death, honorary president. He arranged the preparation of all the twenty-two volumes published for the Society, was the author of two, one of the authors of three, and contributed papers or bibliographies to seven of them. Then there was his revision in two volumes of Sabatier's edition of the *Speculum Perfectionis*. Moreover, with the enthusiastic support of his friend Dr. Walter Seton, who was secretary of the Society from 1923 until his early death in January 1927, he was actively concerned in two commemorations, one the celebration at Canterbury on 10 September 1924 of the seventh centenary of the coming of the Franciscans to England, the other the arrangement of a course of lectures in University College, London, in October 1926 to mark the seventh centenary of the death of St. Francis. The lectures with other papers, edited by Dr. Seton, were published by the London University Press under the title *St. Francis, Essays in Commemoration, 1226-1926*. They comprise, in addition to F. C. Burkitt's study of the sources and other remarkable works, a survey by Little of the first hundred years of the Franciscan school at Oxford, always the theme closest to his mind and heart. The Society came to an end, in accordance with a resolution passed at a general meeting on 31 October 1936, with the publication of two fine volumes on *Franciscan Architecture in England* (1936) and *Franciscan History and Legend in English Mediaeval Art* (1937), due respectively to suggestions made by Sir Charles Peers and Mrs. Bardswell. The decision was taken with reluctance, but lack of funds and support, the consciousness

¹ *Franciscan Essays II* (1932), pp. vii-xii. This volume is the third in the Extra Series of the Society.

that, though much more remained to be done, most of the sources of primary interest in Franciscan history had been published, and the difficulty of finding a successor to Little as editor made it inevitable. As Little says, in the preface to the concluding volume, 'there are fashions in historical as in other movements'. In concluding this brief account of the Society, I must note how much it owed to Little's association with the University of Manchester and its press. Until 1915, the volumes of the Society were published by direct arrangement with the Aberdeen University Press, but from 1918 through the agency of the Manchester University Press. Little's friendly relations with the publications committee in Manchester must have spared him much anxiety. It had already undertaken his *Initia Operum* and his Ford lectures, and was to publish his last collection of essays (1943). It has in hand his last work on Eccleston. His Manchester friends would comment that the advantage was theirs and that the prestige of the University has been enhanced by the loyal co-operation of its former reader in palaeography.

Little was always at work, quietly, steadily, placidly, but with unflinching thoroughness. And it should not be forgotten that he inspired or improved as much work by others as he wrote himself, not only books prepared under his direction while he was engaged in advanced teaching in Manchester, like Miss Margaret Toynbee's *S. Louis of Toulouse*, and Miss Decima Douie's *Nature and Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli*, but the work of fellow scholars who relied on him for advice, for assistance in the search for and handling of manuscripts, and in countless other ways. Whether they knew him personally or not there can be few of his contemporaries and none of his juniors interested in the history of medieval thought or education or ecclesiastical institutions who have not learned of him. Everything that he wrote is straightforward and to the point, and so wisely related to the criticism of texts. It would be hard to distinguish between his learned and his popular essays or lectures as sources on influence, for the learned work is so easy to follow and the popular work is so free from padding, reflecting the best of his thinking and expressing with more freedom his disciplined feelings. As I have said, he returned again and again to the subject of his first book, both in learned and popular studies. One of his most important pieces of work is the long paper on 'the Franciscan School at Oxford in the thirteenth century', which Father Oligier induced him to write for a special number of the periodical of

the Quaracchi fathers, *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* (vol. xix, 1926, pp. 803-74). This includes a revision of the lives and writings of the earlier Oxford scholars dealt with in *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (the articles on Pecham and Duns Scotus are notable) but it also contains a masterly account of the teaching given by the famous secular master Robert Grosseteste and of the academic exercises in early Oxford. It leads naturally to the book which Little prepared, in collaboration with his friend Dr. F. Pelster, S.J., for the Oxford Historical Society in 1934, *Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302*. Four years before, the two scholars had discovered that both were working on the same manuscripts, and in particular on Assisi 158 (*quaestiones* at Oxford and Cambridge 1282-90) and Worcester Cathedral Library Q 99 (*quaestiones* at Oxford, 1300-2). They joined to describe these *questiones* and to add a precious section on the university sermons preached at Oxford in 1290-3. The outcome is a strong and practical study, enriched by texts, notes, and biographies, of academic life in the last years of the thirteenth century. I do not know a better introduction to life in a medieval university. An outcome of Little's work on the Grey Friars at Oxford was his edition of Eccleston's *Tractatus de adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam* published in Sabatier's *Collection d'études et de documents* (Paris, 1909) and his edition of the *Liber Exemplorum* or practical manual of illustrations for the use of preachers, contained in a Durham Cathedral manuscript (British Society of Franciscan Studies, i, 1908). In the former he established and annotated a well-known text, first edited by J. S. Brewer in 1858; in the latter he broke new ground,¹ and notably promoted the literature, now greatly extended, about medieval preaching. These books, with his various studies in local Franciscan history and his numerous papers, prepared him for his more comprehensive and best-known book, the Ford lectures, *Studies in English Franciscan History*, delivered in 1916, just before his first operation, and published by the Manchester University Press in 1917. During the thirty years which have since gone by, many readers and university students, in their successive generations, must have learned from Little's lectures what the coming of the Minorites meant to England and how a fine and sympathetic scholar can throw fresh light on the

¹ At first Little thought he was the first to discover this manuscript. He wrote ruefully to his wife in 1904, while he was examining in Oxford, that W. P. Ker had called his attention to a study of it by a French scholar. This scholar was Paul Meyer.

society of the past by the skilful arrangement of scattered evidence. Dr. Coulton, who had made Little's acquaintance some years before and had sent him notes upon the Eccleston and the Exempla, read the proofs with warm appreciation. He began a series of critical jottings with the words, 'I have read, enjoyed and (I hope) profited; I congratulate you on your sweetness and light.' The lectures have won and will long retain a place in our historical literature undisturbed by changing fashions and enthusiasms, for they are firmly rooted in knowledge and humanity. How far removed is the spirit of the following passage from the fleeting vogue of the Fioretti:

It would ill become a Balliol man lecturing in the Hall of Balliol College to maintain that the Franciscans were exclusively devoted to schemes for the maintenance of their own Order. It is well known that Franciscans took an honourable part in the foundation of Balliol, and for more than two centuries were associated in the government of the College. And there are other instances of Franciscan confessors directing their penitents to apply their property to the advancement of learning—notably in the case of Pembroke College, Cambridge. But these instances, so far as I know, are too few and too exceptional to allow us to alter our general conclusion that the necessity of maintaining themselves on alms impaired the social usefulness of the friars, and their spiritual force. The pressure of material needs was too insistent. The cares of poverty proved as exacting and distracting as the cares of property.

Two other books call for attention, the *Initia Operum* and Sabatier's new edition of the *Speculum Perfectionis*. One of the projects of the original or branch Society of Franciscan Studies was the compilation of a catalogue of Franciscan manuscripts. Though Sabatier warmly encouraged this proposal, it fell to the ground, but Little had begun to compile a catalogue of Franciscan manuscripts in Great Britain. His preliminary studies grew into the more general *Initia Operum Latinorum quae saeculis xiii., xiv., xv. attribuuntur* (Manchester University Press, 1904). The interleaved volume of 275 pages, containing close on 6,000 *incipits*, is now very rare and costly. Little made extensive additions in his own copy, now in the possession of the Institute of Historical Research, but no second edition has ever appeared. The list is obviously provisional; it was primarily intended to help Franciscan students; but Little cast his net wide and produced a book which is still the only attempt of a general kind to cope with a crying need. Since 1904 much other work has been done, notably in Vatasso's *incipits* of writings printed in

Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, in the *Catalogue of the Royal Manuscripts in the British Museum*, in the catalogue of *incipits* of medical manuscripts, and in other more limited ways. An exhaustive work, to comprehend every kind of medieval Latin literature, would be quite impracticable; but a catalogue of the *incipits* of theological and philosophical texts, which would take account of all discussions and identifications during the last fifty years, might well be undertaken by an international group of scholars. Nothing could be a better memorial to A. G. Little.

The *Initia*, of course, was of inestimable service to Little himself. He could proceed more surely with his investigation of manuscripts. In 1910 he had the pleasure of discovering among the Phillipps manuscripts (no. 12290) one precious text, which he was able to purchase. It is now known as the Little MS. His full description of the text, first in 1914 in the first volume of the *Collectanea Franciscana* published by the British Society of Franciscan Studies, and later in the *Opuscles de critique historique* edited by Sabatier (fasc. xviii, 1919), is an important contribution to the study of the sources for the life of St. Francis.¹ He later discussed its relation and the relations of other recently discovered Franciscan documents to the *Second Life* by Celano and the *Speculum Perfectionis*, in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* for 1926. By this time the problem of the sources was known to be more complicated than Sabatier had thought in 1898 when he issued his edition of the *Speculum* or was yet disposed to think, and the drift of opinion among Franciscan scholars was opposed to his conviction that the *Speculum* was written *d'un trait*, less than a year after the death of the saint. He accepted the date, 1228, given in the Mazarin MS. and was not shaken by the discovery of the colophon of the Ognissanti MS. at Florence, where the mcccxxviii of the Mazarin MS. becomes the more likely mcccxviii. Hence when, after his friend's death in 1928, Little undertook to arrange Sabatier's materials and bring out the second edition of the *Speculum*, he was faced by a delicate and difficult task. The first volume (1928) contains the text, the second (1931) Sabatier's account of the manuscripts and the greater number of his long notes prepared some time before 1914 for a projected but unpublished *Étude critique du*

¹ Little gave this and other manuscripts and his working copy of *The Grey Friars in Oxford* to the Bodleian Library. It is now MS. Lat. th. d. 23. The latest study of the place of the text among the sources will be found in J. R. H. Moorman's *The Sources for the Life of S. Francis of Assisi* (1940), pp. 90 ff. and 134-5.

Speculum Perfectionis, followed by an appendix of documents and other matter which, so far as Little could discover, Sabatier had intended to publish, the index of biblical citations in the text, and a comprehensive general index, including, *inter alia*, and in a condensed form, an elaborate *répertoire des termes*. Only a careful student, who has mastered Little's Introduction to the second volume, can appreciate the amount of labour which the preparation of all this material had involved, and the punctilious loyalty with which Little discharged his obligation. The critical study in the second volume gives the considerations which had led Sabatier to the view that, even if the date 1228 in the Mazarin MS. was a scribe's error, the early date of the *Speculum* and the close intimacy of its author with St. Francis was proved by internal evidence. Little himself was convinced. 'I think', he wrote (II, p. xxviii), 'that Sabatier's penetrating criticism proves that a great part of the *Spec. Perf.* was written by Brother Leo soon after the death of St. Francis. . . . In one of his sketches for the unwritten Introduction to this volume Sabatier has the heading, "La victoire de frère Léon". When the long struggle over the historical value of the *Spec. Perf.* is ended, I have no doubt that the result in essentials will be "la victoire de Paul Sabatier".' If we stress the words 'in essentials' this judgement has on the whole been vindicated. Sabatier's book was criticized, even violently criticized, notably by Father Michael Bihl, and, as we all know, 'internal evidence' can be a very tricky thing; yet scholars now seem to agree that, although the *Speculum Perfectionis* as a separate work was compiled in 1318, and is not an original work at all, but incorporates material collected a few years earlier, the greater part of this material is derived from the *Scripta Leonis*, the lost rolls and schedules submitted by Leo and his companions in 1245-6 as contributions to the *Vita Secunda* of St. Francis by Thomas of Celano. This material is embedded in collections discovered by the Franciscans, Leonardus Lemmens and Ferdinand Delorme, and by Little himself. So, in Dr. Moorman's words, 'Sabatier was perfectly right to see in the *Speculum* a work which clearly emanated from the circle of the Saint's intimate friends.'

In a fine survey of Little's work Dr. Moorman has included him among the 'excavators' who make possible the work of others, and whose work remains a storehouse when the work of perhaps more famous men is forgotten. Little was certainly an excavator, but, as we have seen, he was also an incessant interpreter. For my part I could not draw a hard-and-fast line

between his writings. His reviews, for example, especially in his later years, are full of learning, sympathy, and wit. Little was always himself. In him, more than in any scholar I have met, the man was inseparable from what he did. And the consciousness of this fact can be felt in all the letters written about him after his death by all sorts of people. I shall not try to illustrate this single-mindedness. I prefer to close this memoir with the words which he spoke on 14 June 1938, when his friends gathered about him in the rooms of the Royal Historical Society to present the slender volume which had been prepared in his honour during his seventy-fifth year. The President of the Society, Professor Stenton, was in the chair at the informal meeting. The address, with more than 200 signatures, and the bibliography of his writings were given to him. Then came Little's reply:

I thank you all very much for the honour you have done me in presenting me with the bibliography and for coming here. Historians are a generously appreciative body. I am deeply impressed with this large and distinguished gathering and by the long list of distinguished names in the book; each one will recall memories. I should like to say how very greatly I appreciate the presence here of representatives of the Franciscan Order and would especially thank my old friend Father Gregory Clery who has come all the way from Dublin. I would add that in the course of my researches I have invariably met with the utmost courtesy and help from the sons of Francis in all countries and in all Orders—Friars Minor, Conventuals and Capuchins. I have been treated as a brother, not as an interloper. . . .

You all know and will remember with relief that I am not an orator and do not 'yoke the Hours like young Aurora to my car'. But when I was young I heard somebody, who wasn't accustomed to public speaking and had to make a speech, say: 'When in doubt talk about yourself.' This seems an appropriate opportunity of trying that recipe—with this book as the text.

The first entry is 1889: *E.H.R.* 1889–1938. I have been contributing to *E.H.R.* for 50 years. I am reminded of the Scottish minister's comment on the passage about there being no marriage or giving in marriage in heaven—'chilling thought, my brethren'. The whole book illustrates a kind of rake's progress—the specialist's progress—learning more and more about less and less till he ends—The end is not quite yet. But I seem to see the lines converging to a point—and one used to learn in Euclid that a point is that which has no parts and no magnitude—is nothing. I see there is a blank page at the end of the book.

I sometimes think that the best excuse for printing anything is that it forms a nucleus for additions and corrections. The most useful book

I ever had printed was printed on one side of the page only in order to catch additions and corrections; *Initia Operum Latinorum* in the later Middle Ages. It made no attempt at being complete. My copy has some thousands of entries added, and is intended for the Institute of Historical Research when I have ceased to enter fresh *incipits*. The late Father Lacombe once talked to me about it, and wanted a complete list. I told him that if he waited for that he would never do anything—and probably quoted to him the saying: ‘The best is the enemy of the good.’ (It is a dangerous doctrine and only suitable for really conscientious people—such as we all are here.) Vattasso’s *Initia*—containing all *incipits* of the *Patrologia Latina*—is much more systematic than mine (they don’t cover the same period). I was in Rome soon after they both came out, and I remember Vattasso and I were introduced to each other (I think by [Cardinal] Ehrle) as *Initiatores patrum*. Both Vattasso and I made our compilations during a period of enforced leisure (he was on sick leave from the Vatican)—not a bad way of using temporary unemployment, but it implies holidays with pay or its equivalent.

Turning over the leaves of the bibliography I note ‘Authorship of the Lanercost Chronicle’ (1916) which also gives me satisfaction—partly because it was written in much pain (and so is a triumph of mind over matter) but chiefly because there is nothing new in it—no new material. All the sources had been printed for many years and were open to everybody: the only thing was to see what the sources meant and put 2 and 2 together: I put 2 and 2 together and made 22—a very good score on a medieval wicket.

Almost all my printed works relate to the Middle Ages—Croce has a dictum that all history is contemporary history. I am not quite clear what it means but am pretty sure it isn’t true—like most clever sayings. I will give you another: the only ancient history is medieval history. I do not think that the most valuable function of the historian is to trace back the institutions and ways of thought which have survived, as though we were at the end and climax of history. It is at least as important to retrieve the treasures that have been dropped on the way and lost, which, if restored, would enrich our civilization. There are many of these in the Middle Ages. Even a difference of emphasis may have profound importance. Thus in the Middle Ages most good and serious-minded people worked for the glory of God: now they work for the good of man—or rather of some men—not very successfully, owing to mistaken ideas of what is good. There are two Great Commandments: and unless and until both are kept the world will be a lop-sided place.

I have wandered off the autobiographical track. I will only thank you once more and express a hope that more of my colleagues may have their bibliographies printed; they would be useful and save time and mistakes. This bibliography of mine is due to my wife who has kept from year to year a record of my writings, following the excellent

example set by Mrs. Tout. May I commend this example to others? There are marriages made in heaven.

F. M. P.

Note. This Memoir is based upon information given by Mrs. Little and Miss Dora Little, upon correspondence, which Mrs. Little kindly put at my disposal, and upon personal knowledge. Dr. J. R. H. Moorman's appreciation, 'A. G. Little: Franciscan Historian', is printed in the *Church Quarterly Review*, vol. cxliv, pp. 17-27. Mrs. Tout kindly sent me a copy of the speech with which this Memoir ends.

ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
A. G. LITTLE'S WRITINGS

1938

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La Société des Frères Pérégrinants, by R. Loenertz. *Ibid.* 535-6.
Die weltgeschichtliche Apocalypse-Auslegung des Minoriten Alexander von Bremen, by Alois Wachtel. *Ibid.* 735-6.

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
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O. M. DALTON

Photo. Russell & Sons

ORMONDE MADDOCK DALTON

1866-1945

ORMONDE MADDOCK DALTON was born at Cardiff on 30 January 1866, the second son of Thomas Masters Dalton, solicitor and Justice of the Peace. He was sent to school at Harrow from 1878 to 1884; thence he passed as an Exhibitioner to New College, Oxford, to read for Classical Moderations and Literae Humaniores, in each of which he took a first class. The next few years were spent at first partly in France and Germany, then in India, whence he returned through the Far East and the United States. After a year's schoolmastering, he was appointed to an Assistantship in the British Museum. He began work there in 1895 under Sir Wollaston Franks in the Department of British and Medieval Antiquities, in which at that time what afterwards became the Department of Ceramics and Ethnography was included. Sir Wollaston retired in 1896 (to die in 1897) and was succeeded by Hercules Read. Dalton's great abilities were speedily recognized, and won for him special promotion to a first-class Assistantship in October 1901, and to what was then called Assistant (now Deputy) Keepership in 1909. On Read's retirement Ceramics and Ethnography (which also comprised Oriental Antiquities) were budded off into a separate Department, and Dalton was left Keeper of what were still called British and Medieval Antiquities, but were really a vast conglomeration of objects of Prehistoric, Romano-British, British and Medieval, Renaissance, and later date. After nearly thirty-three years of service under the Trustees, but less than seven as Keeper of the Department, he retired in January 1928. He went to live at Bath, with a country cottage at Holford in the Quantocks; to the latter place he eventually retreated altogether, dying there in 1945.

Such is the bare outline of a career to which the reticence characteristic of the man makes it peculiarly difficult to do justice; for even to members of his family, and to those who were in his later years his more or less intimate friends he did not talk about his earlier life, except with a detachment that sometimes made it doubtful how far he was drawing upon personal experience. He was one of six children; there were an elder and a younger brother, and three sisters. The elder brother, A. M. Dalton, became a civil engineer of some distinction, was one of

Sir Francis Fox's chief assistants in the sinking of the Mersey Tunnel, and later was engaged on railways in the Argentine and on bridge building for the United States Government. He died some fifteen years ago. His younger brother Thomas Laurence's tastes were for art and music and for travel, in the course of which he visited every part of the world, writing descriptive articles for the Indian Press. From his father, who is described as living a quiet life, devoted to his hobby of painting sea-pieces, Ormonde may have inherited that retiring nature and that love of study and contemplation which made him shrink from ordinary society. His reticence has deprived us of practically all knowledge of his early years, except the little that can be drawn from one source of information, about which a word must be said in preface; and that is to be found in one of the three pseudonymous books, the authorship of which he never publicly admitted, although equally he never denied it. One of his closest friends, it is true, has expressed some doubt as to his authorship; but from another—who is indeed the anonymous friend to whom the *Apologia Diffidentis* is dedicated—he did not attempt to conceal it. In these circumstances his biographer is justified in making use of the books for his own immediate purposes; indeed, if out of a false sense of delicacy he should respect their secret and ignore them, he would produce a distorted picture of the man. An estimate of the value of the books as a contribution to English literature will not be attempted here; the time will perhaps come when judgement on that point will be passed by a competent literary critic; indeed, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, it is about due.

At this date it is naturally not easy to trace survivors among those who were his contemporaries at school. From one of them, however, Mr. A. Newnham Davis, who was in the same house (Rendall's), and saw a great deal of him, though a year his senior, we learn that 'he was of a retiring disposition, and not particularly keen on games, but that did not interfere with his popularity, as everyone liked him. . . . He had marked ability and a keen power of discernment and of criticizing whatever in the school regime he thought right to disagree with.' Evidently the schoolboy, as afterwards the man, kept his troubles to himself, and did not allow his inner discontent to flaw the geniality which marked his relations with his fellows. A younger brother, Mr. Stuart G. Davis, who was his contemporary in Rendall's, also confirms the impression that there is no reason to suppose that he was miserable at Harrow.

Yet that there was discontent, and that in no small measure, must be admitted in the light of the significant words in the *Apologia*: 'I shall say nothing of the miseries which embittered the life of the diffident boy. But', he goes on, in a passage which must be quoted at length, for it says practically all that is known of the matter:

I cannot pass in silence the deeper trouble of earliest manhood, when my soul first awoke to the dread that though other clouds might drift westward and dissolve, one would impend over me for ever. It was at the university that this vague misgiving crept upon me like a chill mist, until the hopes and aspirations of youth were one by one extinguished, as to a sailor putting out to sea the comfortable harbour lights vanish in the wracks of a tempestuous winter morning. I turned my face away from the gracious young life amidst which I moved, like a man possessed of a dark secret to his undoing. My heart, yet eager for the joy of living and yearning for affection, was daily starved of its need as by a power of deliberate and feline cruelty; and with every expansive impulse instantly restrained by this daemonic force, I was left at last unresponsive as a maltreated child, who flings his arms round no-one, but shrinks back into his own world of solitary fancies. I think there is no misery so great as that of youth surrounded by all opportunities for wholesome fellowship, endowed with natural faculties for enjoyment, yet repressed and thwarted at every turn by invincible self-consciousness and mistrust: surely no lost opportunities of manhood leave such aching voids as these.

There is some confirmation of this plaint from an outside source. 'He definitely did not like Oxford and was quite unhappy in his four years at New College, during which time I first made his acquaintance', writes Dr. Robert Moon—one of the very few men with whom he was intimate at New, perhaps indeed the only one. So that when the four years were over he had no wish for an academic career in what he afterwards called his 'prison city'. But he had not made up his mind in any other direction. Moon had thoughts of the diplomatic service, and Dalton agreed to follow his example and study with that in view; though it is hard to conceive that one of so retiring a disposition would have found the atmosphere of the service congenial. However, the two young men went at different times and to different places in France and Germany, corresponding with each other in the language of the country. With his younger brother, Laurence, he went to Paris early in 1889, read hard and took French lessons; he lived also in private families near Château Thierry and Besançon, speaking always French with his hosts, and at the same time keeping up his classics. He

travelled here and there in east and south-east France. In the autumn of 1889 he stayed in Hanover for two months, then went to Dresden for three, working hard at the German language and literature, and visiting occasionally other places of interest, such as Nuremberg and Hildesheim. Incidentally, in the winter, he took to skating, at which he became very proficient. The two friends joined each other for a time at Eisenach.

Early in 1890 it became obvious that there would be no examination for the diplomatic service or the Foreign Office until they were both over age, and that they must make other plans. Moon chose medicine; Dalton was still uncertain. After returning to England in the spring of 1890, he went with his family to the Rhine and then to Italy (Florence and Rome). His brother Laurence having decided to take up coffee-planting in India, Dalton agreed to join him, and they reached Mysore in the middle of the year. The estate on which they were to learn their work was at North Coorg, where they built their own bungalow and indeed invested money in the business. But his heart was not in coffee-planting. True, he had found tranquillity and release from the conflict of the world, social embarrassments, and the like, which had been so irksome to him. 'All conditions that a recluse might crave seemed now to be fulfilled for my benefit'; he had found 'a quiet happiness never known before'. He read a great deal, poring over the sacred books of the East and striving to master the Vedanta philosophy. He never cared, his brother says, for sport of any kind, such as shooting or fishing. Work—which certainly seems to have been light—on the plantation was varied by journeys in ox-carts through the countryside, or longer expeditions by land or sea, to Cochin or Mangalore or Calicut or other places on the Malabar coast, to Ceylon. But he began to wake from his dream, to realize that 'it was inevitable that the bland ease of such a contemplative life should bring no enduring satisfaction to the mind; it was not an end in itself, but a mere means to serenity, a breathing-space useful to the recovery of a long-lost fortitude'. A long letter—in German—to Moon (29 August 1891) tells how he was excited by reading in Rudyard Kipling's 'Light that failed' the passage where Dick Helder watches the *Barralong* steam away on its voyage to Australia. 'Just reading it has made the idea of travelling stick in my head.' He grew restless, he must get moving. The same letter shows that he was not shutting his eyes to political trends in the home country, and gives vent to his disgust with the stupid elements in democracy,

the lack of moral strength in the Liberals, and the general ignorance about the colonies in the House of Commons. The letter is typical of the critical attitude towards people and institutions, of which traces were, as we have seen, visible even in the school-boy, and which, as a colleague afterwards put it, was sometimes expressed with a plaintive and aggrieved air.

He was still in south India in July 1893 when he wrote to Moon enthusiastically about the *Journal Intime* of Amiel, which he had found a real revelation, making clear much that had hitherto been obscure to him. This discovery of a kindred spirit is interesting. Amiel, too, as Edmond Scherer in his introduction to the *Journal* tells us, had a very unhappy boyhood. But to those who knew him later he was a delightful companion, and his deep-seated melancholy only found expression in the *Journal* published after his death. There is a certain parallel between the two men; but, in spite of the *Apologia*, Dalton will not go down to posterity as one of the *grands mélancoliques*.

Finally, he made up his mind to come home, taking on his way the Straits, China, Japan, Canada, and the United States (where his elder brother, then in New York, showed him something of American life). Of his impressions of these countries there is no record. He had been three and a half years in the East.

Moon was interested in the school founded on original lines by Dr. Reddie at Abbotsholme in Derbyshire, and in 1894 persuaded Dalton to try the experiment of schoolmastering under that remarkable man. He seems to have been reasonably contented there, but that was not his line of life, and when a year later a chance came of a nomination for the British Museum, he seized it, was nominated on 6 March 1895, was successful over two competitors in the examination, and began work on 13 June. He was rather older than the average entrant to the Museum, being nearly thirty, but he had an experience of foreign lands and languages which must have been greatly in his favour. Sir Wollaston Franks was then on the point of retiring. Whether it was definitely intended that the new Assistant should devote himself to the ethnographical section of the Department, cannot now be stated. But his travels in the East, though they had not lasted long, may have inclined him in that direction. It was characteristic of his philosophic bent that, as he once confessed, it was the psychological side of ethnography that interested him. In any case, on to the ethnographical collections he was set. His anthropological work is described and estimated

by the most competent judges elsewhere.¹ Here it is sufficient to record that he became a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1895, a member of its Council in 1898, and Hon. Secretary and Hon. Editor of the Institute's *Journal* for 1896 and 1897. His not infrequent contributions to the *Journal* and to *Man* range from 1898 to 1912, and some of them, as those on the Easter Island script in 1904, were weighty. But the work in this field for which he is best known, at least to others than specialists, is that in which he collaborated with Sir Hercules Read, on *Antiquities from the City of Benin* (1899). (The first detailed report on the Benin collections was read at the Anthropological Institute and published in its *Journal*.) What proportion of the credit for this stately folio should be allotted to each of the two collaborators can only be guessed, and Dalton, always loyal to his chief, would not have wished it to be the subject of speculation. He continued to be actively concerned with the ethnographical collections until the assistance of Thomas Joyce, who was appointed to the Department in July 1902, gradually relieved him of this work. The two collaborated in the very useful *Handbook to the Ethnographical Collections*, which was published by the Trustees in 1910.

In 1899 he was elected to the Society of Antiquaries, and was to serve four times on its Council from 1900 to 1922; although he characteristically refused to allow himself to be nominated a Vice-President, he took a lively interest in its proceedings, though more as a listener than a speaker, and his contributions to its publications—some ten important articles in *Archaeologia* alone—are evidence of his regard for the Society. Like his predecessors, Franks and Read, he considered the service of the Society a legitimate facet of the work of his Department.

Before the end of the century he had begun to turn his attention to what had been hitherto a somewhat neglected portion of the collections. The first-fruits of his work on Early Christian Antiquities, which was by a natural process to develop into those studies which placed him among the leading Byzantine archaeologists of his time, were seen in the *Catalogue of Early Christian Antiquities and Objects from the Christian East* (1901). For the small but important exhibition which he brought together he provided in 1903 the official *Guide to Early Christian and Byzantine Antiquities*. From now on, for some years, his publications were to be mainly concerned with these subjects; though he

¹ By Sir John Myres and Mr. H. J. Braunholtz in *Man*. I owe a bibliography of his contributions on Anthropology to Mr. Braunholtz.

covered, as it were in his stride, the extraordinarily difficult and tricky problem of the Oxus Treasure, which the bold and far-seeing policy of Sir Wollaston Franks had secured years before, and which came with his other bequests to the Museum. The *Treasure of the Oxus*, published by the Trustees in 1905, was a fine example of scholarly discrimination, tactfully penetrating the fog in which everything that passed through the corridor of Rawalpindi seemed to be enveloped, and revealing a solid structure of archaeological facts, which remained in all essentials unshaken when the book went into a second edition in 1926.

At this time interest in things Byzantine was growing in this country. Partly it was fostered by a suspicion, however unwarranted, that classical archaeology was becoming exhausted; and this, combined perhaps with a decline in the study of classical languages and literature, sent students and amateurs further afield. Young would-be archaeologists were turning increasingly to prehistoric antiquities, a 'soft option' which required little knowledge of Greek or Latin, and as to which, at the time, scientific treatment being still in a primitive stage, no one could say you were wrong. On the other hand, coming down to post-classical times, there were scholars who were attracted by the combination of grandeur of scale with richness of decoration which is the characteristic feature of Byzantine art. In time the movement was to shake off the few amateurs who thought it necessary to abuse classical art in order to justify their admiration of its successor. The serious students, partly inspired it would seem by Dalton's own enthusiasm, got together, and the 'Byzantine Research and Publication Fund' was established. Printed reports of its work, if they exist, have evaded inquiries. But it is known that Sir Hercules Read was President; Dalton and the distinguished architect Robert Weir Schultz (afterwards Schultz-Weir) were joint Secretaries. The Fund was from the beginning associated with the British School at Athens, the Director of which was a member of the Committee. Other members were W. R. Lethaby, H. A. Cruso, and Arthur Hamilton Smith. The policy of the Committee was to encourage the study of Byzantine art, especially architecture, and promising young architectural students were helped financially to survey monuments and their reports were printed. The first publication was the Report on *The Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem*, edited by R. Weir Schultz, with contributions by W. Harvey, Lethaby, Dalton, Cruso, and A. C. Headlam (afterwards Bishop of Gloucester), which appeared in 1910. *The Church of Saint*

Eirene at Constantinople, by A. Van Millingen, A. M. Woodward, and A. J. B. Wace, followed in 1913. Adequate support was, however, lacking, and the first World War naturally stopped the work, although *The Church of Our Lady of the Hundred Gates*, by H. H. Jewell and F. W. Hasluck, appeared as late as 1920. Differences had arisen among the Committee; Dalton, who hated squabbles, did not formally withdraw but ceased to take an active interest; the President resigned; and the failure of an organization which had promised well had to be recognized. It was a bitter personal disappointment to Dalton and his fellow enthusiasts. As Mr. Cruso writes, it had the effect of fortifying him in a pessimism which was never far from his outlook and in this case was not entirely justified; for the Fund had to its credit a number of publications on monuments, all of which had been the subject of careful study on the spot by trained observers and often by young architects sent out and financed by it.

The remainder of the funds and the store of drawings which had accumulated but not been published were eventually handed over to the British School at Athens, which still administers (if that is the right word) the Byzantine Research Fund in a state of suspended animation.

During the first twelve years of the century Dalton's publications on Byzantine archaeology, though not numerous, were important. The *Catalogue of Early Christian Antiquities* (1901) has already been mentioned. The great Cyprus Treasure of silver plate of the sixth century was treated by him in *Archaeologia* in 1900 (the British Museum portion) and 1906 (the Pierpont Morgan and Nicosia portions), as well as in the *Burlington Magazine* in 1907.¹ As to the place of origin, he was doubtful; at first he thought of Cyprus, but later, in a note in the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (1906), he preferred Syria or Egypt. He was able to include the recently acquired British Museum portion of the Treasure in the *Guide to the Early Christian and Byzantine Antiquities* (1903) already mentioned.

The official *Catalogue of the Ivory Carvings of the Christian Era* which he produced in 1909 covered not only the Roman, Early Christian, and Byzantine, but the Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, and later periods, and included also examples of Moham-

¹ Dalton contributed to the Magazine from 1904 to 1926, and was a member of its Consultative Committee from 1916 to 1927, 'when, retiring from the British Museum he also retired from this Magazine, ever consistent in that tending towards self-effacement which gave the very key-note to his character' (*Burl. Mag.*, March 1945).

medan art and carvings in bone. But the culmination of his achievement was reached in 1911 with the *Byzantine Art and Archaeology*, published by the Clarendon Press in 1911. It is by this work, which is a sort of Bible for Byzantine archaeologists (although they may not all be 'fundamentalists' in this respect) that he will especially be remembered. The colossal amount of information, which he has collected and methodically and lucidly marshalled, would have been enough to overwhelm any ordinary scholar, working as he did single-handed, and enough to place him in the first rank of Byzantinists, had he produced nothing else. Where he has given us so much, it seems ungrateful to complain that he found himself forced to exclude architecture from his survey; but to have done otherwise might have made the book half as long again. Besides, he knew that he was not a trained architect.

The next year (1912) saw, besides an article in the *Burlington Magazine* on Byzantine Enamels in the Pierpont Morgan collection, the official *Catalogue of Finger Rings, Early Christian, Byzantine, Teutonic, Medieval and Later*, and the *Catalogue of Medieval Ivories, Enamels and Jewels, Gems &c. in the McClean Bequest*, which he compiled for the Fitzwilliam Museum. He had already begun in 1909, as we have seen, to range beyond Byzantine limits into the field of the arts in western Europe in the Middle Ages.

The title 'Catalogue', to a reader who has not consulted the massive volumes which issued from Dalton's workshop during these years, conveys the idea of a mechanical compilation, put together with (or even without) the help of the most obvious books of reference. But a tradition had been formed at the British Museum in accordance with which the preparation of Departmental Catalogues involved not merely accuracy of description but intensive research and the exercise of the critical faculty, so that the volumes came in effect to be standard works on the subjects concerned. Of this tradition Dalton's Catalogues are outstanding monuments. Astonishment at the industry and power of concentration which he displayed grows when one realizes that there was another aspect of his mental activity which is not revealed in these publications. It was in 1908 that John Lane published the first of the three books which he wrote under the pseudonym of W. Compton Leith (W., it has been conjectured, for Wimbledon, where he lived, Compton for the village in Surrey with the Watts picture-gallery, which evoked a beautiful passage in the *Apologia*, and Leith for the hill on whose slopes he loved to wander and often to sleep in the open).

The *Apologia Diffidentis* is often painful reading; this sort of self-vivisection sometimes hurts the looker-on as much as the victim, who may find some relief in liberating his soul. But the book, though pathetic, is not morbid, for the writer's intellectual control is never relaxed or his sanity ever in danger. As to the style, reviewers amused themselves (and us) by comparing Sir Thomas Browne and Stevenson and Pater and even A. C. Benson. All that need be said here is that it is not artificial, in the sense of not being the expression of genuine feeling. If ever Buffon's saying about style is true, it is in this case. The proof lies in many a passage in Dalton's private letters, which were written *currente calamo* and without any intention of publication.

In 1913 appeared *Sirenica*, also from John Lane's house. There is less perhaps to be said of this, the least striking, to one reader's mind, of the trilogy. But it is an interesting study of the escape of the mind of man from the closed intellectual horizon of Greek thought, from 'the possessed and measurable land into the uncharted kingdom of the Vague. For the Sirens mean Romance.' It is written with the same mastery of the English language, and is somewhat more allusive than its predecessor; but it is perhaps, though never tedious, never easy to lay down, a little long drawn out.¹

The first World War broke in upon these manifold activities, although it was possible for the Trustees of the Museum to publish in 1915 the *Catalogue of Engraved Gems of Post-Classical Periods*, on which Dalton had been engaged for some time previously. In the summer of 1912, for instance, he made a special journey to Italy to study the post-classical engraved gems. He had occasional difficulty, like others who have worked in Italian Museums, in tracking down skilfully elusive directors; but he was able to examine the collections at Naples and Florence, which preserve the remains of the Medici Cabinet.

Another book which appeared in 1915 introduces us to a new phase of Dalton's activity. This was the translation of the *Letters of Sidonius Apollinaris*, published in two small volumes by the Clarendon Press. The first volume contains an Introduction of 160 pages, in which he presents a clear and attractive picture of the man, 'Gallo-Roman noble, Prefect and Patrician, Visigothic subject, bishop and Saint'; of his relations with the 28 bishops and the rest of his 109 correspondents; of the political

¹ One would like to know whether it is one of Mr. F. L. Lucas's 11,396 books on Romanticism, and how it appealed to him (*The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal*, p. 3).

and social conditions of the time; of the writer's atrocious style, which yet does not detract from his value to the historian of the period. This Introduction is a model of the way in which such a subject should be handled; there is not a superfluous word, while nothing of value that can be extracted from the convolutions of the text is allowed to escape notice.

During the war, like many other members of the Museum staff he was transferred to another civilian office, working for the Admiralty at the preparation of maps and guides for some of the less well-known regions involved in or affected by hostilities. One morning, as he crossed the road to the Royal Geographical Society's building, he was knocked over by a motor-car. A careless house-surgeon, who examined him at the hospital to which he was carried, failed to diagnose a broken thigh, and sent him on an excruciating journey in a taxi-cab all the way to his lodgings in Wimbledon. It was several months before he came out of the local hospital, fortunately only very slightly lame, and still able to take the long walks in the country which were his favourite relaxation. To this period of enforced retirement we owe the third book of the Compton Leith trilogy, *Domus Doloris* (Lane, 1919). It is a brilliant penetrating study of the members of the staff of a hospital, with some amusing character studies; its real theme is the value of the discipline imposed on body and mind in the House of Pain; and it ends on a note of hope for a better age; 'for there the spirit of best promise for times hereafter is manifest and actual now'.

A spiteful fate, noting his favourable impression of the hospital, decided to send him back to it. After he had returned to his duties at the Museum, and even before *Domus Doloris* appeared in print, he was attacked by an obstinate skin ailment, and went on sick leave from 1 January to 6 June 1919. This setback, and the lengthy task of restoring the normal routine of the Department, to which some of the staff had not yet returned, may explain why his pace slackened. We note only the second edition of the *Guide to Early Christian and Byzantine Antiquities*, which bears the date 1921. Later in that year, on Sir Hercules Read's retirement, he succeeded to the Keepership of the 'British and Medieval Antiquities'. The Department, it should be explained, had originated in the effort of the Trustees about 1850 to meet the demand for a Museum of National Antiquities by the creation of a department which was to function as such a museum within the framework of the British Museum. That accounts for such a feature as the section of Roman Britain, the

inclusion of which in the Department has sometimes puzzled classical archaeologists. In course of time it attracted to itself, more or less by accident, much that lay outside its original horizon. Now, with the change of Keeper, the opportunity was taken to lighten and tidy up to some extent the amorphous bulk of the Department by the separation from it of the Ceramic, Ethnographical, and Oriental Antiquities. But a vast mass remained, and the administrative duties of the Keepership left Dalton less time for research. The happiest man in any Department of the British Museum, if he has a taste for research, is the Deputy Keeper, who is spared the drudgery which falls on some of the juniors, and is involved in administration only in his chief's absence.

Dalton took his task very seriously, how seriously cannot be better expressed than in the words which I am allowed to quote from Mr. Kendrick:

I should like to pay a tribute to Dalton as a most competent and discerning Keeper. He shirked no part of the task, and he was deeply respected for his charmingly courteous and sympathetic treatment of his subordinates. He was in fact, particularly successful with the junior members of the work room, and with them he seemed to have no shyness of an embarrassing kind. He worked hard to buy many things that a less conscientious Keeper might have let slip (e.g. the De Baye Collection of S. Russian antiquities), and it was entirely due to his energy that the British Museum got the 'St. George' Byzantine enamel and the Limoges 'St. Anthony' enamel, a pair to one already in the Museum. O. M. D. possessed an enviable store of flair, taste, and knowledge, and the quality of even his more ordinary acquisitions is an example that we still try to keep in mind. His gallery-work was impeccable, and he took enormous pains over all matters of exhibition and arrangement. Furthermore, he had a very clear sense of the general purpose and destiny of the Department. He understood the growing ascendancy of prehistoric studies, and he planned the popular handbook 'Flints' (written by Reginald Smith) at 6*d.*, a real British Museum innovation and a most successful venture.

Another colleague also stresses his essential kindness; helpfulness towards junior colleagues and lower grades (not merely official); geniality; humour; high sense of duty; dislike of administrative work.

In 1922 the British Academy elected Dalton a Fellow—almost the only public recognition as a scholar that he seems to have received—or at least accepted. He could truly claim, in the words of a poet-antiquary,

my naked name
 Provokes not half the jumbled alphabet
 To jostle in its train across the page
 Of scientific annals.

In 1923, in collaboration with his junior colleague H. J. Braunholtz, he produced a translation of Josef Strzygowski's *Origins of Christian Church Art* (Clarendon Press). He had read and seen the interest of the *Ursprung der christlichen Kirchenkunst: Neue Tatsachen und Grundsätze der Kunstforschung* on its appearance in 1920. The translators, taking each one half of the book, effected a readable version of the craggy Austro-German text of the protagonist of the 'Los von Rom' movement. Since the volume entitled *East Christian Art: a Survey of the Monuments* appeared from the Clarendon Press only two years later, in 1925, it is probable that its author was already preparing it when he tackled the translation of Strzygowski's work. The book covers the same ground as *Byzantine Art and Archaeology*, with the inclusion of something that was missing in the earlier volume, the Architecture; but that the point of view is different is indicated by the title itself, from which the word Byzantine has disappeared. Neither Byzantium, still less a decadent Rome, could any longer be considered as the foundation on which Christian art was based. Admirably written, like everything else from Dalton's pen, the book nevertheless gives the impression of having been suggested to the author rather than springing from his own choice. It did not, of course, pretend to be a work of reference, like its predecessor, which scholars will probably always rank the higher of the two. And although there is a chapter on the Architecture, Dalton's unwillingness to plunge into problems of which he had not the first-hand knowledge which an architectural training might have given him is illustrated by the fact that among the illustrations there is not a single plan of a building.

As already observed he had begun to turn his mind to later periods. The unpretending *Guide to Medieval Antiquities and Objects of Later Date* (1924), patchy as must inevitably be any handbook based on a single collection, however large, is nevertheless one of the most useful and informative of British Museum *Guides*. It was the successor (with alterations, omissions, and additions) of the *Guide to the Medieval Room* which he had produced in 1907. In the same year we note the scholarly little monograph on the *Royal Gold Cup*. *East Christian Art*, already mentioned, and the second edition of the *Treasure of the Oxus*

(1926), next occupied him. The introduction to the latter had to be almost entirely rewritten; the last twenty years had seen much research which had to be taken into account. In this country especially the *Scythians and Greeks* of E. H. Minns had brought the Scythian problem into prominence. The Museum had also acquired since 1905 a number of examples of early metal-work, from Armenia, Persia, Bactria, Siberia, and NW. India, so that the second, supplementary part of the Catalogue was expanded to more than twice its original length, with a corresponding development of the introduction, dealing with the art of NW. India and the Sassanians.

On a visit to Italy, one of the various wanderings on which it was my privilege to accompany him, he was shown by the Director of the Museum at Brescia a Byzantine astrolabe; this was the subject of his only contribution (if we except the short biographical notice of Sir Hercules Read in 1930) to the Proceedings of the British Academy (1926). It was also his last contact with Byzantine studies; and his literary career was about to close. It did so in what is something of a *tour de force*, the translation of the *History of the Franks* by Gregory of Tours, which the Clarendon Press published in June 1927. This book is very much on the same plan as the *Sidonius Apollinaris*, like it in two volumes, but on a larger scale, the historical introduction occupying as much space as the translation and notes. This Introduction, in 450 pages, is an able study of Gregory himself and the chief characters in his book, including Queen Fredegund, the 'wickedest woman of her day', of the history and organization of the Merovingian kingdoms and Church, and of the social life and culture of the period. The abstract of early Merovingian history in less than fifty pages is, it must be admitted, too closely packed to be easily assimilated, but more indigestible material it would be difficult to find. There is probably no better sketch in the English language (one need not except the works of Dill) of the social history of Gaul in the fifth and sixth centuries than is provided by these two Introductions.

The *Gregory of Tours* shows Dalton's scholarship at its most mature; unfortunately it was to bear no more fruit. With his retirement in January 1928, the deep regret that was felt by all his colleagues was tempered by the hope that he would continue to use his pen unhampered by the cares of office. But they were to be disappointed. Leaving London, to the bustle and clamour of which he never returned except for a rare flying visit of the inside of a day, he settled at Bath, in a flat in Sydney

Place, with a country cottage on the fringe of the Quantocks at Holford. Quitting the Museum, he regarded a long chapter of his life as closed, and never reopened it. His was not the case of the official who takes no interest in his work, however conscientiously he performs it; the quality, as well as the quantity, of his output proves that it gave his intellect that exercise in which the scholar's happiness subsists. But for thirty-three years other tastes and inclinations had been kept under rigorous control; now he was free to indulge them. Writing to E. H. Minns, who had recently been appointed to a professorial chair, he remarked (22 January 1928): 'As for me, I seem infinitely remote from all such things. It is very curious, but sometimes I ask myself whether I was ever in the B.M. at all, so completely have I reverted to the freer existence of pre-Museum days. What I am enjoying most for the time being is the beauty of West Somerset in winter.' . . .

A long letter, written on 28 December 1927, throws much light on his state of mind at this time and sets forth his reasons for the premature retirement for which I had reproached him. In the course of it he wrote:

. . . the φιλέρημος held on until the fear of insomnia gave him a reason for departure unconnected with his natural bias. . . . I want to reaffirm the opinion that the B.M. suffers no essential loss by my disappearance. I may have exaggerated when I once told you that the long Byzantine furrow had broken my back; but it has permanently bowed it! For some time now I have been stale, and a living institution has no use for stale men. Sapped of enthusiasm, I have been at a dead end in my Department; my work had become flat and unprofitable. Then, there was another consideration. The mediaeval side of the Department inevitably wanes by the drying up of sources of supply. The prehistoric side waxes in importance. It was quite time that the representative of this side should hold the Keepership, more especially as he has always done his full share in those Councils, Committees &c., which I have as consistently shirked. And while one is on the subject of gain to the Museum, how can I be said to have disserved the republic by bringing a freshet into the dull stream of promotion? My 'Thirdly' is of more general application. I find that the intensive practice of archaeology, like that of other specialisms, makes such demands on time and energy that a man who honestly keeps official hours must have more vigour than I now possess if he is to avoid a deadening of the senses and of the mind in other provinces. Archaeology becomes an old man of the sea; if you let it lock its skinny legs too tightly, it prevents you from leaving its somewhat arid sands. One has no lengthy span of life remaining; though one may not be philosopher enough to contem-

plate all time and all existence, one may at least renew acquaintance with provinces from which a jealous Archaeology has barred one out too long. A partly contemplative life in comparative solitude need not imply a loss of interest in one's kind or a refusal to serve it in inconspicuous ways: the *fallentis semita vitae* leads to places to which the motor-road does not penetrate. I will end by saying that my resolve to retire was taken after due deliberation, and not as the result of any sudden whim or access of perversity. I have aims which draw me on, as well as the health-motive propelling from behind. Having no intention of living aimless, though I may live obscure, I regard myself as an object of compassion from no point of view but one: I am removed in space from the company of a few friends among whom I like to count yourself. And even here there is no room for much pity, for bodily propinquity is not all in friendship, and were it so there will yet be occasions in which we may meet, and ἤλιον ἐν λέσχη καταδύναι, as your Callimachus sings. . . .

His colleagues would not have endorsed his estimate of the waning of his faculties; but experience of the reluctance of many officials to retire before they must suggests that if he was wrong, he erred on the right side.

As to his last sentence, those who visited him at Bath and Holford found that he was indeed always glad to see old friends, and invitations to visit him were regular and frequent. He was a most delightful and assiduous host; as one of these visitors says, 'they will remember his geniality and kindness, enlivened by a sometimes exuberant humour, his hospitality and his generosity, at least as vividly as any malaise or awkwardness of manner arising from a retiring and hermit disposition'. The aims which, he said, drew him on were still, it would seem at least partly, of a literary kind; he was evidently contemplating more translation. His interest in Byzantine matters had faded, to put it mildly; he felt unable to support the scheme for excavation at Constantinople which was set on foot; in an undated letter, apparently of 1929, he says 'it is true that my soul is still deadly weary of Byz. archaeology. I may recover in time, but at present I feel as if I would rather subscribe to *anything* else'.¹ The same letter, however, tells us that he had dallied with Fortunatus, but found him too terribly dull; and his thoughts of the Dialogues and Letters of Sulpicius Severus led him as far as completing

¹ Mr. Cruso records that as late as 1939 he agreed to serve on the 'British Byzantine Archaeological Committee', of which the President was the Marquess of Lothian and Mr. Cruso treasurer. He made the condition that he was not to be bothered with active attendance, &c., but his advice was very useful. The war of course put an end to this movement.


(in 1929) a translation of them in the rough, but he found this writer much duller than he had seemed at the first perusal.¹ He was reading a good deal of Greek—Plato and the Tragedians—which gave him great pleasure; and he hoped to be of use in a small way in helping the Bath City Library to get books along definite lines.

At Bath he saw much of Walter Crum, and something of the veteran collector Whitcombe Greene, of conversations with whom, under conditions of some difficulty (for he owned to ninety years and was stone deaf), he gave amusing accounts. He left his flat in Sydney Place, which was becoming noisy, early in 1934 and went to Uplands, on Bathwick Hill. When even Bath became affected by war conditions, he gave up that house, in April 1940, and retired altogether to the White Cottage at Holford. He took an interest in local affairs, and having acquired some twenty acres of land opposite the Cottage, handed them over to the National Trust, to secure that beauty-spot at any rate from being spoiled by the builder. At Holford he had from the beginning enjoyed the *tunicata quies*, and found it a delight to get into immediate touch with the English countryside once more, in one of the finest parts of the Quantocks, which began at his garden door. He was no longer forced, as he had been in London, to put up with the discords of sound and colour which his sensitive ear and eye abhorred—though he did find, even in the country, that tarmac roads 'spoil the values of the greens'. But he could get away from them, to walk ten miles at a stretch along the ridge of the Quantocks without going off heather and turf. It is pleasant to feel that his last years were passed, as there is every reason to suppose they were, in such peace and contentment as the echoes of the war permitted, in the sort of surroundings that he loved. He died at the White Cottage on 2 February 1945.

The sources of the information, on which this very inadequate narrative of the life of a remarkable, rare, and attractive personality is based, have been for the most part indicated in its course; but it owes a special debt to Dalton's surviving Museum colleagues Messrs. Kendrick, Tonnochy, and Braunholtz; to his younger brother, Mr. T. L. Dalton; to Dr. Robert Moon; and to Mr. H. A. Cruso.

GEORGE HILL

¹ The Life of St. Martin by Sulpicius Severus seemed to me anything but dull. I had tried but failed to persuade Dalton to undertake the translation.



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HORACE WILLIAM BRINDLEY JOSEPH

HORACE WILLIAM BRINDLEY JOSEPH

1867-1943

AS I begin to write about H. W. B. Joseph, I remember that he often quoted to me the words *bene vixit qui bene latuit*, and he evidently thought that they applied to his own life which was so far fortunate. In thinking thus he showed a kind of simplicity which was characteristic of some of his judgements. A college tutor who resides in college rooms, sharing the life of the senior common room with his colleagues, dining always in hall, engaged day in and day out with his pupils, and holding offices which bring him into contact with all the junior members of his society, does not live a life which is concealed from his fellows. Even if he is a man who seems to be of rather ordinary mould, he is observed and long remembered by many; for in the minds of those who have formed successive generations of undergraduates in his college he is associated with the vivid years of their university career. Of Joseph, who through his lectures and his interventions in the discussions of the Jowett and other societies was known to all who studied philosophy in Oxford, it could never be thought that he resembled anyone else, and there were few amongst his contemporaries who excited so much attention or were afterwards so well remembered.

The outline of his life is soon told. He was born on 28 September 1867, and was the second son of the Rev. Alexander Joseph, Rector of St. John's, Chatham, and Honorary Canon of Rochester. For his parents he had a deep veneration, and particularly for his mother who was remarkable both for her character and her strong intelligence. When his father retired to Wimborne, he went to Wimborne Grammar School, thence to Honiton School, and afterwards to Winchester College with a scholarship. During the latter part of his schooldays his family lived at Malvern Link, whence they moved first to Clevedon and later to Holford in the Quantocks, and the surroundings and the simple life of the country were an important part of his upbringing. The life of great cities he disliked and mistrusted, and his ideal was always a small community, having an ordered and traditional pattern and inspiring an uncomplicated loyalty. To Winchester and to New College, to which he was elected as a scholar in 1886, his devotion was entire, and because of the intimate connexion of the two foundations it was undivided. At

Oxford, where he added to his first classes in Classical Moderations and Greats the winning of the Greek Testament Prize and the Arnold Essay, he was marked out from the beginning for a fellowship at New College. His election to it came in 1891, and immediately after a short residence in Germany he began his work as a tutor in philosophy. Thereafter, except for a year of travel in India and the Far East, which was prescribed for him in 1901 when he had been showing some signs that he had begun to overtax his great energy, his work at New College was unbroken until his retirement.

His work, however, was diverted, as it was bound to be, in 1914. The college was denuded of undergraduates when the war had begun, though at various times it was occupied by billeted troops, refugees, and then cadets, and there were also hospital tents in the garden. Joseph had held since 1895 the office of Junior Bursar which gave him responsibility for the domestic economy of the college, and during the years of the war he had many duties and cares. Besides other matters he undertook the keeping of the records of the college which involved unceasing correspondence with many generations of its members and the daily examination of the mounting casualty lists, and he also was one of the most ardent members of the Volunteer Battalion recruited from the senior members of the university which was often called on for heavy physical labours at Didcot and elsewhere. In all this period he found it hard to believe that the life of the college could be again what it was before.

But when the war ended and a generation of undergraduates, many of whom were returning from the Services and were more mature and no less eager than the best of their predecessors, again filled the college, some of the happiest years of his life began. He married in 1919 Margaret Bridges, the daughter of the Poet Laureate, and though he gave up his Junior Bursarship and no longer lived in his old rooms, his part in the affairs of the college was as large as it had ever been and not less strenuous.

My own recollections of him go back to the earlier years of the century. When I first came to New College as an undergraduate in 1902 it was inevitable that almost the first sight I should see was Joseph emerging, gown on arm, from his staircase and running rapidly across the quadrangle. His short, square, and strongly built figure, his powerful head, the frown of concentration on his face, and the pace at which he moved aroused immediate interest and I wondered who of the dons he was. Shortly afterwards I was due to go to the first of a course of

lectures on logic in the college hall, and I found that he was the lecturer. Here indeed was something to excite a young freshman; for he at once began an intricate discussion, taking as his subject the form and matter of thought, and his tightly locked hands and straining body, which became a familiar sight to me afterwards, seemed exactly to accompany the concentration of his thinking. A different and curious picture of him, which is characteristic of a college in the Edwardian era, remains from the same time. There were then many excuses for bonfires in college, and Joseph, who was nothing if not a careful Junior Bursar, hating waste, regarded it as his special duty to save what he could of the college furniture. On this occasion he had rescued from the fire one of the tin baths which were the regular equipment of college rooms in the days when there were no bathrooms, and there was soon in progress an heroic struggle seen in the flickering light of the flames between him and two very large undergraduates who clung also to the bath—a struggle from which it was Joseph who came out victorious amid the cheers of all the spectators. When later I took to him a paper on logic and he seized on the first sentence which I had written, I remembered the episode and had the feeling as I clung to my sentence that it was in the same powerful grasp. It was not long before I had to let it go.

His powers of endurance and disregard of comfort matched the toughness of his body. On reading parties he would outwalk his undergraduate companions, be the first to reach the top of a hill, and descend it always at break-neck speed. To save time he bicycled much in Oxford, where even in his later years he was a familiar figure as bending low against a head wind he passed all others, and he had the fancy that on his birthdays he would bicycle as many miles as the years of his age. I think it was on his sixty-ninth birthday that he found he had miscalculated the mileage of his journey and completed his task by bicycling three or four times up and down a stretch of the Banbury Road. He suffered from asthma and occasionally from severe toothache, but he never allowed his lectures or his other work to be interrupted, and I remember how his disregard of appearance was shown by lectures delivered without a trace of self-consciousness when one side of his face was swollen to twice the size of the other. There were tasks in matters for which the Junior Bursar was responsible which he would not ask others to do, and he might be seen on some afternoon, high on a ladder, precariously clearing an almost inaccessible gutter. But all this

was little in comparison with the strenuousness of his work as a teacher. The number of hours for which he taught during the week was prodigious; for he not only insisted on taking more than his share of pupils, but nearly every pupil was recalled, often more than once, until nothing was left in his essay which had not been examined and refuted.

His energy did not appear to be of the kind which is connected with exuberant spirits, nor to be light-hearted, but rather to be dictated by endless duties which he imposed upon himself. In teaching his pupils he did far more work for them than they did for him, and while the more conscientious of them came to understand and appreciate the standard which he set and thereby learnt from him something which was of inestimable value, the less conscientious found that they could leave to him the labour of unravelling the tangles of a careless essay, not worth the pains which he bestowed upon it. There were some whom he alarmed and discouraged not only by his relentless criticism but by the severity of his manner; but his manner would often change suddenly, and then his wit would enliven all his argument and he would show a characteristic eagerness and freshness of mind which to the end of his life, when he was in the mood, made him seem to be young. His insight regarding his pupils was somewhat uncertain but his interest in them was unflinching, and he helped many whom he found to be in need (though he always tried to conceal what he did) with unstinted generosity.

When I returned to Oxford as his colleague, I found that what I knew of his labours was far short of the full story. He was on every college committee, and on most of them he charged himself with drawing up the agenda, setting out the relevant facts and figures, and, if they were required, drafting reports, so that it often seemed that what was accomplished was his unaided work. When the 1923 Act which followed the Royal Commission made it necessary to redraft the college statutes and by-laws, he undertook the largest share of the redrafting, in which, as might be expected, he showed an extraordinary skill, and even this he treated as a minor incident in his work. In all discussions of college issues he was the foremost figure; nothing was too small for his careful scrutiny, and on every subject the expression which he gave to his views was exact, but his subtlety was such that on occasion his reasons might elude the comprehension of his colleagues. He could be difficult in the sense that he held tenaciously to his judgements and had little liking for

compromise, but he never said anything which was not to the point, and the liveliness and interest of our meetings seemed to have largely evaporated when he was no longer present.

It was a cause for wonder that despite his burden of teaching and administration he seemed to have unimpaired energy for his philosophical work. In the period from 1919 until in 1932 he retired from his official fellowship he produced at intervals of not more than two years fresh courses of lectures to which large audiences were drawn by his authority and reputation. Each course was a finished work, carefully thought out and containing an immense mass of material, so closely packed that it was difficult for his hearers to follow more than a portion of each lecture. In addition it was his habit to make analyses, accompanied with detailed criticism, of most of the books on philosophy which he read, and he wrote innumerable short papers of which some were communicated to one or other of his friends, some were read to philosophical societies or to the circle of his philosophical colleagues who used to meet in each other's rooms for weekly discussions, and some, a small minority, were published. All this was possible only because of the pace at which he worked. It appeared to be a characteristic of his mind that he gave precise linguistic form to his ideas with extraordinary rapidity, and few writers on philosophy can have rivalled him in this respect. His manuscripts have few erasures though sometimes as he wrote he crossed out a whole paragraph, substituting another which put the argument in a different form, and in speech he was always ready, if he were asked, to repeat what he had said in the same words. Perhaps his greatest feat was when, having finished a long and intricate sentence, he was asked by J. A. Smith to say it again 'in words of more than one syllable', and he did so without hesitation, substituting long and accurate polysyllables for almost every word which he had previously used.

When in 1932 at the full tide of his powers he retired from his official fellowship and was elected to a supernumerary fellowship instead, it was difficult to realize that his teaching life had come to an end. It was hoped by many that he would leave himself more time for writing, but though he did not relax his philosophical activity he was speedily absorbed in his work as a city councillor, and it became the more onerous when he was elected to the chairmanship of the education committee. His method of work by which he managed to do more of any task than others who shared it with him remained unchanged, and

so also did his style of speech whether in meetings or in public addresses. He often puzzled his hearers but he was regarded with immense respect, and his authority was such that even if what he said was imperfectly understood, it was almost always accepted as right. He was soon as notable a figure in the affairs of the city as he had been in the university.

The years of his retirement were full of useful work, but at the last he suffered more and more from arthritis and from an infection which it was found hard to diagnose, and all his strength and power of endurance seemed to be summoned in the effort not to relinquish his activity of mind and body. His friends had hoped that towards the end of his life he might allow himself a little ease. Perhaps it would have been in any case an idle wish, but, as it was, he was called on to show in full measure that fortitude of mind which was one of his foremost qualities. He died in the Acland Home at Oxford on 13 November 1943.

Joseph's strongly marked personality might well be expected to show itself in his philosophy. And in fact there is an individual character both of matter and of form in every sentence which he wrote, alike for his books and for his lectures, as there was in his smallest intervention in any discussion. The matter is the more important in his philosophical work, but I should not like to omit a reference to his style, which perhaps has not always been justly estimated. He wrote, as he spoke, with ease, but his readers have none. For he sought and achieved accuracy of statement with the utmost economy of words, and his closely knit sentences with their complex dependent clauses, while they express exactly the sequence and qualifications of his thought, allow the reader's concentration no respite. But even when his sentences are longest and most intricate, the secure and deft rhythm, the felicitous choice of words, and the wit of the illustrations and analogies, however much his reader may be perplexed by the whole, show his mastery of writing.

His illustrations, which are largely drawn from the classics, the Bible, and English literature, suggest vividly his combination of learning with ease and rapidity of thought. They would lose by quotation since their felicity depends on their context, but examples to which I may refer are the illustration drawn from the Crassus omen in *Some Problems of Ethics* (p. 40), the reference to Jonah's anger and the quotation from Housman's *Last Poems*,

both in the *Essays* (p. 66). The following passage from the *Logic* (p. 402) which recalls his love of natural beauty comes from the chapter in which he is explaining the principle of the uniformity of nature:

Watch the movements of a waterfall, how it breaks into a thousand parts which seem to shift and hang, and pause and hurry, first one, and then another, so that the whole never presents quite the same face twice; yet there is not a particle of water whose path is not absolutely determined by the forces acting on it in accordance with quite simple mechanical laws. No one would suppose that because these mechanical laws are unchanging, the waterfall must wear a monotonous and unchanging face; and so it is, on a larger scale, with the course of nature.

And for an example of his wit I think of his controversy with Miss Stebbing in *Mind*, where he so much enlivened a discussion of the logical properties of the individual unicorn by referring to him always as 'Hornboy'. Or take again this characteristic passage from a lecture: 'Plainly number cannot be a property of a unit as such. To say this is not to deny diversity in unity but to deny plurality of the one in that respect in which it is one. One cow may have many attributes; but to be two cows cannot be one of these.'

It is time, however, to turn to the substance of his philosophy. Most of Joseph's pupils and many of the philosophers who were his colleagues in Oxford or otherwise knew him and his work, were inclined to think first of his great powers of criticism. His pupils as they looked back on the fate of their own essays, hardly a sentence of which had not been shown to be confused or inaccurate, seldom felt that they had been taught a philosophic doctrine, although they had always the conviction that the criticism had not been applied for its own sake but was a task performed for their good and in the service of right thinking. What they valued afterwards was the experience of an intellectual discipline more rigorous than anything they had ever conceived, and the example they had had of an unwearied devotion to truth. Amongst philosophers many had the same view of his work, but there were some, especially of those whose philosophical beliefs were very different from his, who thought that the criticism was often eristic. But whether his powers of criticism were admired or distrusted, it was not perhaps the usual view that he was expounding a set of philosophical doctrines, tenaciously held and consistently applied throughout his work. Yet if his work is examined, I think it is difficult to resist the conclusion that this was so. The question at any rate deserves

consideration, and the answer to it is relevant to any judgement about the use to which he put his powers as a critic.

It would be strange if Joseph held no philosophic doctrine when so much of his thought was devoted to the study of Plato and, in a lesser degree, Aristotle, and he venerated them so greatly. The *Republic* of Plato in particular he knew almost by heart and for most of his teaching life in Oxford he was its foremost expositor. He was an accomplished classical scholar and had an excellent knowledge of the historical background of an ancient text, but his first aim in his lectures on the *Republic* was to expound the philosophic truths which he believed that it contained. His method is well shown in the chapters on Plato in his *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. What is noteworthy about them is that they have the freedom of interpretation which marks the work of a disciple claiming not only to reproduce what his master taught, but to fill in what he left unsaid and to show how his doctrines should be developed.

It is worth while to illustrate this point in order to understand what was his way of interpreting Plato. A characteristic example is the turn which his thought takes when in the second chapter of the *Essays* he discusses Plato's concept of μισθαρνητική τέχνη. Plato, in using this term in Book I of the *Republic*, evidently intends to mark the mixture of motives which can be found in a man's pursuits and to allow that the notion of self-interest or gain, in the sense in which Thrasymachus might think of it, is present, though it is not all. But Joseph looks also to the kind of gain which the best men seek, and following this line of thought contends that the notion of μισθαρνητική τέχνη 'is really the same as that of what Aristotle afterwards called ἀρχιτεκτονική τέχνη—the art of so ordering one's life as to secure happiness or realize for oneself in it—so far as that can be realized in one man's life—good' (p. 26). Now it would be difficult to maintain that this is what Plato himself had in mind in the context, but none the less it is a legitimate and very subtle suggestion of the way in which Plato's term might be regarded in another context, and it fits with what, as Joseph argues later, is Plato's doctrine about self-interest.

In this free handling of Plato, Joseph follows in the footsteps of Aristotle, and it is interesting to observe how he often treats Aristotle as one disciple might treat another, who, as he thinks, has misinterpreted or spoilt some jealously guarded tenet of the master. In view of all that he learnt from him, his writings about Aristotle are indeed often oddly perverse. Thus in chapter vi

of the *Essays* he first treats Aristotle's account of moral virtue as if it represented all that he had to say on virtue (ignoring Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*), and then, comparing it with Plato's analysis of justice, concludes that Aristotle in following and trying to improve upon this analysis 'in fact largely spoilt it' (p. 177). I think that Joseph was here in a mood when he thought that none without peril could add anything to a topic which Plato had handled.

It is not difficult to see how much of his philosophy was derived from Plato and Aristotle. His unflagging study of what Plato taught on the subject of the good and of justice determined his thought about the kind of unity which the philosopher should both seek and presuppose in every branch of his inquiry. From the same source he drew also his ideas about the motives of action and the particular unity which the mind aims at achieving. In reading Aristotle (though the germ of Aristotle's teaching is doubtless in Plato) he was stimulated to think about the notions of the potential and the actual, the implicit and the explicit, growth and development, and the final cause. It must be remembered, too, that these ideas were reinforced by the school of thought (itself more influenced by Plato and Aristotle than by Hegel) which in his early life was dominant in Oxford. At no period did he abandon the view that mind and the reality it knows were at least akin (*οὐκεία*), and towards the end of his life he wrote: 'My knowledge is of, and my opinion concerns, a reality which is independent of my knowing it or thinking thus about it; although I do not believe either that there is a real world independent of mind altogether, or that my mind is independent of that mind of which the world is not independent' (*Some Problems in Ethics*, p. 42). Again, in his review (in the *Oxford Magazine*) of Joachim's Inaugural Lecture on *Mediate and Immediate Inference*, he made it clear how much sympathy he had for the coherence theory of truth. I remember also in what generous terms of praise a year or two later he referred to Joachim's lectures on the *Regulae* of Descartes which he himself had made a point of attending. The same doctrine is referred to also in *Some Problems of Ethics* and again sympathetically:

The facts of good and evil apprehended separately may yet be connected. It may be as in mathematics. There a man may come to know, independently one of another, many facts between which he later discovers necessary connexions. Indeed in this field it is hard to doubt that all facts are mutually involved, though we cannot show this. Some have argued that, if this is so, the apprehension of the facts in their

isolation is not properly to be called knowledge of them; we do not really know anything unless we know it in all its linkages. Perhaps there is a parallel here between Ethics and Mathematics. . . . Yet in both fields some isolated judgments seem true, though the facts cannot be so independent of each other as the judgments are isolated (p. 108).

In all this the fundamental basis of his philosophy is, I believe, apparent.

I shall refer briefly to one other influence on his thought. When he had married Margaret Bridges, in the happy seven years which closed with her untimely death, he began to speculate much about poetry and music. He had always been devoted to poetry, but friendship with Robert Bridges turned his thought to the creative work of the poet. Margaret Bridges herself was a gifted musician, and through her he came to think of the processes of the mind, on the fringe of consciousness or beyond, which seem to be implied in the work of musicians, both those who are composers and those who are executants. His speculations here accorded naturally with the comparisons which he knew well both in Plato and in Aristotle between art and morality. But in particular his belief in Aristotle's teleological account of the concept of development was strengthened and clearly showed itself as a central tenet of his thinking.

What has so far been said might seem to suggest that Joseph's work as a philosopher was the teaching of certain doctrines which he drew mainly from Plato and Aristotle, combined with a remarkably acute and vigilant criticism of writings in which they were neglected or not understood. Even if this were held to be the whole truth, his critical work would be thus seen in a better perspective as the outcome of a body of connected philosophical principles. But such a view would still not do justice to his achievement. The problems to which he devoted much thought were not and could not have been precisely the problems which presented themselves to Plato and Aristotle, and his service to philosophy consisted in bringing to bear on those fresh problems a powerful and learned mind, equipped with principles which he had adopted after long meditation in entire independence of contemporary fashion. His extreme rapidity both in discussion and in writing which was one of his most remarkable characteristics was, I think, not simply a native gift but the outcome of the consistency and thoroughness with which he had assembled his chief doctrines and worked out their implications.

His doctrines had a natural bearing on biological topics, and

in the Herbert Spencer Lecture, which he delivered at Oxford in 1924 and reprinted later in his *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, he applied them with great mastery to the examination of the concept of evolution. This lecture can well be studied as a prologue to the rest of his work, since it clearly enunciates much that is essential also in his speculations on logic and ethics and is important for their comprehension.

The main task of the lecture, if I follow it rightly, is to consider whether the processes by which matter assumes new forms, a living organism grows, and a mind develops, are of the same order, and to consider also what is the nature of the process by which new species come to be. The first contrast to be drawn is between a physical process and the development of a mind. In the former, change is a rearrangement of unities (whether atoms or elements into which atoms are further resolved) and these unities 'have not come to be anything which they were not before' (p. 315). In this connexion it may be asked, 'whether there is anything physical which ever increases in size. A crowd is said to grow, but physically regarded what is bigger is not the same with what was smaller. In aggregation, no physical unit and no aggregate of the same physical units gets any bigger' (p. 316). In contrast,

A mind is not an aggregate whose components have been drawn from elsewhere. It does not develop at the expense of that on which it is said metaphorically to feed; for the mind's food is like the oil in the widow's cruse, of which if one partakes, no less is left for others. . . . The growth of a mind then is not aggregation; there is a real coming to be of that which, in the sense in which it exists when it has come to be, did not exist before. And yet in another sense surely it must have existed; for else the mind has not developed. There is no process of development unless that which develops is all the time that which it comes to be; and again there is no process of development unless it is not in the same way so in the earlier and later phases. This is not gratuitous paradox; it is, I am persuaded, the true account of what we mean by development, as it is the old account, put forward by Aristotle in the antithesis of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, the potential and the actual (pp. 314-15).

Of development again he says, 'it is a process in which what as yet in some sense is not brings *itself* into being' (p. 313).

If this distinction and the account given of true development are correct, it is possible to consider now the growth of a living organism. Since development requires an identical subject which is all the time that which it comes to be, it is necessary, if such growth is development, to find the identical subject which

grows. The argument is that clearly (in view of what has been said before) 'it is nothing physical—no physical unit, nor aggregate of physical units', and therefore it must be something immaterial, or, as is said elsewhere, a universal. Where there is growth and not only substitution, 'the form which comes to be displayed later was not displayed before' and yet it is the same form (p. 317). It is an immaterial unity 'though more adequately revealed at one time than at another in what is material'. The sole emphasis at this point on the form or universal in the definition of development seems to raise a difficulty which Joseph notices when he remarks that 'such immaterial unities are found also where there is no development', e.g. in the circularity of all circles (p. 325). The reference to the more adequate revelation of the form at one time than another perhaps hardly resolves the difficulty, as he presumably would not say that an imperfectly spherical body which by rotation came nearer to being spherical furnished an instance of growth or development. The exact relation again of the argument to the earlier statement that in development the undeveloped brings *itself* into being is not at this point made quite clear.

The next step is to consider the evolution of species, and he sets out on a thorough and tenacious criticism of attempts to base the unity of the process on something physical, which is the same throughout. The criticism reinforces the contention that here also we must look for a solution which is in principle the same as before.

There is clearly a difference between the development of the individual, in which one specific nature is gradually revealed, and that which has led to the revelation of all the types of plant or animal that now exist or have existed. Of the latter we shall have to say that what has developed is the generic unity, which requires for the revelation of all the diversity that it holds together not the detail of one organism, but of countless such (p. 328).

But this difference, to which he thus refers, should be viewed also in a wider context. In an earlier passage (pp. 324–7) he had speculated on the many forms which unity in diversity takes, culminating in the unity of mind. He now suggests in regard to these many forms of unity in diversity: 'Perhaps these forms are not merely juxtaposed in the universe, but themselves progressively manifest the fundamental nature of the universe, for the universe is itself the all-embracing unity that determines thereout its own diversity' (p. 332). On such a count the unity of an organism might be thought to be not wholly dissimilar to

the unity of a mind. (Such a view seems to be necessary if growth is to be regarded as complying with Joseph's account of development and it would meet the difficulty referred to above in connexion with his reference to immaterial unities.) But it is the unity of mind at a lower or less developed level, and because the undeveloped can only be explained from the developed (if it can be explained at all), it is from mind that we must start, if we wish to understand the all-pervasive character of the real (cf. pp. 332-4).

It is hard to summarize even the leading ideas of a piece of writing which, like all Joseph's work, is packed and compressed, and I have omitted much. In particular I have omitted the passages in which he explains in more detail the nature of the mind's unity, but to these I shall refer immediately in connexion with his work on ethics as they bear directly on that subject. It is significant and characteristic that a very large part of what Joseph has to say on biological topics is relevant also to his speculations on metaphysics and ethics. In this connexion, too, it may be noticed that a detailed account of the way in which he thinks that the process of natural selection might be conceived to operate is to be found in *Some Problems in Ethics* (pp. 122-4), where it takes the form of an analogy illustrating the purposive working of the mind.

Turning now to his writings on ethics we may begin with the passage on the unity of mind in the Herbert Spencer Lecture which we have not considered. It deals with the function in determining this unity which should be assigned to the conception of the good, and it is as follows:

There is a profound difference between a choice or rational act and action determined by a mere conflict of desires. In the second, the stronger desire prevails, and for a time suppresses the weaker, as when a hungry man insulted forgets his hunger until his desire is satisfied upon his enemy. But if he deliberate whether to risk the loss of his dinner in order to trounce his enemy, or to forgo this in order to appease his hunger, he asks himself which alternative is better. That question implies that he conceives, and desires, what is good; but this is not a third desire co-ordinate with his hunger and his desire to trounce his enemy, since a good alternative to and exclusive of all objects of particular desires would be void, nothing. It is realized in them, or in some selection of them; but it is not a mere sum of them. When a man thus distinguishes himself and his good from all his particular desires and their objects, plainly he and his good are unities displayed, but incompletely displayed, in these. Plainly too his action is comparable to nothing mechanical (p. 326).

In the ensuing paragraph he goes on to another point which is no less significant and important.

But there are [he writes] other manifestations of intelligence besides choice, and without considering them we do not understand what is meant by calling choice rational. Choice involves the thought of something good; but we all know that the thought of this outruns the articulate determination of its nature. How do we come to know what its nature is? This problem is fundamentally the same as how we discover the answer to many other questions. When we have discovered it, we should not know it to be the answer, unless the thought of that of which we are in search somehow accompanied and controlled the activity of the mind whereby we first arrive at the explicit recognition of it. So also in artistic creation some artists have described, and surely it must be so, how an implicit apprehension of what they are reaching after directs them in discarding any suggestion that is amiss, and developing their thought of what they seek. I say developing, because here we seem to have the true notion of development. That which comes to be was there from the beginning; but whereas then it was not developed, now it is (p. 327).

What lies behind both these passages is evidently the conception which he drew from Plato that the Good so operates as to bring about its own realization not only when it is consciously apprehended but also when it is related to levels of being where there is not consciousness of it.

It is easy to see that the line of thought in regard to ethics, which was begun by H. A. Prichard¹ and came to be strongly prevalent in Oxford from 1919 onwards, would seem to Joseph profoundly unsatisfactory. Taking the recognition of duties as the most fundamental factor in ethics, Prichard had argued that actions held to be obligatory could not always be regarded as conducive to good nor could they be regarded as intrinsically good unless performed from the motive of duty; but it was the act not the motive which was thought to be obligatory, and it could not be otherwise since motives were not at our command; and accordingly what was obligatory was not so because it was either conducive to good or intrinsically good, and no more could be said about it than that it was obligatory or right, and was recognized to be so. All this ran entirely counter to Joseph's convictions. He held that such a doctrine, by reducing the understanding of the way in which life should be lived to the perception of particular duties, in no way related, made morality irrational,² and that by separating acts from motives it attached

¹ See his contribution to *Mind*, 1912.

² Cf. *Some Problems in Ethics*, pp. 67-8.

moral predicates to what was not moral.¹ But most of all he believed that it was only by reference to the notion of good, which the doctrine eliminated, that life and morality could be shown to be intelligible.

The good is accordingly the dominant theme in his book *Some Problems in Ethics*, and he seeks to show both how he understands it and how it may be used to surmount the difficulties which Prichard had raised. The good, I think he would say, is that in virtue of which (or in reference to which) we call anything good. It might be held that we call one thing good because we recognize in it a quality which we recognize also in other things, and that things may therefore be said to be good because the goodness of each is an instance of goodness as a universal. Good may thus come to be conceived as a simple quality belonging to everything which is good. This conception Joseph rejects (pp. 75–80), and when he refers to the good he does not think of a universal thus related to its particulars. But it might again be held that particular goods are so called because they are means to the good. This view also he rejects because he thinks that the good, while it is not the same as the so-called means to it which we regard as good, is yet not (as the relation of end and means would imply) wholly other than they are; and what he wishes to maintain instead is that ‘there is a good to be looked to, which in a sense is beyond the action, but yet not as are its consequences’ (p. 35). He indicates perhaps his position most clearly when he writes, ‘Though we do not find those simple factors each good because in each we can discern that form or structure of being of which I spoke, yet neither do we find them good without looking beyond them, and seeing them as characters in some whole which has that structure’ (p. 87).

The passages just quoted show that the view which Joseph is advocating is not that the good is simply the aggregate or totality of the various factors which we call good. The expression, it should be noticed, which he most frequently uses in referring to the good is ‘a form of life’, and ‘form’ must evidently here be taken to have the implications which he would find in Plato’s ‘form of the good’. One of the chief of these implications is that the form is the ground or explanation of the development of the not fully realized particulars of which it is the form. It is doubtless this which he has in mind when he says, ‘In any self-realizing process, that which is ultimately realized is somehow involved in the determination of the process by which or in

¹ *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 38–41.

which it is realized' (p. 55). We should also remember that he did not think the form needed to be explicitly known in order that it should determine the process in which it is realized—indeed in natural processes, where he thought it was involved, there is no knowing. Thus in the same passage he goes on to say, 'When an artist designs, the thought of what is to be designed is at work, however inexplicitly, in completing the design'; and later, 'Just as there are artists (perhaps they are the majority) who only become fully aware of what they mean or are designing in executing their design so that others may see or hear, so men's purposes seem often unable to shape themselves except in action' (p. 57).

We can now see how these doctrines concern the difficulties (which he thought should be treated with great respect) raised by Prichard and those who followed him. In the first place they enable him to reject the sharp disjunction of what is conducive to good and what is intrinsically good, so far as it implies that anything which is conducive to good is not itself good and that anything which is intrinsically good is not related to any other good. For particular goods in which the form of the good is partly realized are good not because they are means to the good but because they partly realize it (and so are intrinsically good), and they are not unrelated to other goods because of the unity of the form which they partly realize. Secondly, when he is challenged to say what is the good which he finds in a given right action he is not bound to think that there is no good because he cannot give an explicit answer to the question; for the answer lies in the form of the good, and that, he believes, can work in the mind without being explicitly known. The last point is directly connected with the third, which we must now consider, namely, the bearing of his doctrines on the contention (of Prichard and others) that while there are actions which we are obliged to perform, we are not obliged to perform them from certain motives.

What Joseph thought about the form of the good in relation to action and the progressive realization of a way of living, led him to believe that there is a kind of motive not entirely identical either with desire or with the thought of obligation. It differs from a desire both because it does not terminate upon a particular object and because it can oppose a desire, and it differs from the thought of obligation because it may exist before the latter has become explicit. As regards the contrast with desire we may compare the passage quoted above from the Herbert Spencer

Lecture where he refers to the way in which a man distinguishes himself or his good from all his particular desires and their objects. He follows here a similar line of thought; for he thinks that the motive which he has in mind is close to the sense 'of a duty to realize a goodness connected with the particular principle of the action which is recognized as my duty now, though I may have no desire to do the action which this principle involves' (p. 48). But it is not an explicit sense of duty. 'Honest men', he writes, 'do not pay their debts because they feel obliged to, nor yet from any inclination to give money to the gentlemen who are their creditors. But if any contrary inclination should be stirred, then a man would begin to feel the obligatoriness of that the thought of which was moving him' (p. 57). Again he says of a man's motives: 'Provided that he is conscious of the facts determining a present obligation to a particular action, the thought of himself acting thus in this situation may work with a sort of urgency in him to the doing of the act, even without his saying to himself that he ought to do it, still more without saying to himself that he ought to do this now, because duty (or something universal) requires it' (pp. 50-1). Now this 'urgency' I think he conceives as the way in which the form of the good works in a man's mind, though it is not necessary that he should apprehend it, towards its own realization. Its presence in him marks him as a moral being, and unless it were present in him he would not be able to reflect about duties (cf. p. 47). But if this account of the matter is correct, it seems that Joseph is in a position to assert that when a man thinks about his duty, he is thinking about realizing in action a motive which he already has (just as he might equally think it his duty to realize in action a desire which he already had), and to those who ask what is the ground of the 'urgency' which thus precedes a sense of duty, he has the answer that the urgency is the working in a man's mind of the form of the good which he aims to realize, but yet cannot describe. Whether the argument is accepted or not, it is at least clear that it is implicated with all Joseph's central convictions, and I think that it stands or falls with them.

There are two other points in Joseph's doctrine to which a brief reference should be made. In the first place if the good is a system realized in individual lives which are different, in the realization of the good of each individual life the good (which is more than its good) is also being realized, and the individual's good is not other than the good, although it is not identical with it. So, too, in regard to motives, when we think of the pursuit

of the good or of our own good, or again of the motives of duty or interest, it is not necessary to hold that the alternatives are wholly distinct. Thus he writes: 'An interest in morality itself is . . . an interest in being oneself moral, though it does not exclude an interest in others being so too; and that interest cannot be ultimately separated from the conviction that one's own good lies in being so' (p. 111). The second point concerns the operation of particular desires. Though such desires need to be distinguished from the 'urgency' directed towards the form of the good, nevertheless since they are desires of a mind in which the good works as an animating principle, they and the urgency towards the good cannot be wholly dissociated. Joseph does not discuss this question explicitly, but he evidently is thinking of it when in a reference to lawless appetites, the indulgence in which at any time and in any degree was held by Plato and Aristotle to be bad, he writes: 'But perhaps even these are not specifically different impulses, but directions of some impulse which also prompts to acts of which we can approve into manifestations that can fit into no good form of life' (p. 126). And he often quotes without dissent Spinoza's dictum *Omnia appetimus sub specie boni*.

I should refer here, before coming to Joseph's work on logic, to his book on *The Labour Theory of Value in Karl Marx* (1923). The purpose of the book, which arose out of a course of lectures, is to examine and refute the theory that exchangeable goods have a definite or absolute value, that the measure of this value is the labour embodied in them, and that it is unjust that those who have laboured to produce them should be rewarded with less than their value. Joseph was disturbed by the 'embittering effect' of the theory; 'for, in those who believe it, to discontent is added the burning sense of a definite injustice; and the problem of a cure, which to others seems intricate and delicate, to them seems definite and simple' (p. 18). He wished, therefore, to show that Marx's theory was definitely false, and that there was 'neither any means by which to settle how much wealth each man creates, nor any rule of justice to determine what share of the total wealth each ought to have' (*ibid.*). In speaking of justice he had in mind that 'in distribution, justice is proceeding according to the recognized rule', and accordingly where there is no fixed rule we should not speak of justice and injustice (*cf.* p. 152). But despite this he thought that 'a wage which cannot properly be called just or unjust may be oppressive or mean or cruel; and a system may deserve these reproaches for

the effects which it produces and for the motives which lead men nevertheless to maintain it' (p. 173). He was disappointed that the book had not more influence, but perhaps he was, characteristically, a little ingenuous in his hopes; for to refute the charge that a system is properly speaking unjust, while allowing that it may be oppressive or mean or cruel, does not seem to contribute greatly to the relief of embittered feeling. Nevertheless, though the criticism of Marx is perhaps more detailed than it needed to be, the examination of the concept of value which the book contains is marked by all Joseph's acumen, and the passages on the philosophic topics of preference (p. 102 et seq.) and desert (p. 158) deserve to be studied. It would be a pity if so careful a piece of work were to fall into neglect.

It is time to turn to Joseph's work on logic. His *Introduction to Logic*, published in 1906, is a classic in its own sphere. It is the most carefully written of his books, and is remarkable alike for its impeccable scholarship, for the range, interest, and wit of its apt illustrations, and for its masterly completeness and accuracy within its defined limits. The aim which he proposed to himself was to set out the traditional doctrine of logic in its most accurate form, in the belief that it was a doctrine which no one who wished to be a philosopher could afford not to know. Neither the justice of his belief nor the success with which he performed his task can be in any doubt. But it was in his mind that there were 'higher and abstruser problems' (Preface, p. viii) for the study of which the traditional logic was the fit propaedeutic, and the great ability which his book displayed encouraged the hope that he would go on to this further task. Any such expectation, however, failed to reckon with contemporary factors which profoundly influenced his philosophical activity.

In 1903 Russell published his *Principles of Mathematics*, and Joseph must have begun to study it carefully when he had finished his own book. There were reasons why he might have turned to Russell's work with interest and the hope of enlightenment. The traditional logic, which he expounded, was concerned in its treatment of deduction most with the syllogism, and he recognized that mathematical argument was not syllogistic (*Logic*, pp. 294-5), though the syllogism might be used 'when we rely upon the results of a previous demonstration whose steps we do not realize in the case before us' (p. 311). But he had made no attempt to examine the nature of mathematical reasoning, and in a context where he was considering the difficulty of

separating the form and matter of inference he seemed explicitly to allow that there was here a gap in the traditional logic. For he writes, 'There is mathematical reasoning, of which we have only said that it is not syllogistic; this from its importance may claim rather fuller consideration. But perhaps more remains to be done in the way of showing how far inference of these different forms enters into the building up of our knowledge, and what other operations of thought enter into it' (p. 370). Again, despite his respect for the coherence theory of truth, he always thought that the judgements of mathematics were a difficulty for the theory; we have noticed already the passage in *Some Problems in Ethics* (p. 108) where he remarks that in this field 'some isolated judgments seem true, though the facts cannot be so independent of each other as the judgments are isolated'. And he would certainly subscribe to Aristotle's view that the abstractness of the science distinguished it from others and dictated its special method.

If, therefore, the mathematical logicians had considered mathematics to be a special province of thinking, which exhibited forms of argument requiring separate investigation because of the special nature of their subject-matter, however much Joseph might have criticized their work in detail, he would have thought that such an inquiry was legitimate and likely to be profitable. But the aim of Russell and his followers was the reverse of this. They desired first to set out the principles of inference in general (which they regarded as fundamental logical concepts capable of being studied apart from any subject-matter), and secondly to show that all the propositions of pure mathematics were deducible from them. What was implied was not that logic had neglected to examine some distinctive forms of inference, but that it was its business to eliminate or reduce, by means of more fundamental and more abstract logical concepts, such distinctions as there seemed to be. Yet while the purpose of the new logicians was thus to eliminate or ignore distinctions imposed by differences in the subject-matter of thinking, their formulation of the fundamental logical concepts and of the nature of logic itself came from reflection on forms of thinking distinguished from all others by their degree of abstractness. In this way the mathematical logicians undertook a complete revision of the fundamental doctrines of the older logic, and mathematical logic became not a part of logic but the whole.

There were two ways in which, holding the views which he did, Joseph might have responded to the new doctrines. He

might have thought and attempted to show that since mathematics is bound to treat of units as nothing more than units, and its concepts are unsuitable (not to speak of other forms of unity) even to the continuous in the physical world, though it may deal with it by a series of devices, a logic based on the study of inference in mathematics would inevitably be an insufficient account of the fundamental concepts of thinking and therefore also of the nature of the real; but that at the same time the concepts of the new logic perhaps illuminated the special nature of mathematical argument. Or alternatively (in the spirit of Peter Ramus) he might have felt it his duty to prove that all the propositions of the new logic were false. It may be regarded as unfortunate that he came nearer to the second alternative than the first, though it was natural enough that he should do so. For the extreme cleverness and self-confidence of the leaders of the new school were highly provocative, and on his side he was spurred on by the venerated Cook Wilson, who also was very clever and exuberantly pugnacious. Still there were those who might have found his arguments more convincing if he had allowed that there was merit in any part of the doctrines which he was criticizing.

But, what was more important, his method hindered, I think, in the result, the progress of his own speculation. He held steadily that when we reflect on unity and intelligibility it is to the immaterial unity controlling the development of a mind that we should constantly look, but he also thought that the forms of unity are different. In his Herbert Spencer Lecture he wrote:

Unity in diversity takes many forms; in some the diversity which the unity holds together is more profound, in others less; in some the unity seems displayed in a manifestation sensibly unchanged; in others though the manifestations change, yet we are helped by these, or some of them, to an apprehension of it; and in yet others nothing sensible can be taken to manifest it (*Essays*, p. 324).

But in his criticisms of the mathematical logic, although he makes it clear that there are forms of unity which this logic ignores, it is not easy to see what he himself thinks is the nature of the fundamental concepts by which mathematics is unified. Another way in which this lack of definition in his own doctrine appears is perhaps to be found in his references to universals ('a universal' being a term which in many passages he seems to use interchangeably with the term 'immaterial unity'). He regarded the unity which controls the development of an individual mind and is manifested in its different phases, as an immaterial unity

or universal; but he also recognized as a universal the same colour or the same geometrical form which is manifested in many instances. The first seems to be endowed with a teleological function, the second not; for though it might be suggested that there would not be two instances which were alike unless there were some law or principle by reason of which both came to be, the law by reason of which two like instances exist is not what we regard when we think they are alike. But he does not himself set out this and other distinctions in his usage of the term 'universal', nor indicate what is the relation between different kinds of universals. It seems indeed that on this subject, to which he might have contributed much, there is not in the writings which he has left a systematic exposition of his own doctrine. He was much preoccupied, as we have seen, with the idea of development and its teleological implications, and he tended to emphasize it at the expense of everything else. It might well have been that if he had tried to find in mathematical logic ideas which were applicable to other forms of unity than this, he would have been led to attempt a more comprehensive account of the forms of unity and of the relation of universals to the problem.

Nevertheless, although Joseph did not in the end work out a system in which he dealt comprehensively with the 'higher and abstruser problems' to which he had referred in his *Introduction to Logic*, others who will continue to investigate these problems will find, I think, in his writings material of very great value for their speculations. Besides his published work he left many completed series of lectures which it is hoped to publish in whole or part, and a very large number of separate papers. In three of the series of lectures, the ease and security with which he handled metaphysical issues are conspicuous. They are his lectures on the central books of Plato's *Republic*, on Leibniz, and on what he referred to as the 'Philosophy of Analysis'. In the last he is concerned to trace (in the work of Russell, Moore, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and others) the repercussions of mathematical logic on the treatment of problems which are essentially metaphysical, and the continuity of his theme perhaps makes these lectures his most sustained work of criticism. Their argument, in its briefest outline, is that all attempts to regard the nature of thought (and thereby of the universe which it apprehends) as an aggregate or construct of simple elements misconceives its unity, and that in such attempts either the divers forms of unity are ignored or else they are covertly and

inconsistently assumed in what is alleged to be simple. The whole criticism is manifestly the outcome and application of his central philosophical tenets. In all, the unpublished writings which deserve publication can hardly be less in volume than those which he published in his lifetime, and when they are taken together, whether they produce agreement or dissent, it is hard not to acknowledge how powerful and impressive a body of philosophical work they form.

I have tried to recall some of Joseph's philosophical doctrines, but I cannot dissociate them from Joseph himself. There is one scene, doubtless remembered by others, which comes to my mind as I conclude what I have written. In the summer term of 1931, when Einstein was staying for a few weeks in Christ Church, he said that he would like to talk to the Oxford philosophers about the theory of relativity and discuss with them any questions which they wished to put. There was a large gathering in one of the Christ Church common rooms, and Einstein speaking with his habitual simplicity made, as he must have done in any company, a deep impression on his hearers. Discussion and comment seemed likely to be formal and desultory until Joseph intervened. He made a short statement, and he had his familiar frown of intense concentration as he listened to Einstein's answers and replied to them. Without either arrogance or humility he explained the reasons why he was not satisfied with the answers which were given to him, and I felt then, as always, that what he was determined to regard was the authority, not of reputation, but only of reason.

A. H. SMITH

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REYNOLD ALLEYNE NICHOLSON

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1868–1945

REYNOLD ALLEYNE NICHOLSON was born on 18 August 1868; his father, Henry Alleyne Nicholson, being at the time a surgeon in practice at Keighley in Yorkshire. Of his paternal forbears it is known that for the greater part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they lived in Cumberland, on an estate known as Thorpe, which they themselves owned and farmed. Mark Nicholson, born in 1770, appears to have broken the agrarian traditions of the family by going to Oxford and taking orders, becoming a Fellow of Queen's College. On being appointed to the Presidency of Codrington College, Barbados, he migrated to the West Indies, where he married a daughter of the Alleyne family. His son, John Nicholson, after leaving Queen's College, Oxford, achieved something of a reputation as a Biblical scholar, adopted the Swedenborgian tenets and acquired a sufficient knowledge of, and interest in, Arabic and Persian literature to make, with a certain amount of taste and discrimination, a collection of manuscripts. This collection afterwards came into the possession of his grandson, the subject of this memoir, to whom, according to family tradition, he endeavoured to teach Arabic, without, however, arousing any interest; although it may with some plausibility be assumed that his efforts were not entirely fruitless. His son, Henry Alleyne Nicholson, a distinguished biologist, inherited his academic tastes. He became a Fellow of the Royal Society and Professor successively at the Universities of St. Andrews and Aberdeen.

In these two cities Reynold Alleyne Nicholson went to school. He came up to Cambridge in 1887 as a pensioner (or commoner) of Trinity, where he read Classics and did well, being awarded the Porson Prize for Greek verse in his first year and taking a First in the Classical Tripos (Part I) in 1889, when he was made a scholar of his college. It was after this that he began to display an interest, possibly inherited, in Oriental languages. In 1892 he was awarded a First Class in the Indian Languages Tripos, having so far neglected his Classics in the meantime—or so it would appear—that he dropped to a Third in the Classical Tripos (Part II) of 1891. It may be that both Classics and Oriental languages had had to make concessions to other

interests, because Nicholson played golf for Cambridge against Oxford in 1888, 1890, and 1891. It was a game which he continued to play well and fairly regularly until he left Cambridge in the recent war, although it is in keeping with his selective spirit that he was scarcely ever known to play on the local Gog Magog course, preferring what he regarded as the more sporting one at Royston.

In 1893 Trinity elected him to a Fellowship. For short periods in the immediately preceding years he had been to Leyden and Strasbourg, where he read Arabic; at the former University with de Goeje and others and at the latter with the famous Orientalist Theodor Nöldeke. His first meeting with Edward Granville Browne was in 1891, when he began Persian. It was a meeting which was to have fruitful consequences, because from then onwards the two remained in close association and thirty years later he dedicated two volumes of studies to this friend, 'whose teaching and example', as he says, 'first inspired me to pursue the study of Oriental learning'. At about the same period he made the acquaintance of W. Robertson Smith, Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic and one-time editor of the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. But it was Persian that attracted him, and his first publication, even though he embarked upon the subject after consultation with Robertson Smith, was *Selected Poems from the Dīvāni Shamsi Tabrīz* (Cambridge, 1898), a work of mature scholarship even then; its Persian text so well edited, translated, and annotated that it has become a classic.

For a brief period Nicholson left Cambridge in 1901 to occupy the Chair of Persian at University College, London; but he returned to succeed Browne as Lecturer in Persian when Browne himself became Sir Thomas's Professor of Arabic on the death of William Wright. Nicholson in his turn succeeded to the Chair of Arabic in 1926; but his occupation of it was comparatively brief, since his retirement under the age limit came in 1933, and it can scarcely be said to have affected his course of study or research except to a very moderate degree. He died at Chester on the 27th of August 1945, having had bestowed on him in his lifetime honours which greatly pleased him, amongst them an honorary degree (LL.D.) of Aberdeen University, a Fellowship of the British Academy, the Gold Medal of the Royal Asiatic Society, and an Associate Membership of the Persian Academy.

Nicholson's quiet way of life and the placidity of his character

were in accord with his chosen subject of mysticism. Few men indeed can have been better endowed by nature with the quality of *aequanimitas*, and one might almost imagine his natural endowment to have been improved by cultivation. Not that he could not be roused. When he was convinced that a certain course of action was right, or he felt that injustice was being done, he could be stirred to speak his mind—and his words were generally effective. One felt that due consideration had been given to all that might be said on the question, for and against.

A general attitude of detachment almost inevitably has as its corollary a certain reserve of manner; yet persons who came into contact with Nicholson, whether as students or colleagues, could be assured of genuine kindness which aroused affection in those who came to know him well. Obvious witness to that are the gifts which came to him from Indian and other students and the various books which were dedicated to him. Another aspect of his general attitude of detachment was that he appeared to be oblivious to practical—or at any rate party—politics; certainly he never discussed them except with a philosophic tolerance, for the reason that he was never scornful of common human tastes and activities. As has been said above, he played golf well; also he enjoyed good wine, good food, and witty talk, and he did not despise detective yarns.

It is in keeping with this characteristic that one of Nicholson's recreations in his earlier years was the writing of light verse, and in 1911 he published a collection—under the title of *The Don and the Dervish*—of his contributions to the *Cambridge Review* and the *Granta*, together with some of his verse translations from the Arabic and Persian. If poetry in general is criticism of life, then humorous verse to be effective must definitely be so, in however restricted a sense. His own products in that line were too mild, too lacking in malice, to have the success of a Calverley in the specialized community amongst whom he dwelt. But they were topical and certainly appreciated in their time.

It may have been his predilection for the Cambridge way of life which decided him not to travel abroad to any great extent. He never visited Persia, Turkey, or the Arabic-speaking lands of the Middle East. Possibly it was of no great consequence. It was said of Theodor Nöldeke, perhaps the most learned of all Orientalists, that he had never been east of Vienna. In effect, the subjects to which both Nöldeke and Nicholson devoted themselves were such as could better be studied in the library

than in the field, being products of the mind in places greatly altered by the circumstances of history and seldom penetrated except by the most active inquirers into things as they are. In the Preface to the first edition (1907) of his *Literary History of the Arabs* Nicholson declared that the literary side of the subject appealed to him more than the historical, and that in his view Arabic poetry was, in the main, a true mirror of Arabian life. When, however, he tried to represent in his verse-translations the spirit and feeling of the original poems he found, as he says, that, 'even in those passages which seem best suited for the purpose we are baffled again and again by the intensely national stamp of the ideas, the strange local colour of the imagery, and the obstinately idiomatic style'.

One gathers from this remark that he felt the disadvantage of his unfamiliarity with the native haunts of his authors. In reality, however, only certain facets of life in the Arabic-speaking countries are pictured by such poetry as is available to us now. It allows us no more than occasional glimpses into the encampments of nomads in the wilds or into the courts of princes in the towns. Some later odes are mystical or religious, others historical or no more than panegyrics made to be sold to a patron; yet whatever its character or subject the greater part of the earliest Arabic poetry surviving to us owes its preservation to philologists and lexicographers anxious to find supporting texts for their definitions of obscure or archaic terms in the Qur'ān or the traditions of the Prophet. Consequently we have verses containing out-of-the-way technicalities culled from the language of camel-owners or sheep-breeders of a day long past as well as metrical compositions which are little more than verbal *tours de force*.

Nicholson was concerned with ideas rather with philology or annals. He availed himself with eagerness of the passages which had a common appeal and his renderings of those he selected—as they appear in the *Literary History of the Arabs* and his *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (1921)—are completely satisfying. The parts he cared less about he left to the cataloguers and compilers.

The story was a different one when it came to Islamic mysticism, or Ṣūfīism. There all was significant, and he cast his net wide. Introducing the *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*, a collection of Arabic mystical odes by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī (d. A.D. 1240-1), he claims that those familiar with the mystical literature of both Arabs and Persians will allow that the Arabs excel in prose rather than in verse, while the Persian prose-

writers on the subject cannot be compared with the poets. As for the *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*,

the obscurity of its style and the strangeness of its imagery will satisfy those austere spirits for whom literature provides a refined form of intellectual exercise, but the sphere in which the author moves is too abstract and remote from common experience to give pleasure to others who do not share his visionary temper or have not themselves drawn inspiration from the same order of ideas. Nevertheless, the work of such a bold and subtle genius deserves, at any rate, to be studied.

Nicholson himself was one of the very few Oriental scholars competent to undertake the task.

Here it should be made clear that 'Islamic mysticism' is a convenient mode of rendering 'Ṣūfīism', but not altogether an accurate one. The doctrines of orthodox Islam have little concern with mysticism, which is contemptuous of forms and ritual, so that Ṣūfīs, who have numbered amongst themselves free-thinkers and pantheists, have at times been regarded as pure heretics. Extensively the term 'Ṣūfīism' covers the sum total of theosophies believed in by individuals of a variety of races and tongues who outwardly professed Islam or wrote in the Arabic script, which is that of the Qur'ān.

Mysticism in general has been compared with alchemy as a product of the mind—and more specifically the medieval mind—in search of security; the one material, the other spiritual. In neither case was any royal road to the truth discovered, and there is, in fact, no Ṣūfī sect with a regular system of dogmas; the paths by which the Ṣūfīs have sought God 'are in number as the souls of men' and vary infinitely. The point is illustrated by Nicholson in the parable, cited from Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's *Mathnawī*, of the people who came to visit an elephant which some Hindus were exhibiting in a dark house. Each visitor felt the animal with his hand. One, taking hold of the trunk, said, 'This creature is like a water-pipe'; another, who touched its ear, declared that it appeared to him to resemble a fan, while a third, handling its leg, decided that the elephant had a shape like a column.

Nicholson was obviously aware of the difficulties in his chosen path of study, but this did not deter him from undertaking the vast amount of reading and research which it involved. In his *Mystics of Islam*—a manual for the general reader—published in 1914, he speaks of drawing to some extent on materials which he had collected during the past twenty years for 'a general history of Islamic mysticism—a subject so vast and many-sided

that several large volumes would be required to do it anything like justice'. During those twenty years he had published, in addition to three Arabic Reading Books and numerous articles in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* and elsewhere, a series of texts and translations intended to be materials for a history of Ṣūfīism. First came (in two volumes, 1905 and 1907) the Persian text of the *Tadhkirat al-Awliyā* ('Memoirs of the Saints'), containing the spiritual biographies of numerous Ṣūfī adepts. This was followed in 1911, firstly by the *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*, A Collection of (Arabic) Mystical Odes, by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī, together with a literal version of the text and an abridged translation of the author's commentary thereon; secondly by a translation of Hujwīrī's *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, The Oldest Persian Treatise on Ṣūfīism (2nd edition, 1936). In 1914 came a stout volume containing the Arabic text of the *Kitāb al-Luma' fi'l-Taṣawwuf* by Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. A.D. 988-9), together with critical notes, abstract of contents, glossary, and indexes. 'This volume', says Nicholson in his introduction, 'marks a further step in the tedious but indispensable task . . . of providing materials for a history of Ṣūfīism, and more especially for the study of its development in the oldest period. . . .'

In this connexion mention should be made of his article entitled: 'A historical enquiry concerning the origin and development of Ṣūfīism, with a list of definitions of the terms Ṣūfī and Taṣawwuf arranged chronologically', which appeared in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1906. In one of his notebooks, dated August 1907, a plan of volume i of a history of Ṣūfīism is outlined as follows: 1. The Ascetic Movement; 2. Beginnings of Ṣūfīism; 3. The Early Ṣūfīs; 4. Theosophy and Pantheism; 5. The Schools of Ṣūfīism and their Founders; 6. Ṣūfī Asceticism (a) Individual, (b) Social; 7. Ṣūfī Mysticism.

The materials he had published up to 1914 were comparatively early, and little worked upon. It remained for him to re-examine texts that were already well known but had been imperfectly studied and interpreted. *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (1921) are essays on important aspects of the subject, with a long chapter making intelligible the *Ta'īyyah* of Ibn al-Fārīd and the even more obscure translation of it by Hammer-Purgstall made in 1854. In 1905 came the first instalment of the text of the masterpiece of Ṣūfīism, the *Mathnawī-i Ma'nawī* ('The Mathnawī of the Spirit') of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. A.D. 1273). Obviously in any study of the subject the examination of this work would have had to play an important part. It had

been famous from the moment of its composition; manuscripts of it, and of commentaries upon it, were numerous, and it had often been printed or lithographed in the East. Yet in the course of its transmission it had become so overlaid by additions and corruptions that before the author's original thought could be laid bare a new edition of the text was necessary.

Nicholson planned a complete text and translation in six volumes, with three volumes of commentary and 'an introductory volume dealing with the life and times of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī and with the linguistic, literary, historical, doctrinal, and other aspects of the poem as a whole'. It was an ambitious programme long present to his mind, and, except for the introductory volume, he achieved it all by a sustained effort rarely equalled and never surpassed. No one without his unique equipment of scholarship could have coped with Rūmī's unruly genius. It illumines the character of the achievement that some Persians felt it a reflection on their own people that it should have been left to a European and a non-Moslem to have edited and interpreted one of the profoundest works of Islam and, possibly, its greatest contribution to the world's corpus of religious literature. Nicholson's own view when summing up the work and genius of Rūmī was that his Odes, collected in the *Dīwāni Shamsi Tabrīz*, reached the utmost heights of which a poetry inspired by vision and rapture is capable and that these alone would have made him the unchallenged laureate of Mysticism. 'But', he said,

'they move in a world remote from ordinary experience, open to none but the "unveiled", whereas the *Mathnawī* is chiefly concerned with the problems and speculations bearing on the conduct, use and meaning of life. . . . Everyone can find something to his taste, from abstruse recondite theories of mystical philosophy to anecdotes of a certain kind, which are told in the plainest terms possible.'

The editing of a difficult text not far short of 26,000 lines in length, in a script which provides endless possibilities for copyist's errors, is in itself an immense task, physical and intellectual. Yet Nicholson was never content to regard as final what he had set down. As better materials became available to him in the course of his transcribing and editing he revised and corrected whole sections, running into thousands of lines. The translation—guided, of course, by the commentaries in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, as well as those in European languages—is an unsurpassable rendering of the original, in a style which has made it eagerly sought after even by people who have little

interest in orientalism but who find in the work food and illumination for their beliefs.

There is no sustained argument in the *Mathnawī*. The thought leaps abruptly from one point to another as fresh illustrations, parallels, objections, and what would appear to be odd irrelevancies occur to the author's mind, so that now and again he must recall himself to the subject in hand. In all this, there are frequent allusions to the details of ordinary workaday life, and it was here that Nicholson's lack of first-hand familiarity with the East caused him on rare occasions to miss the exact significance of a verse, albeit with no great harm done to the general sense. Also, from the nature of the case, the *Mathnawī* is not always *virginibus puerisque*, yet by his delicate recourse to the decent veil of Latin he contrived to make it so.

Of the commentary—in two volumes, finally, and not the three originally planned—it must suffice to say that it is an astonishingly rich storehouse filled with the accumulated reading of a lifetime. The last volume appeared in 1940 and with the publication of it Nicholson regarded his task, begun eighteen years before, as virtually complete. He still hoped to carry out his intention of writing a book which should be a summing up of Rūmī's life and work, and which would have formed incidentally, the Prolegomena to a history of Ṣūfīism. It did not, however, materialize. He may have considered that the time was not ripe even yet; that the mass of materials was still insufficient. In any event, all that is left in manuscript for such a work is an index of the materials available for its compilation.

Even so, the tasks completed by Nicholson during his lifetime have established his vast pre-eminence in the subject he made his own. It is safe to prophesy that for a century or more to come no European will hazard an attempt to equal his performance there—nor, indeed, will it be possible—and, wherever Islamic scholarship is pursued, his name will live admired and honoured.



Photograph by Drummond Young, Edinburgh

ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR

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1869-1945

ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR was born at Oundle on 22 December 1869, the elder son of the Rev. A. Taylor, a Wesleyan minister who had formerly been a missionary on the Gold Coast. Taylor's mother died at an early age, and the family in which he was brought up was that of a father, two sons, and a daughter. Little is on record about his childhood and boyhood, but two things that are prophetic of his later width of knowledge and fluency in expression may be mentioned. One is that he was an insatiable reader; he could not remember the time when he could not read, and he would hide under a table with a book to avoid being sent out to play. The other is that he was an admirable composer of long and intricate stories which he would relate to his brother and sister to their delight. As became the son of a Wesleyan minister, he was sent to Kingswood School, Bath, to which he later showed his affection by dedicating his *Socrates* to its masters and boys. From there he went as a Scholar to New College, Oxford, where he took first classes in Classical Moderations and in Greats, and vastly impressed both his teachers and his fellow-undergraduates by the range of his knowledge and of his interests. He was elected a Fellow of Merton in 1891, held his Fellowship for the full seven years of a Prize Fellowship, and was re-elected in 1901. He outlived all his Merton contemporaries, and little remains on record from that time, except that he became an intimate friend of F. H. Bradley and was one of the very few people who could induce Bradley to talk about philosophy. In 1896 Professor Alexander, always alert to discover the coming men in philosophy, secured him as Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy at Owen's College, Manchester, where he remained until 1903. In 1899 he won the Green Moral Philosophy Prize at Oxford. In 1900 he married Lydia Jutsum Passmore, daughter of Edmund Passmore, of Ruggs, Somerset, herself an authoress, and they had one son, now a Civil Servant in India. From 1903 to 1908 Taylor was Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, Montreal.

In 1908 he succeeded Bosanquet as Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews, and there he remained till 1924, having as his colleague in the chair of Logic and Metaphysics

throughout that time Stout, who did much to modify Taylor's earlier devotion to Bradley's philosophy. Professor Laird, who was his assistant for part of that time, and after Taylor's death undertook to write the Academy memoir of him, did not live to fulfil that task, but I am allowed to quote a characteristically lively sketch of Taylor which he wrote during his own last illness.

When I was his assistant, Taylor had abandoned his excursions into general philosophy, where his *Elements of Metaphysics*—a sort of Bradley-for-the-Million combined with much informative vivacity about contemporary scientific philosophy—had earned its unusual success. He had turned to the main interest of his irrepressible literary career, the re-discovery (as he thought) of the historical Plato and of the historical Socrates, of the Platonic tradition, and of the unconscious Platonism of the modern world. Here he out-Burneted Burnet, but without very much active discussion with Burnet.

More suo, he imposed a certain strain upon his interlocutors, who were expected to make intelligent remarks about Greek dowries, or any other sweeping from the Platonic epistles. But even if one couldn't help, one could admire and be excited. I had never met, or at any rate had never known, a philosopher to whom the Greek or any other past philosophy had been the burning heart of present existence, fresher than the morning's news. A traditionalism of that kind, especially when combined with such a range and versatility of application, would stir the intellectual pulses of the humblest.

Besides, Taylor was much more than a Grecian with a darting eye for all the Atticisms of the modern world. He refreshed himself continually from many other wells in the philosophical and cultural tradition, and, at the time I am recording, had become engrossed in another of his major interests, St. Thomas Aquinas. There we did not try, or pretend to try, to follow him; but he seemed to assume, quite undaunted, that we were respectable mediaevalists as well as passable Grecians. He always spoke as if his own enthusiasms extended over all the literate earth. We, for our parts, thought that Taylor's excitement about St. Thomas was just an aspect of his attitude towards Christian theology and the Christian religion. . . . He had become a High-Church Episcopalian, a member of the Church Catholic though never a Roman Catholic. In our eyes that was an eccentricity. I dare say that our eyes were holden. We were not greatly moved by Taylor's new scholasticism.

I shall never forget those days of my assistantship. On any given afternoon, and there were very few afternoons when Taylor did not walk and talk with his assistant as a matter of kindly course, the odds were that one discussed Greek medicine, Dante's genius, the character of Bishop Bonner, and the delight that was Max Beerbohm. Mrs.

Taylor would join us at tea-time and conduct a cross-conversation about Dickens and Anthony Trollope. Some quick thinking was necessary to keep both streams of conversation going, and I fear I did not always mix my 'Yes's and 'No's quite accurately. In that case there was a lull, sometimes a surprised lull, but not for long. For self-protection I read rather widely at that time.

In 1924 Taylor was called to the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, where Professor Kemp Smith was his colleague until Taylor's retirement in 1941. It was towards the end of this time, in 1938, that Taylor suffered the greatest sorrow of his life, by the death of Mrs. Taylor. His son had already been many years in India; after his wife's death he was a lonely man, and his vitality never recovered from the blow. He died in his sleep, in his house in Edinburgh, on 31 October 1945. He had received many honours, but no more than his due; he was a Doctor of Literature of St. Andrews and of Manchester, an LL.D. of Aberdeen and of St. Andrews, an Honorary Fellow of New College, a Foreign Member of the Accademia dei Lincei, a Corresponding Member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, and had been Gifford Lecturer at St. Andrews.

It might be supposed that a man whose literary output was so great must have found the routine of lecturing rather tedious. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He never neglected his lectures for his books, and he put a great deal of his books into his lectures. Towards the end of his life he developed some little eccentricities; the following account of these by one of his junior colleagues will help to complete the picture of him as he was.

When I first went to Edinburgh I used to attend his Honours Class lectures on the *Republic*. He extracted his notes from the attaché case he always carried, quite often spilling the contents on the floor as he did so. Then he read them word for word, sitting in his heavy coat. He was very apologetic to me about the reading of his lectures, and said he always used to lecture with no notes at all, but his memory was no longer good enough. These lectures were at midday, and he had little sense of time; we stopped him if we could at 1.15, but I have more than once done so, firmly, well after 1.30. He was very absent-minded, and I think must have been unselfconscious. At any rate, one day as I walked with him along the street we met one of his pupils who was 6 feet 7 inches or so in height. Taylor gazed skyward and greeted him, then said to me 'It's a dreadful misfortune for a man to be as tall as that'—apparently quite unconscious of the exceptional contrast with himself. There was one famous occasion when he entered his ordinary class with the tassel of his square (which he was wearing)

burning merrily, having caught fire from his pipe. He was quite unconscious of it, and the story goes that there was a general rush to 'put the Professor out'. With this class too he was loath to stop, and I have often been told how he regularly lectured on as he made his way to the door, and only stopped as he went through it.

He was very proud of his prose style. I forget the context of his remark, but I fancy it relates somehow to Shorey (whom he couldn't abide)—'Why, I am famous for my style'.

He was full of wisdom and humanity, and yet oddly cross-tempered. He was fond of children, though he can have known few. He was a great novel-reader, but I don't know his tastes here. One of his two or three favourite poets was Aeschylus.

An instance of his pungency, and characteristic of his colloquial vocabulary, is his remark on a new appointment in Edinburgh University—'another damned plumber'. There are various stories of his impatience in church. The only one I remember is that he was rebuked from the pulpit with the words: 'Will Professor Taylor please stop rustling his raincoat?'

But with some amusement at such oddities there was joined, in the minds of his students, a vast respect for Taylor both as a man and as a philosopher. They recognized, as they were bound to do, that they were being taught by one of the greatest scholars in the country, and many caught the infection of his enthusiasm for philosophy and for literature.

The history of Taylor's mental development may best be given in his own words, written in his contribution to *Contemporary British Philosophy* (1925):

I could not say precisely when and how my interest in philosophical questions was first aroused. I remember as a very small child being worried by the solipsistic doubt whether the whole choir and furniture of heaven and earth (including my own parents!) might not be the fancies of a dream, and I myself the only real existent. Later on, as a schoolboy, I suffered acute distress for a time from a similar doubt whether all recognized distinctions between good and bad might not be unfounded and subjective prejudices. When I went up to the University of Oxford in 1887 I had already some acquaintance with the philosophy of Berkeley, was fascinated by what I had read of Plato (especially the *Phaedo*), and curious about Kant, of whom I had learned something vaguely in my schooldays from sundry essays of De Quincey. Like most thoughtful lads of my time I had been distressed by what I had learned of the conflict between the theology I had been taught and the supposed results of evolutionary science and Biblical criticism. What I looked for in philosophy was some sane defence of convictions which I felt were essential for the conduct of life against what seemed to be the disintegrating influences of scholarship and biological science.

When I began to read philosophy seriously in 1889, the influence of T. H. Green's work was still predominant in Oxford. My attention was directed by my tutors primarily to Green and Bradley and to Kant as interpreted by Green and Caird; on my own account I also made further study of Plato and Aristotle and, to a lesser degree, of Kant and, as best I could, of Hegel. For the time I was carried off my feet by Bradley (particularly by the *Ethical Studies*), though I found an insoluble puzzle from the first in what seemed to be T. H. Green's conception of a world composed of relations between terms of which we could say nothing, except that they were the terms of the relation. On the whole, however, I seemed to have found what I was in search of, a view of things which would protect the realities of religion and ethics against all danger from 'naturalistic' attacks. I was then not alive to what I now think the great danger of the whole Hegelian way of regarding things, that it dissevers the 'eternal verities' from all contact with historical 'actuality'. Metaphysics seemed, for the time, to absorb all interest in the given and historical. When I became a Fellow of Merton in 1891 I had the opportunity for a few years of steady and uninterrupted study, chiefly given to the attempt to understand Hegel and Aristotle as well as my old 'master' Plato. Above all I had the advantage of daily intercourse with Bradley, whose influence, exercised in many ways, must count for the most potent to which my own thinking has been subjected and the most beneficial. Among the many debts I owe to Bradley, not the least were the recommendation he early gave me to study Herbart as a wholesome corrective of undue absorption in Hegelian ways of thinking, and his repeated exhortations to take empirical psychology in earnest. Those studies in the end led to a natural reaction against what now seemed to me the unhistorical character of the philosophy on which I had been feeding myself. The reaction towards the empirical and given continued, along with a new interest in the principles of physical science, provoked by the writings of E. Mach and others, during the years in which I was associated at Manchester with Professor Alexander (1896-1903), a period also fruitful for me in leading to a serious study of the great seventeenth-century thinkers, Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz. The 'pan-mathematism' of Leibniz, like that of Plato, fascinated me deeply; even now that I am convinced that pan-mathematism, like absolute Idealism, is incompatible with a full sense of the 'historical', I am keenly conscious of the attraction and cannot avoid thinking it the right and proper goal of the sciences of physical nature. I suppose that at this time of my life I was not far from developing into a kind of 'Positivist', though it was at the end of the years to which I have referred that I came for the first time strongly under the influence of the work of Professor James Ward, to whom I owe a great debt of thankfulness for teaching me to appreciate more fully the meaning of 'history', and from whom, in particular, I learned the impossibility of eliminating contingency from

Nature. By the end of these seven years I began to discover that a change was coming over my way of looking at things. I read Plato again, in the light of Leibniz, and found the tendency to empiricism and positivism passing away without any loss of the interest I had acquired in the empirical and the ideas and methods of the sciences.

For some years, while I was at McGill University, Montreal (1903–1908), this process was gradually working itself out. I think I may date almost from my return to Great Britain in 1908 my arrival at certain convictions which had slowly been shaping themselves and which still remain with me very definitely. One is the conviction that the business of metaphysical philosophy is, in a way, a modest one. It has to be content to recognize that in the sciences, in history, in morality and religion it is dealing with a reality which is in the end simply 'given' and not to be explained away. Its concern is with the various intellectual interpretations of the 'given', and its supreme task is not, as I once used to suppose, the 'unification of the sciences', but the necessarily imperfect and tentative reconciliation of the exigences of scientific thinking with the imperative moral and religious demands of life. It has not to invent an improved substitute for historically real religion and morality, but to fathom as much as it can of their significance. There is no special infallibility about metaphysics and its methods are necessarily 'dialectical' in the Aristotelian sense. It seems to follow that there can be no final 'metaphysics', and that the temptation of all others which a student of the subject should avoid as he grows older is the temptation to have a 'system' which leaves no unexplained mystery at the root of things. And it becomes a question whether, after all, the main service of metaphysical study to the mind is not to 'liberate it from prejudices' and thus to prepare it to receive illumination from sources outside metaphysics. Whether this mental attitude is the right one or not, I only mention as influential in leading me to adopt it, besides the Neo-Platonists and the great medieval philosophers to whom I have been led so late by study of the Neo-Platonists, in particular the writings of Baron F. von Hügel. I should be ungrateful to the memory of a profound thinker if I did not add that the influence of Reid's writings has come late into my life, but is not the less felt for that. And I am glad to record the benefit which, like others who have been in touch with him, I owe, in more ways than I can enumerate, to stimulation received from contact with the unwearied thought of Professor Alexander. I would also specially acknowledge my indebtedness to the work of Bernardino Varisco. But indeed I hope I may (with all becoming modesty) copy one utterance of Leibniz. There is perhaps none of my associates and contemporaries from whom I have not learned much, and often most from those whose conclusions I am least able to accept.

The extent and the variety of Taylor's writings are so great that it would be unsuitable, even if the task were within my

power, to attempt any assessment of them all. I must content myself with giving an account and an estimate of some of the most significant of his writings. The earliest (so far as I can discover) and also the latest of his writings were concerned with Spinoza, and to Spinoza he also turned in two articles published in 1937. But his first considerable published work was devoted to what became one of the two prevailing interests of Taylor's life (the other being the philosophy of the Christian religion). This work was the series of essays on Plato's *Parmenides*, published when he was 26. He returned to this topic many years later in an article on Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, and in his great book, *Plato, the Man and his Work*; and later still he published a fine translation of this, one of the most difficult of all Plato's works. His opinion on the intention of this puzzling dialogue did not remain always the same. To take, for instance, the second part of the dialogue—the 'hypotheses'—in the early articles he adopted what Mr. Hardie (in *A Study in Plato*) has called the idealist view, that the first hypothesis is 'the refutation of an abstract and merely eristic view of "The One"'. In *Plato, the Man and his Work*, under the influence of Burnet, he adopted the eristic view, that the hypotheses are merely logical exercises aimed at showing how with the aid of fallacies of which the Eleatics were themselves guilty the Eleatic (i.e. the absolutely monistic) hypothesis can be refuted. It cannot be said that the riddle of the *Parmenides* has yet been solved, but it may be suggested that the hypothetical arguments are carried through not from the desire to commend any one metaphysical view, but simply as affording useful training (*γυμνασία*; *Parm.* 135 d 7, cf. c 5, d 4, 136 a 2) to any aspirant to philosophy.

Taylor's first book was *The Problem of Conduct*, published in 1901, a long book which was in substance identical with the essay 'On the reciprocal relations between Ethics and Metaphysics' which had won the Green Prize at Oxford in 1899. In the preface he claims little originality for his views, and says that he owes almost everything that is of value in the book to Bradley's *Ethical Studies* and *Appearance and Reality*. The influence of Bradley is indeed manifest throughout, but the book displays the wide knowledge and the vigour and ingenuity in presentation which were to characterize everything that Taylor wrote. What emerges most clearly from his discussion is that he wishes to dissociate ethics from metaphysics understood as the generalized study of the nature of all that is (to use Aristotle's phrase) or of all experience (to which, following Bradley, Taylor reduces

all that is), and to make it rest on a study of the moral consciousness in particular. In this reaction from Green's metaphysical ethics Taylor's book, while it does not seem to have influenced later ethical thinking very deeply, is prophetic of the trend which, in this country at least, ethics has followed in the last forty years. In one respect, too, it is prophetic of much of Taylor's later work—in his absorption, towards the end of the book, in the problem of the relation between ethics and religion—though his conception of religion as simply a complete devotion to any object, good or bad ('There may be also . . . a peace of the devil which passeth all understanding') is very different from that which he later reached.

Taylor's first book was a controversial one. His second, *Elements of Metaphysics* (1903) is rather a manual or text-book. Like *The Problem of Conduct*, it is Bradleian in its general outlook, but it shows also the influence of other writers of that date, notably Avenarius, Royce, and Ward. For several years, indeed, it was the most useful handbook that a teacher of philosophy could put into the hands of pupils as an up-to-date account of the state of philosophical thought, and many teachers must have blessed Taylor for that. (I say 'philosophical' rather than 'metaphysical', because much of the book is occupied with topics that are not usually classed as metaphysical—cosmology and 'rational psychology'.) The doctrine of degrees of reality, the relation of the Absolute to its particular manifestations, the nature of causation, the relation of soul to body, the nature of infinity—these are some of the leading topics which are discussed at length in these pages. The scope of the book, dealing as it does with almost all the main questions of philosophy, may perhaps be deemed too ambitious, and the solution of problems is sometimes too facile; but to have treated them at all in a manner so ingenious and interesting was a very remarkable performance.

Between *Elements of Metaphysics* and *The Faith of a Moralist* (1930) Taylor wrote no major book on any subject other than Plato, though he threw off many articles and minor books with the ease and versatility which always characterized him. It was in the book called simply *Plato* (1908) that he first essayed a comprehensive survey of Plato's philosophy, and an admirable survey it is, from the point of view which then characterized all Platonic scholars. But in the same year he came from Montreal to St. Andrews, and renewed the friendship with John Burnet which they had already enjoyed as fellow-Merton-

ians; and his views on Plato underwent a radical change. Burnet seems to have been the moving spirit. The two books in which the new gospel was first preached—Burnet's edition of the *Phaedo* and Taylor's *Varia Socratica*—appeared in the same year, 1911. But in his memoir of Burnet, Taylor treats the new interpretation of the dialogues as Burnet's discovery, and there is no doubt that he is right in this. His own part was to apply the new view to dialogues on which Burnet had not touched and to support it by arguments that Burnet had not thought of. The one department of Plato's thought in which Burnet was not at home and Taylor was very much so was the theory of Idea-Numbers which in Plato's maturity and age followed upon his theory of Ideas; this subject is treated of with great care and insight in Taylor's article on 'Forms and Numbers' (1926).

The new view was the view that not only in the early 'Socratic' dialogues but in all the dialogues Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates only views which the historic Socrates actually held. It is not clear that Burnet ever went so far as this, but Taylor did, and capped it by holding in his edition of the *Timaeus* that similarly Plato puts into Timaeus' mouth only views which Timaeus held or at least could have held.

This interpretation runs contrary to the indications given by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere, e.g. to his remark that what we can attribute to Socrates is 'inductive arguments and general definition', which implies that what we know as the Theory of Ideas was Plato's metaphysical superstructure on Socrates' logical foundation. In some of his writing on the subject Taylor treated Aristotle's evidence rather cavalierly. For this, however, he makes partial amends in his little book on Aristotle and in his articles on 'Forms' and 'Numbers'; for, though a partisan, he was essentially fair-minded.

Taylor states the new view in the preface to *Varia Socratica*, in the following words:

It is that the portrait drawn in the Platonic dialogues of the personal and philosophical individuality of Socrates is in all its main points strictly historical, and capable of being shown to be so. In other words, the demonstrably Orphic and Pythagorean peculiarities of Plato's hero, his conception of φιλοσοφία as an ascetic discipline in the proper meaning of the word, leading through sainthood to the attainment of everlasting life, the stress laid on the μυστήματα as a vehicle of spiritual purification, and the doctrine of the eternal things, the ἀσώματα καὶ νοητὰ εἶδη, as the true objects of knowledge, are no inventions of the

idealising imagination of Plato, but belong in very truth, as their common faith, to the Pythagorean or semi-Pythagorean group whose central figure twice over receives something like formal canonisation from the head of the Academy.

Our chief original authorities for the life and personality of Socrates are Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, and it is a task of the greatest delicacy to frame a picture of Socrates which reconciles, so far as they can be reconciled, the testimony of these writers. My own impression is that much of what Taylor claims in the sentences quoted above is true, but that the degree of Socrates' connexion with a semi-Orphic, semi-Pythagorean group is overstated, and that the final claim, that the actual theory of ideas was the work of Socrates and not of Plato, is irreconcilable with Aristotle's plain statements; and further, that Aristotle, who was a member, and for many years a leading member, of the Platonic school, during Plato's lifetime, cannot have failed to know Plato's own mind on the subject. On the whole, scholars have not accepted this final claim of Taylor's; but they owe a great debt to him for having opened up the question and driven them to re-read their Plato. And even if this final claim does not hold good, the rest of Taylor's statement probably presents a picture of Socrates much truer than the jejune one which Xenophon presents and many scholars had accepted. The centre of interest in *Varia Socratica* is not Plato, but Socrates, and perhaps the most interesting chapter is that on the φροντιστήριον, in which he tries, with (as I believe) much success, to recover the truth that lies behind the caricature in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. The most solid contribution to learning which the book contains is the exhaustive study of the earlier history of the words εἶδος and ἰδέα, with special reference to the Hippocratic writings.

The theme with which *Varia Socratica* closes, that of the linkage between the Socratic-Platonic philosophy and Christian theology, was admirably treated by Taylor in *Platonism and its Influence* (1925). No one else could have written so excellent an introduction to the later history of Platonism. In successive chapters he treats of the Platonic Tradition, the Principles of Science, the Rule of Life, and Plato the Theologian, and shows how time after time philosophy and theology have had new life breathed into them by the revival of some element of Platonism; the influence of Platonism on pure letters—a subject which Taylor (whom Alexander described as the best-read man in these islands) could have dealt with admirably, is omitted

for reasons of space. Taylor's own view of the relation of Plato to Socrates is not obtruded, and indeed much is treated as Platonism which on that view is more properly Socratism. But it is, at any rate, what the world has agreed to call Platonism, and what has reached the world only through Plato's golden pages. The only real blemish on the book is a tendency to treat the teaching of Aristotle as a watered down or vulgarized Platonism; a truer view would, in my opinion, recognize the transcendent merit and the great originality of both thinkers.

Other contributions of Taylor's at this period to the study of Platonism are the articles on the Analysis of 'Επιστήμη in the Seventh Epistle (1914) and on the Philosophy of Proclus (1918). There were also two other writings of Taylor's at this period which illustrate well the variety of his knowledge. One was his lecture on Plato's Biography of Socrates (1918), a veritable *tour de force* of learning and ingenuity in which the characters of the dialogues, the degrees of their connexion with Socrates, and their genealogical and social relations with each other, are depicted with all the skill that Trollope shows in dealing with the characters of his novels. The other was his article on 'Forms and Numbers' (1926), in which he brought his knowledge of modern mathematical logic to the elucidation of the perplexing problem of Plato's transformation of the Theory of Ideas into a Theory of Numbers.

I come now to what is the most important, though not the most exciting, of Taylor's writings on Plato—*Plato, the Man and his Work* (1926). It has two features for which every student must be unfeignedly thankful to Taylor. One is his careful study of the date of writing of the several dialogues. In this he makes full and careful use of all the data—the stylistic data which have proved the most convincing of all, the allusions to historical events, the allusions in one dialogue to another; and with one great exception Taylor's conclusions are likely to be generally accepted. The exception is the large gap which he supposes, on rather insufficient grounds, to exist between the date of the *Republic*, which he places about 387 and assigns to the Socratic group of dialogues, and the *Theaetetus*, which he places about 368 and considers to be the first dialogue in which Plato begins to write as an original philosopher and not a biographer. This is not the place for argument against this view; it is perhaps enough to suggest that there are strong reasons that can be brought against it. The other welcome line of discussion, which Taylor has followed more thoroughly,

I think, than any other Platonic scholar, is the discussion of the dramatic date of each dialogue, accompanied with a summary of what is known or may fairly be conjectured about the *dramatis personae*. To this discussion of the date of writing and the dramatic date, Taylor adds a careful summary of the main contents of each dialogue. These summaries are of the greatest service to any one who desires guidance through any particular dialogue; but one may express the wish that, with such excellent data as we have for the relative dates of writing of the dialogues—more cogent data than any we have for the dating of most of Aristotle's works, for instance—Taylor did not devote some additional chapters to tracing the gradual development of the theory of Ideas from dialogue to dialogue. Such chapters would have made a great book into a still greater.

There remains one more major contribution of Taylor's to Platonic scholarship—his *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (1928). It would be difficult to overpraise the thoroughness, the learning, and the ingenuity displayed in this work. No difficulty in this very difficult dialogue is overlooked, and on many of the problems Taylor has said the last word. Yet the main thesis of the book has not been very well received. It is, that the *Timaeus* is not Plato's expression of his own views on cosmology, but a reconstruction of views current in the Pythagorean school in the fifth century, at least sixty years before the time of writing of the dialogue. This is, of course, in keeping with Taylor's thesis that Plato's object in most of his dialogues was to expound not his own views but those of Socrates. But the theory is much less probable when *Timaeus* takes the place of Socrates. Plato might have thought it worth his while to devote dialogue after dialogue to expounding the views of his own revered master; but it is difficult to see any reason that could have induced him to spend so much effort in stating the views of a Pythagorean who lived many years before his own time. It puts some strain on our belief to suppose that Plato was content, till his sixtieth year or thereabouts, to be the biographer and expositor of Socrates and not exercise in writing his own transcendent gifts as an original thinker; but his reverence for Socrates might be thought to make that possible. There is no similar reason to explain why he should have thought it worth his while to spend such effort in an imaginative reconstruction of Pythagorean views which had been left far behind by the science of his own time. To this consideration we must add the fact that the later Greek writers, from Aristotle onwards, treat

the views expressed in the *Timaeus* as the views of none other than Plato himself.

The tale of Taylor's contributions to Platonic study is completed by his translations of the *Timaeus* and *Critias* (1929), of the *Laws* (1934), and of the *Parmenides* (1934). In particular, the translation of the *Laws*, prefaced as it is by a long introduction, is valuable because of the small amount of attention which this book has received from most Platonic scholars.

A glance at the bibliography which follows this memoir will show the variety of topics on which Taylor wrote, always interestingly and always with the whole history of European philosophy as a background to the particular subject he happens to be writing about. I have not included his reviews in the bibliography; but many readers of *Mind* and of the *Classical Review* must have shared my admiration of him as a reviewer. I have, over and over again, turned to his reviews first among all the contents of the numbers in which they appeared, and rarely have I been disappointed.

Little space remains for dealing with the series of writings on the philosophy of religion which, apart from his work on Plato, formed Taylor's most massive contribution to philosophical thought. He was brought up in a devout Wesleyan Methodist family. His deep interest in religion was already apparent in *The Problem of Conduct*. To quote words used elsewhere¹ by Professor Webb:

Taylor would probably at the time have maintained that there was no inconsistency, as regards the root of the matter, between Christian piety and a metaphysical theory which, like Bradley's, could allow that 'there is nothing more real than what comes in religion', however it might subject to damaging criticism some of the symbolic language in which that piety was wont to express itself. So, when, after moving away from Bradley's philosophy of religion to one more consonant with historical Christianity, he subsequently exchanged his original ecclesiastical allegiance for another, and became a devout and loyal member of the Scottish Episcopal Church, he was not conscious of having departed, as regards fundamentals, from the religion in which he had been brought up by Methodists who (one gathered) had preserved with perhaps less change than others the traditions of the Anglicanism which had been Wesley's own. The movement of his thought to which I have referred was one away from what may be called the 'immanentism' of the idealistic mode of thinking common, among many differences, to the philosophers whose teaching was most influen-

¹ In the *Guardian*, 16 Nov. 1945.

tial in the Oxford of the eighties and nineties of the last century to the conviction which eventually took shape in the reconstructed 'cosmological argument' so clearly and impressively stated in the 'Vindication of Religion', contributed in 1926 to *Essays Catholic and Critical*. This argument turns upon the point that 'nature', as conceived by the man of science, can only be understood by the philosopher as dependent upon a Being which transcends it, and to which the 'personality' requisite in an object of religious worship can be ascribed with less difficulty than to the God of Green's philosophy (whatever may have been Green's personal faith), to the Absolute of Bosanquet's, or even to the God who in Bradley's is the correlative of the religious experience of man but of whom, since he is to be distinguished from 'the Absolute', ultimate reality cannot be predicated.

The two thinkers to whom Taylor owed most in his theological thinking were St. Thomas Aquinas, on whose importance as a philosopher he delivered in 1924 a lecture that is reprinted in *Philosophical Studies*, and Immanuel Kant. To the former he owed the cosmological argument which he restated, with alterations of his own, in 'The Vindication of Religion'. To the latter he owed his sense of the fundamental importance of the Categorical Imperative, and the argument for theism which, again with differences, was restated in *The Faith of a Moralists* (1930), and occupies great part of the first of its two volumes. The strength of his argument will be very differently estimated by those who start with a disposition to agree and by those who start with a disposition to disagree. This at least may be said, that the argument for theism has rarely been stated more persuasively, or with a wider range of philosophical and theological learning.

The second volume is occupied in the main with a discussion of the historical element in religion, and particularly in the Christian religion, which as he points out is more closely bound up than any other of the great religions with a belief in the occurrence of certain historical events. In particular, reference may be made to his contention that a belief in the occurrence of special revelation and of miracles is at least consonant with, if not demanded by, theistic belief. But it is impossible in a brief memoir to attempt any detailed account of the wide range of subjects that is dealt with in a book which has been hailed as one of the most interesting and suggestive of all recent contributions to Christian apologetics.

Taylor's last considerable contribution to the philosophy of religion is the little book *Does God Exist?* (1945), which consists

in the main of a restatement of the argument for the existence of design in the world which is not the design of any finite being and must therefore be the design of an infinite being. The argument is an old one, but it is stated by Taylor with his accustomed originality.

This memoir may fittingly be concluded by quoting two passages which indicate as well, perhaps, as any from his works his general outlook and the close connexion which existed in his mind between the two main objects of his interest—the Platonic philosophy and the theology of Christianity. In the epilogue to *Varia Socratica* he wrote as follows:

Our task, be our success in it what it may, is to restore Socrates to his rightful place as the first thoroughly intelligible figure in the great line of succession by which Greek Philosophy is indissolubly linked with Christianity on the one side and modern science on the other. It must be honestly said that even the fullest execution of such a plan only rolls the darkness a little farther back. Here, as in all our researches, *omnia abeunt in mysterium*. Behind Socrates, if the main ideas of these studies contain substantial truth, we dimly discern the half-obliterated features of Pythagoras of Samos, and behind Pythagoras we can only just descry the mists which enclose whatever may be hidden under the name of Orpheus. And behind Orpheus, for us at least, there is only the impenetrable night. But it is a night in which, as we can hardly fail to recognize, the Church, the University, the organization of science, all have their remote and unknown beginnings. They are all 'houses' of the soul that, by what devious route soever, has come by the faith that she is a pilgrim to a country that does not appear, a creature made to seek not the things which are seen but the things which are eternal. And this is why I have chosen as a second motto for these pages the Scriptural command to lay fast hold on eternal life. Philosophy, as the history of her name shows, began as the quest for the road that leads to the city of God, and she has never numbered many true lovers among those who 'forget the way'. It was precisely because it held out the prospect of the life everlasting to be won by converse with unseen things that Platonism, even apart from its baptism into Christ, had inherent strength to outlast all the other 'philosophies', and to grow up again into a new and profound metaphysic and ethics in the evil times of the third century of our era when the whole system of visible things seemed sinking into the 'gulf of Non-being' before men's eyes. For if the things which are seen are shaken, it is that the things which are not seen may remain. And, if I am not merely mistaken in my main contention, no small part of this inextinguishable vitality which has made the Platonic philosophy, in the favourite image of Plotinus, a spring of the water of life in the deserts of 'becoming', is directly due to the teaching as much as to the life of the thinker whose last

word was the message of immortal hope, καλὸν τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.

This passage is echoed, nineteen years later, by one in *The Faith of a Moralist*:¹

Would successful prosecution of all the varied activities possible to man, simply as one temporal and mutable being among others, suffice to constitute the 'condition' which, in Plato's words, 'will make any man's life happy'? Or have we to confess that, at the heart of all our moral effort, there is always the aspiration towards a good which is strictly speaking 'eternal', outside the temporal order and incommensurable with anything falling within that order? Is the world where we play a part for our three-score years and ten what Wordsworth called it, to Shelley's disgust, 'the home of all of us', where we must 'find our happiness, or not at all', or is it, as others have told us, a far country from which we have to make a tedious pilgrimage to our genuine *patria*?

W. D. Ross

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